Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–908. Argued December 4, 2006—Decided June 28, 2007*
Respondent school districts voluntarily adopted student assignment
plans that rely on race to determine which schools certain children
may attend. The Seattle district, which has never operated legally
segregated schools or been subject to court-ordered desegregation,
classified children as white or nonwhite, and used the racial classifi
cations as a “tiebreaker” to allocate slots in particular high schools.
The Jefferson County, Ky., district was subject to a desegregation de
cree until 2000, when the District Court dissolved the decree after
finding that the district had eliminated the vestiges of prior segrega
tion to the greatest extent practicable. In 2001, the district adopted
its plan classifying students as black or “other” in order to make cer
tain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests.
Petitioners, an organization of Seattle parents (Parents Involved)
and the mother of a Jefferson County student (Joshua), whose chil
dren were or could be assigned under the foregoing plans, filed these
suits contending, inter alia, that allocating children to different pub
lic schools based solely on their race violates the Fourteenth Amend
ment’s equal protection guarantee. In the Seattle case, the District
Court granted the school district summary judgment, finding, inter
alia, that its plan survived strict scrutiny on the federal constitu
tional claim because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In the Jefferson
County case, the District Court found that the school district had as
——————
* Together with No. 05–915, Meredith, Custodial Parent and Next
Friend of McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed et al., on certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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serted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools,
and that its plan was, in all relevant respects, narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded.
No. 05–908, 426 F. 3d 1162; No. 05–915, 416 F. 3d 513, reversed and
remanded.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II, III–A, and III–C, concluding:
1. The Court has jurisdiction in these cases. Seattle argues that
Parents Involved lacks standing because its current members’
claimed injuries are not imminent and are too speculative in that,
even if the district maintains its current plan and reinstitutes the ra
cial tiebreaker, those members will only be affected if their children
seek to enroll in a high school that is oversubscribed and integration
positive. This argument is unavailing; the group’s members have
children in all levels of the district’s schools, and the complaint
sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of members whose
elementary and middle school children may be denied admission to
the high schools of their choice in the future. The fact that those
children may not be denied such admission based on their race be
cause of undersubscription or oversubscription that benefits them
does not eliminate the injury claimed. The group also asserted an in
terest in not being forced to compete in a race-based system that
might prejudice its members’ children, an actionable form of injury
under the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 211. The fact that Seattle has ceased us
ing the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome here is not dispositive,
since the district vigorously defends its program’s constitutionality,
and nowhere suggests that it will not resume using race to assign
students if it prevails. See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envi
ronmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189. Similarly, the
fact that Joshua has been granted a transfer does not eliminate the
Court’s jurisdiction; Jefferson County’s racial guidelines apply at all
grade levels and he may again be subject to race-based assignment in
middle school. Pp. 9–11.
2. The school districts have not carried their heavy burden of show
ing that the interest they seek to achieve justifies the extreme means
they have chosen—discriminating among individual students based
on race by relying upon racial classifications in making school as
signments. Pp. 11–17, 25–28.
(a) Because “racial classifications are simply too pernicious to per
mit any but the most exact connection between justification and clas
sification,” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting), governmental distributions of burdens or benefits based
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on individual racial classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny,
e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505–506. Thus, the school
districts must demonstrate that their use of such classifications is
“narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” government interest.
Adarand, supra, at 227.
Although remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination
is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test, see Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494, that interest is not involved here because
the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to court-
ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jef
ferson County schools were previously subject has been dissolved.
Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U. S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny pur
poses, a government interest in student body diversity “in the context
of higher education” is compelling. That interest was not focused on
race alone but encompassed “all factors that may contribute to stu
dent body diversity,” id., at 337, including, e.g., having “overcome
personal adversity and family hardship,” id., at 338. Quoting Justice
Powell’s articulation of diversity in Regents of the University of Cali
fornia v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 314–315, the Grutter Court noted that
“ ‘it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members
of selected ethnic groups,’ that can justify the use of race,” 539 U. S.,
at 324–325, but “ ‘a far broader array of qualifications and character
istics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element, ’ ” id., at 325. In the present cases, by contrast, race is not
considered as part of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints,” id., at 330; race, for
some students, is determinative standing alone. The districts argue
that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment de
cisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into
play, it is decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with
others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor. See Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 275. Even as to race, the plans here em
ploy only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race exclusively in
white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/“other” terms in Jefferson
County. The Grutter Court expressly limited its holding—defining a
specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context
of higher education—but these limitations were largely disregarded
by the lower courts in extending Grutter to the sort of classifications
at issue here. Pp. 11–17.
(b) Despite the districts’ assertion that they employed individual
racial classifications in a way necessary to achieve their stated ends,
the minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments
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suggests that other means would be effective. Seattle’s racial tie
breaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of stu
dents between schools. Similarly, Jefferson County admits that its
use of racial classifications has had a minimal effect, and claims only
that its guidelines provide a firm definition of the goal of racially in
tegrated schools, thereby providing administrators with authority to
collaborate with principals and staff to maintain schools within the
desired range. Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to
a binary conception of race is an extreme approach in light of this
Court’s precedents and the Nation’s history of using race in public
schools, and requires more than such an amorphous end to justify it.
In Grutter, in contrast, the consideration of race was viewed as indis
pensable in more than tripling minority representation at the law
school there at issue. See 539 U. S., at 320. While the Court does not
suggest that greater use of race would be preferable, the minimal im
pact of the districts’ racial classifications on school enrollment casts
doubt on the necessity of using such classifications. The districts
have also failed to show they considered methods other than explicit
racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Narrow tailoring
requires “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives,” id., at 339, and yet in Seattle several alternative as
signment plans—many of which would not have used express racial
classifications—were rejected with little or no consideration. Jeffer
son County has failed to present any evidence that it considered al
ternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are
achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifica
tions. Pp. 25–28.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE THOMAS, and
JUSTICE ALITO, concluded for additional reasons in Parts III–B and IV
that the plans at issue are unconstitutional under this Court’s prece
dents. Pp. 17–25, 28–41.
1. The Court need not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether ra
cial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores and other
objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits be
cause it is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not nar
rowly tailored to the asserted goal. In design and operation, the
plans are directed only to racial balance, an objective this Court has
repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. They are tied to each district’s
specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of
the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational bene
fits. Whatever those demographics happen to be drives the required
“diversity” number in each district. The districts offer no evidence
that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted
educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demograph
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ics of the respective districts, or rather the districts’ white/nonwhite
or black/“other” balance, since that is the only diversity addressed by
the plans. In Grutter, the number of minority students the school
sought to admit was an undefined “meaningful number” necessary to
achieve a genuinely diverse student body, 539 U. S., at 316, 335–336,
and the Court concluded that the law school did not count back from
its applicant pool to arrive at that number, id., at 335–336. Here, in
contrast, the schools worked backward to achieve a particular type of
racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstra
tion of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits.
This is a fatal flaw under the Court’s existing precedent. See, e.g.,
Freeman, supra, at 494. Accepting racial balancing as a compelling
state interest would justify imposing racial proportionality through
out American society, contrary to the Court’s repeated admonitions
that this is unconstitutional. While the school districts use various
verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek to promote—
racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration—they
offer no definition suggesting that their interest differs from racial
balancing. Pp. 17–25.
2. If the need for the racial classifications embraced by the school
districts is unclear, even on the districts’ own terms, the costs are
undeniable. Government action dividing people by race is inherently
suspect because such classifications promote “notions of racial inferi
ority and lead to a politics of racial hostility,” Croson, supra, at 493,
“reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history,
that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin,” Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 657, and “endorse race-based reasoning and the
conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to
an escalation of racial hostility and conflict,” Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 603 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). When it comes
to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard. In
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, the Court held that seg
regation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities
regardless of whether school facilities and other tangible factors were
equal, because the classification and separation themselves denoted
inferiority. Id., at 493–494. It was not the inequality of the facilities
but the fact of legally separating children based on race on which the
Court relied to find a constitutional violation in that case. Id., at 494.
The districts here invoke the ultimate goal of those who filed Brown
and subsequent cases to support their argument, but the argument of
the plaintiff in Brown was that the Equal Protection Clause “pre
vents states from according differential treatment to American chil
dren on the basis of their color or race,” and that view prevailed—this
Court ruled in its remedial opinion that Brown required school dis
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tricts “to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis.” Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U. S. 294, 300–301 (emphasis added). Pp. 28–41.
JUSTICE KENNEDY agreed that the Court has jurisdiction to decide
these cases and that respondents’ student assignment plans are not
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling goal of diversity properly
defined, but concluded that some parts of the plurality opinion imply
an unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances
when it may be taken into account. Pp. 1–9.
(a) As part of its burden of proving that racial classifications are
narrowly tailored to further compelling interests, the government
must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual stu
dent’s race are made in a challenged program. The Jefferson County
Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate when it con
cedes it denied Joshua’s requested kindergarten transfer on the basis
of his race under its guidelines, yet also maintains that the guide
lines do not apply to kindergartners. This discrepancy is not some
simple and straightforward error that touches only upon the periph
eries of the district’s use of individual racial classifications. As be
comes clearer when the district’s plan is further considered, Jefferson
County has explained how and when it employs these classifications
only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand
strict scrutiny. In its briefing it fails to make clear—even in the lim
ited respects implicated by Joshua’s initial assignment and transfer
denial—whether in fact it relies on racial classifications in a manner
narrowly tailored to the interest in question, rather than in the far-
reaching, inconsistent, and ad hoc manner that a less forgiving read
ing of the record would suggest. When a court subjects governmental
action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities in favor of the
government. In the Seattle case, the school district has gone further
in describing the methods and criteria used to determine assignment
decisions based on individual racial classifications, but it has never
theless failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of
races, with only a minority of the students classified as “white,” it has
employed the crude racial categories of “white” and “non-white” as
the basis for its assignment decisions. Far from being narrowly tai
lored, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and the district
has provided no convincing explanation for its design. Pp. 2–6.
(b) The plurality opinion is too dismissive of government’s legiti
mate interest in ensuring that all people have equal opportunity re
gardless of their race. In administering public schools, it is permissi
ble to consider the schools’ racial makeup and adopt general policies
to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306. School authori
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ties concerned that their student bodies’ racial compositions interfere
with offering an equal educational opportunity to all are free to de
vise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way
and without treating each student in different fashion based solely on
a systematic, individual typing by race. Such measures may include
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of neighborhood demographics; allocating re
sources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a tar
geted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other sta
tistics by race.
Each respondent has failed to provide the necessary support for the
proposition that there is no other way than individual racial classifi
cations to avoid racial isolation in their school districts. Cf. Rich
mond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 501. In these cases, the fact
that the number of students whose assignment depends on express
racial classifications is small suggests that the schools could have
achieved their stated ends through different means, including the fa
cially race-neutral means set forth above or, if necessary, a more nu
anced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteris
tics that might include race as a component. The latter approach
would be informed by Grutter, though the criteria relevant to student
placement would differ based on the students’ age, the parents’
needs, and the schools’ role. Pp. 6–9.

ROBERTS, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III–A, and III–C, in
which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and an opinion
with respect to Parts III–B and IV, in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and
ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. KENNEDY, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–908 and 05–915
_________________

PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS, PETITIONER
05–908 v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, CUSTODIAL PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF JOSHUA RYAN MCDONALD, PETITIONER
05–915 v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 28, 2007]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS announced the judgment of the
Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II, III–A, and III–C, and an opinion with re
spect to Parts III–B and IV, in which JUSTICES SCALIA,
THOMAS, and ALITO join.
The school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted
student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine
which public schools certain children may attend. The
Seattle school district classifies children as white or non
white; the Jefferson County school district as black or
“other.” In Seattle, this racial classification is used to
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allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools. In Jefferson
County, it is used to make certain elementary school
assignments and to rule on transfer requests. In each
case, the school district relies upon an individual student’s
race in assigning that student to a particular school, so
that the racial balance at the school falls within a prede
termined range based on the racial composition of the
school district as a whole. Parents of students denied
assignment to particular schools under these plans solely
because of their race brought suit, contending that allocat
ing children to different public schools on the basis of race
violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection. The Courts of Appeals below upheld the plans.
We granted certiorari, and now reverse.
I
Both cases present the same underlying legal question—
whether a public school that had not operated legally
segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may
choose to classify students by race and rely upon that
classification in making school assignments. Although we
examine the plans under the same legal framework, the
specifics of the two plans, and the circumstances
surrounding their adoption, are in some respects quite
different.
A
Seattle School District No. 1 operates 10 regular public
high schools. In 1998, it adopted the plan at issue in this
case for assigning students to these schools. App. in No.
05–908, pp. 90a–92a.1 The plan allows incoming ninth
——————
1 The plan was in effect from 1999–2002, for three school years. This

litigation was commenced in July 2000, and the record in the District
Court was closed before assignments for the 2001–2002 school year
were made. See Brief for Respondents in No. 05–908, p. 9, n. 9. We
rely, as did the lower courts, largely on data from the 2000–2001 school
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Opinion of the Court

graders to choose from among any of the district’s high
schools, ranking however many schools they wish in order
of preference.
Some schools are more popular than others. If too many
students list the same school as their first choice, the
district employs a series of “tiebreakers” to determine who
will fill the open slots at the oversubscribed school. The
first tiebreaker selects for admission students who have a
sibling currently enrolled in the chosen school. The next
tiebreaker depends upon the racial composition of the
particular school and the race of the individual student.
In the district’s public schools approximately 41 percent of
enrolled students are white; the remaining 59 percent,
comprising all other racial groups, are classified by Seattle
for assignment purposes as nonwhite. Id., at 38a, 103a.2
If an oversubscribed school is not within 10 percentage
points of the district’s overall white/nonwhite racial bal
ance, it is what the district calls “integration positive,” and
the district employs a tiebreaker that selects for assign
ment students whose race “will serve to bring the school
into balance.” Id., at 38a. See Parents Involved VII, 426
F. 3d 1162, 1169–1170 (CA9 2005) (en banc).3 If it is still
necessary to select students for the school after using the
racial tiebreaker, the next tiebreaker is the geographic
proximity of the school to the student’s residence. App. in
No. 05–908, at 38a.
Seattle has never operated segregated schools—legally
——————
year in evaluating the plan. See 426 F. 3d 1162, 1169–1171 (CA9 2005)
(en banc) (Parents Involved VII).
2 The racial breakdown of this nonwhite group is approximately 23.8

percent Asian-American, 23.1 percent African-American, 10.3 percent
Latino, and 2.8 percent Native-American. See 377 F. 3d 949, 1005–
1006 (CA9 2004) (Parents Involved VI) (Graber, J., dissenting).
3 For the 2001–2002 school year, the deviation permitted from the

desired racial composition was increased from 10 to 15 percent. App. in
No. 05–908, p. 38a. The bulk of the data in the record was collected
using the 10 percent band, see n. 1, supra.
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separate schools for students of different races—nor has it
ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation. It none
theless employs the racial tiebreaker in an attempt to
address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns
on school assignments. Most white students live in the
northern part of Seattle, most students of other racial
backgrounds in the southern part. Parents Involved VII,
supra, at 1166. Four of Seattle’s high schools are located
in the north—Ballard, Nathan Hale, Ingraham, and Roo
sevelt—and five in the south—Rainier Beach, Cleveland,
West Seattle, Chief Sealth, and Franklin. One school—
Garfield—is more or less in the center of Seattle. App. in
No. 05–908, at 38a–39a, 45a.
For the 2000–2001 school year, five of these schools
were oversubscribed—Ballard, Nathan Hale, Roosevelt,
Garfield, and Franklin—so much so that 82 percent of
incoming ninth graders ranked one of these schools as
their first choice. Id., at 38a. Three of the oversubscribed
schools were “integration positive” because the school’s
white enrollment the previous school year was greater
than 51 percent—Ballard, Nathan Hale, and Roosevelt.
Thus, more nonwhite students (107, 27, and 82, respec
tively) who selected one of these three schools as a top
choice received placement at the school than would have
been the case had race not been considered, and proximity
been the next tiebreaker. Id., at 39a–40a. Franklin was
“integration positive” because its nonwhite enrollment the
previous school year was greater than 69 percent; 89 more
white students were assigned to Franklin by operation of
the racial tiebreaker in the 2000–2001 school year than
otherwise would have been. Ibid. Garfield was the only
oversubscribed school whose composition during the 1999–
2000 school year was within the racial guidelines, al
though in previous years Garfield’s enrollment had been
predominantly nonwhite, and the racial tiebreaker had
been used to give preference to white students. Id., at 39a.
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Opinion of the Court

Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools
(Parents Involved) is a nonprofit corporation comprising
the parents of children who have been or may be denied
assignment to their chosen high school in the district
because of their race. The concerns of Parents Involved
are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her
ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High School’s
special Biotechnology Career Academy. Andy suffered
from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia,
but had made good progress with hands-on instruction,
and his mother and middle school teachers thought that
the smaller biotechnology program held the most promise
for his continued success. Andy was accepted into this
selective program but, because of the racial tiebreaker,
was denied assignment to Ballard High School. Id., at
143a–146a, 152a–160a. Parents Involved commenced this
suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that
Seattle’s use of race in assignments violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 and the Washington Civil
Rights Act.6 Id., at 28a–35a.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the
school district, finding that state law did not bar the dis
trict’s use of the racial tiebreaker and that the plan sur
vived strict scrutiny on the federal constitutional claim
because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
——————
4 “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1.
5 “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race . . . be

denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 78 Stat.
252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d.
6 “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential

treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting.” Wash. Rev. Code §49.60.400(1)
(2006).
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Opinion of the Court

government interest. 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (WD
Wash. 2001) (Parents Involved I). The Ninth Circuit
initially reversed based on its interpretation of the Wash
ington Civil Rights Act, 285 F. 3d 1236, 1253 (2002) (Par
ents Involved II), and enjoined the district’s use of the
integration tiebreaker, id., at 1257. Upon realizing that
the litigation would not be resolved in time for assignment
decisions for the 2002–2003 school year, the Ninth Circuit
withdrew its opinion, 294 F. 3d 1084 (2002) (Parents In
volved III), vacated the injunction, and, pursuant to Wash.
Rev. Code §2.60.020 (2006), certified the state-law ques
tion to the Washington Supreme Court, 294 F. 3d 1085,
1087 (2002) (Parents Involved IV).
The Washington Supreme Court determined that the
State Civil Rights Act bars only preferential treatment
programs “where race or gender is used by government to
select a less qualified applicant over a more qualified
applicant,” and not “[p]rograms which are racially neu
tral, such as the [district’s] open choice plan.” Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No.
1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 689–690, 663, 72 P. 3d 151, 166, 153
(2003) (en banc) (Parents Involved V). The state court
returned the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceed
ings. Id., at 690, 72 P. 3d, at 167.
A panel of the Ninth Circuit then again reversed the
District Court, this time ruling on the federal constitu
tional question. Parents Involved VI, 377 F. 3d 949 (2004).
The panel determined that while achieving racial diversity
and avoiding racial isolation are compelling government
interests, id., at 964, Seattle’s use of the racial tiebreaker
was not narrowly tailored to achieve these interests, id., at
980. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, 395
F. 3d 1168 (2005), and overruled the panel decision, af
firming the District Court’s determination that Seattle’s
plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern
ment interest, Parents Involved VII, 426 F. 3d, at 1192–
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Opinion of the Court

1193. We granted certiorari. 547 U. S. __ (2006).
B
Jefferson County Public Schools operates the public
school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky. In
1973 a federal court found that Jefferson County had
maintained a segregated school system, Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F. 2d
925, 932 (CA6), vacated and remanded, 418 U. S. 918,
reinstated with modifications, 510 F. 2d 1358, 1359 (CA6
1974), and in 1975 the District Court entered a desegrega
tion decree. See Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 72
F. Supp. 2d 753, 762–764 (WD Ky. 1999). Jefferson
County operated under this decree until 2000, when the
District Court dissolved the decree after finding that the
district had achieved unitary status by eliminating “[t]o
the greatest extent practicable” the vestiges of its prior
policy of segregation. Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of
Ed., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (2000). See Board of Ed. of
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U. S. 237,
249–250 (1991); Green v. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391
U. S. 430, 435–436 (1968).
In 2001, after the decree had been dissolved, Jefferson
County adopted the voluntary student assignment plan at
issue in this case. App. in No. 05–915, p. 77. Approxi
mately 34 percent of the district’s 97,000 students are
black; most of the remaining 66 percent are white.
McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 330 F. Supp.
2d 834, 839–840, and n. 6 (WD Ky. 2004) (McFarland I).
The plan requires all nonmagnet schools to maintain a
minimum black enrollment of 15 percent, and a maximum
black enrollment of 50 percent. App. in No. 05–915, at 81;
McFarland I, supra, at 842.
At the elementary school level, based on his or her
address, each student is designated a “resides” school to
which students within a specific geographic area are
8 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Opinion of the Court

assigned; elementary resides schools are “grouped into
clusters in order to facilitate integration.” App. in No. 05–
915, at 82. The district assigns students to nonmagnet
schools in one of two ways: Parents of kindergartners,
first-graders, and students new to the district may submit
an application indicating a first and second choice among
the schools within their cluster; students who do not sub
mit such an application are assigned within the cluster by
the district. “Decisions to assign students to schools
within each cluster are based on available space within
the schools and the racial guidelines in the District’s
current student assignment plan.” Id., at 38. If a school
has reached the “extremes of the racial guidelines,” a
student whose race would contribute to the school’s racial
imbalance will not be assigned there. Id., at 38–39, 82.
After assignment, students at all grade levels are permit
ted to apply to transfer between nonmagnet schools in the
district. Transfers may be requested for any number of
reasons, and may be denied because of lack of available
space or on the basis of the racial guidelines. Id., at 43.7
When petitioner Crystal Meredith moved into the school
district in August 2002, she sought to enroll her son,
Joshua McDonald, in kindergarten for the 2002–2003
school year. His resides school was only a mile from his
new home, but it had no available space—assignments
had been made in May, and the class was full. Jefferson
County assigned Joshua to another elementary school in
his cluster, Young Elementary. This school was 10 miles
from home, and Meredith sought to transfer Joshua to a
school in a different cluster, Bloom Elementary, which—
——————
7 Middle and high school students are designated a single resides

school and assigned to that school unless it is at the extremes of the
racial guidelines. Students may also apply to a magnet school or
program, or, at the high school level, take advantage of an open enroll
ment plan that allows ninth-grade students to apply for admission to
any nonmagnet high school. App. in No. 05–915, pp. 39–41, 82–83.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

like his resides school—was only a mile from home. See
Tr. in McFarland I, pp. 1–49 through 1–54 (Dec. 8, 2003).
Space was available at Bloom, and intercluster transfers
are allowed, but Joshua’s transfer was nonetheless denied
because, in the words of Jefferson County, “[t]he transfer
would have an adverse effect on desegregation compli
ance” of Young. App. in No. 05–915, at 97.8
Meredith brought suit in the Western District of Ken
tucky, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court found
that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling interest
in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the as
signment plan was (in all relevant respects) narrowly
tailored to serve that compelling interest. McFarland I,
supra, at 837.9 The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam
opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court,
concluding that a written opinion “would serve no useful
purpose.” McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 416
F. 3d 513, 514 (2005) (McFarland II). We granted certio
rari. 547 U. S. __ (2006).
II
As a threshold matter, we must assure ourselves of our
jurisdiction. Seattle argues that Parents Involved lacks
standing because none of its current members can claim
an imminent injury. Even if the district maintains the
——————
8 It is not clear why the racial guidelines were even applied to
Joshua’s transfer application—the guidelines supposedly do not apply
at the kindergarten level. Id., at 43. Neither party disputes, however,
that Joshua’s transfer application was denied under the racial guide
lines, and Meredith’s objection is not that the guidelines were misap
plied but rather that race was used at all.
9 Meredith joined a pending lawsuit filed by several other plaintiffs.

See id., at 7–11. The other plaintiffs all challenged assignments to
certain specialized schools, and the District Court found these assign
ments, which are no longer at issue in this case, unconstitutional.
McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837, 864 (WD Ky. 2004).
10 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Opinion of the Court

current plan and reinstitutes the racial tiebreaker, Seattle
argues, Parents Involved members will only be affected if
their children seek to enroll in a Seattle public high school
and choose an oversubscribed school that is integration
positive—too speculative a harm to maintain standing.
Brief for Respondents in No. 05–908, pp. 16–17.
This argument is unavailing. The group’s members
have children in the district’s elementary, middle, and
high schools, App. in No. 05–908, at 299a–301a; Affidavit
of Kathleen Brose Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 32.3
(Lodging of Petitioner Parents Involved), and the com
plaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of
Parents Involved members whose elementary and middle
school children may be “denied admission to the high
schools of their choice when they apply for those schools in
the future,” App. in No. 05–908, at 30a. The fact that it is
possible that children of group members will not be denied
admission to a school based on their race—because they
choose an undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed
school in which their race is an advantage—does not
eliminate the injury claimed. Moreover, Parents Involved
also asserted an interest in not being “forced to compete
for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race
as a deciding factor in many of its admissions decisions.”
Ibid. As we have held, one form of injury under the Equal
Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-
based system that may prejudice the plaintiff, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 211 (1995);
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of
America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993), an
injury that the members of Parents Involved can validly
claim on behalf of their children.
In challenging standing, Seattle also notes that it has
ceased using the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome of
this litigation. Brief for Respondents in No. 05–908,
at 16–17. But the district vigorously defends the constitu
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

Opinion of the Court

tionality of its race-based program, and nowhere suggests
that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will not
resume using race to assign students. Voluntary cessation
does not moot a case or controversy unless “subsequent
events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrong
ful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,”
Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393
U. S. 199, 203 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
a heavy burden that Seattle has clearly not met.
Jefferson County does not challenge our jurisdiction, Tr.
of Oral Arg. in No. 05–915, p. 48, but we are nonetheless
obliged to ensure that it exists, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). Although apparently Joshua
has now been granted a transfer to Bloom, the school to
which transfer was denied under the racial guidelines, Tr.
of Oral Arg. in No. 05–915, at 45, the racial guidelines
apply at all grade levels. Upon Joshua’s enrollment in
middle school, he may again be subject to assignment
based on his race. In addition, Meredith sought damages
in her complaint, which is sufficient to preserve our ability
to consider the question. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S.
95, 109 (1983).
III

A

It is well established that when the government distrib
utes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scru
tiny. Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505–506
(2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003);
Adarand, supra, at 224. As the Court recently reaffirmed,
“ ‘racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit
any but the most exact connection between justification
and classification.’ ” Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 270
12 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of the Court

(2003) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); brackets omitted). In
order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the
school districts must demonstrate that the use of individ
ual racial classifications in the assignment plans here
under review is “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compel
ling” government interest. Adarand, supra, at 227.
Without attempting in these cases to set forth all the
interests a school district might assert, it suffices to note
that our prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classi
fications in the school context, have recognized two inter
ests that qualify as compelling. The first is the compelling
interest of remedying the effects of past intentional dis
crimination. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494
(1992). Yet the Seattle public schools have not shown that
they were ever segregated by law, and were not subject to
court-ordered desegregation decrees. The Jefferson
County public schools were previously segregated by law
and were subject to a desegregation decree entered in
1975. In 2000, the District Court that entered that decree
dissolved it, finding that Jefferson County had “eliminated
the vestiges associated with the former policy of segrega
tion and its pernicious effects,” and thus had achieved
“unitary” status. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d, at 360.
Jefferson County accordingly does not rely upon an inter
est in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimina
tion in defending its present use of race in assigning stu
dents. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 05–915, at 38.
Nor could it. We have emphasized that the harm being
remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm
that is traceable to segregation, and that “the Constitution
is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without
more.” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280, n. 14
(1977). See also Freeman, supra, at 495–496; Dowell, 498
U. S., at 248; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 746
(1974). Once Jefferson County achieved unitary status, it
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

Opinion of the Court

had remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed race-
based assignments. Any continued use of race must be
justified on some other basis.10
The second government interest we have recognized as
compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny is the interest in
diversity in higher education upheld in Grutter, 539 U. S.,
at 328. The specific interest found compelling in Grutter
was student body diversity “in the context of higher educa
tion.” Ibid. The diversity interest was not focused on race
alone but encompassed “all factors that may contribute to
student body diversity.” Id., at 337. We described the
various types of diversity that the law school sought:
“[The law school’s] policy makes clear there are many
possible bases for diversity admissions, and provides
examples of admittees who have lived or traveled
widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have

——————
10 The districts point to dicta in a prior opinion in which the Court

suggested that, while not constitutionally mandated, it would be
constitutionally permissible for a school district to seek racially bal
anced schools as a matter of “educational policy.” See Swann v. Char
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971). The districts also
quote with approval an in-chambers opinion in which then-Justice
Rehnquist made a suggestion to the same effect. See Bustop, Inc. v. Los
Angeles Bd. of Ed., 439 U. S. 1380, 1383 (1978). The citations do not
carry the significance the districts would ascribe to them. Swann,
evaluating a school district engaged in court-ordered desegregation,
had no occasion to consider whether a district’s voluntary adoption of
race-based assignments in the absence of a finding of prior de jure
segregation was constitutionally permissible, an issue that was again
expressly reserved in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U. S. 457, 472, n. 15 (1982). Bustop, addressing in the context of an
emergency injunction application a busing plan imposed by the Supe
rior Court of Los Angeles County, is similarly unavailing. Then-Justice
Rehnquist, in denying emergency relief, stressed that “equitable
consideration[s]” counseled against preliminary relief. 439 U. S., at
1383. The propriety of preliminary relief and resolution of the merits
are of course “significantly different” issues. University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 393 (1981).
14 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Opinion of the Court

overcome personal adversity and family hardship,
have exceptional records of extensive community ser
vice, and have had successful careers in other fields.”
Id., at 338 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Court quoted the articulation of diversity from Justice
Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), noting that “it is not an
interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to
be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the
use of race.” Grutter, supra, at 324–325 (citing and quot
ing Bakke, supra, at 314–315 (opinion of Powell, J.);
brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead,
what was upheld in Grutter was consideration of “a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though impor
tant element.” 539 U. S., at 325 (quoting Bakke, supra,
at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.); internal quotation marks
omitted).
The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the
admissions program at issue there focused on each appli
cant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a
particular racial group. The classification of applicants by
race upheld in Grutter was only as part of a “highly indi
vidualized, holistic review,” 539 U. S., at 337. As the
Court explained, “[t]he importance of this individualized
consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions
program is paramount.” Ibid. The point of the narrow
tailoring analysis in which the Grutter Court engaged was
to ensure that the use of racial classifications was indeed
part of a broader assessment of diversity, and not simply
an effort to achieve racial balance, which the Court ex
plained would be “patently unconstitutional.” Id., at 330.
In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

Opinion of the Court

as part of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints,” ibid.;
race, for some students, is determinative standing alone.
The districts argue that other factors, such as student
preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans,
but under each plan when race comes into play, it is deci
sive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with
others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor.
Like the University of Michigan undergraduate plan
struck down in Gratz, 539 U. S., at 275, the plans here “do
not provide for a meaningful individualized review of
applicants” but instead rely on racial classifications in a
“nonindividualized, mechanical” way. Id., at 276, 280
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
Even when it comes to race, the plans here employ only
a limited notion of diversity, viewing race exclusively in
white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/“other” terms
in Jefferson County.11 But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 610 (1990) (“We are a Nation not of
black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent
communities knitted together with various traditions and
carried forth, above all, by individuals”) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). The Seattle “Board Statement Reaffirming
Diversity Rationale” speaks of the “inherent educational
value” in “[p]roviding students the opportunity to attend
schools with diverse student enrollment,” App. in No. 05–
908, at 128a, 129a. But under the Seattle plan, a school
with 50 percent Asian-American students and 50 percent
white students but no African-American, Native-
American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced,
——————
11 The way Seattle classifies its students bears this out. Upon enroll

ing their child with the district, parents are required to identify their
child as a member of a particular racial group. If a parent identifies
more than one race on the form, “[t]he application will not be accepted
and, if necessary, the enrollment service person taking the application
will indicate one box.” App. in No. 05–908, at 303a.
16 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of the Court

while a school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent
African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent
white students would not. It is hard to understand how a
plan that could allow these results can be viewed as being
concerned with achieving enrollment that is “ ‘broadly
diverse,’ ” Grutter, supra, at 329.
Prior to Grutter, the courts of appeals rejected as uncon
stitutional attempts to implement race-based assignment
plans—such as the plans at issue here—in primary and
secondary schools. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery Cty.
Public Schools, 197 F. 3d 123, 133 (CA4 1999); Tuttle v.
Arlington Cty. School Bd., 195 F. 3d 698, 701 (CA4 1999);
Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d 790, 809 (CA1 1998). See
also Ho v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 147 F. 3d
854, 865 (CA9 1998). After Grutter, however, the two
Courts of Appeals in these cases, and one other, found that
race-based assignments were permissible at the elemen
tary and secondary level, largely in reliance on that case.
See Parents Involved VII, 426 F. 3d, at 1166; McFarland
II, 416 F. 3d, at 514; Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418
F. 3d 1, 13 (CA1 2005).
In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter, though,
this Court relied upon considerations unique to institu
tions of higher education, noting that in light of “the ex
pansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with
the university environment, universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition.” 539 U. S., at 329.
See also Bakke, supra, at 312, 313 (opinion of Powell, J.).
The Court explained that “[c]ontext matters” in applying
strict scrutiny, and repeatedly noted that it was address
ing the use of race “in the context of higher education.”
Grutter, supra, at 327, 328, 334. The Court in Grutter
expressly articulated key limitations on its holding—
defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting
the unique context of higher education—but these limita
tions were largely disregarded by the lower courts in
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.
Opinion R the Court

extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in
elementary and secondary schools. The present cases are
not governed by Grutter.
B
Perhaps recognizing that reliance on Grutter cannot
sustain their plans, both school districts assert additional
interests, distinct from the interest upheld in Grutter, to
justify their race-based assignments. In briefing and
argument before this Court, Seattle contends that its use
of race helps to reduce racial concentration in schools and
to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns do
not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the
most desirable schools. Brief for Respondents in No. 05–
908, at 19. Jefferson County has articulated a similar
goal, phrasing its interest in terms of educating its stu
dents “in a racially integrated environment.” App. in No.
05–915, at 22.12 Each school district argues that educa
tional and broader socialization benefits flow from a ra
cially diverse learning environment, and each contends
that because the diversity they seek is racial diversity—
not the broader diversity at issue in Grutter—it makes
sense to promote that interest directly by relying on race
alone.
The parties and their amici dispute whether racial
diversity in schools in fact has a marked impact on test
scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangi
ble socialization benefits. The debate is not one we need to
——————
12 Jefferson County also argues that it would be incongruous to hold

that what was constitutionally required of it one day—race-based
assignments pursuant to the desegregation decree—can be constitu
tionally prohibited the next. But what was constitutionally required of
the district prior to 2000 was the elimination of the vestiges of prior
segregation—not racial proportionality in its own right. See Freeman
v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494–496 (1992). Once those vestiges were
eliminated, Jefferson County was on the same footing as any other
school district, and its use of race must be justified on other grounds.
18 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.

