Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
HELEN PURCELL, MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER,
ET AL.
06A375 (06–532) v.
MARIA M. GONZALEZ ET AL.
ARIZONA ET AL.
06A379 (06–533) v.
MARIA M. GONZALEZ ET AL.
ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAY
Nos. 06A375 (06–532) and 06A379 (06–533). Decided October 20, 2006
PER CURIAM.
The State of Arizona and county officials from four of its
counties seek relief from an interlocutory injunction en
tered by a two-judge motions panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. JUSTICE KENNEDY has referred the
applicants’ filings to the Court. We construe the filings of
the State and the county officials as petitions for certio
rari; we grant the petitions; and we vacate the order of the
Court of Appeals.
I
In 2004, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200. The
measure sought to combat voter fraud by requiring voters
to present proof of citizenship when they register to vote
and to present identification when they vote on election
day.
The election procedures implemented to effect Proposi
tion 200 do not necessarily result in the turning away of
qualified, registered voters by election officials for lack of
proper identification. A voter who arrives at the polls on
election day without identification may cast a conditional
provisional ballot. For that ballot to be counted, the voter
2 PURCELL v. GONZALEZ
Per Curiam
is allowed five business days to return to a designated site
and present proper identification. In addition any voter
who knows he or she cannot secure identification within
five business days of the election has the option to vote
before election day during the early voting period. The
State has determined that, because there is adequate time
during the early voting period to compare the voters’
signatures on the ballot with their signatures on the regis
tration rolls, voters need not present identification if
voting early.
Arizona is a covered jurisdiction under §5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. So it was required to preclear any new
voting “standard, practice, or procedure” with either the
United States Attorney General or the District Court for
the District of Columbia to ensure its new voting policy did
“not have the purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color,” 42 U. S. C.
§1973c. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U. S. 461, 461–462
(2003). On May 6, 2005, the United States Attorney Gen
eral precleared the procedures Arizona adopted under
Proposition 200.
In the District Court the plaintiffs in this action are
residents of Arizona; Indian tribes; and various commu
nity organizations. In May 2006, these plaintiffs brought
suit challenging Proposition 200’s identification require
ments. On September 11, 2006, the District Court denied
their request for a preliminary injunction, but it did not at
that time issue findings of fact or conclusions of law.
These findings were important because resolution of legal
questions in the Court of Appeals required evaluation of
underlying factual issues.
The plaintiffs appealed the denial, and the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals set a briefing schedule that concluded on
November 21, two weeks after the upcoming November 7
election. The plaintiffs then requested an injunction
pending appeal from the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Per Curiam
the Court of Appeals’ rules, the request for an injunction
was assigned to a two-judge motions/screening panel. See
Rule 3–3 (CA9 2002). On October 5, after receiving
lengthy written responses from the State and the county
officials but without oral argument, the panel issued a
four-sentence order enjoining Arizona from enforcing
Proposition 200’s provisions pending disposition, after full
briefing, of the appeals of the denial of a preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals offered no explanation or
justification for its order. Four days later, the court de
nied a motion for reconsideration. The order denying the
motion likewise gave no rationale for the court’s decision.
Despite the time-sensitive nature of the proceedings and
the pendency of a request for emergency relief in the Court
of Appeals, the District Court did not issue its findings of
fact and conclusions of law until October 12. It then con
cluded that “plaintiffs have shown a possibility of success
on the merits of some of their arguments but the Court
cannot say that at this stage they have shown a strong
likelihood.” Order in NO. CV 06–1268–PHX–ROS etc.
(D. Ariz., Oct. 11, 2006), pp. 7–8, App. to Application for
Stay of Injunction, Tab 5 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). The District Court then found the
balance of the harms and the public interest counseled in
favor of denying the injunction.
II
“A State indisputably has a compelling interest in pre
serving the integrity of its election process.” Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S.
214, 231 (1989). Confidence in the integrity of our elec
toral processes is essential to the functioning of our par
ticipatory democracy. Voter fraud drives honest citizens
out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our
government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be
outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.
4 PURCELL v. GONZALEZ
Per Curiam
“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively
as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964). Countering
the State’s compelling interest in preventing voter fraud is
the plaintiffs’ strong interest in exercising the “fundamen
tal political right” to vote. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S.
330, 336 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). Al
though the likely effects of Proposition 200 are much
debated, the possibility that qualified voters might be
turned away from the polls would caution any district
judge to give careful consideration to the plaintiffs’
challenges.
Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter
identification procedures just weeks before an election, the
Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the
harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an
injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its
own institutional procedures. Court orders affecting
elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves
result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to
remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer,
that risk will increase. So the Court of Appeals may have
deemed this consideration to be grounds for prompt action.
Furthermore, it might have given some weight to the
possibility that the nonprevailing parties would want to
seek en banc review. In the Ninth Circuit that procedure,
involving voting by all active judges and an en banc hear
ing by a court of 15, can consume further valuable time.
These considerations, however, cannot be controlling here.
It was still necessary, as a procedural matter, for the
Court of Appeals to give deference to the discretion of the
District Court. We find no indication that it did so, and
we conclude this was error.
Although at the time the Court of Appeals issued its
order the District Court had not yet made factual findings
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
STEVENS, J., concurring
to which the Court of Appeals owed deference, see Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a), by failing to provide any factual
findings or indeed any reasoning of its own the Court of
Appeals left this Court in the position of evaluating the
Court of Appeals’ bare order in light of the District Court’s
ultimate findings. There has been no explanation given by
the Court of Appeals showing the ruling and findings of
the District Court to be incorrect. In view of the impend
ing election, the necessity for clear guidance to the State of
Arizona, and our conclusion regarding the Court of Ap
peals’ issuance of the order we vacate the order of the
Court of Appeals.
We underscore that we express no opinion here on the
correct disposition, after full briefing and argument, of the
appeals from the District Court’s September 11 order or on
the ultimate resolution of these cases. As we have noted,
the facts in these cases are hotly contested, and “[n]o
bright line separates permissible election-related regula
tion from unconstitutional infringements.” Timmons v.
Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 359 (1997).
Given the imminence of the election and the inadequate
time to resolve the factual disputes, our action today shall
of necessity allow the election to proceed without an in
junction suspending the voter identification rules.
The order of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 45.3, the
Clerk is directed to issue the judgment in these cases
forthwith.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
Allowing the election to proceed without enjoining the
statutory provisions at issue will provide the courts with
a better record on which to judge their constitutionality.
At least two important factual issues remain largely unre
6 PURCELL v. GONZALEZ
STEVENS, J., concurring
solved: the scope of the disenfranchisement that the novel
identification requirements will produce, and the preva
lence and character of the fraudulent practices that alleg
edly justify those requirements. Given the importance of
the constitutional issues, the Court wisely takes action
that will enhance the likelihood that they will be resolved
correctly on the basis of historical facts rather than
speculation.