F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 8, 2005
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
PAPER, ALLIED-INDUSTRIAL,
CHEMICAL AND ENERGY
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
UNION and PONCA TRIBE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
CONTINENTAL CARBON
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant,
No. 03-6243
and
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY;
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERATION
OF OKLAHOMA; ENVIRONMENT
COLORADO; NEW MEXICO
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH
GROUP; UNITED STATES PUBLIC
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP;
THE SIERRA CLUB,
Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 02-CV-1677-R)
Malcolm E. Wheeler, Wheeler Trigg & Kennedy, LLP, Denver, Colorado, (Darcy
M. Goddard, Wheeler Trigg & Kennedy, LLP, Denver Colorado, and Mark D.
Coldiron, Ryan, Whaley, Coldiron & Shandy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Jim
T. Priest , McKinney & Stringer, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on
the briefs) for Defendant-Appellant.
David Frederick, Frederick-Law, Austin, Texas, (Richard W. Lowerre, Lowerre &
Kelly, Austin, Texas, and Rick W. Bisher, Ryan, Bisher & Ryan, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Donald D. Maisch and Robert D. Singletary, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, filed an
Amicus Curiae brief for Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality in
support of Defendant-Appellant.
James R. Barnett, Kerr, Irvine, Rhodes & Ables, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, filed
an Amicus Curiae brief for Environmental Federation of Oklahoma, Inc., in
support of Defendant-Appellant.
Charles C. Caldart, National Environmental Law Center, Seattle, Washington,
filed an Amici Curiae brief for Environment Colorado, New Mexico Public
Interest Research Group, United States Public Interest Research Group, and The
Sierra Club in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before EBEL, O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges, and STEWART, District Judge. *
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This case involves a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
brought pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000). The district court dismissed the
suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), which deprives federal courts of
*
Honorable Ted Stewart, District Court Judge, District of Utah, sitting by
designation.
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jurisdiction over CWA citizen enforcement actions when a state has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting the same violations under a state law “comparable”
to subsection 1319(g).
This court has not previously enunciated the proper standard for judging
whether a particular state’s laws are comparable to § 1319(g), and we take this
occasion to do so. We hold that in order to satisfy 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii),
three categories of state-law provisions—penalty-assessment, public participation,
and judicial review—must be roughly comparable to the corresponding categories
of federal provisions. Applying this standard, we hold that Oklahoma’s state-law
provisions, and more particularly its public participation provisions, are
comparable to § 1319(g) and therefore conclude that Oklahoma’s proceedings bar
federal jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) for claims pertaining to
civil penalties.
Next, we turn to another question of first impression in this circuit:
Whether the jurisdictional bar contained in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) applies
to equitable relief in addition to civil penalty claims. Affirming the district court,
we hold that the bar applies only to civil penalty claims and that Plaintiffs’
equitable claims should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Defendant-Appellant Continental Carbon Company (“CCC”) manufactures
carbon black, a compound used in the manufacture of tires and other rubber and
plastic products. Since 1954, CCC has maintained and operated a plant in close
proximity to the Arkansas River in Ponca City, Oklahoma. Approximately ninety-
five of the employees at CCC’s Ponca City plant are members of the Paper,
Allied-Industrial Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (“PACE”), a
plaintiff in the instant case. 1
CCC plant operations produce wastewater which is then discharged into
retention lagoons along the plant’s eastern side near the Arkansas River. Such
activities require a permit from the Oklahoma Department of Environmental
Quality (“ODEQ”), which CCC applied for and received in 1998.
In January 2002, PACE began voicing concerns with the wastewater
disposal practices at CCC’s Ponca City plant to ODEQ. Specifically, PACE
representatives alleged in a citizen complaint that industrial wastewater was being
discharged into the marsh area east of the lagoons and near the Arkansas River.
This information prompted ODEQ to conduct an on-site evaluation at the Ponca
1
The other plaintiff in this litigation is the Ponca Tribe, a sovereign Native
American Nation with close ties to the area surrounding CCC’s Ponca City
facility.
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City plant on January 9, 2002. The investigator noticed that the color of the water
in the marshland was black, and oily substances were evident on the surface of
the water. Samples taken from the marshland area had identical chemical
components to samples taken from CCC’s wastewater impoundments.
This investigation led ODEQ to issue a Notice of Violation (“NOV”) to
CCC. The NOV largely dealt with regulatory violations related to CCC’s
unauthorized discharges of polluted wastewater. CCC and ODEQ entered into a
consent decree whereby CCC agreed to take a number of remedial measures,
including an agreement to conduct a permeability study, submitting a water
balance report, completing an approved Supplemental Environmental Project, and
monitoring emissions from the facility.