Opinion R the Court

resolve, however, because it is clear that the racial classi
fications employed by the districts are not narrowly tai
lored to the goal of achieving the educational and social
benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. In design
and operation, the plans are directed only to racial bal
ance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeat
edly condemned as illegitimate.
The plans are tied to each district’s specific racial demo
graphics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level
of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational
benefits. In Seattle, the district seeks white enrollment of
between 31 and 51 percent (within 10 percent of “the
district white average” of 41 percent), and nonwhite en
rollment of between 49 and 69 percent (within 10 percent
of “the district minority average” of 59 percent). App. in
No. 05–908, at 103a. In Jefferson County, by contrast, the
district seeks black enrollment of no less than 15 or more
than 50 percent, a range designed to be “equally above and
below Black student enrollment systemwide,”
McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 842, based on the objec
tive of achieving at “all schools . . . an African-American
enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide Afri
can-American enrollment” of 34 percent. App. in No. 05–
915, at 81. In Seattle, then, the benefits of racial diversity
require enrollment of at least 31 percent white students;
in Jefferson County, at least 50 percent. There must be at
least 15 percent nonwhite students under Jefferson
County’s plan; in Seattle, more than three times that
figure. This comparison makes clear that the racial demo
graphics in each district—whatever they happen to be—
drive the required “diversity” numbers. The plans here
are not tailored to achieving a degree of diversity neces
sary to realize the asserted educational benefits; instead
the plans are tailored, in the words of Seattle’s Manager of
Enrollment Planning, Technical Support, and Demograph
ics, to “the goal established by the school board of attain
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 19

Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.
Opinion R the Court

ing a level of diversity within the schools that approxi
mates the district’s overall demographics.” App. in No.
05–908, at 42a.
The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial
diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational
benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics
of the respective school districts—or rather the
white/nonwhite or black/“other” balance of the districts,
since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.
Indeed, in its brief Seattle simply assumes that the educa
tional benefits track the racial breakdown of the district.
See Brief for Respondents in No. 05–908, at 36 (“For Seat
tle, ‘racial balance’ is clearly not an end in itself but rather
a measure of the extent to which the educational goals the
plan was designed to foster are likely to be achieved”).
When asked for “a range of percentage that would be
diverse,” however, Seattle’s expert said it was important to
have “sufficient numbers so as to avoid students feeling
any kind of specter of exceptionality.” App. in No. 05–908,
at 276a. The district did not attempt to defend the propo
sition that anything outside its range posed the “specter of
exceptionality.” Nor did it demonstrate in any way how
the educational and social benefits of racial diversity or
avoidance of racial isolation are more likely to be achieved
at a school that is 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian-
American, which would qualify as diverse under Seattle’s
plan, than at a school that is 30 percent Asian-American,
25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20
percent white, which under Seattle’s definition would be
racially concentrated.
Similarly, Jefferson County’s expert referred to the
importance of having “at least 20 percent” minority group
representation for the group “to be visible enough to make
a difference,” and noted that “small isolated minority
groups in a school are not likely to have a strong effect on
the overall school.” App. in No. 05–915, at 159, 147. The
20 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.

Opinion R the Court

Jefferson County plan, however, is based on a goal of
replicating at each school “an African-American enroll
ment equivalent to the average district-wide African-
American enrollment.” Id., at 81. Joshua McDonald’s
requested transfer was denied because his race was listed
as “other” rather than black, and allowing the transfer
would have had an adverse effect on the racial guideline
compliance of Young Elementary, the school he sought to
leave. Id., at 21. At the time, however, Young Elementary
was 46.8 percent black. Id., at 73. The transfer might
have had an adverse effect on the effort to approach dis
trict-wide racial proportionality at Young, but it had noth
ing to do with preventing either the black or “other” group
from becoming “small” or “isolated” at Young.
In fact, in each case the extreme measure of relying on
race in assignments is unnecessary to achieve the stated
goals, even as defined by the districts. For example, at
Franklin High School in Seattle, the racial tiebreaker was
applied because nonwhite enrollment exceeded 69 percent,
and resulted in an incoming ninth-grade class in 2000–
2001 that was 30.3 percent Asian-American, 21.9 percent
African-American, 6.8 percent Latino, 0.5 percent Native-
American, and 40.5 percent Caucasian. Without the racial
tiebreaker, the class would have been 39.6 percent Asian-
American, 30.2 percent African-American, 8.3 percent
Latino, 1.1 percent Native-American, and 20.8 percent
Caucasian. See App. in No. 05–908, at 308a. When the
actual racial breakdown is considered, enrolling students
without regard to their race yields a substantially diverse
student body under any definition of diversity.13
——————
13 Data for the Seattle schools in the several years since this litigation

was commenced further demonstrate the minimal role that the racial
tiebreaker in fact played. At Ballard, in 2005–2006—when no class at
the school was subject to the racial tiebreaker—the student body was
14.2 percent Asian-American, 9 percent African-American, 11.7 percent
Latino, 62.3 percent Caucasian, and 2.8 percent Native-American.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 21

Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.
Opinion R the Court

In Grutter, the number of minority students the school
sought to admit was an undefined “meaningful number”
necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body.
539 U. S., at 316, 335–336. Although the matter was the
subject of disagreement on the Court, see id., at 346–347
(SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.,
at 382–383 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 388–392
(KENNEDY, J., dissenting), the majority concluded that the
law school did not count back from its applicant pool to
arrive at the “meaningful number” it regarded as neces
sary to diversify its student body. Id., at 335–336. Here
the racial balance the districts seek is a defined range set
solely by reference to the demographics of the respective
school districts.
This working backward to achieve a particular type of
racial balance, rather than working forward from some
demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the
purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing
precedent. We have many times over reaffirmed that
“[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.”
——————
Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 05–908, p. 7. In 2000–2001, when the
racial tiebreaker was last used, Ballard’s total enrollment was 17.5
percent Asian-American, 10.8 percent African-American, 10.7 percent
Latino, 56.4 percent Caucasian, and 4.6 percent Native-American.
App. in No. 05–908, at 283a. Franklin in 2005–2006 was 48.9 percent
Asian-American, 33.5 percent African-American, 6.6 percent Latino,
10.2 percent Caucasian, and 0.8 percent Native-American. Reply Brief
for Petitioner in No. 05–908, at 7. With the racial tiebreaker in 2000–
2001, total enrollment was 36.8 percent Asian-American, 32.2 percent
African-American, 5.2 percent Latino, 25.1 percent Caucasian, and 0.7
percent Native-American. App. in No. 05–908, at 284a. Nathan Hale’s
2005–2006 enrollment was 17.3 percent Asian-American, 10.7 percent
African-American, 8 percent Latino, 61.5 percent Caucasian, and 2.5
percent Native-American. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 05–908, at
7. In 2000–2001, with the racial tiebreaker, it was 17.9 percent Asian-
American, 13.3 percent African-American, 7 percent Latino, 58.4
percent Caucasian, and 3.4 percent Native-American. App. in No. 05–
908, at 286a.
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Freeman, 503 U. S., at 494. See also Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989); Bakke, 438 U. S., at
307 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“If petitioner’s purpose is to
assure within its student body some specified percentage
of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic
origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected . . . as
facially invalid”). Grutter itself reiterated that “outright
racial balancing” is “patently unconstitutional.” 539 U. S.,
at 330.
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest
would justify the imposition of racial proportionality
throughout American society, contrary to our repeated
recognition that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s guar
antee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (quot
ing Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 602 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted).14 Allowing
racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would “effec
tively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in Ameri
can life, and that the ‘ultimate goal’ of ‘eliminating en
tirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant
factors as a human being’s race’ will never be achieved.”
Croson, supra, at 495 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 320
(1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), in turn quoting Fullilove,
——————
14 In contrast, Seattle’s website formerly described “emphasizing

individualism as opposed to a more collective ideology” as a form of
“cultural racism,” and currently states that the district has no intention
“to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as [a] . . . colorblind mental
ity.” Harrell, School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked
Controversy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, pp. B1, B5.
Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law”).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 23

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Opinion R the Court

448 U. S., at 547 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); brackets and
citation omitted). An interest “linked to nothing other
than proportional representation of various races . . .
would support indefinite use of racial classifications,
employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture of racial
views and then to ensure that the [program] continues to
reflect that mixture.” Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 614
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
The validity of our concern that racial balancing has “no
logical stopping point,” Croson, supra, at 498 (quoting
Wygant, supra, at 275 (plurality opinion); internal quota
tion marks omitted); see also Grutter, supra, at 343, is
demonstrated here by the degree to which the districts tie
their racial guidelines to their demographics. As the
districts’ demographics shift, so too will their definition of
racial diversity. See App. in No. 05–908, at 103a (describ
ing application of racial tiebreaker based on “current white
percentage” of 41 percent and “current minority percent
age” of 59 percent (emphasis added)).
The Ninth Circuit below stated that it “share[d] in the
hope” expressed in Grutter that in 25 years racial prefer
ences would no longer be necessary to further the interest
identified in that case. Parents Involved VII, 426 F. 3d, at
1192. But in Seattle the plans are defended as necessary
to address the consequences of racially identifiable hous
ing patterns. The sweep of the mandate claimed by the
district is contrary to our rulings that remedying past
societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious
government action. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899,
909–910 (1996) (“[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of
societal discrimination is not a compelling interest”);
Croson, supra, at 498–499; Wygant, 476 U. S., at 276
(plurality opinion) (“Societal discrimination, without more,
is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy”); id., at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (“[A] governmental agency’s
24 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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interest in remedying ‘societal’ discrimination, that is,
discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be
deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional
muster”).
The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is
one of substance, not semantics. Racial balancing is not
transformed from “patently unconstitutional” to a compel
ling state interest simply by relabeling it “racial diversity.”
While the school districts use various verbal formulations
to describe the interest they seek to promote—racial di
versity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration—
they offer no definition of the interest that suggests it
differs from racial balance. See, e.g., App. in No. 05–908,
at 257a (“Q. What’s your understanding of when a school
suffers from racial isolation? A. I don’t have a definition
for that”); id., at 228a–229a (“I don’t think we’ve ever sat
down and said, ‘Define racially concentrated school exactly
on point in quantitative terms.’ I don’t think we’ve ever
had that conversation”); Tr. in McFarland I, at 1–90 (Dec.
8, 2003) (“Q. How does the Jefferson County School Board
define diversity . . . ?” “A. Well, we want to have the
schools that make up the percentage of students of the
population”).
Jefferson County phrases its interest as “racial integra
tion,” but integration certainly does not require the sort of
racial proportionality reflected in its plan. Even in the
context of mandatory desegregation, we have stressed that
racial proportionality is not required, see Milliken, 433
U. S., at 280, n. 14 (“[A desegregation] order contemplat
ing the substantive constitutional right [to a] particular
degree of racial balance or mixing is . . . infirm as a matter
of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971)
(“The constitutional command to desegregate schools does
not mean that every school in every community must
always reflect the racial composition of the school system
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 25

Opinion of the Court

as a whole”), and here Jefferson County has already been
found to have eliminated the vestiges of its prior segre
gated school system.
The en banc Ninth Circuit declared that “when a ra
cially diverse school system is the goal (or racial concen
tration or isolation is the problem), there is no more effec
tive means than a consideration of race to achieve the
solution.” Parents Involved VII, supra, at 1191. For the
foregoing reasons, this conclusory argument cannot sus
tain the plans. However closely related race-based as
signments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself
cannot be the goal, whether labeled “racial diversity” or
anything else. To the extent the objective is sufficient
diversity so that students see fellow students as individu
als rather than solely as members of a racial group, using
means that treat students solely as members of a racial
group is fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.
C
The districts assert, as they must, that the way in which
they have employed individual racial classifications is
necessary to achieve their stated ends. The minimal effect
these classifications have on student assignments, how
ever, suggests that other means would be effective. Seat
tle’s racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a
small number of students between schools. Approximately
307 student assignments were affected by the racial tie
breaker in 2000–2001; the district was able to track the
enrollment status of 293 of these students. App. in No.
05–908, at 162a. Of these, 209 were assigned to a school
that was one of their choices, 87 of whom were assigned to
the same school to which they would have been assigned
without the racial tiebreaker. Eighty-four students were
assigned to schools that they did not list as a choice, but
29 of those students would have been assigned to their
respective school without the racial tiebreaker, and 3 were
26 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of the Court

able to attend one of the oversubscribed schools due to
waitlist and capacity adjustments. Id., at 162a–163a. In
over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial
tiebreaker, then, the use of race in the end made no differ
ence, and the district could identify only 52 students who
were ultimately affected adversely by the racial tiebreaker
in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not
listed as a preference and to which they would not other
wise have been assigned.
As the panel majority in Parents Involved VI concluded:
“[T]he tiebreaker’s annual effect is thus merely to
shuffle a few handfuls of different minority students
between a few schools—about a dozen additional La
tinos into Ballard, a dozen black students into Nathan
Hale, perhaps two dozen Asians into Roosevelt, and so
on. The District has not met its burden of proving
these marginal changes . . . outweigh the cost of sub
jecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment
based solely upon the color of their skin.” 377 F. 3d,
at 984–985 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, Jefferson County’s use of racial classifications
has only a minimal effect on the assignment of students.
Elementary school students are assigned to their first- or
second-choice school 95 percent of the time, and transfers,
which account for roughly 5 percent of assignments, are
only denied 35 percent of the time—and presumably an
even smaller percentage are denied on the basis of the
racial guidelines, given that other factors may lead to a
denial. McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d, at 844–845, nn. 16,
18. Jefferson County estimates that the racial guidelines
account for only 3 percent of assignments. Brief in Oppo
sition in No. 05–915, p. 7, n. 4; Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 05–
915, at 46. As Jefferson County explains, “the racial
guidelines have minimal impact in this process, because
they ‘mostly influence student assignment in subtle and
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 27

Opinion of the Court

indirect ways.’ ” Brief for Respondents in No. 05–915,
pp. 8–9.
While we do not suggest that greater use of race would
be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts’ racial
classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the
necessity of using racial classifications. In Grutter, the
consideration of race was viewed as indispensable in more
than tripling minority representation at the law school—
from 4 to 14.5 percent. See 539 U. S., at 320. Here the
most Jefferson County itself claims is that “because the
guidelines provide a firm definition of the Board’s goal of
racially integrated schools, they ‘provide administrators
with the authority to facilitate, negotiate and collaborate
with principals and staff to maintain schools within the
15–50% range.’ ” Brief in Opposition in No. 05–915, at 7
(quoting McFarland I, supra, at 842). Classifying and
assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception
of race is an extreme approach in light of our precedents
and our Nation’s history of using race in public schools,
and requires more than such an amorphous end to justify
it.
The districts have also failed to show that they consid
ered methods other than explicit racial classifications to
achieve their stated goals. Narrow tailoring requires
“serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives,” Grutter, supra, at 339, and yet in Seattle
several alternative assignment plans—many of which
would not have used express racial classifications—were
rejected with little or no consideration. See, e.g., App. in
No. 05–908, at 224a–225a, 253a–259a, 307a. Jefferson
County has failed to present any evidence that it consid
ered alternatives, even though the district already claims
that its goals are achieved primarily through means other
than the racial classifications. Brief for Respondents in
No. 05–915, at 8–9. Compare Croson, 488 U. S., at 519
(KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg
28 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion R the Court

ment) (racial classifications permitted only “as a last
resort”).
IV
JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent takes a different approach to
these cases, one that fails to ground the result it would
reach in law. Instead, it selectively relies on inapplicable
precedent and even dicta while dismissing contrary hold
ings, alters and misapplies our well-established legal
framework for assessing equal protection challenges to
express racial classifications, and greatly exaggerates the
consequences of today’s decision.
To begin with, JUSTICE BREYER seeks to justify the
plans at issue under our precedents recognizing the com
pelling interest in remedying past intentional discrimina
tion. See post, at 18–24. Not even the school districts go
this far, and for good reason. The distinction between
segregation by state action and racial imbalance caused by
other factors has been central to our jurisprudence in this
area for generations. See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280,
n. 14; Freeman, 503 U. S., at 495–496 (“Where resegrega
tion is a product not of state action but of private choices,
it does not have constitutional implications”). The dissent
elides this distinction between de jure and de facto segre
gation, casually intimates that Seattle’s school attendance
patterns reflect illegal segregation, post, at 5, 18, 23,15 and
——————
15 JUSTICE BREYER makes much of the fact that in 1978 Seattle “set
tled” an NAACP complaint alleging illegal segregation with the federal
Office for Civil Rights (OCR). See post, at 5, 8–9, 18, 23. The memo
randum of agreement between Seattle and OCR, of course, contains no
admission by Seattle that such segregation ever existed or was ongoing
at the time of the agreement, and simply reflects a “desire to avoid the
incovenience [sic] and expense of a formal OCR investigation,” which
OCR was obligated under law to initiate upon the filing of such a
complaint. Memorandum of Agreement between Seattle School District
No. 1 of King County, Washington, and the Office for Civil Rights,
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 2 (June 9,
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 29

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Opinion R the Court

fails to credit the judicial determination—under the most
rigorous standard—that Jefferson County had eliminated
the vestiges of prior segregation. The dissent thus alters
in fundamental ways not only the facts presented here but
the established law.
JUSTICE BREYER’s reliance on McDaniel v. Barresi, 402
U. S. 39 (1971), post, at 23–24, 29–30, highlights how far
removed the discussion in the dissent is from the question
actually presented in these cases. McDaniel concerned a
Georgia school system that had been segregated by law.
There was no doubt that the county had operated a “dual
school system,” McDaniel, supra, at 41, and no one ques
tions that the obligation to disestablish a school system
segregated by law can include race-conscious remedies—
whether or not a court had issued an order to that effect.
See supra, at 12. The present cases are before us, how
ever, because the Seattle school district was never segre
gated by law, and the Jefferson County district has been
found to be unitary, having eliminated the vestiges of its
prior dual status. The justification for race-conscious
remedies in McDaniel is therefore not applicable here.
The dissent’s persistent refusal to accept this distinction—
its insistence on viewing the racial classifications here as
if they were just like the ones in McDaniel, “devised to
overcome a history of segregated public schools,” post, at
47—explains its inability to understand why the remedial
justification for racial classifications cannot decide these
cases.
JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent next relies heavily on dicta
from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402
U. S., at 16—far more heavily than the school districts
themselves. Compare post, at 3, 22–28, with Brief for
Respondents in No. 05–908, at 19–20; Brief for Respon
dents in No. 05–915, at 31. The dissent acknowledges that
——————

1978); see also 45 CFR §80.7(c) (2006).

30 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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the two-sentence discussion in Swann was pure dicta,
post, at 22, but nonetheless asserts that it demonstrates a
“basic principle of constitutional law” that provides “au
thoritative legal guidance.” Post, at 22, 30. Initially, as
the Court explained just last Term, “we are not bound to
follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at
issue was not fully debated.” Central Va. Community
College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 363 (2006). That is particu
larly true given that, when Swann was decided, this Court
had not yet confirmed that strict scrutiny applies to racial
classifications like those before us. See n. 16, infra. There
is nothing “technical” or “theoretical,” post, at 30, about
our approach to such dicta. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264, 399–400 (1821) (Marshall, C. J.) (explaining
why dicta is not binding).
JUSTICE BREYER would not only put such extraordinary
weight on admitted dicta, but relies on the statement for
something it does not remotely say. Swann addresses only
a possible state objective; it says nothing of the permissi
ble means—race conscious or otherwise—that a school
district might employ to achieve that objective. The rea
son for this omission is clear enough, since the case did not
involve any voluntary means adopted by a school district.
The dissent’s characterization of Swann as recognizing
that “the Equal Protection Clause permits local school
boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve positive
race-related goals” is—at best—a dubious inference. Post,
at 22. Even if the dicta from Swann were entitled to the
weight the dissent would give it, and no dicta is, it not
only did not address the question presented in Swann, it
also does not address the question presented in these
cases—whether the school districts’ use of racial classifica
tions to achieve their stated goals is permissible.
Further, for all the lower court cases JUSTICE BREYER
cites as evidence of the “prevailing legal assumption”
embodied by Swann, very few are pertinent. Most are not.
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Opinion R the Court

For example, the dissent features Tometz v. Board of Ed.,
Waukegan City School Dist. No. 61, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 596–
598, 237 N. E. 2d 498, 500–502 (1968), an Illinois decision,
as evidence that “state and federal courts had considered
the matter settled and uncontroversial.” Post, at 25. But
Tometz addressed a challenge to a statute requiring race-
consciousness in drawing school attendance boundaries—
an issue well beyond the scope of the question presented in
these cases. Importantly, it considered that issue only
under rational-basis review, 39 Ill. 2d, at 600, 237 N. E.
2d, at 502 (“The test of any legislative classification essen
tially is one of reasonableness”), which even the dissent
grudgingly recognizes is an improper standard for evaluat
ing express racial classifications. Other cases cited are
similarly inapplicable. See, e.g., Citizens for Better Ed. v.
Goose Creek Consol. Independent School Dist., 719 S. W.
2d 350, 352–353 (Tex. App. 1986) (upholding rezoning
plan under rational-basis review).16
——————
16 In fact, all the cases JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent cites as evidence of
the “prevailing legal assumption,” see post, at 25–27, were decided
before this Court definitively determined that “all racial classifications
. . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995). Many
proceeded under the now-rejected view that classifications seeking to
benefit a disadvantaged racial group should be held to a lesser stan
dard of review. See, e.g., Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348
F. 2d 261, 266 (CA1 1965). Even if this purported distinction, which
JUSTICE STEVENS would adopt, post, at 2, n. 3 (dissenting opinion), had
not been already rejected by this Court, the distinction has no relevance
to these cases, in which students of all races are excluded from the
schools they wish to attend based solely on the racial classifications.
See, e.g., App. in No. 05–908, at 202a (noting that 89 nonwhite students
were denied assignment to a particular school by operation of Seattle’s
racial tiebreaker).
JUSTICE STEVENS’s reliance on School Comm. of Boston v. Board of
Ed., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N. E. 2d 729 (1967), appeal dism’d, 389 U. S.
572 (1968) (per curiam), post, at 3–5, is inapposite for the same reason
that many of the cases cited by JUSTICE BREYER are inapposite; the case
involved a Massachusetts law that required school districts to avoid
32 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent next looks for authority to a
footnote in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U. S. 457, 472, n. 15 (1982), post, at 56–57, but there this
Court expressly noted that it was not passing on the pro
priety of race-conscious student assignments in the ab
sence of a finding of de jure segregation. Similarly, the
citation of Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458
U. S. 527 (1982), post, at 24, in which a state referendum
prohibiting a race-based assignment plan was challenged,
is inapposite—in Crawford the Court again expressly
reserved the question presented by these cases. 458 U. S.,
at 535, n. 11. Such reservations and preliminary analyses
of course did not decide the merits of this question—as
evidenced by the disagreement among the lower courts on
this issue. Compare Eisenberg, 197 F. 3d, at 133, with
Comfort, 418 F. 3d, at 13.
JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent also asserts that these cases
are controlled by Grutter, claiming that the existence of a
compelling interest in these cases “follows a fortiori” from
Grutter, post, at 41, 64–66, and accusing us of tacitly
——————
racial imbalance in schools but did not specify how to achieve this
goal—and certainly did not require express racial classifications as the
means to do so. The law was upheld under rational-basis review, with
the state court explicitly rejecting the suggestion—which is now plainly
the law—that “racial group classifications bear a far heavier burden of
justification.” 352 Mass., at 700, 227 N. E. 2d, at 734 (internal quota
tion marks and citation omitted). The passage JUSTICE STEVENS quotes
proves our point; all the quoted language says is that the school com
mittee “shall prepare a plan to eliminate the imbalance.” Id., at 695,
227 N. E. 2d, at 731; see post, at 4, n. 5. Nothing in the opinion ap
proves use of racial classifications as the means to address the imbal
ance. The suggestion that our decision today is somehow inconsistent
with our disposition of that appeal is belied by the fact that neither the
lower courts, the respondent school districts, nor any of their 51 amici
saw fit even to cite the case. We raise this fact not to argue that the
dismissal should be afforded any different stare decisis effect, but
rather simply to suggest that perhaps—for the reasons noted above—
the dismissal does not mean what JUSTICE STEVENS believes it does.
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Opinion R the Court

overruling that case, see post, at 64–66. The dissent over-
reads Grutter, however, in suggesting that it renders pure
racial balancing a constitutionally compelling interest;
Grutter itself recognized that using race simply to achieve
racial balance would be “patently unconstitutional,” 539
U. S., at 330. The Court was exceedingly careful in de
scribing the interest furthered in Grutter as “not an inter
est in simple ethnic diversity” but rather a “far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics” in which race
was but a single element. 539 U. S., at 324–325 (internal
quotation marks omitted). We take the Grutter Court at
its word. We simply do not understand how JUSTICE
BREYER can maintain that classifying every schoolchild as
black or white, and using that classification as a determi
native factor in assigning children to achieve pure racial
balance, can be regarded as “less burdensome, and hence
more narrowly tailored” than the consideration of race in
Grutter, post, at 47, when the Court in Grutter stated that
“[t]he importance of . . . individualized consideration” in
the program was “paramount,” and consideration of race
was one factor in a “highly individualized, holistic review.”
539 U. S., at 337. Certainly if the constitutionality of the
stark use of race in these cases were as established as the
dissent would have it, there would have been no need for
the extensive analysis undertaken in Grutter. In light of
the foregoing, JUSTICE BREYER’s appeal to stare decisis
rings particularly hollow. See post, at 65–66.
At the same time it relies on inapplicable desegregation
cases, misstatements of admitted dicta, and other noncon
trolling pronouncements, JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent can
didly dismisses the significance of this Court’s repeated
holdings that all racial classifications must be reviewed
under strict scrutiny, see post, at 31–33, 35–36, arguing
that a different standard of review should be applied
because the districts use race for beneficent rather than
malicious purposes, see post, at 31–36.
34 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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This Court has recently reiterated, however, that “ ‘all
racial classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’ ”
Johnson, 543 U. S., at 505 (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at
227; emphasis added by Johnson Court). See also Grutter,
supra, at 326 (“[G]overnmental action based on race—a
group classification long recognized as in most circum
stances irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry” (internal quotation
marks and emphasis omitted)). JUSTICE BREYER nonethe
less relies on the good intentions and motives of the school
districts, stating that he has found “no case that . . . repu
diated this constitutional asymmetry between that which
seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members
of minority races.” Post, at 29 (emphasis in original). We
have found many. Our cases clearly reject the argument
that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis. See John
son, supra, at 505 (“We have insisted on strict scrutiny in
every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ racial classifica
tions”); Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227 (rejecting idea that
“ ‘benign’ ” racial classifications may be held to “different
standard”); Croson, 488 U. S., at 500 (“Racial classifica
tions are suspect, and that means that simple legislative
assurances of good intention cannot suffice”).
This argument that different rules should govern racial
classifications designed to include rather than exclude is
not new; it has been repeatedly pressed in the past, see,
e.g., Gratz, 539 U. S., at 282 (BREYER, J., concurring in
judgment); id., at 301 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Ada-
rand, supra, at 243 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Wygant, 476
U. S., at 316–317 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), and has been
repeatedly rejected. See also Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289–291
(opinion of Powell, J.) (rejecting argument that strict
scrutiny should be applied only to classifications that
disadvantage minorities, stating “[r]acial and ethnic dis
tinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
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Opinion R the Court

for the most exacting judicial examination”).
The reasons for rejecting a motives test for racial classi
fications are clear enough. “The Court’s emphasis on
‘benign racial classifications’ suggests confidence in its
ability to distinguish good from harmful governmental
uses of racial criteria. History should teach greater humil
ity. . . . ‘[B]enign’ carries with it no independent meaning,
but reflects only acceptance of the current generation’s
conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on
particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable.”
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 609–610 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). See also Adarand, supra, at 226 (“ ‘[I]t may
not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact
benign’ ” (quoting Bakke, supra, at 298 (opinion of Powell,
J.))). Accepting JUSTICE BREYER’s approach would “do no
more than move us from ‘separate but equal’ to ‘unequal
but benign.’ ” Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 638 (KEN
NEDY, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE BREYER speaks of bringing “the races” together
(putting aside the purely black-and-white nature of the
plans), as the justification for excluding individuals on the
basis of their race. See post, at 28–29. Again, this ap
proach to racial classifications is fundamentally at odds
with our precedent, which makes clear that the Equal
Protection Clause “protect[s] persons, not groups,” Ada-
rand, 515 U. S., at 227 (emphasis in original). See ibid.
(“[A]ll governmental action based on race—a group classi
fication long recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrele
vant and therefore prohibited,’ Hirabayashi [v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943)]—should be subjected to
detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right
to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed”
(first emphasis in original); Metro Broadcasting, supra, at
636 (“[O]ur Constitution protects each citizen as an indi
vidual, not as a member of a group” (KENNEDY, J., dissent
ing)); Bakke, supra, at 289 (opinion of Powell, J.) (Four
36 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.

Opinion R the Court

teenth Amendment creates rights “guaranteed to the
individual. The rights established are personal rights”).
This fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to
Brown itself. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294, 300 (1955) (Brown II) (“At stake is the personal inter
est of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools . . . on a
nondiscriminatory basis” (emphasis added)). For the
dissent, in contrast, “ ‘individualized scrutiny’ is simply
beside the point.” Post, at 55.
JUSTICE BREYER’s position comes down to a familiar
claim: The end justifies the means. He admits that “there
is a cost in applying ‘a state-mandated racial label,’ ” post,
at 67, but he is confident that the cost is worth paying.
Our established strict scrutiny test for racial classifica
tions, however, insists on “detailed examination, both as to
ends and as to means.” Adarand, supra, at 236 (emphasis
added). Simply because the school districts may seek a
worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on
the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifi
cations should be subject to less exacting scrutiny.
Despite his argument that these cases should be evalu
ated under a “standard of review that is not ‘strict’ in the
traditional sense of that word,” post, at 36, JUSTICE
BREYER still purports to apply strict scrutiny to these
cases. See post, at 37. It is evident, however, that
JUSTICE BREYER’s brand of narrow tailoring is quite
unlike anything found in our precedents. Without any
detailed discussion of the operation of the plans, the stu
dents who are affected, or the districts’ failure to consider
race-neutral alternatives, the dissent concludes that the
districts have shown that these racial classifications are
necessary to achieve the districts’ stated goals. This con
clusion is divorced from any evaluation of the actual im
pact of the plans at issue in these cases—other than to
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Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.
Opinion R the Court

note that the plans “often have no effect.” Post, at 46.17
Instead, the dissent suggests that some combination of the
development of these plans over time, the difficulty of the
endeavor, and the good faith of the districts suffices to
demonstrate that these stark and controlling racial classi
fications are constitutional. The Constitution and our
precedents require more.
In keeping with his view that strict scrutiny should not
apply, JUSTICE BREYER repeatedly urges deference to local
school boards on these issues. See, e.g., post, at 21, 48–49,
66. Such deference “is fundamentally at odds with our
equal protection jurisprudence. We put the burden on
state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies
are justified.” Johnson, 543 U. S., at 506, n. 1. See Cro
son, 488 U. S., at 501 (“The history of racial classifications
in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to
legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has
no place in equal protection analysis”); West Virginia Bd.
of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943) (“The Four
teenth Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education
not excepted”).
JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent ends on an unjustified note of
alarm. It predicts that today’s decision “threaten[s]” the
validity of “[h]undreds of state and federal statutes and
regulations.” Post, at 61; see also post, at 27–28. But the
——————
17 JUSTICE BREYER also tries to downplay the impact of the racial as
signments by stating that in Seattle “students can decide voluntarily to
transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of
race-conscious criteria).” Post, at 46. This presumably refers to the
district’s decision to cease, for 2001–2002 school year assignments,
applying the racial tiebreaker to students seeking to transfer to a
different school after ninth grade. See App. in No. 05–908, at 137a–
139a. There are obvious disincentives for students to transfer to a
different school after a full quarter of their high school experience has
passed, and the record sheds no light on how transfers to the oversub
scribed high schools are handled.
38 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion R the Court

examples the dissent mentions—for example, a provision
of the No Child Left Behind Act that requires States to set
measurable objectives to track the achievement of stu
dents from major racial and ethnic groups, 20 U. S. C.
§6311(b)(2)(C)(v)—have nothing to do with the pertinent
issues in these cases.
JUSTICE BREYER also suggests that other means for
achieving greater racial diversity in schools are necessar
ily unconstitutional if the racial classifications at issue in
these cases cannot survive strict scrutiny. Post, at 58–62.
These other means—e.g., where to construct new schools,
how to allocate resources among schools, and which aca
demic offerings to provide to attract students to certain
schools—implicate different considerations than the ex
plicit racial classifications at issue in these cases, and we
express no opinion on their validity—not even in dicta.
Rather, we employ the familiar and well-established ana
lytic approach of strict scrutiny to evaluate the plans at
issue today, an approach that in no way warrants the
dissent’s cataclysmic concerns. Under that approach, the
school districts have not carried their burden of showing
that the ends they seek justify the particular extreme
means they have chosen—classifying individual students
on the basis of their race and discriminating among them
on that basis.
* * *
If the need for the racial classifications embraced by the
school districts is unclear, even on the districts’ own
terms, the costs are undeniable. “[D]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Adarand, 515
U. S., at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted). Gov
ernment action dividing us by race is inherently suspect
because such classifications promote “notions of racial
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 39

Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.
Opinion R the Court

inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility,” Croson,
supra, at 493, “reinforce the belief, held by too many for
too much of our history, that individuals should be judged
by the color of their skin,” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630,
657 (1993), and “endorse race-based reasoning and the
conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus con
tributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.”
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 603 (O’Connor, J., dis
senting). As the Court explained in Rice v. Cayetano, 528
U. S. 495, 517 (2000), “[o]ne of the principal reasons race
is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans
the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry
instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”
All this is true enough in the contexts in which these
statements were made—government contracting, voting
districts, allocation of broadcast licenses, and electing
state officers—but when it comes to using race to assign
children to schools, history will be heard. In Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), we
held that segregation deprived black children of equal
educational opportunities regardless of whether school
facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because
government classification and separation on grounds of
race themselves denoted inferiority. Id., at 493–494. It
was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of le
gally separating children on the basis of race on which the
Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954. See
id., at 494 (“ ‘The impact [of segregation] is greater when it
has the sanction of the law’ ”). The next Term, we accord
ingly stated that “full compliance” with Brown I required
school districts “to achieve a system of determining admis
sion to the public schools on a nonracial basis.” Brown II,
349 U. S., at 300–301 (emphasis added).
The parties and their amici debate which side is more
faithful to the heritage of Brown, but the position of the
plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could
40 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.

