F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 11 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DON SIGMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMUNITYCARE HMO, INC., an
No. 99-5196
Oklahoma Corporation, doing business
as Community Care Behavioral Health
Services EAP; MITCHELL GODI, an
Individual,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 97-CV-845)
Steven R. Hickman, Frasier, Frasier & Hickman, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Jon E. Brightmire (S. Douglas Dodd with him on the brief), Doerner, Saunders,
Daniel & Anderson, L.L.P., Tulsa, Oklahoma for Defendant-Appellees.
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Don Sigmon (“Sigmon”) is an employee of the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma
(“Tulsa” or “the City”). In June 1997, Sigmon was randomly selected to undergo
testing for the presence of alcohol and narcotics in his bloodstream pursuant to a
drug testing policy covering certain of Tulsa’s employees. He tested positive for
marijuana, and Tulsa conditioned his continued employment upon his completion
of a substance abuse program recommended by CommunityCare HMO, Inc.
(“CommunityCare”), a private corporation providing services to the City.
CommunityCare and Mitchell Godi (“Godi”), an Employee Assistance Program
counselor employed by CommunityCare, referred Sigmon to a substance abuse
program which Sigmon objected to because of religious content which he found to
be disagreeable. Sigmon claims he was thus faced with a choice between
enduring repeated offensive religious experiences or losing his job with the City.
Sigmon sued CommunityCare, Godi, (collectively “the Appellees”) and the
City for conspiring to force him to undergo an offensive religious experience on
threat of termination of his employment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
City settled with Sigmon, and consequently Sigmon proceeded with his claims
against only CommunityCare and Godi. The district court granted summary
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judgment for CommunityCare and Godi, holding that they did not act under color
of state law as required by § 1983. 1 Sigmon now appeals, and we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Tulsa’s Drug and Alcohol Program and its Relationship with
CommunityCare
The city of Tulsa maintains a policy designed to prevent drug and alcohol
abuse by its employees. Pursuant to this policy, Tulsa requires employees in
safety-related or otherwise sensitive jobs to submit to random drug and alcohol
testing. Typically, employees who test positive are given the opportunity to retain
their jobs by (1) passing a “return to work” test demonstrating they are free of
drugs and alcohol; (2) submitting to additional periodic testing; and (3)
successfully completing substance abuse treatment as provided through an
Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) offered by Tulsa to help its employees
cope with a variety of personal problems.
1
The majority of the facts in this case are undisputed, and are derived
either from the district court’s findings of fact in its order dated September 22,
1997 issuing a temporary restraining order enjoining the City from commencing
pre-termination proceedings against Sigmon, or from the allegations in the
parties’ pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and an evidentiary hearing conducted
on September 19, 1997. Because this appeal stems from a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the two defendants, to the extent that any facts are disputed
we have viewed them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Kaul v.
Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
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In August 1992, Tulsa entered into a contract with CommunityCare 2
whereby CommunityCare was to act as an independent contractor providing
substance abuse counseling and other services to Tulsa employees referred to it
pursuant to Tulsa’s EAP. The record shows that CommunityCare identified
independent third-party health care providers to supply these services, and then
referred Tulsa’s employees to those providers for actual treatment. In most cases,
CommunityCare recommended an intensive treatment program usually lasting for
a period of several weeks, with periodic follow-up treatment for one year.
Neither the contract itself nor the EAP program purported to modify Tulsa’s
existing disciplinary policies or to transfer any authority to discipline employees
from Tulsa to CommunityCare. 3 CommunityCare has entered into numerous
similar agreements with other public and private entities which it performs in
substantially the same manner. CommunityCare’s agreement with Tulsa remained
in effect throughout the time of the events at issue in this lawsuit.
The agreement was signed by CommunityCare’s predecessor, CorpHealth
2
of MidAmerica.
3
The relevant portion of the EAP policy reads:
Nothing in this Employee Assistance Program is to be interpreted as
constituting a waiver of management’s rights to take disciplinary
measures nor shall the program be interpreted as a waiver of the right
of any employee to use the grievance procedure within the
framework of existing policy.
(Aplt. App. at 128 ¶ 6.)
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B. CommunityCare’s Actions with respect to Don Sigmon
On June 17, 1997, pursuant to its drug testing policy, Tulsa ordered Sigmon
to submit to a random urinalyses to screen for drugs and alcohol. Soon thereafter,
a doctor employed by Tulsa notified Sigmon that he had tested positive for
marijuana, and Sigmon’s supervisor, Don McGlory (“McGlory”), enrolled him in
Tulsa’s EAP. Sigmon concedes that he had smoked marijuana the evening before
he took the test.