Opinion R the Court

not have been clearer: “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
prevents states from according differential treatment to
American children on the basis of their color or race.”
Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and for Respon
dents in No. 10 on Reargument in Brown I, O. T. 1953,
p. 15 (Summary of Argument). What do the racial classifi
cations at issue here do, if not accord differential treat
ment on the basis of race? As counsel who appeared be
fore this Court for the plaintiffs in Brown put it: “We have
one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop
in the course of this argument, and that contention is that
no State has any authority under the equal-protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a
factor in affording educational opportunities among its
citizens.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Brown I, p. 7 (Robert L.
Carter, Dec. 9, 1952). There is no ambiguity in that state
ment. And it was that position that prevailed in this
Court, which emphasized in its remedial opinion that
what was “[a]t stake is the personal interest of the plain
tiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable
on a nondiscriminatory basis,” and what was required was
“determining admission to the public schools on a nonra
cial basis.” Brown II, supra, at 300–301 (emphasis added).
What do the racial classifications do in these cases, if not
determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they
could and could not go to school based on the color of their
skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried
the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow
this once again—even for very different reasons. For
schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as
Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past segrega
tion, such as Jefferson County, the way “to achieve a
system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis,” Brown II, 349 U. S., at 300–301, is to
stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop
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Opinion of ofOBERTS, C. J.
Opinion R the Court

discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminat
ing on the basis of race.
The judgments of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–908 and 05–915
_________________

PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS, PETITIONER
05–908 v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, CUSTODIAL PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF JOSHUA RYAN MCDONALD, PETITIONER
05–915 v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 28, 2007]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
Today, the Court holds that state entities may not ex
periment with race-based means to achieve ends they
deem socially desirable. I wholly concur in THE CHIEF
JUSTICE’s opinion. I write separately to address several of
the contentions in JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent (hereinafter
the dissent). Contrary to the dissent’s arguments, reseg
regation is not occurring in Seattle or Louisville; these
school boards have no present interest in remedying past
segregation; and these race-based student-assignment
programs do not serve any compelling state interest.
Accordingly, the plans are unconstitutional. Disfavoring a
color-blind interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent
would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on
the basis of race—an approach reminiscent of that advo
2 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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THOMAS, J., concurring

cated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Educa
tion, 347 U. S 483 (1954). This approach is just as wrong
today as it was a half-century ago. The Constitution and
our cases require us to be much more demanding before
permitting local school boards to make decisions based on
race.
I
The dissent repeatedly claims that the school districts
are threatened with resegregation and that they will
succumb to that threat if these plans are declared uncon
stitutional. It also argues that these plans can be justified
as part of the school boards’ attempts to “eradicat[e] ear
lier school segregation.” See, e.g., post, at 4. Contrary to
the dissent’s rhetoric, neither of these school districts is
threatened with resegregation, and neither is constitu
tionally compelled or permitted to undertake race-based
remediation. Racial imbalance is not segregation, and the
mere incantation of terms like resegregation and remedia
tion cannot make up the difference.
A
Because this Court has authorized and required race-
based remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it
is important to define segregation clearly and to distin
guish it from racial imbalance. In the context of public
schooling, segregation is the deliberate operation of a
school system to “carry out a governmental policy to sepa
rate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.” Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 6 (1971);
see also Monroe v. Board of Comm’rs of Jackson, 391 U. S.
450, 452 (1968). In Brown, this Court declared that segre
gation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann, supra, at
6; see also Green v. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S.
430, 435 (1968) (“[T]he State, acting through the local
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

THOMAS, J., concurring

school board and school officials, organized and operated a
dual system, part ‘white’ and part ‘Negro.’ It was such
dual systems that 14 years ago Brown I[, 347 U. S. 483,]
held unconstitutional and a year later Brown II[, 349 U. S.
294 (1955)] held must be abolished”).1
Racial imbalance is the failure of a school district’s
individual schools to match or approximate the demo
graphic makeup of the student population at large. Cf.
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457,
460 (1982). Racial imbalance is not segregation.2 Al
though presently observed racial imbalance might result
from past de jure segregation, racial imbalance can also
result from any number of innocent private decisions,
including voluntary housing choices. See Swann, supra,
at 25–26; Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 116 (1995)
(THOMAS, J., concurring). Because racial imbalance is not
inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation, it is not
unconstitutional in and of itself. Dayton Bd. of Ed. v.
Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 413 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v.
Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979) (“Racial imbal
ance . . . is not per se a constitutional violation”); Freeman
v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494 (1992); see also Swann, supra,
at 31–32; cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 740–741,
and n. 19 (1974).
——————
1 In this Court’s paradigmatic segregation cases, there was a local

ordinance, state statute, or state constitutional provision requiring
racial separation. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners in Bolling v. Sharpe,
O. T. 1952, No. 4, pp. 28–30 (cataloging state laws requiring separa
tion of the races); id., at App. A (listing “Statutory and Consti
tutional Provisions in the States Where Segregation in Education is
Institutionalized”).
2 The dissent refers repeatedly and reverently to “ ‘integration.’ ”

However, outside of the context of remediation for past de jure segrega
tion, “integration” is simply racial balancing. See post, at 37. There
fore, the school districts’ attempts to further “integrate” are properly
thought of as little more than attempts to achieve a particular racial
balance.
4 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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THOMAS, J., concurring

Although there is arguably a danger of racial imbalance
in schools in Seattle and Louisville, there is no danger of
resegregation. No one contends that Seattle has estab
lished or that Louisville has reestablished a dual school
system that separates students on the basis of race. The
statistics cited in Appendix A to the dissent are not to the
contrary. See post, at 69–72. At most, those statistics
show a national trend toward classroom racial imbalance.
However, racial imbalance without intentional state action
to separate the races does not amount to segregation. To
raise the specter of resegregation to defend these pro
grams is to ignore the meaning of the word and the nature
of the cases before us.3
B
Just as the school districts lack an interest in prevent
ing resegregation, they also have no present interest in
remedying past segregation. The Constitution generally
prohibits government race-based decisionmaking, but this
Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for
remedial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances.
——————
3 The dissent’s assertion that these plans are necessary for the school

districts to maintain their “hard-won gains” reveals its conflation of
segregation and racial imbalance. Post, at 38. For the dissent’s pur
poses, the relevant hard-won gains are the present racial compositions
in the individual schools in Seattle and Louisville. However, the actual
hard-won gain in these cases is the elimination of the vestiges of the
system of state-enforced racial separation that once existed in Louis
ville. To equate the achievement of a certain statistical mix in several
schools with the elimination of the system of systematic de jure segre
gation trivializes the latter accomplishment. Nothing but an interest in
classroom aesthetics and a hypersensitivity to elite sensibilities justi
fies the school districts’ racial balancing programs. See Part II–B,
infra. But “the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses
our Constitution” required the disestablishment of de jure segregation.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Assessed
in any objective manner, there is no comparison between the two.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

THOMAS, J., concurring

First, in schools that were formerly segregated by law,
race-based measures are sometimes constitutionally com
pelled to remedy prior school segregation. Second, in
Croson, the Court appeared willing to authorize a govern
ment unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was
responsible. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,
504 (1989). Without explicitly resting on either of these
strands of doctrine, the dissent repeatedly invokes the
school districts’ supposed interests in remedying past
segregation. Properly analyzed, though, these plans do
not fall within either existing category of permissible race-
based remediation.
1
The Constitution does not permit race-based govern
ment decisionmaking simply because a school district
claims a remedial purpose and proceeds in good faith with
arguably pure motives. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S.
306, 371 (2003) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dis
senting in part) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,
515 U. S. 200, 239 (1995) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)). Rather, race-based gov
ernment decisionmaking is categorically prohibited unless
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Grutter,
supra, at 326; see also Part II–A, infra. This exacting
scrutiny “has proven automatically fatal” in most cases.
Jenkins, supra, at 121 (THOMAS, J., concurring); cf. Hira
bayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943)
(“[R]acial discriminations are in most circumstances ir
relevant and therefore prohibited”). And appropriately so.
“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not
only because those classifications can harm favored races
or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because
every time the government places citizens on racial regis
ters and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens
or benefits, it demeans us all.” Grutter, supra, at 353
6 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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THOMAS, J., concurring

(opinion of THOMAS, J.). Therefore, as a general rule, all
race-based government decisionmaking—regardless of
context—is unconstitutional.
2
This Court has carved out a narrow exception to that
general rule for cases in which a school district has a
“history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single
school system deliberately operated to carry out a govern
mental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the
basis of race.”4 See Swann, 402 U. S., at 5–6. In such
cases, race-based remedial measures are sometimes re
quired.5 Green, 391 U. S., at 437–438; cf. United States v.
Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 745 (1992) (THOMAS, J., concur
ring).6 But without a history of state-enforced racial
——————
4 The dissent makes much of the supposed difficulty of determining
whether prior segregation was de jure or de facto. See, e.g., post, at 19–
20. That determination typically will not be nearly as difficult as the
dissent makes it seem. In most cases, there either will or will not have
been a state constitutional amendment, state statute, local ordinance,
or local administrative policy explicitly requiring separation of the
races. See, e.g., n. 1, supra. And even if the determination is difficult,
it is one the dissent acknowledges must be made to determine what
remedies school districts are required to adopt. Post, at 43.
5 This Court’s opinion in McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), fits

comfortably within this framework. There, a Georgia school board
voluntarily adopted a desegregation plan. At the time of Brown, v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), Georgia’s Constitution
required that “[s]eparate schools shall be provided for the white and
colored races.” Ga. Const., Art. VII, §1, ch. 2–6401 (1948). Given that
state law had previously required the school board to maintain a dual
school system, the county was obligated to take measures to remedy its
prior de jure segregation. This Court recognized as much in its opinion,
which stated that the school board had an “affirmative duty to disestab
lish the dual school system.” McDaniel, supra, at 41.
6 As I have explained elsewhere, the remedies this Court authorized

lower courts to compel in early desegregation cases like Green and
Swann were exceptional. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 124–
125 (1995), (THOMAS, J., concurring). Sustained resistance to Brown
prompted the Court to authorize extraordinary race-conscious remedial
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

THOMAS, J., concurring

separation, a school district has no affirmative legal obli
gation to take race-based remedial measures to eliminate
segregation and its vestiges.
Neither of the programs before us today is compelled as
a remedial measure, and no one makes such a claim.
Seattle has no history of de jure segregation; therefore, the
Constitution did not require Seattle’s plan.7 Although
Louisville once operated a segregated school system and
was subject to a Federal District Court’s desegregation
decree, see ante, at 7; Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of
Ed., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 376–377 (WD Ky. 2000), that
decree was dissolved in 2000, id., at 360. Since then, no
race-based remedial measures have been required in
Louisville. Thus, the race-based student-assignment plan
at issue here, which was instituted the year after the
dissolution of the desegregation decree, was not even
arguably required by the Constitution.

——————
measures (like compelled racial mixing) to turn the Constitution’s
dictate to desegregate into reality. 515 U. S., at 125 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring). Even if these measures were appropriate as remedies in
the face of widespread resistance to Brown’s mandate, they are not
forever insulated from constitutional scrutiny. Rather, “such powers
should have been temporary and used only to overcome the widespread
resistance to the dictates of the Constitution.” 515 U. S., at 125 (THO
MAS, J., concurring).
7 Though the dissent cites every manner of complaint, record mate

rial, and scholarly article relating to Seattle’s race-based student
assignment efforts, post, at 73–75, it cites no law or official policy that
required separation of the races in Seattle’s schools. Nevertheless, the
dissent tries to cast doubt on the historical fact that the Seattle schools
were never segregated by law by citing allegations that the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and other organiza
tions made in court filings to the effect that Seattle’s schools were once
segregated by law. See post, at 7–9, 23. These allegations were never
proved and were not even made in this case. Indeed, the record before
us suggests the contrary. See App. in No. 05–908, pp. 214a, 225a, 257a.
Past allegations in another case provide no basis for resolving these
cases.
8 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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THOMAS, J., concurring

3
Aside from constitutionally compelled remediation in
schools, this Court has permitted government units to
remedy prior racial discrimination only in narrow circum
stances. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267,
277 (1986) (plurality opinion). Regardless of the constitu
tional validity of such remediation, see Croson, supra, at
524–525 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), it does not
apply here. Again, neither school board asserts that its
race-based actions were taken to remedy prior discrimina
tion. Seattle provides three forward-looking—as opposed
to remedial—justifications for its race-based assignment
plan. Brief for Respondents in No. 05–908, pp. 24–34.
Louisville asserts several similar forward-looking inter
ests, Brief for Respondents in No. 05–915, pp. 24–29, and
at oral argument, counsel for Louisville disavowed any
claim that Louisville’s argument “depend[ed] in any way
on the prior de jure segregation,” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No.
05–915, p. 38.
Furthermore, for a government unit to remedy past
discrimination for which it was responsible, the Court has
required it to demonstrate “a ‘strong basis in evidence for
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.’ ” Cro
son, 488 U. S., at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277
(plurality opinion)). Establishing a “strong basis in evi
dence” requires proper findings regarding the extent of the
government unit’s past racial discrimination. Croson, 488
U. S., at 504. The findings should “define the scope of any
injury [and] the necessary remedy,” id., at 505, and must
be more than “inherently unmeasurable claims of past
wrongs,” id., at 506. Assertions of general societal dis
crimination are plainly insufficient. Id., at 499, 504;
Wygant, supra, at 274 (plurality opinion); cf. Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.). Neither school district has made any such
specific findings. For Seattle, the dissent attempts to
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

THOMAS, J., concurring

make up for this failing by adverting to allegations made
in past complaints filed against the Seattle school district.
However, allegations in complaints cannot substitute for
specific findings of prior discrimination—even when those
allegations lead to settlements with complaining parties.
Cf. Croson, supra, at 505; Wygant, supra, at 279, n. 5
(plurality opinion). As for Louisville, its slate was cleared
by the District Court’s 2000 dissolution decree, which
effectively declared that there were no longer any effects
of de jure discrimination in need of remediation.8
Despite the dissent’s repeated intimation of a remedial
purpose, neither of the programs in question qualifies as a
permissible race-based remedial measure. Thus, the
programs are subject to the general rule that government
race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional.
C
As the foregoing demonstrates, racial balancing is some
times a constitutionally permissible remedy for the dis
crete legal wrong of de jure segregation, and when directed
to that end, racial balancing is an exception to the general
rule that government race-based decisionmaking is uncon
——————
8 Contrary to the dissent’s argument, post, at 44, the Louisville school

district’s interest in remedying its past de jure segregation did vanish
the day the District Court found that Louisville had eliminated the
vestiges of its historic de jure segregation. See Hampton v. Jefferson
Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, at 360 (WD Ky. 2000). If there
were further remediation to be done, the District Court could not
logically have reached the conclusion that Louisville “ha[d] eliminated
the vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its
pernicious effects.” Ibid. Because Louisville could use race-based
measures only as a remedy for past de jure segregation, it is not “inco
herent,” post, at 56, to say that race-based decisionmaking was allowed
to Louisville one day—while it was still remedying—and forbidden to it
the next—when remediation was finished. That seemingly odd turn
around is merely a result of the fact that the remediation of de jure
segregation is a jealously guarded exception to the Equal Protection
Clause’s general rule against government race-based decisionmaking.
10 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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stitutional. Perhaps for this reason, the dissent conflates
the concepts of segregation and racial imbalance: If racial
imbalance equates to segregation, then it must also be
constitutionally acceptable to use racial balancing to
remedy racial imbalance.
For at least two reasons, however, it is wrong to place
the remediation of segregation on the same plane as the
remediation of racial imbalance. First, as demonstrated
above, the two concepts are distinct. Although racial
imbalance can result from de jure segregation, it does not
necessarily, and the further we get from the era of state-
sponsored racial separation, the less likely it is that racial
imbalance has a traceable connection to any prior segrega
tion. See Freeman, 503 U. S., at 496; Jenkins, 515 U. S.,
at 118 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
Second, a school cannot “remedy” racial imbalance in
the same way that it can remedy segregation. Remedia
tion of past de jure segregation is a one-time process in
volving the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an
identified entity. At some point, the discrete injury will be
remedied, and the school district will be declared unitary.
See Swann, 402 U. S., at 31. Unlike de jure segregation,
there is no ultimate remedy for racial imbalance. Individ
ual schools will fall in and out of balance in the natural
course, and the appropriate balance itself will shift with a
school district’s changing demographics. Thus, racial
balancing will have to take place on an indefinite basis—a
continuous process with no identifiable culpable party and
no discernable end point. In part for those reasons, the
Court has never permitted outright racial balancing solely
for the purpose of achieving a particular racial balance.
II
Lacking a cognizable interest in remediation, neither of
these plans can survive strict scrutiny because neither
plan serves a genuinely compelling state interest. The
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

THOMAS, J., concurring

dissent avoids reaching that conclusion by unquestion
ingly accepting the assertions of selected social scientists
while completely ignoring the fact that those assertions
are the subject of fervent debate. Ultimately, the dissent’s
entire analysis is corrupted by the considerations that lead
it initially to question whether strict scrutiny should apply
at all. What emerges is a version of “strict scrutiny” that
combines hollow assurances of harmlessness with reflex
ive acceptance of conventional wisdom. When it comes to
government race-based decisionmaking, the Constitution
demands more.
A
The dissent claims that “the law requires application
here of a standard of review that is not ‘strict’ in the tradi
tional sense of that word.” Post, at 36. This view is in
formed by dissents in our previous cases and the concur
rences of two Court of Appeals judges. Post, at 34–36
(citing 426 F. 3d 1162, 1193–1194 (CA9 2005) (Kozinski,
J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F. 3d
1, 28–29 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C. J., concurring)). Those
lower court judges reasoned that programs like these are
not “aimed at oppressing blacks” and do not “seek to give
one racial group an edge over another.” Comfort, supra, at
27 (Boudin, C. J., concurring); 426 F. 3d, at 1193 (Kozin
ski, J., concurring). They were further persuaded that
these plans differed from other race-based programs this
Court has considered because they are “certainly more
benign than laws that favor or disfavor one race, segregate
by race, or create quotas for or against a racial group,”
Comfort, 418 F. 3d, at 28 (Boudin, C. J., concurring), and
they are “far from the original evils at which the Four
teenth Amendment was addressed,” id., at 29; 426 F. 3d,
at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Instead of strict scru
tiny, Judge Kozinski would have analyzed the plans under
“robust and realistic rational basis review.” Id., at 1194.
12 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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These arguments are inimical to the Constitution and to
this Court’s precedents.9 We have made it unusually clear
that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification.
Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227; Grutter, 539 U. S., at 326;
Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005) (“We have
insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-
called ‘benign’ racial classifications”).10 There are good
reasons not to apply a lesser standard to these cases. The
constitutional problems with government race-based
decisionmaking are not diminished in the slightest by the
presence or absence of an intent to oppress any race or by
the real or asserted well-meaning motives for the race-
based decisionmaking. Adarand, 515 U. S., at 228–229.
Purportedly benign race-based decisionmaking suffers the
same constitutional infirmity as invidious race-based
decisionmaking. Id., at 240 (THOMAS, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (“As far as the Constitu
tion is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government’s
racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to
oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to
help those thought to be disadvantaged”).
Even supposing it mattered to the constitutional analy
sis, the race-based student assignment programs before us
——————
9 The dissent’s appeal to stare decisis, post, at 65, is particularly ironic
in light of its apparent willingness to depart from these precedents,
post, at 36–37.
10 The idea that government racial classifications must be subjected

to strict scrutiny did not originate in Adarand. As early as Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), this Court made clear that government
action that “rest[s] solely upon distinctions drawn according to race”
had to be “subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’ ” Id., at 11 (quoting
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944)); see also
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964) (requiring a statute
drawing a racial classification to be “necessary, and not merely ration
ally related, to accomplishment of a permissible state policy”); id., at
197 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The necessity test . . . should be equally
applicable in a case involving state racial discrimination”).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

THOMAS, J., concurring

are not as benign as the dissent believes. See post, at 34–
35. “[R]acial paternalism and its unintended conse
quences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination.” Adarand, supra, at 241 (opinion
of THOMAS, J.). As these programs demonstrate, every
time the government uses racial criteria to “bring the
races together,” post, at 29, someone gets excluded, and
the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his
or her race. The petitioner in the Louisville case received
a letter from the school board informing her that her
kindergartener would not be allowed to attend the school
of petitioner’s choosing because of the child’s race. App. in
No. 05–915, p. 97. Doubtless, hundreds of letters like this
went out from both school boards every year these race-
based assignment plans were in operation. This type of
exclusion, solely on the basis of race, is precisely the sort
of government action that pits the races against one an
other, exacerbates racial tension, and “provoke[s] resent
ment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government’s use of race.” Adarand,
supra, at 241 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Accordingly, these
plans are simply one more variation on the government
race-based decisionmaking we have consistently held must
be subjected to strict scrutiny. Grutter, supra, at 326.
B
Though the dissent admits to discomfort in applying
strict scrutiny to these plans, it claims to have nonetheless
applied that exacting standard. But in its search for a
compelling interest, the dissent casually accepts even the
most tenuous interests asserted on behalf of the plans,
grouping them all under the term “ ‘integration.’ ” See
post, at 37. “ ‘[I]ntegration,’ ” we are told, has “three essen
tial elements.” Ibid. None of these elements is compel
ling. And the combination of the three unsubstantiated
elements does not produce an interest any more compel
14 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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ling than that represented by each element independently.
1
According to the dissent, integration involves “an inter
est in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of
segregation.” Post, at 37. For the reasons explained
above, the records in these cases do not demonstrate that
either school board’s plan is supported by an interest in
remedying past discrimination. Part I–B, supra.
Moreover, the school boards have no interest in remedy
ing the sundry consequences of prior segregation unre
lated to schooling, such as “housing patterns, employment
practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes.” Post,
at 38. General claims that past school segregation af
fected such varied societal trends are “too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy,” Wygant,
476 U. S., at 276 (plurality opinion), because “[i]t is sheer
speculation” how decades-past segregation in the school
system might have affected these trends, see Croson, 488
U. S., at 499. Consequently, school boards seeking to
remedy those societal problems with race-based measures
in schools today would have no way to gauge the proper
scope of the remedy. Id., at 498. Indeed, remedial meas
ures geared toward such broad and unrelated societal ills
have “ ‘no logical stopping point,’ ” ibid., and threaten to
become “ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless
in their ability to affect the future,” Wygant, supra, at 276
(plurality opinion). See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342 (stating
the “requirement that all governmental use of race must
have a logical end point”).
Because the school boards lack any further interest in
remedying segregation, this element offers no support for
the purported interest in “integration.”
2
Next, the dissent argues that the interest in integration
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

THOMAS, J., concurring

has an educational element. The dissent asserts that
racially balanced schools improve educational outcomes
for black children. In support, the dissent unquestioningly
cites certain social science research to support proposi
tions that are hotly disputed among social scientists. In
reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing
has any educational benefits, much less that integration is
necessary to black achievement.
Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educa
tional benefits arise from racial balancing. Some have
concluded that black students receive genuine educational
benefits. See, e.g., Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and
Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 17, 48 (1978). Others have been more
circumspect. See, e.g., Henderson, Greenberg, Schneider,
Uribe, & Verdugo, High Quality Schooling for African
American Students, in Beyond Desegregation 166 (M.
Shujaa ed. 1996) (“Perhaps desegregation does not have a
single effect, positive or negative, on the academic
achievement of African American students, but rather
some strategies help, some hurt, and still others make no
difference whatsoever. It is clear to us that focusing sim
ply on demographic issues detracts from focusing on im
proving schools”). And some have concluded that there
are no demonstrable educational benefits. See, e.g., Armor
& Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public
Schools, in Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on
Race and Ethnicity in America 239, 251 (A. Thernstrom &
S. Thernstrom eds. 2002).
The amicus briefs in the cases before us mirror this
divergence of opinion. Supporting the school boards, one
amicus has assured us that “both early desegregation
research and recent statistical and econometric analyses
. . . indicate that there are positive effects on minority
student achievement scores arising from diverse school
settings.” Brief for American Educational Research Asso
16 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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ciation as Amicus Curiae 10. Another brief claims that
“school desegregation has a modest positive impact on the
achievement of African-American students.” App. to Brief
for 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae 13–14 (footnote
omitted). Yet neither of those briefs contains specific
details like the magnitude of the claimed positive effects
or the precise demographic mix at which those positive
effects begin to be realized. Indeed, the social scientists’
brief rather cautiously claims the existence of any benefit
at all, describing the “positive impact” as “modest,” id., at
13, acknowledging that “there appears to be little or no
effect on math scores,” id., at 14, and admitting that the
“underlying reasons for these gains in achievement are not
entirely clear,” id., at 15.11
Other amici dispute these findings. One amicus reports
that “[i]n study after study, racial composition of a student
body, when isolated, proves to be an insignificant determi
nant of student achievement.” Brief for Dr. John Murphy
et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 05–908, p. 8; see also id., at 9
(“[T]here is no evidence that diversity in the K–12 class
room positively affects student achievement”). Another
amicus surveys several social science studies and con
cludes that “a fair and comprehensive analysis of the
——————
11 At least one of the academic articles the dissent cites to support
this proposition fails to establish a causal connection between the
supposed educational gains realized by black students and racial
mixing. See Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social
Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 733 (1998). In the pages following
the ones the dissent cites, the author of that article remarks that “the
main reason white and minority students perform better academically
in majority white schools is likely that these schools provide greater
opportunities to learn. In other words, it is not desegregation per se
that improves achievement, but rather the learning advantages some
desegregated schools provide.” Id., at 744. Evidence that race is a good
proxy for other factors that might be correlated with educational
benefits does not support a compelling interest in the use of race to
achieve academic results.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

THOMAS, J., concurring

research shows that there is no clear and consistent evi
dence of [educational] benefits.” Brief for David J. Armor
et al. as Amici Curiae 29.
Add to the inconclusive social science the fact of black
achievement in “racially isolated” environments. See T.
Sowell, Education: Assumptions Versus History 7–38
(1986). Before Brown, the most prominent example of an
exemplary black school was Dunbar High School. Id., at
29 (“[I]n the period 1918–1923, Dunbar graduates earned
fifteen degrees from Ivy League colleges, and ten degrees
from Amherst, Williams, and Wesleyan”). Dunbar is by no
means an isolated example. See id., at 10–32 (discussing
other successful black schools); Walker, Can Institutions
Care? Evidence from the Segregated Schooling of African
American Children, in Beyond Desegregation 209–226 (M.
Shujaa ed. 1996); see also T. Sowell, Affirmative Action
Around the World: An Empirical Study 141–165 (2004).
Even after Brown, some schools with predominantly black
enrollments have achieved outstanding educational re
sults. See, e.g., S. Carter, No Excuses: Lessons from 21
High-Performing, High-Poverty Schools 49–50, 53–56, 71–
73, 81–84, 87–88 (2001); A. Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom,
No Excuses: Closing the Racial Gap in Learning 43–64
(2003); see also L. Izumi, They Have Overcome: High-
Poverty, High-Performing Schools in California (2002)
(chronicling exemplary achievement in predominantly
Hispanic schools in California). There is also evidence
that black students attending historically black colleges
achieve better academic results than those attending
predominantly white colleges. Grutter, supra, at 364–365
(THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg
ment) (citing sources); see also Fordice, 505 U. S., at 748–
749 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
The Seattle school board itself must believe that racial
mixing is not necessary to black achievement. Seattle
operates a K–8 “African-American Academy,” which has a
18 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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THOMAS, J., concurring

“nonwhite” enrollment of 99%. See App. in No. 05–908,
p. 227a; Reply Brief in No. 05–908, p. 13, n. 13. That
school was founded in 1990 as part of the school board’s
effort to “increase academic achievement.”12 See African
American Academy History, online at http://www.
seattleschools.org/schools/aaa/history.htm (all Internet
materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk
of Court’s case file). According to the school’s most recent
annual report, “[a]cademic excellence” is its “primary
goal.” See African American Academy 2006 Annual Re
port, p. 2, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/area/
siso/reports/anrep/altern/938.pdf. This racially imbal
anced environment has reportedly produced test scores
“higher across all grade levels in reading, writing and
math.” Ibid. Contrary to what the dissent would have
predicted, see post, at 38–39, the children in Seattle’s
African American Academy have shown gains when placed
in a “highly segregated” environment.
Given this tenuous relationship between forced racial
mixing and improved educational results for black chil
dren, the dissent cannot plausibly maintain that an educa
tional element supports the integration interest, let alone
makes it compelling.13 See Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 121–122
——————
12 Of course, if the Seattle school board were truly committed to the
notion that diversity leads directly to educational benefits, operating a
school with such a high “nonwhite” enrollment would be a shocking
dereliction of its duty to educate the students enrolled in that school.
13 In fact, the available data from the Seattle school district appear to

undercut the dissent’s view. A comparison of the test results of the
schools in the last year the racial balancing program operated to the
results in the 2004-to-2005 school year (in which student assignments
were race-neutral) does not indicate the decline in black achieve-
ment one would expect to find if black achievement were contin-
gent upon a particular racial mix. See Washington State Report
Card, online at http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/summary.aspx?schoolId=
1099&OrgType=4&reportLevel=School; http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/
summary.aspx?schoolId=1104&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1104&yrs=;
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 19

THOMAS, J., concurring

(THOMAS, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no reason to think
that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded
by members of their own race as when they are in an
integrated environment”).
Perhaps recognizing as much, the dissent argues that
the social science evidence is “strong enough to permit a
democratically elected school board reasonably to deter
mine that this interest is a compelling one.” Post, at 38.
This assertion is inexplicable. It is not up to the school
boards—the very government entities whose race-based
practices we must strictly scrutinize—to determine what
interests qualify as compelling under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rather,
this Court must assess independently the nature of the
interest asserted and the evidence to support it in order to
determine whether it qualifies as compelling under our
precedents. In making such a determination, we have
deferred to state authorities only once, see Grutter, 539
U. S., at 328–330, and that deference was prompted by
factors uniquely relevant to higher education. Id., at 328
(“Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic
decisions”). The dissent’s proposed test—whether suffi
cient social science evidence supports a government unit’s
conclusion that the interest it asserts is compelling—calls
to mind the rational-basis standard of review the dissent
purports not to apply, post, at 36-37. See Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and
——————
http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/summary.aspx?schoolId=1061&report
Level=School&orgLinkId=1061&yrs=; http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/
summary.aspx?schoolId=1043&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1043&
yrs= (showing that reading scores went up, not down, when Seattle’s race-
based assignment program ended at Sealth High School, Ingraham High
School, and Franklin High School—some of the schools most affected by
the plan).
20 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it”). Furthermore,
it would leave our equal-protection jurisprudence at the
mercy of elected government officials evaluating the eva
nescent views of a handful of social scientists. To adopt
the dissent’s deferential approach would be to abdicate our
constitutional responsibilities.14
3
Finally, the dissent asserts a “democratic element” to
the integration interest. It defines the “democratic ele
ment” as “an interest in producing an educational envi
ronment that reflects the ‘pluralistic society’ in which our
children will live.” Post, at 39.15 Environmental reflec
——————
14 The dissent accuses me of “feel[ing] confident that, to end invidious

discrimination, one must end all governmental use of race-conscious
criteria” and chastises me for not deferring to democratically elected
majorities. See post, at 62. Regardless of what JUSTICE BREYER’s goals
might be, this Court does not sit to “create a society that includes all
Americans” or to solve the problems of “troubled inner city schooling.”
Ibid. We are not social engineers. The United States Constitution
dictates that local governments cannot make decisions on the basis of
race. Consequently, regardless of the perceived negative effects of
racial imbalance, I will not defer to legislative majorities where the
Constitution forbids it.
It should escape no one that behind JUSTICE BREYER’s veil of judicial
modesty hides an inflated role for the Federal Judiciary. The dissent’s
approach confers on judges the power to say what sorts of discrimina
tion are benign and which are invidious. Having made that determina
tion (based on no objective measure that I can detect), a judge following
the dissent’s approach will set the level of scrutiny to achieve the
desired result. Only then must the judge defer to a democratic major
ity. In my view, to defer to one’s preferred result is not to defer at all.
15 The notion that a “democratic” interest qualifies as a compelling

interest (or constitutes a part of a compelling interest) is proposed for
the first time in today’s dissent and has little basis in the Constitution
or our precedent, which has narrowly restricted the interests that
qualify as compelling. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 351–354
(2003) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact the dissent’s newly minted
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 21

THOMAS, J., concurring

tion, though, is just another way to say racial balancing.
And “[p]referring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its
own sake.” Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
“This the Constitution forbids.” Ibid.; Grutter, supra, at
329–330; Freeman, 503 U. S., at 494.
Navigating around that inconvenient authority, the
dissent argues that the racial balancing in these plans is
not an end in itself but is instead intended to “teac[h]
children to engage in the kind of cooperation among
Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land of
three hundred million people one Nation.” Post, at 39–40.
These “generic lessons in socialization and good citizen
ship” are too sweeping to qualify as compelling interests.
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 348 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). And they are not “uniquely rele
vant” to schools or “uniquely ‘teachable’ in a formal educa
tional setting.” Id., at 347. Therefore, if governments may
constitutionally use racial balancing to achieve these
aspirational ends in schools, they may use racial balancing
to achieve similar goals at every level—from state-
sponsored 4–H clubs, see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S.
385, 388–390 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring), to the state
civil service. See Grutter, 539 U. S. 347–348 (opinion of
SCALIA, J.).
Moreover, the democratic interest has no durational
limit, contrary to Grutter’s command. See id., at 342; see
also Croson, 488 U. S., at 498; Wygant, 476 U. S., at 275
(plurality opinion). In other words, it will always be im
portant for students to learn cooperation among the races.
If this interest justifies race-conscious measures today,
then logically it will justify race-conscious measures for
——————

understanding of liberty. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75

(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The Fourteenth Amendment does not

enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics”).