As an initial step in entering Tulsa’s EAP, Sigmon and McGlory both
signed a “Post-Rehabilitation Drug and Alcohol Testing Agreement” dated June
18, 1997 (“the Post-Rehabilitation Agreement”). The Post-Rehabilitation
Agreement contains Sigmon’s promise, as a condition of his continued
employment, to undergo periodic additional drug testing. Further, Sigmon
acknowledged that “any unsatisfactory cooperation, compliance or attendance
with the Employee Assistance Program’s contract provider . . . will result in the
initiation of pretermination procedures and disciplinary action.”
After signing the Post-Rehabilitation Agreement, Sigmon was sent to see
Godi at CommunityCare for assessment and referral to treatment. Godi referred
him to an intensive six-week substance abuse treatment program provided by
Laureate Psychiatric Clinic and Hospital (“Laureate”) which was based on a “12-
Step” program of recovery. A devout Christian, Sigmon was offended by the
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program’s references to a self-defined “higher power” instead of the traditional
Judeo-Christian figures of God and Jesus Christ, but he nevertheless completed
his initial course of treatment.
After Sigmon completed Laureate’s initial intensive treatment program,
Godi and a Laureate counselor met with Sigmon and McGlory to inform Sigmon
that he was being referred for an additional one-year course of follow-up
treatment. Godi presented Sigmon with a form entitled “Return to Duty/Post
Treatment Agreement” (“Return to Duty Agreement”) that: (1) required Sigmon to
undergo a “continuing care” program at Laureate and to attend a minimum of two
meetings per week for a period of one year of either Alcoholics Anonymous
(“AA”) or Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”); (2) stated Sigmon “understood . . . that
failure to comply with its terms may result in disciplinary action, up to and
including termination of [his] employment;” and (3) incorporated the grievance
and arbitration procedures of Tulsa’s collective bargaining agreement to settle
disputes arising under the Return to Duty Agreement. Laureate’s AA and NA
programs are both based on a “12-Step” method and advance religious ideas
similar to those expressed in Laureate’s more intensive program.
Both Sigmon and McGlory refused to sign the agreement, and Sigmon
heatedly objected to the religious content of the programs. Sigmon alleges that
Godi “mentioned” termination at least twice during this meeting. Godi stated in
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his deposition that he told Sigmon it was his duty to report Sigmon’s refusal to
comply with the EAP to Tulsa, and concedes he might have told Sigmon his
report could prompt Tulsa to begin pretermination proceedings pursuant to the
Post-Rehabilitation Agreement Sigmon had entered into with Tulsa.
Godi reported Sigmon’s refusal to attend AA and NA meetings to Tulsa’s
human resources department and participated in a meeting with McGlory and
several members of Tulsa’s human resources department to discuss possible
disciplinary actions against Sigmon. The record shows that Godi may have
recommended Sigmon be terminated in the interest of maintaining consistency in
Tulsa’s drug and alcohol disciplinary actions.
Based on this meeting, McGlory told Sigmon that he had a choice of either
attending the meetings, facing termination hearings, or submitting to a formal
reprimand and a 30-day suspension from his job. Sigmon continued in his refusal
to attend the meetings, and the City began the paperwork necessary to institute
hearings leading to Sigmon’s possible termination. In response, Sigmon filed the
present lawsuit.
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C. Procedural History
Sigmon sued Tulsa, CommunityCare, and Godi under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 4 alleging that they conspired to force Sigmon to
participate in an offensive religious program on threat of termination of his
employment with Tulsa, thereby violating his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Following an evidentiary hearing conducted on
September 19, 1997, the district court entered a temporary restraining order
enjoining Tulsa from taking any disciplinary action against Sigmon for refusing to
participate in a 12-step program, and later issued a preliminary injunction
covering the same conduct. On August 11, 1999, the district court entered a
consent judgment against Tulsa disposing of all of Sigmon’s claims against Tulsa.
In July 1998, CommunityCare and Godi jointly filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing
that there is no dispute of material fact sufficient to establish that they acted
under color of law as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted
4
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part: “Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.”
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the Appellees’ motion on September 16, 1998, and Sigmon filed a notice of
appeal. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “When applying
this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Kaul, 83
F.3d at 1212. If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then we
must determine if the substantive law was correctly applied by the district court.
See id.
While the movant bears the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the movant need not negate the non-
movant’s claim, but need only point to an absence of evidence to
support the non-movant’s claim. If the movant carries this initial
burden, the non-movant may not rest upon its pleadings, but must set
forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those
dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof. An issue
of material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-movant.
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Id. (citation omitted).
Sigmon alleges that Appellees conspired with Tulsa to violate § 1983 by
forcing him to submit either to an unwelcome religious experience or to face
disciplinary action. In this case, the sole issue before the court is whether Sigmon
has shown there is a material question as to whether the Appellees acted under
color of law for the purposes of § 1983.
Plaintiffs alleging a violation of § 1983 must demonstrate they have been
deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States,” 5 and that the defendants deprived them of this right acting under color of
law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73
L. Ed.2d 482 (1982) (citations omitted). “Thus, the only proper defendants in a
Section 1983 claim are those who represent [the state] in some capacity, whether
they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.” See Gallagher v. Neil
Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and
quotations omitted). However, a defendant need not be an officer of the state in
5
Perhaps because of the trial court’s injunctive relief and its ultimate entry
of a consent judgment against the City, Sigmon never faced formal termination
proceedings and he retained his job with Tulsa. Therefore, a question exists as to
whether Sigmon can meet the first prong of the inquiry set forth in Lugar.
However, this issue was neither raised by the parties nor addressed by the trial
court in its order granting the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that
Sigmon has alleged facts sufficient to support a finding that he suffered a
deprivation of rights under the constitution and laws of the United States.
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order to act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed.2d 185 (1980); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed.2d 142 (1970). Rather,
courts have applied four separate tests to determine whether a private party acted
under color of law in causing an alleged deprivation of federal rights: (1) the
nexus test; (2) the symbiotic relation test; (3) the joint action test; and (4) the
traditional public powers test or public functions test. See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at
1447. Because the gravamen of Sigmon’s argument is that the Appellees
conspired with Tulsa to violate his civil rights, thereby satisfying the joint action
test, we confine our analysis to this issue.
Unlike the usual case in which a plaintiff attempts to hold a public official
or entity responsible for the acts of a private party, Sigmon here seeks to impose
liability against private parties for the harmful actions of a public entity – that is,
for Tulsa’s threat to terminate him for not participating in CommunityCare’s
recommended treatment. Cf. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179, 192, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed. 469 (1988) (plaintiff sought to
impose § 1983 liability against NCAA, a private entity, after he was suspended
from his job by a state university for violating the NCAA’s standards for
recruiting student athletes). Thus, we are required to “step through an analytical
looking glass” to resolve the case by considering whether Tulsa’s act of
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threatening discipline against Sigmon in reliance on the Appellees’ report and
recommendation converts the Appellees’ conduct into state action. Id. at 193.
Sigmon alleges that the Appellees acted under color of state law because
they conspired with Tulsa to violate his constitutional rights by referring him to
the objectionable treatment program, and then recommending that Tulsa fire him
for failing to participate. In Adickes, the Supreme Court held that, “[t]o act under
color of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the state. It is
enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its
agents.” 398 U.S. at 152 (quotations and citations omitted). This circuit has held
that one way to prove willful joint action is to demonstrate that the public and
private actors engaged in a conspiracy. See, e.g., Anaya v. Crossroads Managed
Care Systems, 195 F.3d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1999); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263,
1268 (10th Cir. 1994). When a plaintiff seeks to prove state action based on a
conspiracy theory, “a requirement of the joint action charge . . . is that both public
and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.” See Anaya, 195 F.3d
at 596. Moreover, “the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show
agreement and concerted action.” Hunt, 17 F.3d at 1268. In this case, Sigmon
has failed to present sufficient evidence of agreement and concerted action to
overcome the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
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Anaya provides a helpful example of this circuit’s application of the joint
action or conspiracy test. In Anaya, we reversed a lower court’s order of
summary judgment for the defendant because of evidence that Crossroads
Managed Care Systems, an HMO interested in establishing a detoxification center
in the city of Trinidad, Colorado, persuaded local law enforcement agencies to
increase dramatically their alcohol-related arrests, even to the extent of utilizing
unconstitutional arrests by the city police, and then to refer arrestees to the detox
center run by Crossroads. See Anaya, 195 F.3d at 587-89. The plaintiffs in
Anaya presented evidence that Crossroads had appointed city law enforcement
officials to serve on an advisory panel created to help establish the center, and
that a Crossroads executive helped the city officers formulate police department
policies causing arrests for public intoxication and similar offenses nearly to
double. See id. at 596-597. In remanding the case for trial, we emphasized:
. . . Crossroads’ mere lack of concern or even recklessness for
causing the violation of others’ constitutional rights would not seem
to rise to the level of establishing Crossroads’ liability under section
1983. What might establish liability, however, is Crossroads’ role in
creating the unconstitutional detention policy that led to the allegedly
illegal unconstitutional seizures.