22 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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ever. Thus, the democratic interest, limitless in scope and
“timeless in [its] ability to affect the future,” id., at 276
(plurality opinion), cannot justify government race-based
decisionmaking.16
In addition to these defects, the democratic element of
the integration interest fails on the dissent’s own terms.
The dissent again relies upon social science research to
support the proposition that state-compelled racial mixing
teaches children to accept cooperation and improves racial
attitudes and race relations. Here again, though, the
dissent overstates the data that supposedly support the
interest.
The dissent points to data that indicate that “black and
white students in desegregated schools are less racially
prejudiced than those in segregated schools.” Post, at 40
(internal quotation marks omitted). By the dissent’s
account, improvements in racial attitudes depend upon
the increased contact between black and white students
thought to occur in more racially balanced schools. There
is no guarantee, however, that students of different races
in the same school will actually spend time with one an
other. Schools frequently group students by academic
——————
16 The dissent does not explain how its recognition of an interest in

teaching racial understanding and cooperation here is consistent with
the Court’s rejection of a similar interest in Wygant. In Wygant, a
school district justified its race-based teacher-layoff program in part on
the theory that “minority teachers provided ‘role models’ for minority
students and that a racially ‘diverse’ faculty would improve the educa
tion of all students.” Grutter, supra, at 352 (opinion of THOMAS, J.)
(citing Brief for Respondents, O. T. 1984, No. 84–1340, pp. 27–28; 476
U. S., at 315 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)). The Court rejected the inter
ests asserted to justify the layoff program as insufficiently compelling.
Wygant, 476 U. S., at 275–276 (plurality opinion); id., at 295 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment). If a school district has an interest in teaching
racial understanding and cooperation, there is no logical reason why
that interest should not extend to the composition of the teaching staff
as well as the composition of the student body. The dissent’s reliance
on this interest is, therefore, inconsistent with Wygant.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 23

THOMAS, J., concurring

ability as an aid to efficient instruction, but such group
ings often result in classrooms with high concentrations of
one race or another. See, e.g., Yonezawa, Wells, & Serna,
Choosing Tracks: “Freedom of Choice” in Detracting
Schools, 39 Am. Ed. Research J., No. 1, p. 38 (Spring
2002); Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-
Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools, 38 Am. Ed. Research J., No. 2, pp. 233–234
(Summer 2001) (describing this effect in schools in Char
lotte, North Carolina). In addition to classroom separa
tion, students of different races within the same school
may separate themselves socially. See Hallinan & Wil
liams, Interracial Friendship Choices in Secondary
Schools, 54 Am. Sociological Rev., No. 1, pp. 72–76 (Feb.
1989); see also Clotfelter, Interracial Contact in High
School Extracurricular Activities, 34 Urban Rev., No. 1,
pp. 41–43 (Mar. 2002). Therefore, even supposing interra
cial contact leads directly to improvements in racial atti
tudes and race relations, a program that assigns students
of different races to the same schools might not capture
those benefits. Simply putting students together under
the same roof does not necessarily mean that the students
will learn together or even interact.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether increased interracial
contact improves racial attitudes and relations.17 One
——————
17 Outside the school context, this Court’s cases reflect the fact that

racial mixing does not always lead to harmony and understanding. In
Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499 (2005), this Court considered a
California prison policy that separated inmates racially. Id., at 525–
528 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). That policy was necessary because of
“numerous incidents of racial violence.” Id., at 502; id., at 532–534
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). As a result of this Court’s insistence on strict
scrutiny of that policy, but see id., at 538–547, inmates in the Califor
nia prisons were killed. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U. S. ___, ___ (2006)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that two were killed and
hundreds were injured in race rioting subsequent to this Court’s
decision in Johnson).
24 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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researcher has stated that “the reviews of desegregation
and intergroup relations were unable to come to any con
clusion about what the probable effects of desegregation
were . . . [;] virtually all of the reviewers determined that
few, if any, firm conclusions about the impact of desegre
gation on intergroup relations could be drawn.” Schofield,
School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations: A Review
of the Literature, in 17 Review of Research in Education
356 (G. Grant ed. 1991). Some studies have even found
that a deterioration in racial attitudes seems to result
from racial mixing in schools. See N. St. John, School
Desegregation Outcomes for Children 67–68 (1975) (“A
glance at [the data] shows that for either race positive
findings are less common than negative findings”);
Stephan, The Effects of School Desegregation: An Evalua
tion 30 Years After Brown, in Advances in Applied Social
Psychology 183–186 (M. Saks & L. Saxe eds. 1986).
Therefore, it is not nearly as apparent as the dissent
suggests that increased interracial exposure automatically
leads to improved racial attitudes or race relations.
Given our case law and the paucity of evidence support
ing the dissent’s belief that these plans improve race
relations, no democratic element can support the integra
tion interest.18
4
The dissent attempts to buttress the integration interest
by claiming that it follows a fortiori from the interest this
——————
18 After discussing the “democratic element,” the dissent repeats its

assertion that the social science evidence supporting that interest is
“sufficiently strong to permit a school board to determine . . . that this
interest is compelling.” Post, at 40. Again, though, the school boards
have no say in deciding whether an interest is compelling. Strict
scrutiny of race-based government decisionmaking is more searching
than Chevron-style administrative review for reasonableness. See
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837, 845 (1984).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 25

THOMAS, J., concurring

Court recognized as compelling in Grutter. Post, at 41.
Regardless of the merit of Grutter, the compelling interest
recognized in that case cannot support these plans. Grut
ter recognized a compelling interest in a law school’s at
tainment of a diverse student body. 539 U. S., at 328.
This interest was critically dependent upon features
unique to higher education: “the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university envi
ronment,” the “special niche in our constitutional tradi
tion” occupied by universities, and “[t]he freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education[,]
includ[ing] the selection of its student body.” Id., at 329
(internal quotation marks omitted). None of these fea
tures is present in elementary and secondary schools.
Those schools do not select their own students, and educa
tion in the elementary and secondary environment gener
ally does not involve the free interchange of ideas thought
to be an integral part of higher education. See 426 F. 3d,
at 1208 (Bea, J., dissenting). Extending Grutter to this
context would require us to cut that holding loose from its
theoretical moorings. Thus, only by ignoring Grutter’s
reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compel
ling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of
Grutter.
C
Stripped of the baseless and novel interests the dissent
asserts on their behalf, the school boards cannot plausibly
maintain that their plans further a compelling interest.
As I explained in Grutter, only “those measures the State
must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy . . . or to
prevent violence” and “a government’s effort to remedy
past discrimination for which it is responsible” constitute
compelling interests. 539 U. S., at 351–352, 353. Neither
of the parties has argued—nor could they—that race-
based student assignment is necessary to provide a bul
26 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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wark against anarchy or to prevent violence. And as I
explained above, the school districts have no remedial
interest in pursuing these programs. See Part I–B, supra.
Accordingly, the school boards cannot satisfy strict scru
tiny. These plans are unconstitutional.
III
Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be
traced to its rejection of the color-blind Constitution. See
post, at 29. The dissent attempts to marginalize the no
tion of a color-blind Constitution by consigning it to me
and Members of today’s plurality.19 See ibid.; see also
post, at 61. But I am quite comfortable in the company I
keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view
in Plessy: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
And my view was the rallying cry for the lawyers who
litigated Brown. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants in Brown v.
Board of Education, O. T. 1953, Nos. 1, 2, and 4 p. 65
(“That the Constitution is color blind is our dedicated
belief”); Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Educa
tion, O. T. 1952, No. 1, p. 5 (“The Fourteenth Amendment
precludes a state from imposing distinctions or classifica

——————
19 The dissent half-heartedly attacks the historical underpinnings of

the color-blind Constitution. Post, at 28–29. I have no quarrel with the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former
slaves into American society as full members. Post, at 28 (citing
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71–72 (1873)). What the dissent
fails to understand, however, is that the color-blind Constitution does
not bar the government from taking measures to remedy past state-
sponsored discrimination—indeed, it requires that such measures be
taken in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Part I–B, supra. Race-based
government measures during the 1860’s and 1870’s to remedy state-
enforced slavery were therefore not inconsistent with the color-blind
Constitution.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 27

THOMAS, J., concurring

tions based upon race and color alone”);20 see also In Mem
oriam: Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Proceedings of the
Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United
States, X (1993) (remarks of Judge Motley) (“Marshall had
a ‘Bible’ to which he turned during his most depressed
moments. The ‘Bible’ would be known in the legal com
munity as the first Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 552 (1896). I do not know of
any opinion which buoyed Marshall more in his pre-Brown
days . . .”).
The dissent appears to pin its interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause to current societal practice and
expectations, deference to local officials, likely practical
consequences, and reliance on previous statements from
this and other courts. Such a view was ascendant in this
Court’s jurisprudence for several decades. It first ap
peared in Plessy, where the Court asked whether a state
law providing for segregated railway cars was “a reason
able regulation.” 163 U. S., at 550. The Court deferred to
local authorities in making its determination, noting that
in inquiring into reasonableness “there must necessarily
be a large discretion on the part of the legislature.” Ibid.
The Court likewise paid heed to societal practices, local
expectations, and practical consequences by looking to “the
established usages, customs and traditions of the people,
——————
20 See also Juris. Statement in Davis v. County School Board, O. T.

1952, No. 3, p. 8 (“[W]e take the unqualified position that the Four
teenth Amendment has totally stripped the state of power to make race
and color the basis for governmental action”); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Brown
v. Board of Education, O. T. 1952, No. 1, p. 7 (“We have one fundamen
tal contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argu
ment, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the
equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a
factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens”); Tr. of
Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 50 (“[T]he state is
deprived of any power to make any racial classifications in any gov
ernmental field”).
28 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order.” Ibid.
Guided by these principles, the Court concluded: “[W]e
cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires
the separation of the two races in public conveyances is
unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth
Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia.”
Id., at 550–551.
The segregationists in Brown embraced the arguments
the Court endorsed in Plessy. Though Brown decisively
rejected those arguments, today’s dissent replicates them
to a distressing extent. Thus, the dissent argues that
“[e]ach plan embodies the results of local experience and
community consultation.” Post, at 47. Similarly, the
segregationists made repeated appeals to societal practice
and expectation. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargu
ment in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 76 (“[A]
State has power to establish a school system which is
capable of efficient administration, taking into account
local problems and conditions”).21 The dissent argues that
——————
21 See also Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O. T.

1952, No. 3, p. 1 (“[T]he Court is asked . . . to outlaw the fixed policies of
the several States which are based on local social conditions well known
to the respective legislatures”); id., at 9 (“For this purpose, Virginia
history and present Virginia conditions are important”); Tr. of Oral Arg.
in Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1952, No. 3, p. 57 (“[T]he his
torical background that exists, certainly in this Virginia situation, with
all the strife and the history that we have shown in this record, shows a
basis, a real basis, for the classification that has been made”); id., at 69
(describing the potential abolition of segregation as “contrary to the
customs, the traditions and the mores of what we might claim to be a
great people, established through generations, who themselves are
fiercely and irrevocably dedicated to the preservation of the white and
colored races”). Accord, post, at 68 (“Today, almost 50 years later,
attitudes toward race in this Nation have changed dramatically. Many
parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools
with children of different races. Indeed, the very school districts that
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THOMAS, J., concurring

“weight [must be given] to a local school board’s knowl
edge, expertise, and concerns,” post, at 48, and with equal
vigor, the segregationists argued for deference to local
authorities. See, e.g., Brief for Kansas on Reargument in
Brown v. Board of Education, O. T. 1953, No. 1, p. 14 (“We
advocate only a concept of constitutional law that permits
determinations of state and local policy to be made on
state and local levels. We defend only the validity of the
statute that enables the Topeka Board of Education to
determine its own course”).22 The dissent argues that
——————
once spurned integration now strive for it. The long history of their
efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they have faced”); post,
at 21 (emphasizing the importance of “local circumstances” and encour
aging different localities to “try different solutions to common problems
and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them
best to suit their individual needs” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)); post, at 48 (emphasizing the school districts’ “40-year
history” during which both school districts have tried numerous ap
proaches “to achieve more integrated schools”); post, at 63 (“[T]he
histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a
long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards”).
22 See also Brief for Appellees in Brown v. Board of Education, O. T.

1952, No. 1, p. 29 (“ ‘It is universally held, therefore, that each state
shall determine for itself, subject to the observance of the fundamental
rights and liberties guaranteed by the federal Constitution, how it shall
exercise the police power . . . . And in no field is this right of the several
states more clearly recognized than in that of public education’ ” (quot
ing Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 532 (SC 1951))); Brief for Appel
lees in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1952, No. 2, p. 7 (“Local self-government
in local affairs is essential to the peace and happiness of each locality
and to the strength and stability of our whole federal system. Nowhere
is this more profoundly true than in the field of education”); Tr. of Oral
Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1952, No. 2, pp. 54–55 (“What is the great
national and federal policy on this matter? Is it not a fact that the very
strength and fiber of our federal system is local self-government in
those matters for which local action is competent? Is it not of all the
activities of government the one which most nearly approaches the
hearts and minds of people, the question of the education of their
young? Is it not the height of wisdom that the manner in which that
shall be conducted should be left to those most immediately affected by
30 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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THOMAS, J., concurring

today’s decision “threatens to substitute for present calm a
disruptive round of race-related litigation,” post, at 2, and
claims that today’s decision “risks serious harm to the law
and for the Nation,” post, at 65. The segregationists also
relied upon the likely practical consequences of ending the
state-imposed system of racial separation. See, e.g., Brief
for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School
Board, O. T. 1953, No. 3, p. 37 (“Yet a holding that school
segregation by race violates the Constitution will result in
upheaval in all of those places not now subject to Federal
judicial scrutiny. This Court has made many decisions of
widespread effect; none would affect more people more
directly in more fundamental interests and, in fact, cause
more chaos in local government than a reversal of the
decision in this case”).23 And foreshadowing today’s dis
——————
it, and that the wishes of the parents, both white and colored, should be
ascertained before their children are forced into what may be an
unwelcome contact?”). Accord, post, at 48 (“[L]ocal school boards better
understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of
what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils”);
post, at 66 (“[W]hat of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by
States and school boards?”); ibid. (explaining “that the Constitution
grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway”).
23 See also Reply Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board,

O. T. 1953, No. 3, p. 17 (“The Court is . . . dealing with thousands of
local school districts and schools. Is each to be the subject of litigation
in the District Courts?”); Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v.
Board of Education, O. T. 1953, No. 1, p. 51 (“The delicate nature of the
problem of segregation and the paramount interest of the State of
Kansas in preserving the internal peace and tranquility of its people
indicates that this is a question which can best be solved on the local
level, at least until Congress declares otherwise”). Accord, post, at 61
(“At a minimum, the plurality’s views would threaten a surge of race-
based litigation. Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regula
tions use racial classifications for educational or other purposes. . . . In
many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these
classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm”); post, at
65 (“Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today
are serious. Yesterday, the plans under review were lawful. Today,
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 31

THOMAS, J., concurring

sent, the segregationists most heavily relied upon judicial
precedent. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in
Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 59 (“[I]t would be
difficult indeed to find a case so favored by precedent as is
the case for South Carolina here”).24
——————
they are not”); post, at 66 (predicting “further litigation, aggravating
race-related conflict”).
24 See also Statement of Appellees Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion

to Dismiss or Affirm in Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1952, No. 3,
p. 5 (“[I]t would be difficult to find from any field of law a legal principle
more repeatedly and conclusively decided than the one sought to be
raised by appellants”); Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School
Board, O. T. 1953, No. 3, p. 46–47 (“If this case were to be decided
solely on the basis of precedent, this brief could have been much more
limited. There is ample precedent in the decisions of this Court to
uphold school segregation”); Brief for Petitioners in Gebhart v. Belton,
O. T. 1952, No. 5, p. 27 (“Respondents ask this Court to upset a long
established and well settled principle recognized by numerous state
Legislatures, and Courts, both state and federal, over a long period of
years”); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 79
(“But be that doctrine what it may, somewhere, sometime to every
principle comes a moment of repose when it has been so often an
nounced, so confidently relied upon, so long continued, that it passes
the limits of judicial discretion and disturbance. . . . We relied on the
fact that this Court had not once but seven times, I think it is, pro
nounced in favor of the separate but equal doctrine. We relied on the
fact that the courts of last appeal of some sixteen or eighteen States
have passed upon the validity of the separate but equal doctrine vis-a
vis the Fourteenth Amendment. We relied on the fact that Congress
has continuously since 1862 segregated its schools in the District of
Columbia”); Brief for Appellees in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1952, No. 2,
App. D (collecting citations of state and federal cases “[w]hich
[e]nunciate the [p]rinciple that [s]tate [l]aws [p]roviding for [r]acial
[s]egregation in the [p]ublic [s]chools do not [c]onflict with the Four
teenth Amendment”). Accord, post, at 22 (“[T]he Court set forth in
Swann a basic principle of constitutional law—a principle of law that
has found wide acceptance in the legal culture” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)); post, at 25 (“Lower state and federal courts
had considered the matter settled and uncontroversial even before this
Court decided Swann”); post, at 26 (“Numerous state and federal courts
explicitly relied upon Swann’s guidance for decades to follow”); post, at
32 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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The similarities between the dissent’s arguments and
the segregationists’ arguments do not stop there. Like the
dissent, the segregationists repeatedly cautioned the
Court to consider practicalities and not to embrace too
theoretical a view of the Fourteenth Amendment.25 And
just as the dissent argues that the need for these pro
grams will lessen over time, the segregationists claimed
that reliance on segregation was lessening and might
eventually end.26
——————
27 (stating “how lower courts understood and followed Swann’s enun
ciation of the relevant legal principle”); post, at 30 (“The constitutional
principle enunciated in Swann, reiterated in subsequent cases, and
relied upon over many years, provides, and has widely been thought to
provide, authoritative legal guidance”); post, at 61 (“[T]oday’s opinion
will require setting aside the laws of several States and many local
communities”); post, at 66 (“And what has happened to Swann? To
McDaniel? To Crawford? To Harris? To School Committee of Boston?
To Seattle School Dist. No. 1? After decades of vibrant life, they would
all, under the plurality’s logic, be written out of the law”).
25 Compare Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O. T.

1952, No. 3, p. 16–17 (“ ‘It is by such practical considerations based on
experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question
of equal protection is to be answered’ ” (quoting Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 110 (1949))); Brief for Appellees on
Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1953, No. 3, p. 76
(“The question is a practical one for them to solve; it is not subject to
solution in the theoretical realm of abstract principles”); Tr. of Oral
Arg. in Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1953, No. 4, p. 86 (“[Y]ou
cannot talk about this problem just in a vacuum in the manner of a law
school discussion”), with post, at 57 (“The Founders meant the
Constitution as a practical document”).
26 Compare Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of

Education, O. T. 1953, No. 1, p. 57 (“[T]he people of Kansas . . . are
abandoning the policy of segregation whenever local conditions and
local attitudes make it feasible”), Brief for Appellees on Reargument in
Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1953, No. 3, p. 76 (“As time passes,
it may well be that segregation will end”), with post, at 19 (“[T]hey use
race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways”);
post, at 48 (“[E]ach plan’s use of race-conscious elements is diminished
compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans”); post, at 55
(describing the “historically-diminishing use of race” in the school
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 33

THOMAS, J., concurring

What was wrong in 1954 cannot be right today.27 What
ever else the Court’s rejection of the segregationists’ ar
guments in Brown might have established, it certainly
made clear that state and local governments cannot take
from the Constitution a right to make decisions on the
basis of race by adverse possession. The fact that state
and local governments had been discriminating on the
basis of race for a long time was irrelevant to the Brown
Court. The fact that racial discrimination was preferable
to the relevant communities was irrelevant to the Brown
Court. And the fact that the state and local governments
had relied on statements in this Court’s opinions was
irrelevant to the Brown Court. The same principles guide
today’s decision. None of the considerations trumpeted by
the dissent is relevant to the constitutionality of the school
boards’ race-based plans because no contextual detail—or
——————
districts).
27 It is no answer to say that these cases can be distinguished from

Brown because Brown involved invidious racial classifications whereas
the racial classifications here are benign. See post, at 62. How does
one tell when a racial classification is invidious? The segregationists in
Brown argued that their racial classifications were benign, not invidi
ous. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 83 (“It
[South Carolina] is confident of its good faith and intention to produce
equality for all of its children of whatever race or color. It is convinced
that the happiness, the progress and the welfare of these children is
best promoted in segregated schools”); Brief for Appellees on Reargu
ment in Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1953, No. 3, p. 82–83 (“Our
many hours of research and investigation have led only to confirmation
of our view that segregation by race in Virginia’s public schools at this
time not only does not offend the Constitution of the United States but
serves to provide a better education for living for the children of both
races”); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1952,
No. 3, p. 71 (“[T]o make such a transition, would undo what we have
been doing, and which we propose to continue to do for the uplift and
advancement of the education of both races. It would stop this march of
progress, this onward sweep”). It is the height of arrogance for Mem
bers of this Court to assert blindly that their motives are better than
others.
34 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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collection of contextual details, post, at 2–22—can “provide
refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the
government may not make distinctions on the basis of
race.” Adarand, 515 U. S., at 240 (THOMAS, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).28
In place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent
would permit measures to keep the races together and
proscribe measures to keep the races apart.29 See post, at
28–34, 64–65. Although no such distinction is apparent in
——————
28 See also id., at 8–9 (“It has been urged that [these state laws and

policies] derive validity as a consequence of a long duration supported
and made possible by a long line of judicial decisions, including expres
sions in some of the decisions of this Court. At the same time, it is
urged that these laws are valid as a matter of constitutionally permis
sible social experimentation by the States. On the matter of stare
decisis, I submit that the duration of the challenged practice, while it is
persuasive, is not controlling. . . . As a matter of social experimentation,
the laws in question must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution.
While this Court has permitted the States to legislate or otherwise
officially act experimentally in the social and economic fields, it has
always recognized and held that this power is subject to the limitations
of the Constitution, and that the tests of the Constitution must be
met”); Reply Brief for Appellants in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. 2,
pp. 18–19 (“The truth of the matter is that this is an attempt to place
local mores and customs above the high equalitarian principles of our
Government as set forth in our Constitution and particularly the
Fourteenth Amendment. This entire contention is tantamount to
saying that the vindication and enjoyment of constitutional rights
recognized by this Court as present and personal can be postponed
whenever such postponement is claimed to be socially desirable”).
29 The dissent does not face the complicated questions attending its

proposed standard. For example, where does the dissent’s principle
stop? Can the government force racial mixing against the will of those
being mixed? Can the government force black families to relocate to
white neighborhoods in the name if bringing the races together? What
about historically black colleges, which have “established traditions and
programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another”?
United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 749 (1992) (THOMAS, J., concur
ring). The dissent does not and cannot answer these questions because
the contours of the distinction it propounds rest entirely in the eye of
the beholder.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 35

THOMAS, J., concurring

the Fourteenth Amendment, the dissent would constitu
tionalize today’s faddish social theories that embrace that
distinction. The Constitution is not that malleable. Even
if current social theories favor classroom racial engineer
ing as necessary to “solve the problems at hand,” post, at
21, the Constitution enshrines principles independent of
social theories. See Plessy, 163 U. S., at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“The white race deems itself to be the domi
nant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time . . . . But in
view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
. . . Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens”). Indeed, if our history
has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware of
elites bearing racial theories.30 See, e.g., Dred Scott v.
——————
30 JUSTICE BREYER’s good intentions, which I do not doubt, have the

shelf life of JUSTICE BREYER’s tenure. Unlike the dissenters, I am
unwilling to delegate my constitutional responsibilities to local school
boards and allow them to experiment with race-based decisionmaking
on the assumption that their intentions will forever remain as good as
JUSTICE BREYER’s. See The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(“If men were angels, no government would be necessary”). Indeed, the
racial theories endorsed by the Seattle school board should cause the
dissenters to question whether local school boards should be entrusted
with the power to make decisions on the basis of race. The Seattle
school district’s Website formerly contained the following definition of
“cultural racism”: “Those aspects of society that overtly and covertly
attribute value and normality to white people and whiteness, and
devalue, stereotype, and label people of color as ‘other,’ different, less
than, or render them invisible. Examples of these norms include
defining white skin tones as nude or flesh colored, having a future time
orientation, emphasizing individualism as opposed to a more collective
ideology, defining one form of English as standard . . . .” See Harrell,
School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controversy,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, p. B1. After the site was
removed, the district offered the comforting clarification that the site
was not intended “ ‘to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as melting
36 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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THOMAS, J., concurring

Sandford, 19 How. 393, 407 (1857) (“[T]hey [members of
the “negro African race”] had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect”). Can we really be sure that
the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy
are a relic of the past or that future theories will be noth
ing but beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am
unwilling to take, and it is one the Constitution does not
allow.
* * *
The plans before us base school assignment decisions on
students’ race. Because “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,”
such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional.
Plessy, supra, at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). I concur in
THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion so holding.

——————
pot or colorblind mentality.’ ” Ibid.; see also ante, at 22, n. 15 (plurality
opinion).
More recently, the school district sent a delegation of high school
students to a “White Privilege Conference.” See Equity and Race
Relations White Privilege Conference, https://www.seattleschools.
org/area/equityandrace/whiteprivilegeconference.xml. One conference
participant described “white privilege” as “an invisible package of
unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about
which I was meant to remain oblivious. White Privilege is like an
invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports,
codebooks, visas, clothes, tools, and blank checks.” See White Privilege
Conference, Questions and Answers, http://www.uccs.edu/~wpc/
faqs.htm; see generally Westneat, School District’s Obsessed with Race,
Seattle Times, Apr. 1, 2007, p. B1 (describing racial issues in Seattle
schools).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–908 and 05–915
_________________

PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS, PETITIONER
05–908 v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, CUSTODIAL PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF JOSHUA RYAN MCDONALD, PETITIONER
05–915 v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 28, 2007]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
The Nation’s schools strive to teach that our strength
comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures
uniting in commitment to the freedom of all. In these
cases two school districts in different parts of the country
seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that
reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community.
That the school districts consider these plans to be neces
sary should remind us our highest aspirations are yet
unfulfilled. But the solutions mandated by these school
districts must themselves be lawful. To make race matter
now so that it might not matter later may entrench the
very prejudices we seek to overcome. In my view the
state-mandated racial classifications at issue, official
2 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

labels proclaiming the race of all persons in a broad class
of citizens—elementary school students in one case, high
school students in another—are unconstitutional as the
cases now come to us.
I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that we have jurisdic
tion to decide the cases before us and join Parts I and II of
the Court’s opinion. I also join Parts III–A and III–C for
reasons provided below. My views do not allow me to join
the balance of the opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, which
seems to me to be inconsistent in both its approach and its
implications with the history, meaning, and reach of the
Equal Protection Clause. JUSTICE BREYER’s dissenting
opinion, on the other hand, rests on what in my respectful
submission is a misuse and mistaken interpretation of our
precedents. This leads it to advance propositions that, in
my view, are both erroneous and in fundamental conflict
with basic equal protection principles. As a consequence,
this separate opinion is necessary to set forth my conclu
sions in the two cases before the Court.
I
The opinion of the Court and JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent
ing opinion (hereinafter dissent) describe in detail the
history of integration efforts in Louisville and Seattle.
These plans classify individuals by race and allocate bene
fits and burdens on that basis; and as a result, they are to
be subjected to strict scrutiny. See Johnson v. California,
543 U. S. 499, 505–506 (2005); ante, at 11. The dissent
finds that the school districts have identified a compelling
interest in increasing diversity, including for the purpose
of avoiding racial isolation. See post, at 37–45. The plu
rality, by contrast, does not acknowledge that the school
districts have identified a compelling interest here. See
ante, at 17–25. For this reason, among others, I do not
join Parts III–B and IV. Diversity, depending on its mean
ing and definition, is a compelling educational goal a
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

school district may pursue.
It is well established that when a governmental policy is
subjected to strict scrutiny, “the government has the
burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests.’ ” Johnson, supra, at 505 (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995)).
“Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for
such race-based measures, there is simply no way of de
termining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegiti
mate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion). And the inquiry into less restrictive
alternatives demanded by the narrow tailoring analysis
requires in many cases a thorough understanding of how a
plan works. The government bears the burden of justify
ing its use of individual racial classifications. As part of
that burden it must establish, in detail, how decisions
based on an individual student’s race are made in a chal
lenged governmental program. The Jefferson County
Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate.
Petitioner Crystal Meredith challenges the district’s
decision to deny her son Joshua McDonald a requested
transfer for his kindergarten enrollment. The district
concedes it denied his request “under the guidelines,”
which is to say, on the basis of Joshua’s race. Brief for
Respondents in No. 05–915, p. 10; see also App. in No. 05–
915, p. 97. Yet the district also maintains that the guide
lines do not apply to “kindergartens,” Brief for Respon
dents in No. 05–915, at 4, and it fails to explain the dis
crepancy. Resort to the record, including the parties’
Stipulation of Facts, further confuses the matter. See
App. in No. 05–915, at 43 (“Transfer applications can be
denied because of lack of available space or, for students in
grades other than Primary 1 (kindergarten), the racial
4 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

guidelines in the District’s current student assignment
plan”); id., at 29 (“The student assignment plan does not
apply to . . . students in Primary 1”); see also Stipulation
of Facts in No. 3:02–CV–00620–JGH; Doc. 32, Exh. 44,
p. 6 (2003–04 Jefferson County Public Schools Elementary
Student Assignment Application, Section B) (“Assignment
is made to a school for Primary 1 (Kindergarten) through
Grade Five as long as racial guidelines are maintained. If
the Primary 1 (Kindergarten) placement does not enhance
racial balance, a new application must be completed for
Primary 2 (Grade One)”).
The discrepancy identified is not some simple and
straightforward error that touches only upon the peripher
ies of the district’s use of individual racial classifications.
To the contrary, Jefferson County in its briefing has ex
plained how and when it employs these classifications only
in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot with
stand strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in
No. 05–915, at 4–10. While it acknowledges that racial
classifications are used to make certain assignment deci
sions, it fails to make clear, for example, who makes the
decisions; what if any oversight is employed; the precise
circumstances in which an assignment decision will or will
not be made on the basis of race; or how it is determined
which of two similarly situated children will be subjected
to a given race-based decision. See ibid.; see also App. in
No. 05–915, at 38, 42 (indicating that decisions are “based
on . . . the racial guidelines” without further explanation);
id., at 81 (setting forth the blanket mandate that
“[s]chools shall work cooperatively with each other and
with central office to ensure that enrollment at all schools
[in question] is within the racial guidelines annually and
to encourage that the enrollment at all schools progresses
toward the midpoint of the guidelines”); id., at 43, 76–77,
81–83; McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 330
F. Supp. 2d 834, 837–845, 855–862 (WD Ky. 2004).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