Id. at 597.
In contrast, in Gallagher, we held that a concert promoter who rented a
state university’s stadium and then conducted illegal pat-down searches of concert
goers did not act under color of law. See 49 F.3d at 1455. Although we accepted
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that the promoter and university likely shared common goals of hosting a
successful concert, we held that this was insufficient to establish a conspiracy to
violate patrons’ civil rights. See id. Rather, the plaintiffs must show that the
promoter and university specifically shared a common goal that the pat-downs
themselves take place. See id.
Sigmon urges that a jury could find that Appellees engaged in a conspiracy
to violate his civil rights because they referred Sigmon to a religiously-based
treatment program and then reported his non-compliance to the City, aware that
this would likely prompt Tulsa to begin termination proceedings. Sigmon notes
that Godi “mentioned” termination during his meeting with Sigmon to persuade
him to attend a 12-step program, participated as CommunityCare’s representative
in a meeting which led to Tulsa’s decision to institute termination proceedings,
and may have urged that Sigmon be terminated during that meeting.
These facts fail to satisfy the joint action test for state action. Reliance on
these factors alone misses the fundamental point that Tulsa retained complete
authority to enforce its drug policy, while the Appellees merely acted as an
independent contractor in identifying and referring employees to treatment
services. It is true that the Appellees could reasonably have foreseen that their
actions might trigger Tulsa to begin termination proceedings against Sigmon. This
fact does not, however, demonstrate that they performed their contract obligations
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with the objective of utilizing Tulsa’s employment authority over Sigmon to force
Sigmon unconstitutionally to engage in unacceptable religious practices. 6
Sigmon relies on the fact that Godi mentioned termination as a possible
consequence of his failure to attend the 12-step meetings. However, this only
restated the obvious, as Sigmon was already aware of the possible consequences
of his refusal based on his Post-Rehabilitation Agreement with Tulsa. The Return
to Duty Agreement that Godi presented to Sigmon merely repeated these terms
and incorporated Tulsa’s formal grievance and arbitration procedures to resolve
disputes arising from the agreement. Thus, even if Godi verbally told Sigmon he
could be terminated for refusing to attend 12-step meetings, the circumstances of
the conversation and the language of the Return to Duty Agreement remove any
suggestion that the Appellees could discipline Sigmon on their own initiative.
Godi’s admission that he may have advised Tulsa to terminate Sigmon
rather than deviate from its established drug policies does not change this
6
We note that a private party who intentionally tailors its performance
under a contract to assist a state in causing a constitutional deprivation–for
example, an accounting firm that assisted a state actor in concealing racial
discrimination in its employment practices–might well be considered to have
acted under color of state law. See Malak v. Associated Physicians, 784 F.2d
277, 281-282 (7th Cir. 1986) (private association of physicians providing services
to a public hospital were acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983
when they conspired with the hospital to fire the plaintiff because of his criticism
of hospital procedures). In the present case, however, there is nothing to suggest
that the Appellees deviated in any way from how they have performed similar
services for a variety of state and private clients.
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analysis. At most, the record permits an inference that Tulsa might have
considered Godi’s advice as a factor in its ultimate decision to discipline Sigmon.
But it is clear that Tulsa acted independently in making its final decision, and
therefore no meeting of the minds occurred on this point. At most, Godi’s advice
was simply one component leading to Tulsa’s ultimate decision.
Finally, Sigmon’s brief suggests without further analysis that, even if the
Appellees did not directly conspire to violate his civil rights, they conspired to
“accomplish a legal result by illegal means.” (Aplt. Br. at 13.) In other words, he
contends that the agreement to provide drug treatment programs to Tulsa’s
employees may have been lawful, but the means employed – forcing employees
with religious objections to submit on threat of termination – was unlawful. But,
there is no evidence that CommunityCare undertook any unlawful act in fulfilling
its side of the contract, or that Tulsa was required to engage in unlawful acts to
satisfy its own end of the bargain. Rather, the evidence shows that the threat of
termination for failing to participate in Tulsa’s EAP was designed and carried out
on Tulsa’s initiative and authority.
III. CONCLUSION
We find that Sigmon failed to put forth sufficient evidence of a conspiracy
or joint action to show that the Appellees acted under color of law, as is required
for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s
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order granting summary judgment to CommunityCare and Godi, and dismiss the
plaintiff’s claims against those defendants.
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