When litigation, as here, involves a “complex, compre
hensive plan that contains multiple strategies for achiev
ing racially integrated schools,” Brief for Respondents in
No. 05–915, at 4, these ambiguities become all the more
problematic in light of the contradictions and confusions
that result. Compare, e.g., App. in No. 05–915, at 37
(“Each [Jefferson County] school . . . has a designated
geographic attendance area, which is called the ‘resides
area’ of the school[, and each] such school is the ‘resides
school’ for those students whose parent’s or guardian’s
residence address is within the school’s geographic atten
dance area”); id., at 82 (“All elementary students . . . shall
be assigned to the school which serves the area in which
they reside”); and Brief for Respondents in No. 05–915, at
5 (“There are no selection criteria for admission to [an
elementary school student’s] resides school, except at
tainment of the appropriate age and completion of the
previous grade”), with App. in No. 05–915, at 38 (“Deci
sions to assign students to schools within each cluster are
based on available space within the [elementary] schools
and the racial guidelines in the District’s current student
assignment plan”); id., at 82 (acknowledging that a stu
dent may not be assigned to his or her resides school if it
“has reached . . . the extremes of the racial guidelines”).
One can attempt to identify a construction of Jefferson
County’s student assignment plan that, at least as a logi
cal matter, complies with these competing propositions;
but this does not remedy the underlying problem. Jeffer
son County fails to make clear to this Court—even in the
limited respects implicated by Joshua’s initial assignment
and transfer denial—whether in fact it relies on racial
classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the inter
est in question, rather than in the far-reaching, inconsis
tent, and ad hoc manner that a less forgiving reading of
the record would suggest. When a court subjects govern
mental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambi
6 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

guities in favor of the State.
As for the Seattle case, the school district has gone
further in describing the methods and criteria used to
determine assignment decisions on the basis of individual
racial classifications. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in
No. 05–908, p. 5–11. The district, nevertheless, has failed
to make an adequate showing in at least one respect. It
has failed to explain why, in a district composed of a di
versity of races, with fewer than half of the students clas
sified as “white,” it has employed the crude racial catego
ries of “white” and “non-white” as the basis for its
assignment decisions. See, e.g., id., at 1–11.
The district has identified its purposes as follows: “(1) to
promote the educational benefits of diverse school enroll
ments; (2) to reduce the potentially harmful effects of
racial isolation by allowing students the opportunity to opt
out of racially isolated schools; and (3) to make sure that
racially segregated housing patterns did not prevent non
white students from having equitable access to the most
popular over-subscribed schools.” Id., at 19. Yet the
school district does not explain how, in the context of its
diverse student population, a blunt distinction between
“white” and “non-white” furthers these goals. As the
Court explains, “a school with 50 percent Asian-American
students and 50 percent white students but no African-
American, Native-American, or Latino students would
qualify as balanced, while a school with 30 percent Asian-
American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent La
tino, and 20 percent white students would not.” Ante, at
15–16; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
in No. 05–908, pp. 13–14. Far from being narrowly tai
lored to its purposes, this system threatens to defeat its
own ends, and the school district has provided no convinc
ing explanation for its design. Other problems are evident
in Seattle’s system, but there is no need to address them
now. As the district fails to account for the classification
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

system it has chosen, despite what appears to be its ill fit,
Seattle has not shown its plan to be narrowly tailored
to achieve its own ends; and thus it fails to pass strict
scrutiny.
II
Our Nation from the inception has sought to preserve
and expand the promise of liberty and equality on which it
was founded. Today we enjoy a society that is remarkable
in its openness and opportunity. Yet our tradition is to go
beyond present achievements, however significant, and to
recognize and confront the flaws and injustices that re
main. This is especially true when we seek assurance that
opportunity is not denied on account of race. The endur
ing hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that
too often it does.
This is by way of preface to my respectful submission
that parts of the opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE imply an
all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in
instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account.
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal
opportunity regardless of their race. The plurality’s postu
late that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,” ante, at
40–41, is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years
of experience since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 (1954), should teach us that the problem before us
defies so easy a solution. School districts can seek to reach
Brown’s objective of equal educational opportunity. The
plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that
the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot
endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opin
ion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and
local school authorities must accept the status quo of
8 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly
mistaken.
The statement by Justice Harlan that “[o]ur Constitu
tion is color-blind” was most certainly justified in the
context of his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537,
559 (1896). The Court’s decision in that case was a griev
ous error it took far too long to overrule. Plessy, of course,
concerned official classification by race applicable to all
persons who sought to use railway carriages. And, as an
aspiration, Justice Harlan’s axiom must command our
assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot
be a universal constitutional principle.
In the administration of public schools by the state and
local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial
makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encour
age a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003);
id., at 387–388 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). If school au
thorities are concerned that the student-body compositions
of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an
equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they
are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the
problem in a general way and without treating each stu
dent in different fashion solely on the basis of a system
atic, individual typing by race.
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other
means, including strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance,
and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are race
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be
defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would de
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

mand strict scrutiny to be found permissible. See Bush v.
Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“Strict
scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is
performed with consciousness of race. . . . Electoral district
lines are ‘facially race neutral’ so a more searching inquiry
is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable
in redistricting cases than in cases of ‘classifications based
explicitly on race’ ” (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 213)).
Executive and legislative branches, which for generations
now have considered these types of policies and proce
dures, should be permitted to employ them with candor
and with confidence that a constitutional violation does
not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact
a given approach might have on students of different
races. Assigning to each student a personal designation
according to a crude system of individual racial classifica
tions is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis
changes accordingly.
Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of
individual students by race is permissible because there is
no other way to avoid racial isolation in the school dis
tricts. Yet, as explained, each has failed to provide the
support necessary for that proposition. Cf. Croson, 488
U. S., at 501 (“The history of racial classifications in this
country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative
or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in
equal protection analysis”). And individual racial classifi
cations employed in this manner may be considered le
gitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compel
ling interest. See id., at 519 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
In the cases before us it is noteworthy that the number
of students whose assignment depends on express racial
classifications is limited. I join Part III–C of the Court’s
opinion because I agree that in the context of these plans,
the small number of assignments affected suggests that
10 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

the schools could have achieved their stated ends through
different means. These include the facially race-neutral
means set forth above or, if necessary, a more nuanced,
individual evaluation of school needs and student charac
teristics that might include race as a component. The
latter approach would be informed by Grutter, though of
course the criteria relevant to student placement would
differ based on the age of the students, the needs of the
parents, and the role of the schools.
III
The dissent rests on the assumptions that these sweep
ing race-based classifications of persons are permitted by
existing precedents; that its confident endorsement of race
categories for each child in a large segment of the commu
nity presents no danger to individual freedom in other,
prospective realms of governmental regulation; and that
the racial classifications used here cause no hurt or anger
of the type the Constitution prevents. Each of these prem
ises is, in my respectful view, incorrect.
A
The dissent’s reliance on this Court’s precedents to
justify the explicit, sweeping, classwide racial classifica
tions at issue here is a misreading of our authorities that,
it appears to me, tends to undermine well-accepted princi
ples needed to guard our freedom. And in his critique of
that analysis, I am in many respects in agreement with
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. The conclusions he has set forth in
Part III–A of the Court’s opinion are correct, in my view,
because the compelling interests implicated in the cases
before us are distinct from the interests the Court has
recognized in remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination and in increasing diversity in higher edu
cation. See ante, at 12–13. As the Court notes, we recog
nized the compelling nature of the interest in remedying
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

past intentional discrimination in Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U. S. 467, 494 (1992), and of the interest in diversity in
higher education in Grutter. At the same time, these
compelling interests, in my view, do help inform the pre
sent inquiry. And to the extent the plurality opinion can
be interpreted to foreclose consideration of these interests,
I disagree with that reasoning.
As to the dissent, the general conclusions upon which it
relies have no principled limit and would result in the
broad acceptance of governmental racial classifications in
areas far afield from schooling. The dissent’s permissive
strict scrutiny (which bears more than a passing resem
blance to rational-basis review) could invite widespread
governmental deployment of racial classifications. There
is every reason to think that, if the dissent’s rationale
were accepted, Congress, assuming an otherwise proper
exercise of its spending authority or commerce power,
could mandate either the Seattle or the Jefferson County
plans nationwide. There seems to be no principled rule,
moreover, to limit the dissent’s rationale to the context of
public schools. The dissent emphasizes local control, see
post, at 48–49, the unique history of school desegregation,
see post, at 2, and the fact that these plans make less use
of race than prior plans, see post, at 57, but these factors
seem more rhetorical than integral to the analytical struc
ture of the opinion.
This brings us to the dissent’s reliance on the Court’s
opinions in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244 (2003), and
Grutter, 539 U. S. 306. If today’s dissent said it was ad
hering to the views expressed in the separate opinions in
Gratz and Grutter, see Gratz, 539 U. S., at 281 (BREYER,
J., concurring in judgment); id., at 282 (STEVENS, J., dis
senting); id., at 291 (SOUTER, J., dissenting); id., at 298
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Grutter, supra, at 344
(GINSBURG, J., concurring), that would be understandable,
and likely within the tradition—to be invoked, in my view,
12 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

in rare instances—that permits us to maintain our own
positions in the face of stare decisis when fundamental
points of doctrine are at stake. See, e.g., Federal Maritime
Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743,
770 (2002) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). To say, however,
that we must ratify the racial classifications here at issue
based on the majority opinions in Gratz and Grutter is,
with all respect, simply baffling.
Gratz involved a system where race was not the entire
classification. The procedures in Gratz placed much less
reliance on race than do the plans at issue here. The issue
in Gratz arose, moreover, in the context of college admis
sions where students had other choices and precedent
supported the proposition that First Amendment interests
give universities particular latitude in defining diversity.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312–
314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Even so the race factor
was found to be invalid. Gratz, supra, at 251. If Gratz is
to be the measure, the racial classification systems here
are a fortiori invalid. If the dissent were to say that col
lege cases are simply not applicable to public school sys
tems in kindergarten through high school, this would
seem to me wrong, but at least an arguable distinction.
Under no fair reading, though, can the majority opinion in
Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifica
tions under consideration here.
The same must be said for the controlling opinion in
Grutter. There the Court sustained a system that, it
found, was flexible enough to take into account “all perti
nent elements of diversity,” 539 U. S., at 341 (internal
quotation marks omitted), and considered race as only one
factor among many, id., at 340. Seattle’s plan, by con
trast, relies upon a mechanical formula that has denied
hundreds of students their preferred schools on the basis
of three rigid criteria: placement of siblings, distance from
schools, and race. If those students were considered for a
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

whole range of their talents and school needs with race as
just one consideration, Grutter would have some applica
tion. That, though, is not the case. The only support
today’s dissent can draw from Grutter must be found in its
various separate opinions, not in the opinion filed for the
Court.
B
To uphold these programs the Court is asked to brush
aside two concepts of central importance for determining
the validity of laws and decrees designed to alleviate the
hurt and adverse consequences resulting from race dis
crimination. The first is the difference between de jure
and de facto segregation; the second, the presumptive
invalidity of a State’s use of racial classifications to differ
entiate its treatment of individuals.
In the immediate aftermath of Brown the Court ad
dressed other instances where laws and practices enforced
de jure segregation. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 (1967) (marriage); New Orleans City Park Improvement
Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public
parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 (1956) (per cu
riam) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955) (per
curiam) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U. S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches). But with refer
ence to schools, the effect of the legal wrong proved most
difficult to correct. To remedy the wrong, school districts
that had been segregated by law had no choice, whether
under court supervision or pursuant to voluntary desegre
gation efforts, but to resort to extraordinary measures
including individual student and teacher assignment to
schools based on race. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 8–10 (1971); see also
Croson, 488 U. S., at 519 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (noting that racial classifica
tions “may be the only adequate remedy after a judicial
14 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

determination that a State or its instrumentality has
violated the Equal Protection Clause”). So it was, as the
dissent observes, see post, at 13–14, that Louisville classi
fied children by race in its school assignment and busing
plan in the 1970’s.
Our cases recognized a fundamental difference between
those school districts that had engaged in de jure segrega
tion and those whose segregation was the result of other
factors. School districts that had engaged in de jure seg
regation had an affirmative constitutional duty to deseg
regate; those that were de facto segregated did not. Com
pare Green v. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430,
437–438 (1968), with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717,
745 (1974). The distinctions between de jure and de facto
segregation extended to the remedies available to govern
mental units in addition to the courts. For example, in
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 274 (1986),
the plurality noted: “This Court never has held that socie
tal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial
classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved before allowing limited use of racial classifica
tions in order to remedy such discrimination.” The Court’s
decision in Croson, supra, reinforced the difference be
tween the remedies available to redress de facto and de
jure discrimination:
“To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination
alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial prefer
ences would be to open the door to competing claims
for ‘remedial relief’ for every disadvantaged group.
The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society
where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and
achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting
preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims
of past wrongs.” Id., at 505–506.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

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From the standpoint of the victim, it is true, an injury
stemming from racial prejudice can hurt as much when
the demeaning treatment based on race identity stems
from bias masked deep within the social order as when it
is imposed by law. The distinction between government
and private action, furthermore, can be amorphous both as
a historical matter and as a matter of present-day finding
of fact. Laws arise from a culture and vice versa. Neither
can assign to the other all responsibility for persisting
injustices.
Yet, like so many other legal categories that can overlap
in some instances, the constitutional distinction between
de jure and de facto segregation has been thought to be an
important one. It must be conceded its primary function
in school cases was to delimit the powers of the Judiciary
in the fashioning of remedies. See, e.g., Milliken, supra, at
746. The distinction ought not to be altogether disre
garded, however, when we come to that most sensitive of
all racial issues, an attempt by the government to treat
whole classes of persons differently based on the govern
ment’s systematic classification of each individual by race.
There, too, the distinction serves as a limit on the exercise
of a power that reaches to the very verge of constitutional
authority. Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial
identity for differential treatment is among the most
pernicious actions our government can undertake. The
allocation of governmental burdens and benefits, conten
tious under any circumstances, is even more divisive when
allocations are made on the basis of individual racial
classifications. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U. S. 265 (1978); Adarand, 515 U. S. 200.
Notwithstanding these concerns, allocation of benefits
and burdens through individual racial classifications was
found sometimes permissible in the context of remedies for
de jure wrong. Where there has been de jure segregation,
there is a cognizable legal wrong, and the courts and
16 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

legislatures have broad power to remedy it. The remedy,
though, was limited in time and limited to the wrong. The
Court has allowed school districts to remedy their prior de
jure segregation by classifying individual students based
on their race. See North Carolina Bd. of Ed. v. Swann,
402 U. S. 43, 45–46 (1971). The limitation of this power to
instances where there has been de jure segregation serves
to confine the nature, extent, and duration of governmen
tal reliance on individual racial classifications.
The cases here were argued upon the assumption, and
come to us on the premise, that the discrimination in
question did not result from de jure actions. And when de
facto discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that
the remedial rules are different. The State must seek
alternatives to the classification and differential treat
ment of individuals by race, at least absent some extraor
dinary showing not present here.
C
The dissent refers to an opinion filed by Judge Kozinski
in one of the cases now before us, and that opinion relied
upon an opinion filed by Chief Judge Boudin in a case
presenting an issue similar to the one here. See post, at
35 (citing 426 F. 3d 1162, 1193–1196 (CA9 2005) (concur
ring opinion) (citing Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418
F. 3d 1, 27–29 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C. J., concurring))).
Though this may oversimplify the matter a bit, one of the
main concerns underlying those opinions was this: If it is
legitimate for school authorities to work to avoid racial
isolation in their schools, must they do so only by indirec
tion and general policies? Does the Constitution mandate
this inefficient result? Why may the authorities not rec
ognize the problem in candid fashion and solve it alto
gether through resort to direct assignments based on
student racial classifications? So, the argument proceeds,
if race is the problem, then perhaps race is the solution.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

The argument ignores the dangers presented by indi
vidual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing
when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means.
When the government classifies an individual by race, it
must first define what it means to be of a race. Who ex
actly is white and who is nonwhite? To be forced to live
under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with
the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label
that an individual is powerless to change. Governmental
classifications that command people to march in different
directions based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse,
where race serves not as an element of our diverse heri
tage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political proc
ess. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do
not rely on differential treatment based on individual
classifications present these problems to a lesser degree.
The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instru
ment with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an
analytical leap forward. And if this is a frustrating dual
ity of the Equal Protection Clause it simply reflects the
duality of our history and our attempts to promote free
dom in a world that sometimes seems set against it.
Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can
find his own identity, can define her own persona, without
state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or
the color of her skin.
* * *
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill
its historic commitment to creating an integrated society
that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an
interest that a school district, in its discretion and exper
tise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may con
sider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
18 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

population. Race may be one component of that diversity,
but other demographic factors, plus special talents and
needs, should also be considered. What the government is
not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not
made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race
and to assign each of them to schools based on that classi
fication. Crude measures of this sort threaten to reduce
children to racial chits valued and traded according to one
school’s supply and another’s demand.
That statement, to be sure, invites this response: A
sense of stigma may already become the fate of those
separated out by circumstances beyond their immediate
control. But to this the replication must be: Even so,
measures other than differential treatment based on racial
typing of individuals first must be exhausted.
The decision today should not prevent school districts
from continuing the important work of bringing together
students of different racial, ethnic, and economic back
grounds. Due to a variety of factors—some influenced by
government, some not—neighborhoods in our communities
do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole.
Those entrusted with directing our public schools can
bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, adminis
trators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to
achieve the compelling interests they face without resort
ing to widespread governmental allocation of benefits and
burdens on the basis of racial classifications.
With this explanation I concur in the judgment of the
Court.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–908 and 05–915
_________________

PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS, PETITIONER
05–908 v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, CUSTODIAL PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF JOSHUA RYAN MCDONALD, PETITIONER
05–915 v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 28, 2007]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
While I join JUSTICE BREYER’s eloquent and unanswer
able dissent in its entirety, it is appropriate to add these
words.
There is a cruel irony in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s reliance
on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294 (1955). The first sentence in the concluding para
graph of his opinion states: “Before Brown, schoolchildren
were told where they could and could not go to school
based on the color of their skin.” Ante, at 40. This sen
tence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he
majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
2 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

their bread.”1 THE CHIEF JUSTICE fails to note that it was
only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the
history books do not tell stories of white children strug
gling to attend black schools.2 In this and other ways, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE rewrites the history of one of this Court’s
most important decisions. Compare ante, at 39 (“history
will be heard”), with Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U. S. ___,
___ (2007) (slip op., at 11) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (“It
is a familiar adage that history is written by the victors”).
THE CHIEF JUSTICE rejects the conclusion that the racial
classifications at issue here should be viewed differently
than others, because they do not impose burdens on one
race alone and do not stigmatize or exclude.3 The only
justification for refusing to acknowledge the obvious im
——————
1 LeLys Rouge (The Red Lily) 95 (W. Stephens transl. 6th ed. 1922).
2 See,e.g., J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke 11 (1979) (“Everyone
understands that Brown v. Board of Education helped deliver the
Negro from over three centuries of legal bondage”); Black, The Lawful
ness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L. J. 421, 424–425 (“History,
too, tells us that segregation was imposed on one race by the other race;
consent was not invited or required. Segregation in the South grew up
and is kept going because and only because the white race has wanted
it that way—an incontrovertible fact which itself hardly consorts with
equality”).
3 I have long adhered to the view that a decision to exclude a member

of a minority because of his race is fundamentally different from a
decision to include a member of a minority for that reason. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 243, 248, n. 6 (1995)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267,
316 (1986) (same). This distinction is critically important in the context
of education. While the focus of our opinions is often on the benefits
that minority schoolchildren receive from an integrated education, see,
e.g., ante, at 15 (THOMAS, J., concurring), children of all races benefit
from integrated classrooms and playgrounds, see Wygant, 476 U. S., at
316 (“[T]he fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have differ
ently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there is some signifi
cant difference between such persons. The inclusion of minority teach
ers in the educational process inevitably tends to dispel that illusion
whereas their exclusion could only tend to foster it”).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

portance of that difference is the citation of a few recent
opinions—none of which even approached unanimity—
grandly proclaiming that all racial classifications must be
analyzed under “strict scrutiny.” See, e.g., Adarand Con
structors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995). Even
today, two of our wisest federal judges have rejected such
a wooden reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the
context of school integration. See 426 F. 3d 1162, 1193–
1196 (CA9 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v.
Lynn School Comm., 418 F. 3d 1, 27–29 (CA1 2005)
(Boudin, C. J., concurring). The Court’s misuse of the
three-tiered approach to Equal Protection analysis merely
reconfirms my own view that there is only one such Clause
in the Constitution. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 211
(1976) (concurring opinion).4
If we look at cases decided during the interim between
Brown and Adarand, we can see how a rigid adherence to
tiers of scrutiny obscures Brown’s clear message. Perhaps
the best example is provided by our approval of the deci
sion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
1967 upholding a state statute mandating racial integra
tion in that State’s school system. See School Comm. of

——————
4 THE CHIEF JUSTICE twice cites my dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick,

448 U. S. 448 (1980). See ante, at 12, 23. In that case, I stressed the
importance of confining a remedy for past wrongdoing to the members
of the injured class. See 448 U. S., at 539. The present cases, unlike
Fullilove but like our decision in Wygant, 476 U. S. 267, require us to
“ask whether the Board[s’] actions[s] advanc[e] the public interest in
educating children for the future,” id., at 313 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). See ibid. (“In my opinion, it is not necessary to find
that the Board of Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in
the past to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in
employing more black teachers in the future”). See also Adarand, 515
U. S., at 261–262 (1995) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (“This program, then,
if in part a remedy for past discrimination, is most importantly a
forward-looking response to practical problems faced by minority
subcontractors”).
4 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Boston v. Board of Education, 352 Mass. 693, 227 N. E. 2d
729.5 Rejecting arguments comparable to those that the
plurality accepts today,6 that court noted: “It would be the
height of irony if the racial imbalance act, enacted as it
was with the laudable purpose of achieving equal educa
tional opportunities, should, by prescribing school pupil
allocations based on race, founder on unsuspected shoals
in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 698, 227 N. E. 2d,
at 733 (footnote omitted).
Invoking our mandatory appellate jurisdiction,7 the
——————
5 THE CHIEF JUSTICE states that the Massachusetts racial imbalance
Act did not require express classifications. See ante, at 31-32, n. 16.
This is incorrect. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressly
stated:
“The racial imbalance act requires the school committee of every
municipality annually to submit statistics showing the percentage of
nonwhite pupils in all public schools and in each school. Whenever the
board finds that racial imbalance exists in a public school, it shall give
written notice to the appropriate school committee, which shall prepare
a plan to eliminate imbalance and file a copy with the board. ‘The term
“racial imbalance” refers to a ratio between nonwhite and other stu
dents in public schools which is sharply out of balance with the racial
composition of the society in which nonwhite children study, serve and
work. For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance shall be deemed
to exist when the per cent of nonwhite students in any public school is
in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such
school.’ ” 352 Mass., at 695, 227 N. E. 2d, at 731.
6 Compare ante, at 39 (“It was not the inequality of the facilities but

the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the
Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954”), with Juris.
Statement in School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education, O. T.
1967, No. 67–759, p. 11 (“It is implicit in Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, that color or race is a constitutionally imper
missible standard for the assignment of school children to public
schools. We construe Brown as endorsing Mr. Justice Harlan’s classical
statement in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 539: ‘Our constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens’ ”).
7 In 1968 our mandatory jurisdiction was defined by the provision of

the 1948 Judicial Code then codified at 28 U. S. C. §1257, see 62 Stat.
929; that provision was repealed in 1988, see 102 Stat. 662.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Boston plaintiffs prosecuted an appeal in this Court. Our
ruling on the merits simply stated that the appeal was
“dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.”
School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S.
572 (1968) (per curiam). That decision not only expressed
our appraisal of the merits of the appeal, but it constitutes
a precedent that the Court overrules today. The subse
quent statements by the unanimous Court in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971),
by then-Justice Rehnquist in chambers in Bustop, Inc. v.
Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., 439 U. S. 1380, 1383 (1978), and by
the host of state court decisions cited by JUSTICE BREYER,
see post, 25–27,8 were fully consistent with that disposi
tion. Unlike today’s decision, they were also entirely loyal
to Brown.
The Court has changed significantly since it decided
School Comm. of Boston in 1968. It was then more faith
ful to Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it
——————
8 For example, prior to our decision in School Comm. of Boston, the

Illinois Supreme Court had issued an unpublished opinion holding
unconstitutional a similar statute aimed at eliminating racial imbal
ance in public schools. See Juris. Statement in School Comm. of Boston
v. Board of Education, O. T. 1967, No. 67–759, at 9 (“Unlike the Massa
chusetts Court, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently held its law to
eliminate racial imbalance unconstitutional on the ground that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”);
ibid., n. 1. However, shortly after we dismissed the Massachusetts suit
for want of a substantial federal question, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed course and upheld its statute in the published decision that
JUSTICE BREYER extensively quotes in his dissent. See Tometz v. Board
of Ed., Waukegan School Dist. No. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N. E. 2d 498
(1968). In so doing, the Illinois Supreme Court acted in explicit reli
ance on our decision in School Comm. of Boston. See 39 Ill. 2d, at 599–
600, 237 N. E. 2d, at 502 (“Too, the United States Supreme Court on
January 15, 1968, dismissed an appeal in School Committee of Boston
v. Board of Education, (Mass. 1967) 227 N. E. 2d 729, which challenged
the statute providing for elimination of racial imbalance in public
schools ‘for want of a substantial federal question.’ 389 U. S. 572”).
6 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the
Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s
decision.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–908 and 05–915
_________________

PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS, PETITIONER
05–908 v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, CUSTODIAL PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF JOSHUA RYAN MCDONALD, PETITIONER
05–915 v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 28, 2007]

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS,
JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting.
These cases consider the longstanding efforts of two
local school boards to integrate their public schools. The
school board plans before us resemble many others
adopted in the last 50 years by primary and secondary
schools throughout the Nation. All of those plans repre
sent local efforts to bring about the kind of racially inte
grated education that Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U. S. 483 (1954), long ago promised—efforts that this
Court has repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged
local authorities to undertake. This Court has recognized
that the public interests at stake in such cases are “com
2 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

pelling.” We have approved of “narrowly tailored” plans
that are no less race-conscious than the plans before us.
And we have understood that the Constitution permits
local communities to adopt desegregation plans even
where it does not require them to do so.
The plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to
past opinions’ rationales, their language, and the contexts
in which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and
reaches the wrong conclusion. In doing so, it distorts
precedent, it misapplies the relevant constitutional princi
ples, it announces legal rules that will obstruct efforts by
state and local governments to deal effectively with the
growing resegregation of public schools, it threatens to
substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-
related litigation, and it undermines Brown’s promise of
integrated primary and secondary education that local
communities have sought to make a reality. This cannot
be justified in the name of the Equal Protection Clause.
I
Facts
The historical and factual context in which these cases
arise is critical. In Brown, this Court held that the gov
ernment’s segregation of schoolchildren by race violates
the Constitution’s promise of equal protection. The Court
emphasized that “education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.” 347 U. S., at
493. And it thereby set the Nation on a path toward pub
lic school integration.
In dozens of subsequent cases, this Court told school
districts previously segregated by law what they must do
at a minimum to comply with Brown’s constitutional
holding. The measures required by those cases often
included race-conscious practices, such as mandatory
busing and race-based restrictions on voluntary transfers.
See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449,
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

BREYER, J., dissenting

455, n. 3 (1979); Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs of
Mobile Cty., 402 U. S. 33, 37–38 (1971); Green v. School
Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430, 441–442 (1968).
Beyond those minimum requirements, the Court left
much of the determination of how to achieve integration to
the judgment of local communities. Thus, in respect to
race-conscious desegregation measures that the Constitu
tion permitted, but did not require (measures similar to
those at issue here), this Court unanimously stated:
“School authorities are traditionally charged with
broad power to formulate and implement educational
policy and might well conclude, for example, that in
order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic soci
ety each school should have a prescribed ratio of Ne
gro to white students reflecting the proportion for the
district as a whole. To do this as an educational pol
icy is within the broad discretionary powers of school
authorities.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971) (emphasis added).
As a result, different districts—some acting under court
decree, some acting in order to avoid threatened lawsuits,
some seeking to comply with federal administrative or
ders, some acting purely voluntarily, some acting after
federal courts had dissolved earlier orders—adopted,
modified, and experimented with hosts of different kinds
of plans, including race-conscious plans, all with a similar
objective: greater racial integration of public schools. See
F. Welch & A. Light, New Evidence on School Desegrega
tion v (1987) (hereinafter Welch) (prepared for the Com
mission on Civil Rights) (reviewing a sample of 125 school
districts, constituting 20% of national public school en
rollment, that had experimented with nearly 300 different
plans over 18 years). The techniques that different dis
tricts have employed range “from voluntary transfer pro
grams to mandatory reassignment.” Id., at 21. And the
4 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

design of particular plans has been “dictated by both the
law and the specific needs of the district.” Ibid.
Overall these efforts brought about considerable racial
integration. More recently, however, progress has stalled.
Between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children
attending a school where minority children constituted
more than half of the school fell from 77% to 63% in the
Nation (from 81% to 57% in the South) but then reversed
direction by the year 2000, rising from 63% to 72% in the
Nation (from 57% to 69% in the South). Similarly, be
tween 1968 and 1980, the number of black children at
tending schools that were more than 90% minority fell
from 64% to 33% in the Nation (from 78% to 23% in the
South), but that too reversed direction, rising by the year
2000 from 33% to 37% in the Nation (from 23% to 31% in
the South). As of 2002, almost 2.4 million students, or
over 5% of all public school enrollment, attended schools
with a white population of less than 1%. Of these, 2.3
million were black and Latino students, and only 72,000
were white. Today, more than one in six black children
attend a school that is 99–100% minority. See Appendix
A, infra. In light of the evident risk of a return to school
systems that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated,
many school districts have felt a need to maintain or to
extend their integration efforts.
The upshot is that myriad school districts operating in
myriad circumstances have devised myriad plans, often
with race-conscious elements, all for the sake of eradicat
ing earlier school segregation, bringing about integration,
or preventing retrogression. Seattle and Louisville are
two such districts, and the histories of their present plans
set forth typical school integration stories.
I describe those histories at length in order to highlight
three important features of these cases. First, the school
districts’ plans serve “compelling interests” and are “nar
rowly tailored” on any reasonable definition of those
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

BREYER, J., dissenting

terms. Second, the distinction between de jure segregation
(caused by school systems) and de facto segregation
(caused, e.g., by housing patterns or generalized societal
discrimination) is meaningless in the present context,
thereby dooming the plurality’s endeavor to find support
for its views in that distinction. Third, real-world efforts
to substitute racially diverse for racially segregated
schools (however caused) are complex, to the point where
the Constitution cannot plausibly be interpreted to rule
out categorically all local efforts to use means that are
“conscious” of the race of individuals.
In both Seattle and Louisville, the local school districts
began with schools that were highly segregated in fact. In
both cities plaintiffs filed lawsuits claiming unconstitu
tional segregation. In Louisville, a federal district court
found that school segregation reflected pre-Brown state
laws separating the races. In Seattle, the plaintiffs al
leged that school segregation unconstitutionally reflected
not only generalized societal discrimination and residen
tial housing patterns, but also school board policies and
actions that had helped to create, maintain, and aggravate
racial segregation. In Louisville, a federal court entered a
remedial decree. In Seattle, the parties settled after the
school district pledged to undertake a desegregation plan.
In both cities, the school boards adopted plans designed to
achieve integration by bringing about more racially di
verse schools. In each city the school board modified its
plan several times in light of, for example, hostility to
busing, the threat of resegregation, and the desirability of
introducing greater student choice. And in each city, the
school boards’ plans have evolved over time in ways that
progressively diminish the plans’ use of explicit race-
conscious criteria.
The histories that follow set forth these basic facts.
They are based upon numerous sources, which for ease of
exposition I have cataloged, along with their correspond
6 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1
BREYER, J., dissenting

ing citations, at Appendix B, infra.
A
Seattle
1. Segregation, 1945 to 1956. During and just after
World War II, significant numbers of black Americans
began to make Seattle their home. Few black residents
lived outside the central section of the city. Most worked
at unskilled jobs. Although black students made up about
3% of the total Seattle population in the mid-1950’s,
nearly all black children attended schools where a major
ity of the population was minority. Elementary schools in
central Seattle were between 60% and 80% black; Gar
field, the central district high school, was more than 50%
minority; schools outside the central and southeastern
sections of Seattle were virtually all white.
2. Preliminary Challenges, 1956 to 1969. In 1956, a
memo for the Seattle School Board reported that school
segregation reflected not only segregated housing patterns
but also school board policies that permitted white stu
dents to transfer out of black schools while restricting the
transfer of black students into white schools. In 1958,
black parents whose children attended Harrison Elemen
tary School (with a black student population of over 75%)
wrote the Seattle board, complaining that the “ ‘boundaries
for the Harrison Elementary School were not set in accor
dance with the long-established standards of the School
District . . . but were arbitrarily set with an end to exclud
ing colored children from McGilvra School, which is adja
cent to the Harrison school district.’ ”
In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other
community groups, the school board adopted a new race-
based transfer policy. The new policy added an explicitly
racial criterion: If a place exists in a school, then, irrespec
tive of other transfer criteria, a white student may trans
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

BREYER, J., dissenting

fer to a predominantly black school, and a black student
may transfer to a predominantly white school.
At that time one high school, Garfield, was about two-
thirds minority; eight high schools were virtually all white.
In 1963, the transfer program’s first year, 239 black stu
dents and 8 white students transferred. In 1969, about
2,200 (of 10,383 total) of the district’s black students and
about 400 of the district’s white students took advantage
of the plan. For the next decade, annual program trans
fers remained at approximately this level.
3. The NAACP’s First Legal Challenge and Seattle’s
Response, 1969 to 1977. In 1969 the NAACP filed a fed
eral lawsuit against the school board, claiming that the
board had “unlawfully and unconstitutionally” “estab
lish[ed]” and “maintain[ed]” a system of “racially segre
gated public schools.” The complaint said that 77% of
black public elementary school students in Seattle at
tended 9 of the city’s 86 elementary schools and that 23 of
the remaining schools had no black students at all. Simi
larly, of the 1,461 black students enrolled in the 12 senior
high schools in Seattle, 1,151 (or 78.8%) attended 3 senior
high schools, and 900 (61.6%) attended a single school,
Garfield.
The complaint charged that the school board had
brought about this segregated system in part by “mak[ing]
and enforc[ing]” certain “rules and regulations,” in part by
“drawing . . . boundary lines” and “executing school atten
dance policies” that would create and maintain “predomi
nantly Negro or non-white schools,” and in part by build
ing schools “in such a manner as to restrict the Negro
plaintiffs and the class they represent to predominantly
negro or non-white schools.” The complaint also charged
that the board discriminated in assigning teachers.
The board responded to the lawsuit by introducing a
plan that required race-based transfers and mandatory
busing. The plan created three new middle schools at
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three school buildings in the predominantly white north
end. It then created a “mixed” student body by assigning
to those schools students who would otherwise attend
predominantly white, or predominantly black, schools
elsewhere. It used explicitly racial criteria in making
these assignments (i.e., it deliberately assigned to the new
middle schools black students, not white students, from
the black schools and white students, not black students,
from the white schools). And it used busing to transport
the students to their new assignments. The plan provoked
considerable local opposition. Opponents brought a law
suit. But eventually a state court found that the manda
tory busing was lawful.
In 1976–1977, the plan involved the busing of about 500
middle school students (300 black students and 200 white
students). Another 1,200 black students and 400 white
students participated in the previously adopted voluntary
transfer program. Thus about 2,000 students out of a
total district population of about 60,000 students were
involved in one or the other transfer program. At that
time, about 20% or 12,000 of the district’s students were
black. And the board continued to describe 26 of its 112
schools as “segregated.”
4. The NAACP’s Second Legal Challenge, 1977. In
1977, the NAACP filed another legal complaint, this time
with the federal Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The complaint
alleged that the Seattle School Board had created or per
petuated unlawful racial segregation through, e.g., certain
school-transfer criteria, a construction program that need
lessly built new schools in white areas, district line-
drawing criteria, the maintenance of inferior facilities at
black schools, the use of explicit racial criteria in the
assignment of teachers and other staff, and a general
pattern of delay in respect to the implementation of prom
ised desegregation efforts.
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The OCR and the school board entered into a formal
settlement agreement. The agreement required the board
to implement what became known as the “Seattle Plan.”
5. The Seattle Plan: Mandatory Busing, 1978 to 1988.
The board began to implement the Seattle Plan in 1978.
This plan labeled “racially imbalanced” any school at
which the percentage of black students exceeded by more
than 20% the minority population of the school district as
a whole. It applied that label to 26 schools, including 4
high schools—Cleveland (72.8% minority), Franklin
(76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority), and Rainier
Beach (58.9% minority). The plan paired (or “triaded”)
“imbalanced” black schools with “imbalanced” white
schools. It then placed some grades (say, third and fourth
grades) at one school building and other grades (say, fifth
and sixth grades) at the other school building. And it
thereby required, for example, all fourth grade students
from the previously black and previously white schools
first to attend together what would now be a “mixed”
fourth grade at one of the school buildings and then the
next year to attend what would now be a “mixed” fifth
grade at the other school building.
At the same time, the plan provided that a previous
“black” school would remain about 50% black, while a
previous “white” school would remain about two-thirds
white. It was consequently necessary to decide with some
care which students would attend the new “mixed” grade.
For this purpose, administrators cataloged the racial
makeup of each neighborhood housing block. The school
district met its percentage goals by assigning to the new
“mixed” school an appropriate number of “black” housing
blocks and “white” housing blocks. At the same time,
transport from house to school involved extensive busing,
with about half of all students attending a school other
than the one closest to their home.
The Seattle Plan achieved the school integration that it
10 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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sought. Just prior to the plan’s implementation, for ex
ample, 4 of Seattle’s 11 high schools were “imbalanced,”
i.e., almost exclusively “black” or almost exclusively
“white.” By 1979, only two were out of “balance.” By 1980
only Cleveland remained out of “balance” (as the board
defined it) and that by a mere two students.
Nonetheless, the Seattle Plan, due to its busing, pro
voked serious opposition within the State. See generally
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457,
461–466 (1982). Thus, Washington state voters enacted
an initiative that amended state law to require students to
be assigned to the schools closest to their homes. Id., at
462. The Seattle School Board challenged the constitu
tionality of the initiative. Id., at 464. This Court then
held that the initiative—which would have prevented the
Seattle Plan from taking effect—violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id., at 470.
6. Student Choice, 1988 to 1998. By 1988, many white
families had left the school district, and many Asian fami
lies had moved in. The public school population had fallen
from about 100,000 to less than 50,000. The racial
makeup of the school population amounted to 43% white,
24% black, and 23% Asian or Pacific Islander, with His
panics and Native Americans making up the rest. The
cost of busing, the harm that members of all racial com
munities feared that the Seattle Plan caused, the desire to
attract white families back to the public schools, and the
interest in providing greater school choice led the board to
abandon busing and to substitute a new student assign
ment policy that resembles the plan now before us.
The new plan permitted each student to choose the
school he or she wished to attend, subject to race-based
constraints. In respect to high schools, for example, a
student was given a list of a subset of schools, carefully
selected by the board to balance racial distribution in the
district by including neighborhood schools and schools in
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racially different neighborhoods elsewhere in the city. The
student could then choose among those schools, indicating
a first choice, and other choices the student found accept
able. In making an assignment to a particular high
school, the district would give first preference to a student
with a sibling already at the school. It gave second prefer
ence to a student whose race differed from a race that was
“over-represented” at the school (i.e., a race that accounted
for a higher percentage of the school population than of
the total district population). It gave third preference to
students residing in the neighborhood. It gave fourth
preference to students who received child care in the
neighborhood. In a typical year, say, 1995, about 20,000
potential high school students participated. About 68%
received their first choice. Another 16% received an “ac
ceptable” choice. A further 16% were assigned to a school
they had not listed.
7. The Current Plan, 1999 to the Present. In 1996, the
school board adopted the present plan, which began in
1999. In doing so, it sought to deemphasize the use of
racial criteria and to increase the likelihood that a student
would receive an assignment at his first or second choice
high school. The district retained a racial tiebreaker for
oversubscribed schools, which takes effect only if the
school’s minority or majority enrollment falls outside of a
30% range centered on the minority/majority population
ratio within the district. At the same time, all students
were free subsequently to transfer from the school at
which they were initially placed to a different school of
their choice without regard to race. Thus, at worst, a
student would have to spend one year at a high school he
did not pick as a first or second choice.
The new plan worked roughly as expected for the two
school years during which it was in effect (1999–2000 and
2000–2001). In the 2000–2001 school year, for example,
with the racial tiebreaker, the entering ninth grade class
12 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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at Franklin High School had a 60% minority population;
without the racial tiebreaker that same class at Franklin
would have had an almost 80% minority population. (We
consider only the ninth grade since only students entering
that class were subject to the tiebreaker, and because the
plan was not in place long enough to change the composi
tion of an entire school.) In the year 2005–2006, by which
time the racial tiebreaker had not been used for several
years, Franklin’s overall minority enrollment had risen to
90%. During the period the tiebreaker applied, it typically
affected about 300 students per year. Between 80% and
90% of all students received their first choice assignment;
between 89% and 97% received their first or second choice
assignment.
Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools
objected to Seattle’s most recent plan under the State and
Federal Constitutions. In due course, the Washington
Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) rejected
the challenge and found Seattle’s plan lawful.
B
Louisville
1. Before the Lawsuit, 1954 to 1972. In 1956, two years
after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer
require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of
Education created a geography-based student assignment
plan designed to help achieve school integration. At the
same time it adopted an open transfer policy under which
approximately 3,000 of Louisville’s 46,000 students ap
plied for transfer. By 1972, however, the Louisville School
District remained highly segregated. Approximately half
the district’s public school enrollment was black; about
half was white. Fourteen of the district’s nineteen non-
vocational middle and high schools were close to totally
black or totally white. Nineteen of the district’s forty-six
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BREYER, J., dissenting

elementary schools were between 80% and 100% black.
Twenty-one elementary schools were between roughly 90%
and 100% white.
2. Court-Imposed Guidelines and Busing, 1972 to 1991.
In 1972, civil rights groups and parents, claiming uncon
stitutional segregation, sued the Louisville Board of Edu
cation in federal court. The original litigation eventually
became a lawsuit against the Jefferson County School
System, which in April 1975 absorbed Louisville’s schools
and combined them with those of the surrounding sub
urbs. (For ease of exposition, I shall still use “Louisville”
to refer to what is now the combined districts.) After
preliminary rulings and an eventual victory for the plain
tiffs in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the
District Court in July 1975 entered an order requiring
desegregation.
The order’s requirements reflected a (newly enlarged)
school district student population of about 135,000, ap
proximately 20% of whom were black. The order required
the school board to create and to maintain schools with
student populations that ranged, for elementary schools,
between 12% and 40% black, and for secondary schools
(with one exception), between 12.5% and 35% black.
The District Court also adopted a complex desegregation
plan designed to achieve the order’s targets. The plan
required redrawing school attendance zones, closing 12
schools, and busing groups of students, selected by race
and the first letter of their last names, to schools outside
their immediate neighborhoods. The plan’s initial busing
requirements were extensive, involving the busing of
23,000 students and a transportation fleet that had to
“operate from early in the morning until late in the eve
ning.” For typical students, the plan meant busing for
several years (several more years for typical black stu
dents than for typical white students). The following
notice, published in a Louisville newspaper in 1976, gives
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a sense of how the district’s race-based busing plan oper
ated in practice:

Louisville Courier Journal, June 18, 1976 (reproduced in
J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court
and School Integration 1954–1978, p. 176 (1979)).
The District Court monitored implementation of the
plan. In 1978, it found that the plan had brought all of
Louisville’s schools within its “ ‘guidelines’ for racial com
position” for “at least a substantial portion of the [previ
ous] three years.” It removed the case from its active
docket while stating that it expected the board “to con
tinue to implement those portions of the desegregation
order which are by their nature of a continuing effect.”
By 1984, after several schools had fallen out of compli
ance with the order’s racial percentages due to shifting
demographics in the community, the school board revised
its desegregation plan. In doing so, the board created a
new racial “guideline,” namely a “floating range of 10%
above and 10% below the countywide average for the
different grade levels.” The board simultaneously redrew
district boundaries so that middle school students could
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BREYER, J., dissenting

attend the same school for three years and high school
students for four years. It added “magnet” programs at
two high schools. And it adjusted its alphabet-based
system for grouping and busing students. The board
estimated that its new plan would lead to annual reas
signment (with busing) of about 8,500 black students and
about 8,000 white students.
3. Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991 to
1996. By 1991, the board had concluded that assigning
elementary school students to two or more schools during
their elementary school years had proved educationally
unsound and, if continued, would undermine Kentucky’s
newly adopted Education Reform Act. It consequently
conducted a nearly year-long review of its plan. In doing
so, it consulted widely with parents and other members of
the local community, using public presentations, public
meetings, and various other methods to obtain the public’s
input. At the conclusion of this review, the board adopted
a new plan, called “Project Renaissance,” that emphasized
student choice.
Project Renaissance again revised the board’s racial
guidelines. It provided that each elementary school would
have a black student population of between 15% and 50%;
each middle and high school would have a black popula
tion and a white population that fell within a range, the
boundaries of which were set at 15% above and 15% below
the general student population percentages in the county
at that grade level. The plan then drew new geographical
school assignment zones designed to satisfy these guide
lines; the district could reassign students if particular
schools failed to meet the guidelines and was required to
do so if a school repeatedly missed these targets.
In respect to elementary schools, the plan first drew a
neighborhood line around each elementary school, and it
then drew a second line around groups of elementary
schools (called “clusters”). It initially assigned each stu
16 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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dent to his or her neighborhood school, but it permitted
each student freely to transfer between elementary schools
within each cluster provided that the transferring student
(a) was black if transferring from a predominantly black
school to a predominantly white school, or (b) was white if
transferring from a predominantly white school to a pre
dominantly black school. Students could also apply to
attend magnet elementary schools or programs.
The plan required each middle school student to be
assigned to his or her neighborhood school unless the
student applied for, and was accepted by, a magnet middle
school. The plan provided for “open” high school enroll
ment. Every 9th or 10th grader could apply to any high
school in the system, and the high school would accept
applicants according to set criteria—one of which con
sisted of the need to attain or remain in compliance with
the plan’s racial guidelines. Finally, the plan created two
new magnet schools, one each at the elementary and
middle school levels.
4. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance Modified,
1996 to 2003. In 1995 and 1996, the Louisville School
Board, with the help of a special “Planning Team,” com
munity meetings, and other official and unofficial study
groups, monitored the effects of Project Renaissance and
considered proposals for improvement. Consequently, in
1996, the board modified Project Renaissance, thereby
creating the present plan.
At the time, the district’s public school population was
approximately 30% black. The plan consequently redrew
the racial “guidelines,” setting the boundaries at 15% to
50% black for all schools. It again redrew school assign
ment boundaries. And it expanded the transfer opportuni
ties available to elementary and middle school pupils. The
plan forbade transfers, however, if the transfer would lead
to a school population outside the guideline range, i.e., if it
would create a school where fewer than 15% or more than
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BREYER, J., dissenting

50% of the students were black.
The plan also established “Parent Assistance Centers”
to help parents and students navigate the school selection
and assignment process. It pledged the use of other re
sources in order to “encourage all schools to achieve an
African-American enrollment equivalent to the average
district-wide African-American enrollment at the school’s
respective elementary, middle or high school level.” And
the plan continued use of magnet schools.
In 1999, several parents brought a lawsuit in federal
court attacking the plan’s use of racial guidelines at one of
the district’s magnet schools. They asked the court to
dissolve the desegregation order and to hold the use of
magnet school racial guidelines unconstitutional. The
board opposed dissolution, arguing that “the old dual
system” had left a “demographic imbalance” that “pre
vent[ed] dissolution.” In 2000, after reviewing the present
plan, the District Court dissolved the 1975 order. It wrote
that there was “overwhelming evidence of the Board’s good
faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its
underlying purposes.” It added that the Louisville School
Board had “treated the ideal of an integrated system as
much more than a legal obligation—they consider it a
positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any
well-rounded public school education.”
The Court also found that the magnet programs avail
able at the high school in question were “not available at
other high schools” in the school district. It consequently
held unconstitutional the use of race-based “targets” to
govern admission to magnet schools. And it ordered the
board not to control access to those scarce programs
through the use of racial targets.
5. The Current Lawsuit, 2003 to the Present. Subse
quent to the District Court’s dissolution of the desegrega
tion order (in 2000) the board simply continued to imple
ment its 1996 plan as modified to reflect the court’s
18 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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magnet school determination. In 2003, the petitioner now
before us, Crystal Meredith, brought this lawsuit challeng
ing the plan’s unmodified portions, i.e., those portions that
dealt with ordinary, not magnet, schools. Both the Dis
trict Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
rejected Meredith’s challenge and held the unmodified
aspects of the plan constitutional.
C
The histories I have set forth describe the extensive and
ongoing efforts of two school districts to bring about
greater racial integration of their public schools. In both
cases the efforts were in part remedial. Louisville began
its integration efforts in earnest when a federal court in
1975 entered a school desegregation order. Seattle under
took its integration efforts in response to the filing of a
federal lawsuit and as a result of its settlement of a segre
gation complaint filed with the federal OCR.
The plans in both Louisville and Seattle grow out of
these earlier remedial efforts. Both districts faced prob
lems that reflected initial periods of severe racial segrega
tion, followed by such remedial efforts as busing, followed
by evidence of resegregation, followed by a need to end
busing and encourage the return of, e.g., suburban stu
dents through increased student choice. When formulat
ing the plans under review, both districts drew upon their
considerable experience with earlier plans, having revised
their policies periodically in light of that experience. Both
districts rethought their methods over time and explored a
wide range of other means, including non-race-conscious
policies. Both districts also considered elaborate studies
and consulted widely within their communities.
Both districts sought greater racial integration for
educational and democratic, as well as for remedial, rea
sons. Both sought to achieve these objectives while pre
serving their commitment to other educational goals, e.g.,
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BREYER, J., dissenting

districtwide commitment to high quality public schools,
increased pupil assignment to neighborhood schools,
diminished use of busing, greater student choice, reduced
risk of white flight, and so forth. Consequently, the pre
sent plans expand student choice; they limit the burdens
(including busing) that earlier plans had imposed upon
students and their families; and they use race-conscious
criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways. In
particular, they use race-conscious criteria only to mark
the outer bounds of broad population-related ranges.
The histories also make clear the futility of looking
simply to whether earlier school segregation was de jure or
de facto in order to draw firm lines separating the consti
tutionally permissible from the constitutionally forbidden
use of “race-conscious” criteria. JUSTICE THOMAS suggests
that it will be easy to identify de jure segregation because
“[i]n most cases, there either will or will not have been a
state constitutional amendment, state statute, local ordi
nance, or local administrative policy explicitly requiring
separation of the races.” Ante, at 6, n. 4 (concurring opin
ion). But our precedent has recognized that de jure dis
crimination can be present even in the absence of racially
explicit laws. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373–
374 (1886).
No one here disputes that Louisville’s segregation was
de jure. But what about Seattle’s? Was it de facto? De
jure? A mixture? Opinions differed. Or is it that a prior
federal court had not adjudicated the matter? Does that
make a difference? Is Seattle free on remand to say that
its schools were de jure segregated, just as in 1956 a memo
for the School Board admitted? The plurality does not
seem confident as to the answer. Compare ante, at 12
(opinion of the Court) (“[T]he Seattle public schools have
never shown that they were ever segregated by law” (em
phasis added)), with ante at 29–30 (plurality opinion)
(assuming “the Seattle school district was never segre
20 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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gated by law,” but seeming to concede that a school dis
trict with de jure segregation need not be subject to a court
order to be allowed to engage in race-based remedial
measures).
A court finding of de jure segregation cannot be the
crucial variable. After all, a number of school districts in
the South that the Government or private plaintiffs
challenged as segregated by law voluntarily desegregated
their schools without a court order—just as Seattle did.
See, e.g., Coleman, Desegregation of the Public Schools
in Kentucky—The Second Year After the Supreme
Court’s Decision, 25 J. Negro Educ. 254, 256, 261 (1956)
(40 of Kentucky’s 180 school districts began desegre
gation without court orders); Branton, Little Rock
Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation, 52 J. Negro
Educ. 250, 251 (1983) (similar in Arkansas); Bullock
& Rodgers, Coercion to Compliance: Southern School
Districts and School Desegregation Guidelines, 38 J.
Politics 987, 991 (1976) (similar in Georgia); McDaniel v.
Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 40, n. 1 (1971) (Clarke County,
Georgia). See also Letter from Robert F. Kennedy,
Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President (Jan.
24, 1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at
http://www.gilderlehrman.org/search/collection_pdfs/05/63/
0/05630.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 26,
2007, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (reporting
successful efforts by the Government to induce voluntary
desegregation).
Moreover, Louisville’s history makes clear that a com
munity under a court order to desegregate might submit a
race-conscious remedial plan before the court dissolved the
order, but with every intention of following that plan even
after dissolution. How could such a plan be lawful the day
before dissolution but then become unlawful the very next
day? On what legal ground can the majority rest its con
trary view? But see ante, at 12–13, 17, n. 12.
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BREYER, J., dissenting

Are courts really to treat as merely de facto segregated
those school districts that avoided a federal order by vol
untarily complying with Brown’s requirements? See id.,
at 12, 29–30. This Court has previously done just the
opposite, permitting a race-conscious remedy without any
kind of court decree. See McDaniel, supra, at 41. Because
the Constitution emphatically does not forbid the use of
race-conscious measures by districts in the South that
voluntarily desegregated their schools, on what basis does
the plurality claim that the law forbids Seattle to do the
same? But see ante, at 29.
The histories also indicate the complexity of the tasks
and the practical difficulties that local school boards face
when they seek to achieve greater racial integration. The
boards work in communities where demographic patterns
change, where they must meet traditional learning goals,
where they must attract and retain effective teachers,
where they should (and will) take account of parents’
views and maintain their commitment to public school
education, where they must adapt to court intervention,
where they must encourage voluntary student and parent
action—where they will find that their own good faith,
their knowledge, and their understanding of local circum
stances are always necessary but often insufficient to solve
the problems at hand.
These facts and circumstances help explain why in this
context, as to means, the law often leaves legislatures, city
councils, school boards, and voters with a broad range of
choice, thereby giving “different communities” the oppor
tunity to “try different solutions to common problems and
gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem
to them best to suit their individual needs.” Comfort v.
Lynn School Comm., 418 F. 3d 1, 28 (CA1 2005) (Boudin,
C. J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S.
549, 581 (1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring)), cert. denied,
546 U. S. 1061 (2005).
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With this factual background in mind, I turn to the legal
question: Does the United States Constitution prohibit
these school boards from using race-conscious criteria in
the limited ways at issue here?
II
The Legal Standard
A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority
tells us that the Equal Protection Clause permits local
school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve
positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution
does not compel it. Because of its importance, I shall
repeat what this Court said about the matter in Swann.
Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a unanimous Court in a
case of exceptional importance, wrote:
“School authorities are traditionally charged with
broad power to formulate and implement educational
policy and might well conclude, for example, that in
order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic soci
ety each school should have a prescribed ratio of Ne
gro to white students reflecting the proportion for the
district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy
is within the broad discretionary powers of school au
thorities.” 402 U. S., at 16.
The statement was not a technical holding in the case.
But the Court set forth in Swann a basic principle of
constitutional law—a principle of law that has found “wide
acceptance in the legal culture.” Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314,
330 (1999); id., at 331, 332 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (citing
“ ‘wide acceptance in the legal culture’ ” as “adequate rea
son not to overrule” prior cases).
Thus, in North Carolina Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U. S.
43, 45 (1971), this Court, citing Swann, restated the point.
“[S]chool authorities,” the Court said, “have wide discre
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BREYER, J., dissenting

tion in formulating school policy, and . . . as a matter of
educational policy school authorities may well conclude
that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable
quite apart from any constitutional requirements.” Then-
Justice Rehnquist echoed this view in Bustop, Inc. v. Los
Angeles Bd. of Ed., 439 U. S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (opinion in
chambers), making clear that he too believed that Swann’s
statement reflected settled law: “While I have the gravest
doubts that [a state supreme court] was required by the
United States Constitution to take the [desegregation]
action that it has taken in this case, I have very little
doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take
such action.” (Emphasis in original.)
These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is
limited to school districts where court-ordered desegrega
tion measures are also in effect. Indeed, in McDaniel, a
case decided the same day as Swann, a group of parents
challenged a race-conscious student assignment plan that
the Clarke County School Board had voluntarily adopted
as a remedy without a court order (though under federal
agency pressure—pressure Seattle also encountered). The
plan required that each elementary school in the district
maintain 20% to 40% enrollment of African-American
students, corresponding to the racial composition of the
district. See Barresi v. Browne, 226 Ga. 456, 456–459, 175
S. E. 2d 649, 650–651 (1970). This Court upheld the plan,
see McDaniel, 402 U. S., at 41, rejecting the parents’
argument that “a person may not be included or excluded
solely because he is a Negro or because he is white.” Brief
for Respondents in McDaniel, O. T. 1970, No. 420, p. 25.
Federal authorities had claimed—as the NAACP and
the OCR did in Seattle—that Clarke County schools were
segregated in law, not just in fact. The plurality’s claim
that Seattle was “never segregated by law” is simply not
accurate. Compare ante, at 29, with supra, at 6–9. The
plurality could validly claim that no court ever found that
24 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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BREYER, J., dissenting

Seattle schools were segregated in law. But that is also
true of the Clarke County schools in McDaniel. Unless we
believe that the Constitution enforces one legal standard
for the South and another for the North, this Court should
grant Seattle the permission it granted Clarke County,
Georgia. See McDaniel, 402 U. S., at 41 (“[S]teps will
almost invariably require that students be assigned ‘dif
ferently because of their race.’ . . . Any other approach
would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all
desegregation processes.”).
This Court has also held that school districts may be
required by federal statute to undertake race-conscious
desegregation efforts even when there is no likelihood that
de jure segregation can be shown. In Board of Ed. of City
School Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U. S. 130, 148–149
(1979), the Court concluded that a federal statute required
school districts receiving certain federal funds to remedy
faculty segregation, even though in this Court’s view the
racial disparities in the affected schools were purely de
facto and would not have been actionable under the Equal
Protection Clause. Not even the dissenters thought the
race-conscious remedial program posed a constitutional
problem. See id., at 152 (opinion of Stewart, J.). See also,
e.g., Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U. S.
527, 535–536 (1982) (“[S]tate courts of California continue
to have an obligation under state law to order segregated
school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques,
whether or not there has been a finding of intentional
segregation. . . . [S]chool districts themselves retain a
state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to
desegregate, and they remain free to adopt reassignment
and busing plans to effectuate desegregation” (emphasis
added)); School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education,
389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a
federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide
integration plan using express racial criteria).
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BREYER, J., dissenting

Lower state and federal courts had considered the mat
ter settled and uncontroversial even before this Court
decided Swann. Indeed, in 1968, the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a race-
conscious state law seeking to undo de facto segregation:
“To support [their] claim, the defendants heavily
rely on three Federal cases, each of which held, no
State law being involved, that a local school board
does not have an affirmative constitutional duty to act
to alleviate racial imbalance in the schools that it did
not cause. However, the question as to whether the
constitution requires a local school board, or a State,
to act to undo de facto school segregation is simply not
here concerned. The issue here is whether the consti
tution permits, rather than prohibits, voluntary State
action aimed toward reducing and eventually elimi
nating de facto school segregation.
“State laws or administrative policies, directed to
ward the reduction and eventual elimination of de
facto segregation of children in the schools and racial
imbalance, have been approved by every high State
court which has considered the issue. Similarly, the
Federal courts which have considered the issue . . .
have recognized that voluntary programs of local
school authorities designed to alleviate de facto segre
gation and racial imbalance in the schools are not
constitutionally forbidden.” Tometz v. Board of Ed.,
Waukegan School Dist. No. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 597–598,
237 N. E. 2d 498, 501 (1968) (citations omitted) (citing
decisions from the high courts of Pennsylvania, Mas
sachusetts, New Jersey, California, New York, and
Connecticut, and from the Courts of Appeals for the
First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits).
See also, e.g., Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F. 2d 22, 24
(CA2 1967); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Ed., 369 F. 2d 55, 61
26 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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BREYER, J., dissenting

(CA6 1966), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 847 (1967); Springfield
School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F. 2d 261, 266 (CA1
1965); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n v. Chester
School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 164, 233 A. 2d 290, 294 (1967);
Booker v. Board of Ed. of Plainfield, Union Cty., 45 N. J.
161, 170, 212 A. 2d 1, 5 (1965); Jackson v. Pasadena City
School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881–882, 382 P. 2d 878, 881–
882 (1963) (in bank).
I quote the Illinois Supreme Court at length to illustrate
the prevailing legal assumption at the time Swann was
decided. In this respect, Swann was not a sharp or unex
pected departure from prior rulings; it reflected a consen
sus that had already emerged among state and lower
federal courts.
If there were doubts before Swann was decided, they did
not survive this Court’s decision. Numerous state and
federal courts explicitly relied upon Swann’s guidance for
decades to follow. For instance, a Texas appeals court in
1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a
voluntary integration plan by explaining:
“[T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not
mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum re
quirements in order to promote school integration.
School authorities are traditionally given broad dis
cretionary powers to formulate and implement educa
tional policy and may properly decide to ensure to
their students the value of an integrated school ex
perience.” Citizens for Better Ed. v. Goose Creek Con-
sol. Independent School Dist., 719 S. W. 2d 350, 352
353 (Ct. App. Tex. 1986) (citing Swann and North
Carolina Bd. of Ed.), appeal dism’d for want of a sub
stantial federal question, 484 U. S. 804 (1987).
Similarly, in Zaslawsky v. Bd. of Ed. of Los Angeles City
Unified School Dist., 610 F. 2d 661, 662–664 (1979), the
Ninth Circuit rejected a federal constitutional challenge to
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BREYER, J., dissenting

a school district’s use of mandatory faculty transfers to
ensure that each school’s faculty makeup would fall within
10% of the districtwide racial composition. Like the Texas
court, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Swann and North
Carolina Bd. of Ed. to reject the argument that “a race-
conscious plan is permissible only when there has been a
judicial finding of de jure segregation.” 610 F. 2d, at 663–
664. See also, e.g., Darville v. Dade County School Bd.,
497 F. 2d 1002, 1004–1006 (CA5 1974); State ex rel. Citi
zens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d
121, 128–129, 492 P. 2d 536, 541–542 (1972) (en banc),
overruled on other grounds, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d
280, 692 P. 2d 799 (1984) (en banc); School Comm. of
Springfield v. Board of Ed., 362 Mass. 417, 428–429 287
N. E. 2d 438, 447–448 (1972). These decisions illustrate
well how lower courts understood and followed Swann’s
enunciation of the relevant legal principle.
Courts are not alone in accepting as constitutionally
valid the legal principle that Swann enunciated—i.e., that
the government may voluntarily adopt race-conscious
measures to improve conditions of race even when it is not
under a constitutional obligation to do so. That principle
has been accepted by every branch of government and is
rooted in the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself.
Thus, Congress has enacted numerous race-conscious
statutes that illustrate that principle or rely upon its
validity. See, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (No Child
Left Behind Act); §1067 et seq. (authorizing aid to minority
institutions). In fact, without being exhaustive, I have
counted 51 federal statutes that use racial classifications.
I have counted well over 100 state statutes that similarly
employ racial classifications. Presidential administrations
for the past half-century have used and supported various
race-conscious measures. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10925,
26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (President Kennedy); Exec.
Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) (President
28 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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Johnson); Sugrue, Breaking Through: The Troubled Ori
gins of Affirmative Action in the Workplace, in Colorlines:
Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options
for America 31 (Skretny ed. 2001) (describing President
Nixon’s lobbying for affirmative action plans, e.g., the
Philadelphia Plan); White, Affirmative Action’s Alamo:
Gerald Ford Returns to Fight Once More for Michigan,
Time, Aug. 23, 1999, p. 48 (reporting on President Ford’s
support for affirmative action); Schuck, Affirmative Ac
tion: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1,
50 (2002) (describing President Carter’s support for affir
mation action). And during the same time, hundreds of
local school districts have adopted student assignment
plans that use race-conscious criteria. See Welch 83–91.
That Swann’s legal statement should find such broad
acceptance is not surprising. For Swann is predicated
upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That view understands the basic objective of
those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding
practices that lead to racial exclusion. The Amendment
sought to bring into American society as full members
those whom the Nation had previously held in slavery.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1872) (“[N]o
one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading pur
pose found in [all the Reconstruction amendments] . . . we
mean the freedom of the slave race”); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 306 (1879) (“[The Fourteenth
Amendment] is one of a series of constitutional provisions
having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race
recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the supe
rior race enjoy”).
There is reason to believe that those who drafted an
Amendment with this basic purpose in mind would have
understood the legal and practical difference between the
use of race-conscious criteria in defiance of that purpose,
namely to keep the races apart, and the use of race
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BREYER, J., dissenting

conscious criteria to further that purpose, namely to bring
the races together. See generally R. Sears, A Utopian
Experiment in Kentucky: Integration and Social Equality
at Berea, 1866–1904 (1996) (describing federal funding,
through the Freedman’s Bureau, of race-conscious school
integration programs). See also R. Fischer, The Segrega
tion Struggle in Louisiana 1862–77, p. 51 (1974) (describ
ing the use of race-conscious remedies); Harlan, Desegre
gation in New Orleans Public Schools During
Reconstruction, 67 Am. Hist. Rev. 663, 664 (1962) (same);
W. Vaughn, Schools for All: The Blacks and Public Educa
tion in the South, 1865–1877, pp. 111–116 (1974) (same).
Although the Constitution almost always forbids the
former, it is significantly more lenient in respect to the
latter. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003)
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Sometimes Members of this Court have disagreed about
the degree of leniency that the Clause affords to programs
designed to include. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U. S. 267, 274 (1986); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980). But I can find no
case in which this Court has followed JUSTICE THOMAS’
“colorblind” approach. And I have found no case that
otherwise repudiated this constitutional asymmetry be
tween that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to
include members of minority races.
What does the plurality say in response? First, it seeks
to distinguish Swann and other similar cases on the
ground that those cases involved remedial plans in re
sponse to judicial findings of de jure segregation. As
McDaniel and Harris show, that is historically untrue.
See supra, at 22–24. Many school districts in the South
adopted segregation remedies (to which Swann clearly
applies) without any such federal order, see supra, at 19–
20. See also Kennedy Report. Seattle’s circumstances are
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not meaningfully different from those in, say, McDaniel,
where this Court approved race-conscious remedies.
Louisville’s plan was created and initially adopted when a
compulsory district court order was in place. And, in any
event, the histories of Seattle and Louisville make clear
that this distinction—between court-ordered and volun
tary desegregation—seeks a line that sensibly cannot be
drawn.
Second, the plurality downplays the importance of
Swann and related cases by frequently describing their
relevant statements as “dicta.” These criticisms, however,
miss the main point. Swann did not hide its understand
ing of the law in a corner of an obscure opinion or in a
footnote, unread but by experts. It set forth its view
prominently in an important opinion joined by all nine
Justices, knowing that it would be read and followed
throughout the Nation. The basic problem with the plu
rality’s technical “dicta”-based response lies in its overly
theoretical approach to case law, an approach that empha
sizes rigid distinctions between holdings and dicta in a
way that serves to mask the radical nature of today’s
decision. Law is not an exercise in mathematical logic.
And statements of a legal rule set forth in a judicial opin
ion do not always divide neatly into “holdings” and “dicta.”
(Consider the legal “status” of Justice Powell’s separate
opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265
(1978).) The constitutional principle enunciated in
Swann, reiterated in subsequent cases, and relied upon
over many years, provides, and has widely been thought to
provide, authoritative legal guidance. And if the plurality
now chooses to reject that principle, it cannot adequately
justify its retreat simply by affixing the label “dicta” to
reasoning with which it disagrees. Rather, it must explain
to the courts and to the Nation why it would abandon
guidance set forth many years before, guidance that count
less others have built upon over time, and which the law
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BREYER, J., dissenting

has continuously embodied.
Third, a more important response is the plurality’s
claim that later cases—in particular Johnson, Adarand,
and Grutter—supplanted Swann. See ante, at 11–12, 31–
32, n. 16, 34–35 (citing Adarand, supra, at 227; Johnson v.
California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003)). The plurality says that cases
such as Swann and the others I have described all “were
decided before this Court definitively determined that ‘all
racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.’ ” Ante, at 31, n. 16 (quoting
Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227). This Court in Adarand added
that “such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling gov
ernmental interests.” Ibid. And the Court repeated this
same statement in Grutter. See 539 U. S., at 326.
Several of these cases were significantly more restrictive
than Swann in respect to the degree of leniency the Four
teenth Amendment grants to programs designed to in
clude people of all races. See, e.g., Adarand, supra; Gratz,
supra; Grutter, supra. But that legal circumstance cannot
make a critical difference here for two separate reasons.
First, no case—not Adarand, Gratz, Grutter, or any
other—has ever held that the test of “strict scrutiny”
means that all racial classifications—no matter whether
they seek to include or exclude—must in practice be
treated the same. The Court did not say in Adarand or in
Johnson or in Grutter that it was overturning Swann or
its central constitutional principle.
Indeed, in its more recent opinions, the Court recognized
that the “fundamental purpose” of strict scrutiny review is
to “take relevant differences” between “fundamentally
different situations . . . into account.” Adarand, supra, at
228 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court made
clear that “[s]trict scrutiny does not trea[t] dissimilar race-
based decisions as though they were equally objection
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able.” Ibid. It added that the fact that a law “treats [a
person] unequally because of his or her race . . . says
nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law.”
Id., at 229–230 (internal quotation marks omitted). And
the Court, using the very phrase that Justice Marshall
had used to describe strict scrutiny’s application to any
exclusionary use of racial criteria, sought to “dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny” is as likely to condemn inclu
sive uses of “race-conscious” criteria as it is to invalidate
exclusionary uses. That is, it is not in all circumstances
“ ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’ ” Id., at 237 (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
The Court in Grutter elaborated:
“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’ . . . Although all governmental uses of race
are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated
by it. . . .
“Context matters when reviewing race-based gov
ernmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.
See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 343–344
(1960) (admonishing that, ‘in dealing with claims un
der broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive
content by an interpretive process of inclusion and ex
clusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on
and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise
to them, must not be applied out of context in disre
gard of variant controlling facts’). . . . Not every deci
sion influenced by race is equally objectionable, and
strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity
of the reasons advanced by the governmental deci
sionmaker for the use of race in that particular con
text.” 539 U. S., at 326–327.
The Court’s holding in Grutter demonstrates that the
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BREYER, J., dissenting

Court meant what it said, for the Court upheld an elite
law school’s race-conscious admissions program.
The upshot is that the cases to which the plurality
refers, though all applying strict scrutiny, do not treat
exclusive and inclusive uses the same. Rather, they apply
the strict scrutiny test in a manner that is “fatal in fact”
only to racial classifications that harmfully exclude; they
apply the test in a manner that is not fatal in fact to racial
classifications that seek to include.
The plurality cannot avoid this simple fact. See ante, at
34–36. Today’s opinion reveals that the plurality would
rewrite this Court’s prior jurisprudence, at least in practi
cal application, transforming the “strict scrutiny” test into
a rule that is fatal in fact across the board. In doing so,
the plurality parts company from this Court’s prior cases,
and it takes from local government the longstanding legal
right to use race-conscious criteria for inclusive purposes
in limited ways.
Second, as Grutter specified, “[c]ontext matters when
reviewing race-based governmental action under the
Equal Protection Clause.” 539 U. S., at 327 (citing Gomil
lion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 343–344 (1960)). And
contexts differ dramatically one from the other. Govern
mental use of race-based criteria can arise in the context
of, for example, census forms, research expenditures for
diseases, assignments of police officers patrolling pre
dominantly minority-race neighborhoods, efforts to deseg
regate racially segregated schools, policies that favor
minorities when distributing goods or services in short
supply, actions that create majority-minority electoral
districts, peremptory strikes that remove potential jurors
on the basis of race, and others. Given the significant
differences among these contexts, it would be surprising if
the law required an identically strict legal test for evaluat
ing the constitutionality of race-based criteria as to each of
them.
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Here, the context is one in which school districts seek to
advance or to maintain racial integration in primary and
secondary schools. It is a context, as Swann makes clear,
where history has required special administrative reme
dies. And it is a context in which the school boards’ plans
simply set race-conscious limits at the outer boundaries of
a broad range.
This context is not a context that involves the use of race
to decide who will receive goods or services that are nor
mally distributed on the basis of merit and which are in
short supply. It is not one in which race-conscious limits
stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue do not pit the
races against each other or otherwise significantly exacer
bate racial tensions. They do not impose burdens unfairly
upon members of one race alone but instead seek benefits
for members of all races alike. The context here is one of
racial limits that seek, not to keep the races apart, but to
bring them together.
The importance of these differences is clear once one
compares the present circumstances with other cases
where one or more of these negative features are present.
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Brown, 347
U. S. 483; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986); Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630
(1993); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200
(1995); Grutter, supra; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244
(2003); Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499 (2005).
If one examines the context more specifically, one finds
that the districts’ plans reflect efforts to overcome a his
tory of segregation, embody the results of broad experience
and community consultation, seek to expand student
choice while reducing the need for mandatory busing, and
use race-conscious criteria in highly limited ways that
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BREYER, J., dissenting

diminish the use of race compared to preceding integration
efforts. Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d 790,
809–810 (CA1 1998) (Boudin, J., concurring), with Com
fort, 418 F. 3d, at 28–29 (Boudin, C. J., concurring). They
do not seek to award a scarce commodity on the basis of
merit, for they are not magnet schools; rather, by design
and in practice, they offer substantially equivalent aca
demic programs and electives. Although some parents or
children prefer some schools over others, school popularity
has varied significantly over the years. In 2000, for exam
ple, Roosevelt was the most popular first choice high
school in Seattle; in 2001, Ballard was the most popular;
in 2000, West Seattle was one of the least popular; by
2003, it was one of the more popular. See Research,
Evaluation and Assessment, Student Information Serv-
ices Office, District Summaries 1999–2005, available at
http: //www.seattleschools.org/area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05
all.pdf. In a word, the school plans under review do not
involve the kind of race-based harm that has led this
Court, in other contexts, to find the use of race-conscious
criteria unconstitutional.
These and related considerations convinced one Ninth
Circuit judge in the Seattle case to apply a standard of
constitutionality review that is less than “strict,” and to
conclude that this Court’s precedents do not require the
contrary. See 426 F. 3d 1162, 1193–1194 (2005) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) (“That a student is denied the school of his
choice may be disappointing, but it carries no racial
stigma and says nothing at all about that individual’s
aptitude or ability”). That judge is not alone. Cf. Gratz,
supra, at 301 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Adarand, supra,
at 243 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Carter, When Victims
Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale L. J. 420, 433–434 (1988).
The view that a more lenient standard than “strict
scrutiny” should apply in the present context would not
imply abandonment of judicial efforts carefully to deter
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mine the need for race-conscious criteria and the criteria’s
tailoring in light of the need. And the present context
requires a court to examine carefully the race-conscious
program at issue. In doing so, a reviewing judge must be
fully aware of the potential dangers and pitfalls that
JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE KENNEDY mention. See
ante, at 11–12 (THOMAS, J., concurring); ante, at 3, 17
(opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
But unlike the plurality, such a judge would also be
aware that a legislature or school administrators, ulti
mately accountable to the electorate, could nonetheless
properly conclude that a racial classification sometimes
serves a purpose important enough to overcome the risks
they mention, for example, helping to end racial isolation
or to achieve a diverse student body in public schools. Cf.
ante, at 17–18 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Where that is so,
the judge would carefully examine the program’s details to
determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is
proportionate to the important ends it serves.
In my view, this contextual approach to scrutiny is
altogether fitting. I believe that the law requires applica
tion here of a standard of review that is not “strict” in the
traditional sense of that word, although it does require the
careful review I have just described. See Gratz, supra, at
301 (GINSBURG, J., joined by SOUTER, J., dissenting);
Adarand, supra, at 242–249 (STEVENS, J., joined by
GINSBURG, J., dissenting); 426 F. 3d, at 1193–1194 (Koz
inski, J., concurring). Apparently JUSTICE KENNEDY also
agrees that strict scrutiny would not apply in respect to
certain “race-conscious” school board policies. See ante, at
9 (“Executive and legislative branches, which for genera
tions now have considered these types of policies and
procedures, should be permitted to employ them with
candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation
does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the
impact a given approach might have on students of differ
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BREYER, J., dissenting

ent races”).
Nonetheless, in light of Grutter and other precedents,
see, e.g., Bakke, 438 U. S., at 290 (opinion of Powell, J.), I
shall adopt the first alternative. I shall apply the version
of strict scrutiny that those cases embody. I shall conse
quently ask whether the school boards in Seattle and
Louisville adopted these plans to serve a “compelling
governmental interest” and, if so, whether the plans are
“narrowly tailored” to achieve that interest. If the plans
survive this strict review, they would survive less exacting
review a fortiori. Hence, I conclude that the plans before
us pass both parts of the strict scrutiny test. Conse
quently I must conclude that the plans here are permitted
under the Constitution.
III
Applying the Legal Standard
A
Compelling Interest
The principal interest advanced in these cases to justify
the use of race-based criteria goes by various names.
Sometimes a court refers to it as an interest in achieving
racial “diversity.” Other times a court, like the plurality
here, refers to it as an interest in racial “balancing.” I
have used more general terms to signify that interest,
describing it, for example, as an interest in promoting or
preserving greater racial “integration” of public schools.
By this term, I mean the school districts’ interest in elimi
nating school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the
degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the
district’s schools and each individual student’s public
school experience.
Regardless of its name, however, the interest at stake
possesses three essential elements. First, there is a his
torical and remedial element: an interest in setting right
the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. This
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refers back to a time when public schools were highly
segregated, often as a result of legal or administrative
policies that facilitated racial segregation in public
schools. It is an interest in continuing to combat the
remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by
these school-related policies, which have often affected not
only schools, but also housing patterns, employment prac
tices, economic conditions, and social attitudes. It is an
interest in maintaining hard-won gains. And it has its
roots in preventing what gradually may become the de
facto resegregation of America’s public schools. See Part I,
supra, at 4; Appendix A, infra. See also ante, at 17 (opin
ion of KENNEDY, J.) (“This Nation has a moral and ethical
obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an
integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of
its children”).
Second, there is an educational element: an interest in
overcoming the adverse educational effects produced by
and associated with highly segregated schools. Cf. Grut
ter, 539 U. S., at 345 (GINSBURG, J., concurring). Studies
suggest that children taken from those schools and placed
in integrated settings often show positive academic gains.
See, e.g., Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing
and Education, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking
Housing and Education Policy 15, 35 (J. Powell, G. Kear
ney, & V. Kay eds. 2001) (hereinafter Powell); Hallinan,
Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science
Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 733, 741–742 (1998) (hereinaf
ter Hallinan).
Other studies reach different conclusions. See, e.g., D.
Armor, Forced Justice (1995). See also ante, at 15–17
(THOMAS, J., concurring). But the evidence supporting an
educational interest in racially integrated schools is well
established and strong enough to permit a democratically
elected school board reasonably to determine that this
interest is a compelling one.
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Research suggests, for example, that black children
from segregated educational environments significantly
increase their achievement levels once they are placed in a
more integrated setting. Indeed in Louisville itself the
achievement gap between black and white elementary
school students grew substantially smaller (by seven
percentage points) after the integration plan was imple
mented in 1975. See Powell 35. Conversely, to take an
other example, evidence from a district in Norfolk, Vir
ginia, shows that resegregated schools led to a decline in
the achievement test scores of children of all races. Ibid.
One commentator, reviewing dozens of studies of the
educational benefits of desegregated schooling, found that
the studies have provided “remarkably consistent” results,
showing that: (1) black students’ educational achievement
is improved in integrated schools as compared to racially
isolated schools, (2) black students’ educational achieve
ment is improved in integrated classes, and (3) the earlier
that black students are removed from racial isolation, the
better their educational outcomes. See Hallinan 741–742.
Multiple studies also indicate that black alumni of inte
grated schools are more likely to move into occupations
traditionally closed to African-Americans, and to earn
more money in those fields. See, e.g., Schofield, Review of
Research on School Desegregation’s Impact on Elementary
and Secondary School Students, in Handbook of Research
on Multicultural Education 597, 606–607 (J. Banks & C.
Banks eds. 1995). Cf. W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of
the River 118 (1998) (hereinafter Bowen & Bok).
Third, there is a democratic element: an interest in
producing an educational environment that reflects the
“pluralistic society” in which our children will live.
Swann, 402 U. S., at 16. It is an interest in helping our
children learn to work and play together with children of
different racial backgrounds. It is an interest in teaching
children to engage in the kind of cooperation among
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Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land of
three hundred million people one Nation.
Again, data support this insight. See, e.g., Hallinan 745;
Quillian & Campbell, Beyond Black and White: The Pre
sent and Future of Multiracial Friendship Segregation, 68
Am. Sociological Rev. 540, 541 (2003) (hereinafter Quillian
& Campbell); Dawkins & Braddock, The Continuing Sig
nificance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and
African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J.
Negro Ed. 394, 401–403 (1994) (hereinafter Dawkins &
Braddock); Wells & Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the
Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 Rev. Edu
cational Research 531, 550 (1994) (hereinafter Wells &
Crain).
There are again studies that offer contrary conclusions.
See, e.g., Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup
Relations, in 17 Review of Research in Education 356 (G.
Grant ed. 1991). See also ante, at 22–23 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring). Again, however, the evidence supporting a
democratic interest in racially integrated schools is firmly
established and sufficiently strong to permit a school
board to determine, as this Court has itself often found,
that this interest is compelling.
For example, one study documented that “black and
white students in desegregated schools are less racially
prejudiced than those in segregated schools,” and that
“interracial contact in desegregated schools leads to an
increase in interracial sociability and friendship.” Hal
linan 745. See also Quillian & Campbell 541. Cf. Bowen
& Bok 155. Other studies have found that both black and
white students who attend integrated schools are more
likely to work in desegregated companies after graduation
than students who attended racially isolated schools.
Dawkins & Braddock 401–403; Wells & Crain 550. Fur
ther research has shown that the desegregation of schools
can help bring adult communities together by reducing
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BREYER, J., dissenting

segregated housing. Cities that have implemented suc
cessful school desegregation plans have witnessed in
creased interracial contact and neighborhoods that tend to
become less racially segregated. Dawkins & Braddock
403. These effects not only reinforce the prior gains of
integrated primary and secondary education; they also
foresee a time when there is less need to use race-
conscious criteria.
Moreover, this Court from Swann to Grutter has treated
these civic effects as an important virtue of racially di
verse education. See, e.g., Swann, supra, at 16; Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S., at 472–473. In Grutter, in
the context of law school admissions, we found that these
types of interests were, constitutionally speaking, “compel
ling.” See 539 U. S., at 330 (recognizing that Michigan
Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy “promotes
cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races,” and pointing out that “the
skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints” (internal quota
tion marks omitted; alteration in original)).
In light of this Court’s conclusions in Grutter, the “com
pelling” nature of these interests in the context of primary
and secondary public education follows here a fortiori.
Primary and secondary schools are where the education of
this Nation’s children begins, where each of us begins to
absorb those values we carry with us to the end of our
days. As Justice Marshall said, “unless our children begin
to learn together, there is little hope that our people will
ever learn to live together.” Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S.
717, 783 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
And it was Brown, after all, focusing upon primary and
secondary schools, not Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629
(1950), focusing on law schools, or McLaurin v. Oklahoma
42 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

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State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U. S. 637 (1950), focus
ing on graduate schools, that affected so deeply not only
Americans but the world. R. Kluger, Simple Justice: The
History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black Amer
ica’s Struggle for Equality, p. x (1975) (arguing that per
haps no other Supreme Court case has “affected more
directly the minds, hearts, and daily lives of so many
Americans”); Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education
xxvii (2001) (identifying Brown as “the most eagerly
awaited and dramatic judicial decision of modern times”).
See also Parents Involved VII, 426 F. 3d, at 1194 (Kozin
ski, J., concurring); Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 937 (1989)
(calling Brown “the Supreme Court’s greatest anti
discrimination decision”); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae in Brown, 347 U. S. 483; Dudziak, Brown
as a Cold War Case, 91 J. Am. Hist. 32 (2004); A Great
Decision, Hindustan Times (New Dehli, May 20, 1954),
p. 5; USA Takes Positive Step, West African Pilot (Lagos,
May 22, 1954), p. 2 (stating that Brown is an acknowl
edgment that the “United States should set an example for
all other nations by taking the lead in removing from its
national life all signs and traces of racial intolerance,
arrogance or discrimination”). Hence, I am not surprised
that JUSTICE KENNEDY finds that, “a district may consider
it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student popu
lation,” including a racially diverse population. Ante, at
17–18.
The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an
effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general “societal
discrimination,” ante, at 23 (plurality opinion), but of
primary and secondary school segregation, see supra, at 7,
14; it includes an effort to create school environments that
provide better educational opportunities for all children; it
includes an effort to help create citizens better prepared to
know, to understand, and to work with people of all races
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BREYER, J., dissenting

and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of democ
ratic government our Constitution foresees. If an educa
tional interest that combines these three elements is not
“compelling,” what is?
The majority acknowledges that in prior cases this
Court has recognized at least two interests as compelling:
an interest in “remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination,” and an interest in “diversity in higher
education.” Ante, at 12, 13. But the plurality does not
convincingly explain why those interests do not constitute
a “compelling interest” here. How do the remedial inter
ests here differ in kind from those at issue in the volun
tary desegregation efforts that Attorney General Kennedy
many years ago described in his letter to the President?
Supra, at 19–20. How do the educational and civic inter
ests differ in kind from those that underlie and justify the
racial “diversity” that the law school sought in Grutter,
where this Court found a compelling interest?
The plurality tries to draw a distinction by reference to
the well-established conceptual difference between de jure
segregation (“segregation by state action”) and de facto
segregation (“racial imbalance caused by other factors”).
Ante, at 28. But that distinction concerns what the Con
stitution requires school boards to do, not what it permits
them to do. Compare, e.g., Green, 391 U. S., at 437–438
(“School boards . . . operating state-compelled dual sys
tems” have an “affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch”), with, e.g., Milliken, 418 U. S., at 745 (the Con
stitution does not impose a duty to desegregate upon
districts that have not been “shown to have committed any
constitutional violation”).
The opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance
upon the de jure/de facto distinction only address what
remedial measures a school district may be constitution
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ally required to undertake. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U. S. 467, 495 (1992). As to what is permitted, nothing in
our equal protection law suggests that a State may right
only those wrongs that it committed. No case of this Court
has ever relied upon the de jure/de facto distinction in
order to limit what a school district is voluntarily allowed
to do. That is what is at issue here. And Swann, McDan
iel, Crawford, North Carolina Bd. of Ed., Harris, and
Bustop made one thing clear: significant as the difference
between de jure and de facto segregation may be to the
question of what a school district must do, that distinction
is not germane to the question of what a school district
may do.
Nor does any precedent indicate, as the plurality sug
gests with respect to Louisville, ante, at 29, that remedial
interests vanish the day after a federal court declares that
a district is “unitary.” Of course, Louisville adopted those
portions of the plan at issue here before a court declared
Louisville “unitary.” Moreover, in Freeman, this Court
pointed out that in “one sense of the term, vestiges of past
segregation by state decree do remain in our society and in
our schools. Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs com
mitted by the State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of
history. And stubborn facts of history linger and persist.”
503 U. S., at 495. See also ante, at 15 (opinion of
KENNEDY, J.). I do not understand why this Court’s cases,
which rest the significance of a “unitary” finding in part
upon the wisdom and desirability of returning schools to
local control, should deprive those local officials of legal
permission to use means they once found necessary to
combat persisting injustices.
For his part, JUSTICE THOMAS faults my citation of
various studies supporting the view that school districts
can find compelling educational and civic interests in
integrating their public schools. See ante, at 15–17, 23
(concurring opinion). He is entitled of course to his own
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BREYER, J., dissenting

opinion as to which studies he finds convincing—although
it bears mention that even the author of some of JUSTICE
THOMAS’ preferred studies has found some evidence link
ing integrated learning environments to increased aca
demic achievement. Cf. ante, at 15–17 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.) (citing Armor & Rossell, Desegregation and
Resegregation in the Public Schools, in Beyond the Color
Line 239 (A. Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom eds. 2002);
Brief for Armor et al. as Amici Curiae, with Rosen, Per
haps Not All Affirmative Action is Created Equal, N. Y.
Times, June 11, 2006 (quoting David Armor as comment
ing “ ‘[w]e did find the [racial] achievement gap changing
significantly’ ” and acknowledging that he “ ‘did find a
modest association for math but not reading in terms of
racial composition and achievement, but there’s a big state
variation’ ” (emphasis added)). If we are to insist upon
unanimity in the social science literature before finding a
compelling interest, we might never find one. I believe
only that the Constitution allows democratically elected
school boards to make up their own minds as to how best
to include people of all races in one America.
B
Narrow Tailoring
I next ask whether the plans before us are “narrowly
tailored” to achieve these “compelling” objectives. I shall
not accept the school board’s assurances on faith, cf. Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 920 (1995), and I shall subject
the “tailoring” of their plans to “rigorous judicial review.”
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 388 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).
Several factors, taken together, nonetheless lead me to
conclude that the boards’ use of race-conscious criteria in
these plans passes even the strictest “tailoring” test.
First, the race-conscious criteria at issue only help set
the outer bounds of broad ranges. Cf. id., at 390
(KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about “nar
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row fluctuation band[s]”). They constitute but one part of
plans that depend primarily upon other, nonracial ele
ments. To use race in this way is not to set a forbidden
“quota.” See id., at 335 (“Properly understood, a ‘quota’ is
a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion
of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively for certain mi
nority groups’ ” (quoting Croson, 488 U. S., at 496)).
In fact, the defining feature of both plans is greater
emphasis upon student choice. In Seattle, for example, in
more than 80% of all cases, that choice alone determines
which high schools Seattle’s ninth graders will attend.
After ninth grade, students can decide voluntarily to
transfer to a preferred district high school (without any
consideration of race-conscious criteria). Choice, therefore,
is the “predominant factor” in these plans. Race is not.
See Grutter, supra, at 393 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (al
lowing consideration of race only if it does “not become a
predominant factor”).
Indeed, the race-conscious ranges at issue in these cases
often have no effect, either because the particular school is
not oversubscribed in the year in question, or because the
racial makeup of the school falls within the broad range,
or because the student is a transfer applicant or has a
sibling at the school. In these respects, the broad ranges
are less like a quota and more like the kinds of “useful
starting points” that this Court has consistently found
permissible, even when they set boundaries upon volun
tary transfers, and even when they are based upon a
community’s general population. See, e.g., North Carolina
Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971) (no “absolute
prohibition against [the] use” of mathematical ratios as a
“starting point”); Swann, 402 U. S., at 24–25 (approving
the use of a ratio reflecting “the racial composition of the
whole school system” as a “useful starting point,” but not
as an “inflexible requirement”). Cf. United States v. Mont
gomery County Bd. of Ed., 395 U. S. 225, 232 (1969) (ap
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BREYER, J., dissenting

proving a lower court desegregation order that “provided
that the [school] board must move toward a goal under
which ‘in each school the ratio of white to Negro faculty
members is substantially the same as it is throughout the
system,’ ” and “immediately” requiring “[t]he ratio of Negro
to white teachers” in each school to be equal to “the ratio
of Negro to white teachers in . . . the system as a whole”).
Second, broad-range limits on voluntary school choice
plans are less burdensome, and hence more narrowly
tailored, see Grutter, supra, at 341, than other race-
conscious restrictions this Court has previously approved.
See, e.g., Swann, supra, at 26–27; Montgomery Co. Bd. of
Ed., supra, at 232. Indeed, the plans before us are more
narrowly tailored than the race-conscious admission plans
that this Court approved in Grutter. Here, race becomes a
factor only in a fraction of students’ non-merit-based
assignments—not in large numbers of students’ merit-
based applications. Moreover, the effect of applying race-
conscious criteria here affects potentially disadvantaged
students less severely, not more severely, than the criteria
at issue in Grutter. Disappointed students are not rejected
from a State’s flagship graduate program; they simply
attend a different one of the district’s many public schools,
which in aspiration and in fact are substantially equal.
Cf. Wygant, 476 U. S., at 283. And, in Seattle, the disad
vantaged student loses at most one year at the high school
of his choice. One will search Grutter in vain for similarly
persuasive evidence of narrow tailoring as the school
districts have presented here.
Third, the manner in which the school boards developed
these plans itself reflects “narrow tailoring.” Each plan
was devised to overcome a history of segregated public
schools. Each plan embodies the results of local experi
ence and community consultation. Each plan is the prod
uct of a process that has sought to enhance student choice,
while diminishing the need for mandatory busing. And
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each plan’s use of race-conscious elements is diminished
compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans.
The school boards’ widespread consultation, their ex
perimentation with numerous other plans, indeed, the 40
year history that Part I sets forth, make clear that plans
that are less explicitly race-based are unlikely to achieve
the board’s “compelling” objectives. The history of each
school system reveals highly segregated schools, followed
by remedial plans that involved forced busing, followed by
efforts to attract or retain students through the use of
plans that abandoned busing and replaced it with greater
student choice. Both cities once tried to achieve more
integrated schools by relying solely upon measures such as
redrawn district boundaries, new school building construc
tion, and unrestricted voluntary transfers. In neither city
did these prior attempts prove sufficient to achieve the
city’s integration goals. See Parts I–A and I–B, supra, at
6–18.
Moreover, giving some degree of weight to a local school
board’s knowledge, expertise, and concerns in these par
ticular matters is not inconsistent with rigorous judicial
scrutiny. It simply recognizes that judges are not well
suited to act as school administrators. Indeed, in the
context of school desegregation, this Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of acknowledging that local school
boards better understand their own communities and have
a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the
educational needs of their pupils. See Milliken, 418 U. S.,
at 741–42 (“No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential
both to the maintenance of community concern and sup
port for public schools and to quality of the educational
process”). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49–50 (1973) (extolling local
control for “the opportunity it offers for participation in
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BREYER, J., dissenting

the decisionmaking process that determines how . . . local
tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor
local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a
healthy competition for educational excellence”); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968) (“Judicial interposi
tion in the operation of the public school system of the
Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . .
By and large, public education in our Nation is committed
to the control of state and local authorities”); Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II)
(“Full implementation of these constitutional principles
may require solution of varied local school problems.
School authorities have the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts
will have to consider whether the action of school authori
ties constitutes good faith implementation of the govern
ing constitutional principles”).
Experience in Seattle and Louisville is consistent with
experience elsewhere. In 1987, the U. S. Commission on
Civil Rights studied 125 large school districts seeking
integration. It reported that most districts—92 of them, in
fact—adopted desegregation policies that combined two or
more highly race-conscious strategies, for example, rezon
ing or pairing. See Welch 83–91.
Having looked at dozens of amicus briefs, public reports,
news stories, and the records in many of this Court’s prior
cases, which together span 50 years of desegregation
history in school districts across the Nation, I have discov
ered many examples of districts that sought integration
through explicitly race-conscious methods, including man
datory busing. Yet, I have found no example or model that
would permit this Court to say to Seattle and to Louisville:
“Here is an instance of a desegregation plan that is likely
to achieve your objectives and also makes less use of race-
conscious criteria than your plans.” And, if the plurality
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cannot suggest such a model—and it cannot—then it seeks
to impose a “narrow tailoring” requirement that in prac
tice would never be met.
Indeed, if there is no such plan, or if such plans are
purely imagined, it is understandable why, as the plural
ity notes, ante, at 27, Seattle school officials concentrated
on diminishing the racial component of their districts’
plan, but did not pursue eliminating that element entirely.
For the plurality now to insist as it does, ante, at 27–28,
that these school districts ought to have said so officially is
either to ask for the superfluous (if they need only make
explicit what is implicit) or to demand the impossible (if
they must somehow provide more proof that there is no
hypothetical other plan that could work as well as theirs).
I am not aware of any case in which this Court has read
the “narrow tailoring” test to impose such a requirement.
Cf. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Ed. School Dist.
No. 205, 961 F. 2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 1992) (Easterbrook, J.)
(“Would it be necessary to adjudicate the obvious
before adopting (or permitting the parties to agree on) a
remedy . . . ?”).
The plurality also points to the school districts’ use of
numerical goals based upon the racial breakdown of the
general school population, and it faults the districts for
failing to prove that no other set of numbers will work. See
ante, at 18–20. The plurality refers to no case in support
of its demand. Nor is it likely to find such a case. After
all, this Court has in many cases explicitly permitted
districts to use target ratios based upon the district’s
underlying population. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U. S., at 24–
25; North Carolina Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S., at 46; Montgom
ery County Bd. of Ed., 395 U. S., at 232. The reason is
obvious: In Seattle, where the overall student population
is 41% white, permitting 85% white enrollment at a single
school would make it much more likely that other schools
would have very few white students, whereas in Jefferson
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BREYER, J., dissenting

County, with a 60% white enrollment, one school with 85%
white students would be less likely to skew enrollments
elsewhere.
Moreover, there is research-based evidence supporting,
for example, that a ratio no greater than 50% minority—
which is Louisville’s starting point, and as close as feasible
to Seattle’s starting point—is helpful in limiting the risk of
“white flight.” See Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegre
gation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, in Pursuit of a
Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy
121, 125. Federal law also assumes that a similar target
percentage will help avoid detrimental “minority group
isolation.” See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Title V,
Part C, 115 Stat. 1806, 20 U. S. C. §7231 et seq. (2000 ed.,
Supp. IV); 34 CFR §§280.2, 280.4 (2006) (implementing
regulations). What other numbers are the boards to use
as a “starting point”? Are they to spend days, weeks, or
months seeking independently to validate the use of ratios
that this Court has repeatedly authorized in prior cases?
Are they to draw numbers out of thin air? These districts
have followed this Court’s holdings and advice in “tailor
ing” their plans. That, too, strongly supports the lawful
ness of their methods.
Nor could the school districts have accomplished their
desired aims (e.g., avoiding forced busing, countering
white flight, maintaining racial diversity) by other means.
Nothing in the extensive history of desegregation efforts
over the past 50 years gives the districts, or this Court,
any reason to believe that another method is possible to
accomplish these goals. Nevertheless, JUSTICE KENNEDY
suggests that school boards:
“may pursue the goal of bringing together students of
diverse backgrounds and races through other means,
including strategic site selection of new schools; draw
ing attendance zones with general recognition of the
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demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources
for special programs; recruiting students and faculty
in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, per
formance, and other statistics by race.” Ante, at 8.
But, as to “strategic site selection,” Seattle has built one
new high school in the last 44 years (and that specialized
school serves only 300 students). In fact, six of the Seattle
high schools involved in this case were built by the 1920’s;
the other four were open by the early 1960’s. See gener
ally N. Thompson & C. Marr, Building for Learning: Seat
tle Public Schools Histories, 1862–2000 (2002). As to
“drawing” neighborhood “attendance zones” on a racial
basis, Louisville tried it, and it worked only when forced
busing was also part of the plan. See supra, at 12–14. As
to “allocating resources for special programs,” Seattle and
Louisville have both experimented with this; indeed, these
programs are often referred to as “magnet schools,” but
the limited desegregation effect of these efforts extends at
most to those few schools to which additional resources are
granted. In addition, there is no evidence from the experi
ence of these school districts that it will make any mean
ingful impact. See Brief for Respondents in No. 05–908, p.
42. As to “recruiting faculty” on the basis of race, both
cities have tried, but only as one part of a broader pro
gram. As to “tracking enrollments, performance and other
statistics by race,” tracking reveals the problem; it does
not cure it.
JUSTICE KENNEDY sets forth two additional concerns
related to “narrow tailoring.” In respect to Louisville, he
says first that officials stated (1) that kindergarten as
signments are not subject to the race-conscious guidelines,
and (2) that the child at issue here was denied permission
to attend the kindergarten he wanted because of those
guidelines. Both, he explains, cannot be true. He adds
that this confusion illustrates that Louisville’s assignment
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BREYER, J., dissenting

plan (or its explanation of it to this Court) is insufficiently
precise in respect to “who makes the decisions,” “over
sight,” “the precise circumstances in which an assignment
decision” will be made; and “which of two similarly situ
ated children will be subjected to a given race-based deci
sion.” Ante, at 4.
The record suggests, however, that the child in question
was not assigned to the school he preferred because he
missed the kindergarten application deadline. See App. in
05–915, p. 20. After he had enrolled and after the aca
demic year had begun, he then applied to transfer to his
preferred school after the kindergarten assignment dead
line had passed, id., at 21, possibly causing school officials
to treat his late request as an application to transfer to the
first grade, in respect to which the guidelines apply. I am
not certain just how the remainder of JUSTICE KENNEDY’s
concerns affect the lawfulness of the Louisville program,
for they seem to be failures of explanation, not of admini
stration. But Louisville should be able to answer the
relevant questions on remand.
JUSTICE KENNEDY’s second concern is directly related to
the merits of Seattle’s plan: Why does Seattle’s plan group
Asian-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans,
and African-Americans together, treating all as similar
minorities? Ante, at 6–7. The majority suggests that
Seattle’s classification system could permit a school to be
labeled “diverse” with a 50% Asian-American and 50%
white student body, and no African-American students,
Hispanic students, or students of other ethnicity. Ante, at
6; ante, at 15–16 (opinion of the Court).
The 50/50 hypothetical has no support in the record
here; it is conjured from the imagination. In fact, Seattle
apparently began to treat these different minority groups
alike in response to the federal Emergency School Aid
Act’s requirement that it do so. Siqueland 116–117. See
also Hanawalt 31; Pub. L. 95–561, Tit. VI (1978) (prescrib
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ing percentage enrollment requirements for “minority”
students); Siqueland 55 (discussing HEW definition of
“minority”). Moreover, maintaining this federally man
dated system of classification makes sense insofar as
Seattle’s experience indicates that the relevant circum
stances in respect to each of these different minority
groups are roughly similar, e.g., in terms of residential
patterns, and call for roughly similar responses. This is
confirmed by the fact that Seattle has been able to achieve
a desirable degree of diversity without the greater empha
sis on race that drawing fine lines among minority groups
would require. Does the plurality’s view of the Equal
Protection Clause mean that courts must give no weight to
such a board determination? Does it insist upon especially
strong evidence supporting inclusion of multiple minority
groups in an otherwise lawful government minority-
assistance program? If so, its interpretation threatens to
produce divisiveness among minority groups that is in
compatible with the basic objectives of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Regardless, the plurality cannot object that
the constitutional defect is the individualized use of race
and simultaneously object that not enough account of
individuals’ race has been taken.
Finally, I recognize that the Court seeks to distinguish
Grutter from these cases by claiming that Grutter arose in
“ ‘the context of higher education.’ ” Ante, at 16. But that
is not a meaningful legal distinction. I have explained
why I do not believe the Constitution could possibly find
“compelling” the provision of a racially diverse education
for a 23-year-old law student but not for a 13-year-old high
school pupil. See supra, at 46–48. And I have explained
how the plans before us are more narrowly tailored than
those in Grutter. See supra, at 45. I add that one cannot
find a relevant distinction in the fact that these school
districts did not examine the merits of applications “indi
vidual[ly].” See ante, at 13–15. The context here does not
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involve admission by merit; a child’s academic, artistic,
and athletic “merits” are not at all relevant to the child’s
placement. These are not affirmative action plans, and
hence “individualized scrutiny” is simply beside the point.
The upshot is that these plans’ specific features—(1)
their limited and historically-diminishing use of race, (2)
their strong reliance upon other non-race-conscious ele
ments, (3) their history and the manner in which the
districts developed and modified their approach, (4) the
comparison with prior plans, and (5) the lack of reasonably
evident alternatives—together show that the districts’
plans are “narrowly tailored” to achieve their “compelling”
goals. In sum, the districts’ race-conscious plans satisfy
“strict scrutiny” and are therefore lawful.
IV
Direct Precedent
Two additional precedents more directly related to the
plans here at issue reinforce my conclusion. The first
consists of the District Court determination in the Louis
ville case when it dissolved its desegregation order that
there was “overwhelming evidence of the Board’s good
faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its
underlying purposes,” indeed that the Board had “treated
the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a
legal obligation—they consider it a positive, desirable
policy and an essential element of any well-rounded public
school education.” Hampton II, 102 F. Supp. 2d, at 370.
When the court made this determination in 2000, it did so
in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan that the
board had adopted in 1996. That plan, which took effect
before 1996, is the very plan that in all relevant respects is
in effect now and is the subject of the present challenge.
No one claims that (the relevant portion of) Louisville’s
plan was unlawful in 1996 when Louisville adopted it. To
the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it repre
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sented part of an effort to implement the 1978 desegrega
tion order. But if the plan was lawful when it was first
adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District
Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now sug
gest that it became unlawful the following day? Is it
conceivable that the Constitution, implemented through a
court desegregation order, could permit (perhaps require)
the district to make use of a race-conscious plan the day
before the order was dissolved and then forbid the district
to use the identical plan the day after? See id., at 380
(“The very analysis for dissolving desegregation decrees
supports continued maintenance of a desegregated system
as a compelling state interest”). The Equal Protection
Clause is not incoherent. And federal courts would rightly
hesitate to find unitary status if the consequences of the
ruling were so dramatically disruptive.
Second, Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, is
directly on point. That case involves the original Seattle
Plan, a more heavily race-conscious predecessor of the very
plan now before us. In Seattle School Dist. No. 1, this
Court struck down a state referendum that effectively
barred implementation of Seattle’s desegregation plan and
“burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate Washington
schools in districts throughout the State.” Id., at 462–463,
483. Because the referendum would have prohibited the
adoption of a school-integration plan that involved manda
tory busing, and because it would have imposed a special
burden on school integration plans (plans that sought to
integrate previously segregated schools), the Court found
it unconstitutional. Id., at 483–487.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not directly
address the constitutional merits of the underlying Seattle
plan. But it explicitly cited Swann’s statement that the
Constitution permitted a local district to adopt such a
plan. 458 U. S., at 472, n. 15. It also cited to Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, approving of the limited use of
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race-conscious criteria in a university-admissions “af
firmative action” case. 458 U. S., at 472, n. 15. In addi
tion, the Court stated that “[a]ttending an ethnically
diverse school,” id., at 473, could help prepare “minority
children for citizenship in our pluralistic society,” hope
fully “teaching members of the racial majority to live in
harmony and mutual respect with children of minority
heritage.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
It is difficult to believe that the Court that held uncon
stitutional a referendum that would have interfered with
the implementation of this plan thought that the integra
tion plan it sought to preserve was itself an unconstitu
tional plan. And if Seattle School Dist. No. 1 is premised
upon the constitutionality of the original Seattle Plan, it is
equally premised upon the constitutionality of the present
plan, for the present plan is the Seattle Plan, modified
only insofar as it places even less emphasis on race-
conscious elements than its predecessors.
It is even more difficult to accept the plurality’s contrary
view, namely that the underlying plan was unconstitu
tional. If that is so, then all of Seattle’s earlier (even more
race-conscious) plans must also have been unconstitu
tional. That necessary implication of the plurality’s posi
tion strikes the 13th chime of the clock. How could the
plurality adopt a constitutional standard that would hold
unconstitutional large numbers of race-conscious integra
tion plans adopted by numerous school boards over the
past 50 years while remaining true to this Court’s deseg
regation precedent?
V
Consequences
The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical
document that would transmit its basic values to future
generations through principles that remained workable
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over time. Hence it is important to consider the potential
consequences of the plurality’s approach, as measured
against the Constitution’s objectives. To do so provides
further reason to believe that the plurality’s approach is
legally unsound.
For one thing, consider the effect of the plurality’s views
on the parties before us and on similar school districts
throughout the Nation. Will Louisville and all similar
school districts have to return to systems like Louisville’s
initial 1956 plan, which did not consider race at all? See
supra, at 12. That initial 1956 plan proved ineffective.
Sixteen years into the plan, 14 of 19 middle and high
schools remained almost totally white or almost totally
black. Ibid.
The districts’ past and current plans are not unique.
They resemble other plans, promulgated by hundreds of
local school boards, which have attempted a variety of
desegregation methods that have evolved over time in
light of experience. A 1987 Civil Rights Commission
Study of 125 school districts in the Nation demonstrated
the breadth and variety of desegregation plans:
“The [study] documents almost 300 desegregation
plans that were implemented between 1961 and 1985.
The degree of heterogeneity within these districts is
immediately apparent. They are located in every re
gion of the country and range in size from Las Cruces,
New Mexico, with barely over 15,000 students attend
ing 23 schools in 1968, to New York City, with more
than one million students in 853 schools. The sample
includes districts in urban areas of all sizes, suburbs
(e.g., Arlington County, Virginia) and rural areas (e.g.,
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and Raleigh County,
West Virginia). It contains 34 countywide districts
with central cities (the 11 Florida districts fit this de
scription, plus Clark County, Nevada and others) and
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a small number of consolidated districts (New Castle
County, Delaware and Jefferson County, Kentucky).
“The districts also vary in their racial compositions
and levels of segregation. Initial plans were imple
mented in Mobile, Alabama and Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina, and in a number of other southern
districts in the face of total racial segregation. At the
other extreme, Santa Clara, California had a rela
tively even racial distribution prior to its 1979 deseg
regation plan. When the 1965 plan was designed for
Harford County, Maryland, the district was 92 per
cent white. Compton, California, on the other hand,
became over 99 percent black in the 1980s, while Buf
falo, New York had a virtual 50–50 split between
white and minority students prior to its 1977 plan.
“It is not surprising to find a large number of differ
ent desegregation strategies in a sample with this
much variation.” Welch 23 (footnotes omitted).
A majority of these desegregation techniques explicitly
considered a student’s race. See id., at 24–28. Transfer
plans, for example, allowed students to shift from a school
in which they were in the racial majority to a school in
which they would be in a racial minority. Some districts,
such as Richmond, California, and Buffalo, New York,
permitted only “one-way” transfers, in which only black
students attending predominantly black schools were
permitted to transfer to designated receiver schools. Id.,
at 25. Fifty-three of the 125 studied districts used trans
fers as a component of their plans. Id., at 83–91.
At the state level, 46 States and Puerto Rico have
adopted policies that encourage or require local school
districts to enact interdistrict or intradistrict open choice
plans. Eight of those States condition approval of trans
fers to another school or district on whether the transfer
will produce increased racial integration. Eleven other
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States require local boards to deny transfers that are
not in compliance with the local school board’s desegre-
gation plans. See Education Commission of the States,
Open Enrollment: 50-State Report (2007), online at
http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=268.
Arkansas, for example, provides by statute that “[n]o
student may transfer to a nonresident district where the
percentage of enrollment for the student’s race exceeds
that percentage in the student’s resident district.” Ark.
Code Ann. §6–18–206(f)(1), as amended 2007 Ark. Gen.
Acts 552 (2007). An Ohio statute provides, in respect to
student choice, that each school district must establish
“[p]rocedures to ensure that an appropriate racial balance
is maintained in the district schools.” Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §3313.98(B)(2)(b)(iii) (Lexis Supp. 2006). Ohio adds
that a “district may object to the enrollment of a native
student in an adjacent or other district in order to main
tain an appropriate racial balance.” §3313.98 (F)(1)(a).
A Connecticut statute states that its student choice
program will seek to “preserve racial and ethnic balance.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. §10–266aa(b)(2) (2007). Connecticut law
requires each school district to submit racial group popu
lation figures to the State Board of Education. §10–226a.
Another Connecticut regulation provides that “[a]ny school
in which the Proportion for the School falls outside of a
range from 25 percentage points less to 25 percentage
points more than the Comparable Proportion for the
School District, shall be determined to be racially imbal
anced.” Conn. Agencies Regs. §10–226e–3(b) (1999). A
“racial imbalance” determination requires the district to
submit a plan to correct the racial imbalance, which plan
may include “mandatory pupil reassignment.” §§10–226e–
5(a) and (c)(4).
Interpreting that State’s Constitution, the Connecticut
Supreme Court has held legally inadequate the reliance by
a local school district solely upon some of the techniques
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JUSTICE KENNEDY today recommends (e.g., reallocating
resources, etc.). See Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678
A. 2d 1267 (1996). The State Supreme Court wrote: “De
spite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to
alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among
school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants
did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the
disparities that continue to burden the education of the
plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitu
tional right to a substantially equal educational opportu
nity.” Id., at 42, 678 A. 2d, at 1289.
At a minimum, the plurality’s views would threaten a
surge of race-based litigation. Hundreds of state and
federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications
for educational or other purposes. See supra, at 27. In
many such instances, the contentious force of legal chal
lenges to these classifications, meritorious or not, would
displace earlier calm.
The wide variety of different integration plans that
school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that
the problem of racial segregation in schools, including de
facto segregation, is difficult to solve. The fact that many
such plans have used explicitly racial criteria suggests
that such criteria have an important, sometimes neces
sary, role to play. The fact that the controlling opinion
would make a school district’s use of such criteria often
unlawful (and the plurality’s “colorblind” view would make
such use always unlawful) suggests that today’s opinion
will require setting aside the laws of several States and
many local communities.
As I have pointed out, supra, at 4, de facto resegregation
is on the rise. See Appendix A, infra. It is reasonable to
conclude that such resegregation can create serious educa
tional, social, and civic problems. See supra, at 37–45.
Given the conditions in which school boards work to set
policy, see supra, at 20–21, they may need all of the means
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presently at their disposal to combat those problems. Yet
the plurality would deprive them of at least one tool that
some districts now consider vital—the limited use of broad
race-conscious student population ranges.
I use the words “may need” here deliberately. The
plurality, or at least those who follow JUSTICE THOMAS’
“ ‘color-blind’ ” approach, see ante, at 26–27 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring); Grutter, 539 U. S., at 353–354 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), may feel confi
dent that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end
all governmental use of race-conscious criteria including
those with inclusive objectives. See ante, at 40–41 (plural
ity opinion); see also ante, at 26 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how best to stop
harmful discrimination; how best to create a society that
includes all Americans; how best to overcome our serious
problems of increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner
city schooling, and poverty correlated with race. But, as a
judge, I do know that the Constitution does not authorize
judges to dictate solutions to these problems. Rather, the
Constitution creates a democratic political system through
which the people themselves must together find answers.
And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Na
tion’s children and how best to administer America’s
schools to achieve that aim. The Court should leave them
to their work. And it is for them to decide, to quote the
plurality’s slogan, whether the best “way to stop discrimi
nation on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.” Ante, at 40–41. See also Parents Involved
VII, 426 F. 3d, at 1222 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“The way to
end racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by
race”). That is why the Equal Protection Clause outlaws
invidious discrimination, but does not similarly forbid all
use of race-conscious criteria.
Until today, this Court understood the Constitution as
affording the people, acting through their elected repre
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BREYER, J., dissenting

sentatives, freedom to select the use of “race-conscious”
criteria from among their available options. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc., 515 U. S., at 237 (“[S]trict scrutiny” in
this context is “[not] ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’ ”
(quoting Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J., concur
ring in judgment))). Today, however, the Court restricts
(and some Members would eliminate) that leeway. I fear
the consequences of doing so for the law, for the schools,
for the democratic process, and for America’s efforts to
create, out of its diversity, one Nation.
VI
Conclusions
To show that the school assignment plans here meet the
requirements of the Constitution, I have written at excep
tional length. But that length is necessary. I cannot refer
to the history of the plans in these cases to justify the use
of race-conscious criteria without describing that history
in full. I cannot rely upon Swann’s statement that the use
of race-conscious limits is permissible without showing,
rather than simply asserting, that the statement repre
sents a constitutional principle firmly rooted in federal
and state law. Nor can I explain my disagreement with
the Court’s holding and the plurality’s opinion, without
offering a detailed account of the arguments they pro
pound and the consequences they risk.
Thus, the opinion’s reasoning is long. But its conclusion
is short: The plans before us satisfy the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause. And it is the plurality’s
opinion, not this dissent that “fails to ground the result it
would reach in law.” Ante, at 28.
Four basic considerations have led me to this view.
First, the histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal com
plex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious
efforts by local school boards to resist racial segregation in
public schools. Segregation at the time of Brown gave way
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to expansive remedies that included busing, which in turn
gave rise to fears of white flight and resegregation. For
decades now, these school boards have considered and
adopted and revised assignment plans that sought to rely
less upon race, to emphasize greater student choice, and to
improve the conditions of all schools for all students, no
matter the color of their skin, no matter where they hap
pen to reside. The plans under review—which are less
burdensome, more egalitarian, and more effective than
prior plans—continue in that tradition. And their history
reveals school district goals whose remedial, educational,
and democratic elements are inextricably intertwined each
with the others. See Part I, supra, at 2–21.
Second, since this Court’s decision in Brown, the law
has consistently and unequivocally approved of both vol
untary and compulsory race-conscious measures to combat
segregated schools. The Equal Protection Clause, ratified
following the Civil War, has always distinguished in prac
tice between state action that excludes and thereby subor
dinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to
bring together people of all races. From Swann to Grutter,
this Court’s decisions have emphasized this distinction,
recognizing that the fate of race relations in this country
depends upon unity among our children, “for unless our
children begin to learn together, there is little hope that
our people will ever learn to live together.” Milliken, 418
U. S., at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also C. Sum
ner, Equality Before the Law: Unconstitutionality of Sepa
rate Colored Schools in Massachusetts, in 2 The Works of
Charles Sumner 327, 371 (1849) (“The law contemplates
not only that all be taught, but that all shall be taught
together”). See Part II, supra, at 21–37.
Third, the plans before us, subjected to rigorous judicial
review, are supported by compelling state interests and
are narrowly tailored to accomplish those goals. Just as
diversity in higher education was deemed compelling in
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Grutter, diversity in public primary and secondary
schools—where there is even more to gain—must be, a
fortiori, a compelling state interest. Even apart from
Grutter, five Members of this Court agree that “avoiding
racial isolation” and “achiev[ing] a diverse student popula
tion” remain today compelling interests. Ante, at 17–18
(opinion of KENNEDY, J.). These interests combine reme
dial, educational, and democratic objectives. For the
reasons discussed above, however, I disagree with JUSTICE
KENNEDY that Seattle and Louisville have not done
enough to demonstrate that their present plans are neces
sary to continue upon the path set by Brown. These plans
are more “narrowly tailored” than the race-conscious law
school admissions criteria at issue in Grutter. Hence,
their lawfulness follows a fortiori from this Court’s prior
decisions. See Parts III–IV, supra, at 37–57.
Fourth, the plurality’s approach risks serious harm to
the law and for the Nation. Its view of the law rests either
upon a denial of the distinction between exclusionary and
inclusive use of race-conscious criteria in the context of the
Equal Protection Clause, or upon such a rigid application
of its “test” that the distinction loses practical significance.
Consequently, the Court’s decision today slows down and
sets back the work of local school boards to bring about
racially diverse schools. See Part V, supra, at 57–63.
Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court
takes today are serious. Yesterday, the plans under re
view were lawful. Today, they are not. Yesterday, the
citizens of this Nation could look for guidance to this
Court’s unanimous pronouncements concerning desegre
gation. Today, they cannot. Yesterday, school boards had
available to them a full range of means to combat segre
gated schools. Today, they do not.
The Court’s decision undermines other basic institu
tional principles as well. What has happened to stare
decisis? The history of the plans before us, their educa
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tional importance, their highly limited use of race—all
these and more—make clear that the compelling interest
here is stronger than in Grutter. The plans here are more
narrowly tailored than the law school admissions program
there at issue. Hence, applying Grutter’s strict test, their
lawfulness follows a fortiori. To hold to the contrary is to
transform that test from “strict” to “fatal in fact”—the very
opposite of what Grutter said. And what has happened to
Swann? To McDaniel? To Crawford? To Harris? To
School Committee of Boston? To Seattle School Dist. No.
1? After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the
plurality’s logic, be written out of the law.
And what of respect for democratic local decisionmaking
by States and school boards? For several decades this
Court has rested its public school decisions upon Swann’s
basic view that the Constitution grants local school dis
tricts a significant degree of leeway where the inclusive
use of race-conscious criteria is at issue. Now localities
will have to cope with the difficult problems they face
(including resegregation) deprived of one means they may
find necessary.
And what of law’s concern to diminish and peacefully
settle conflict among the Nation’s people? Instead of
accommodating different good-faith visions of our country
and our Constitution, today’s holding upsets settled expec
tations, creates legal uncertainty, and threatens to pro
duce considerable further litigation, aggravating race-
related conflict.
And what of the long history and moral vision that the
Fourteenth Amendment itself embodies? The plurality
cites in support those who argued in Brown against segre
gation, and JUSTICE THOMAS likens the approach that I
have taken to that of segregation’s defenders. See ante, at
39–41 (plurality opinion) (comparing Jim Crow segrega
tion to Seattle and Louisville’s integration polices); ante,
at 28–32 (THOMAS, J., concurring). But segregation poli
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cies did not simply tell schoolchildren “where they could
and could not go to school based on the color of their skin,”
ante, at 40 (plurality opinion); they perpetuated a caste
system rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of
legalized subordination. The lesson of history, see ante, at
39 (plurality opinion), is not that efforts to continue racial
segregation are constitutionally indistinguishable from
efforts to achieve racial integration. Indeed, it is a cruel
distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the
1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in the modern day—to
equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to
attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua
McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school closer to
home was initially declined). This is not to deny that
there is a cost in applying “a state-mandated racial label.”
Ante, at 17 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concur
ring in judgment). But that cost does not approach, in
degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the result
ing caste system, and 80 years of legal racial segregation.
* * *
Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? For
much of this Nation’s history, the races remained divided.
It was not long ago that people of different races drank
from separate fountains, rode on separate buses, and
studied in separate schools. In this Court’s finest hour,
Brown v. Board of Education challenged this history and
helped to change it. For Brown held out a promise. It was
a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to
make citizens of slaves. It was the promise of true racial
equality—not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a
matter of everyday life in the Nation’s cities and schools.
It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for
all Americans. It sought one law, one Nation, one people,
not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of
how we actually live.
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Not everyone welcomed this Court’s decision in Brown.
Three years after that decision was handed down, the
Governor of Arkansas ordered state militia to block the
doors of a white schoolhouse so that black children could
not enter. The President of the United States dispatched
the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock, Arkansas, and
federal troops were needed to enforce a desegregation
decree. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). Today,
almost 50 years later, attitudes toward race in this Nation
have changed dramatically. Many parents, white and
black alike, want their children to attend schools with
children of different races. Indeed, the very school dis
tricts that once spurned integration now strive for it. The
long history of their efforts reveals the complexities and
difficulties they have faced. And in light of those chal
lenges, they have asked us not to take from their hands
the instruments they have used to rid their schools of
racial segregation, instruments that they believe are
needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race
and poverty. The plurality would decline their modest
request.
The plurality is wrong to do so. The last half-century
has witnessed great strides toward racial equality, but we
have not yet realized the promise of Brown. To invalidate
the plans under review is to threaten the promise of
Brown. The plurality’s position, I fear, would break that
promise. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation
will come to regret.
I must dissent.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 69

Appendix A to ,opinion of BREYER, J.

BREYER J., dissenting

APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.

A

Resegregation Trends

Percentage of Black Students in 90–100 Percent
Nonwhite and Majority Nonwhite Public Schools by
Region, 1950–1954 to 2000, Fall Enrollment

1950– 1960–
Region 1954 1961 1968 1972 1976 1980 1989 1999 2000
Percentage in 90–100% Nonwhite Schools
Northeast — 40 42.7 46.9 51.4 48.7 49.8 50.2 51.2
Border 100 59 60.2 54.7 42.5 37.0 33.7 39.7 39.6
South 100 100 77.8 24.7 22.4 23.0 26.0 31.1 30.9
Midwest 53 56 58.0 57.4 51.1 43.6 40.1 45.0 46.3
West — 27 50.8 42.7 36.3 33.7 26.7 29.9 29.5
U. S. 64.3 38.7 35.9 33.2 33.8 37.4 37.4
Percentage in 50–100% Nonwhite Schools
Northeast — 62 66.8 69.9 72.5 79.9 75.4 77.5 78.3
Border 100 69 71.6 67.2 60.1 59.2 58.0 64.8 67.0
South 100 100 80.9 55.3 54.9 57.1 59.3 67.3 69.0
Midwest 78 80 77.3 75.3 70.3 69.5 69.4 67.9 73.3
West — 69 72.2 68.1 67.4 66.8 67.4 76.7 75.3
U. S. 76.6 63.6 62.4 62.9 64.9 70.1 71.6

Source: C. Clotfelter, After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of
School Desegregation 56 (2004) (Table 2.1).
70 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Appendix A to ,opinion of BREYER, J.

BREYER J., dissenting

Changes in the Percentage of White Students in
Schools Attended by the Average Black Student by
State, 1970–2003 (includes States with 5% or greater
enrollment of black students in 1970 and 1980)

% % White Students in School
Change
White of Average Black Student
1970– 1980– 1991–
2003 1970 1980 1991 2003 1980 1991 2003
Alabama 60 33 38 35 30 5 -3 -5
Arkansas 70 43 47 44 36 4 -3 -8
California 33 26 28 27 22 2 -1 -5
Connecticut 68 44 40 35 32 -4 -5 -3
Delaware 57 47 69 65 49 22 -4 -16
Florida 51 43 51 43 34 8 -8 -9
Georgia 52 35 38 35 30 3 -3 -5
Illinois 57 15 19 20 19 4 1 -1
Indiana 82 32 39 47 41 7 8 -6
Kansas 76 52 59 58 51 7 -1 -7
Kentucky 87 49 74 42 65 25 -2 -7
Louisiana 48 31 33 32 27 2 -1 -5
Maryland 50 30 35 29 23 5 -6 -6
Massachusetts 75 48 50 45 38 2 -5 -7
Michigan 73 22 23 22 22 1 -1 0
Mississippi 47 30 29 30 26 -1 1 -4
Missouri 78 21 34 40 33 13 6 -7
Nebraska 80 33 66 62 49 33 -4 -13
New Jersey 58 32 26 26 25 -6 0 -1
New York 54 29 23 20 18 -6 -3 -2
Nevada 51 56 68 62 38 12 -6 -24
N. Carolina 58 49 54 51 40 5 -3 -11
Ohio 79 28 43 41 32 15 -2 -9
Oklahoma 61 42 58 51 42 16 -7 -9
Pennsylvania 76 28 29 31 30 1 2 -1
S. Carolina 54 41 43 42 39 2 -1 -3
Tennessee 73 29 38 36 32 9 -2 -4
Texas 39 31 35 35 27 4 0 -8
Virginia 61 42 47 46 41 5 -1 -5
Wisconsin 79 26 45 39 29 19 -6 -10

Source: G. Orfield & C. Lee, Racial Transformation and the
Changing Nature of Segregation 18 (Table 8) (Jan. 2006),
(Civil Rights Project), online at http://www.civilrightspro
ject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007)
71

Appendix A to ,opinion of BREYER, J.

BREYER J., dissenting

Percentage of White Students in Schools Attended
by the Average Black Student, 1968–2000

Source: Modified from E. Frankenberg, C. Lee, & G. Orfield,
A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We
Losing the Dream?, p. 30, fig. 5 (Jan. 2003), online at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/
AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield)
(using U. S. Dept. of Education and National Center for
Education Statistics Common Core data).
72 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Appendix A to ,opinion of BREYER, J.

BREYER J., dissenting

Percentage of Students in Minority Schools by
Race, 2000–2001

Source: Id., at 28, fig. 4.

 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 73

Appendix B to ,opinion of BREYER, J.
BREYER J., dissenting

B
Sources for Parts I–A and I–B
Part I–A: Seattle
Section 1. Segregation
¶1 C. Schmid & W. McVey, Growth and Distribution of
Minority Races in Seattle, Washington, 3, 7–9 (1964); F.
Hanawalt & R. Williams, The History of Desegregation in
Seattle Public Schools, 1954–1981, pp. 1–7 (1981) (herein
after Hanawalt); Taylor, The Civil Rights Movement in
the American West: Black Protest in Seattle, 1960–1970,
80 J. Negro Hist. 1, 2–3 (1995); A. Siqueland, Without A
Court Order: The Desegregation of Seattle’s Schools 10
(1981) (hereinafter Siqueland); D. Pieroth, Desegregating
the Public Schools, Seattle, Washington, 1954–1968, p. 6
(Dissertation Draft 1979) (hereinafter Pieroth).

Section 2. Preliminary Challenges, 1956 to 1969
¶1 Pieroth 32, 41; Hanawalt 4.

¶2 Hanawalt 11–13.

¶3 Id., at 5, 13, 27.

Section 3. The NAACP’s First Legal Challenge and Seat
tle’s Response, 1969 to 1977

¶1 Complaint in Adams v. Forbes Bottomly, Civ. No. 6704

(WD Wash., 1969), pp. 10–11.

¶2 Id., at 10, 14–15.

¶3 Planning and Evaluation Dept., Seattle Public Schools,

The Plan Adopted by the Seattle School Board to Desegre

gate Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Grade Pupils in the

Garfield, Lincoln, and Roosevelt High School Districts by

September, 1971, pp. 6, 11 (on file with the University of

Washington Library); see generally Siqueland 12–15;

Hanawalt 18–20.

¶4 Siqueland 5, 7, 21.

74 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Appendix B to ,opinion of BREYER, J.

BREYER J., dissenting

Section 4. The NAACP’s Second Legal Challenge, 1977

¶1 Administrative Complaint in Seattle Branch, NAACP v.

Seattle School Dist. No. 1, pp. 2–3 (OCR, Apr. 22, 1977)

(OCR Complaint) (filed with Court as Exhibit in Seattle

School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457); see generally Siqueland

23–24.

¶2 Memorandum of Agreement between Seattle School

District No. 1 of King Cty., Washington, and the OCR

(June 9, 1978) (filed with the Court as Exh. A to Kiner

Affidavit in Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra.

Section 5. The Seattle Plan: Mandatory Busing, 1978 to

1988

¶1 See generally Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 461;

Seattle Public Schools Desegregation Planning Office,

Proposed Alternative Desegregation Plans: Options for

Eliminating Racial Imbalance by the 1979-80 School Year

(Sept. 1977) (filed with the Court as Exh. B to Roe Affida

vit in Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra); Hanawalt 36–38,

40; Siqueland 3, 184, Table 4.

¶2 Id., at 151–152; Hanawalt 37–38; Seattle School Dist.

No. 1, supra, at 461; Complaint and Motion to Dismiss or

Affirm in Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra.

¶3 Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 461; Hanawalt 40.

¶4 See generally Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra.

Section 6. Student Choice, 1988 to 1998
¶1 L. Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing

for School Desegregation in Seattle and the Nation 27–30,

32 (Mar. 1996).

¶2 Id., at 32–34.

Section 7. The Current Plan, 1999 to the Present
¶1 App. in No. 05–908, p. 84a; Brief for Respondents in
No. 05–908, pp. 5–7; 426 F. 3d 1162, 1169–1170 (CA9
2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 75

Appendix B to ,opinion of BREYER, J.
BREYER J., dissenting

¶2 App. in No. 05–908, at 39–42; Research, Evaluation
and Assessment, Student Information Services Office,
Seattle Public Schools Data Profile: DistrictSummary
December 2005, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/
area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05all.pdf; Brief for Respond-
ents in No. 05–908, at 9–10, 47; App. in No. 05–908,
at 309a; School Board Report, School Choices and Assign
ments 2005–2006 School Year (Apr. 2005), online at
http:// www.seattleschools.org/ area/ facilties-plan/Choice/05
06AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf.
¶3 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School Dist., No. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 72 P. 3d 151 (2003);
137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (2001); 426 F. 3d 1162 (CA9 2005)
(en banc) (Parents Involved VII).

Part I–B: Louisville
Section 1. Before the Lawsuit, 1954 to 1972
¶1 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty., Bd. of Ed., 72 F. Supp. 2d
753, 756, and nn. 2, 4, 5 (WD Ky. 1999) (Hampton I).

Section 2. Court-Imposed Guidelines and Busing, 1972 to
1991
¶1 Hampton I, supra, at 757–758, 762; Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F. 2d
925 (CA6 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U. S. 918
(1974), reinstated with modifications, 510 F. 2d 1358 (CA6
1974) (per curiam); Judgment and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Ed., of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291 (WD
Ky., July 30, 1975) (1975 Judgment and Findings).
¶2 Id., at 2, 3, and Attachment 1.
¶3 Id., at 4–16.
¶4 Memorandum Opinion and Order in Haycraft v. Board
of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291, (WD Ky.,
June 16, 1978), pp. 1, 2, 4, 18 (1978 Memo & Order).
¶5 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Haycraft v. Board of
76 PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.

SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1

Appendix B to ,opinion of BREYER, J.

BREYER J., dissenting

Ed. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., Sept.
24, 1985), p. 3; Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson,
Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty.
Public School Dist., pp. 1, 3, 5 (Apr. 4, 1984) (1984 Memo
randum); Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Su
perintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson County
Public School District, pp. 4–5 (Dec. 19, 1991) (1991
Memorandum).

Section 3. Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991
to 1996
¶1 1991 Memorandum 1–4, 7–11 (Stipulated Exh. 72);

Brief for Respondents in No. 05–915, P. 12, n. 13.

¶2 1991 Memorandum 14–16.

¶3 Id., at 11, 14–15.

¶4 Id., at 15–16; Memorandum from Stephen W.

Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board of Education,

Jefferson Cty. Public School Dist., p. 2 (Aug. 6, 1996) (1996

Memorandum).

Section 4. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance Modi
fied, 1996 to 2003
¶1 1996 Memorandum 1–4; Brief for Respondents in No.

05–915, at 12, and n. 13.

¶2 1996 Memorandum 4–7, and Attachment 2; Hampton I,

supra, at 768.

¶3 1996 Memorandum 5–8; Hampton I, supra, at 768,

n. 30.
¶4 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F. Supp. 2d
358, 359, 363, 370, 377 (WD Ky. 2000) (Hampton II).
¶5 Id., at 380–381.

Section 5. The Current Lawsuit, 2003 to the Present
¶1 McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 330
F. Supp. 2d 834 (WD Ky. 2004); McFarland v. Jefferson
Cty. Public Schools, 416 F. 3d 513 (2005); Memorandum
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 77

Appendix B to ,opinion of BREYER, J.
BREYER J., dissenting

from Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board
of Education, Jefferson Cty. Public School Dist., 3–4 (Apr.
2, 2001).