Several months later, ODEQ also discovered a discrepancy in CCC’s 1998
permit application related to the depth between the wastewater impoundments and
the groundwater beneath the impoundments (“depth-to-groundwater”). In that
permit application, CCC reported the depth-to-groundwater level for the
impoundments as eighty feet. However, upon looking at data from other water
wells in the vicinity, ODEQ believed the true depth-to-ground water level was
less than fifteen feet. According to ODEQ’s letter, placing a wastewater
impoundment in an area with such a shallow depth-to-groundwater level violated
Oklahoma law. CCC and ODEQ agreed to resolve the issues dealing with depth-
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to-groundwater in an upcoming permit renewal process. On June 1, 2005, ODEQ
issued CCC a new wastewater disposal/treatment permit, effective through May
31, 2010. 2
Plaintiffs did not consider the matter closed. In a series of letters to
ODEQ, they stated numerous objections to CCC’s performance under the decree
and ODEQ’s enforcement thereof. Specifically, Plaintiffs objected to the fact that
the consent decree called for an investigation that ignored the portion of CCC
land where the violations took place. Plaintiffs also sought a meeting with ODEQ
representatives and were turned away. The relationship between Plaintiffs and
ODEQ continued to grow increasingly acrimonious, with ODEQ representatives
restricting access to CCC records and refusing to divulge the substance of
conversations with CCC officials on legal privilege and work product grounds.
Finally, on June 19, 2002, Plaintiffs served notice of intent to sue upon the U.S.
Attorney General, the EPA, the State of Oklahoma, and CCC.
II. Procedural history
2
Appellant submitted this permit to the court as an attachment to a Fed. R.
App. P. 28(j) letter, which we construe as a motion to supplement the record.
Because this document is relevant to our inquiry into whether any of Plaintiffs’
claims are moot on appeal, we grant the motion. At oral argument, we raised sua
sponte the issue of whether CCC’s successful completion of the repermitting
process could moot any portion of this lawsuit. Counsel submitted supplemental
briefing at our request, and having reviewed those briefs, we are convinced that
the case is not moot. Instead, we will proceed directly to the issues raised by the
parties.
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A. The complaint
On November 26, 2002, Plaintiffs filed suit against CCC under section 505
of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Their first amended
complaint outlines three claims: (1) unauthorized discharges of wastewater; (2)
misrepresentation of facts in the 1998 permit application; and (3) failure to report
unauthorized discharge in its lagoons, including but not limited to the discharges
identified in Claim 1. In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs requested the following:
1. A declaratory judgment that CCC violated the CWA and Oklahoma
statutes through unsafe operation of its plant.
2. Civil Penalties authorized by the CWA up to a maximum of $25,000
per day per violation.
3. An injunction that would prohibit all unpermitted discharges and
impose a compliance schedule on CCC.
B. CCC’s motion to dismiss
Before submitting its answer, CCC moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
CCC’s argument was predicated on 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), which states, in
relevant part:
[A]ny violation [of the Clean Water Act] . . . with respect to which a
State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a
State law comparable to this subsection . . . shall not be the subject
of a civil penalty action under . . . section 1365 of this title.
In evaluating the motion to dismiss, the district court focused on whether
Oklahoma law was “comparable” to the Clean Water Act. After reviewing the
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factual materials provided by CCC and the relevant statutes, the court concluded
that Oklahoma law was comparable and therefore that § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) applied
to Plaintiffs’ claims.
Next the court turned to the question of whether § 1319 barred only the
civil penalty remedies or whether it also barred Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief. Noting that “the plain language of Section 1319(g)(6)
indicates that only civil penalty actions are precluded when the conditions set
forth in § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) are satisfied[,]” the district court granted CCC’s
motion to dismiss with respect to the civil penalty claims only, stating that § 1319
deprived it of jurisdiction only of the civil penalties claims. The injunctive and
declaratory claims were left intact. Recognizing that it had, to some extent,
waded into uncharted waters, the district court stayed its order to permit an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). CCC subsequently filed a
petition with this court for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which
we granted.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of issues on appeal
CCC’s petition for interlocutory appeal raised the limited question of
whether 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) operated to bar civil penalty suits only, or
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whether the bar extended to declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs
subsequently briefed and argued several other issues, including (1) whether
Oklahoma law was actually “comparable” to federal law; (2) whether the state
was “diligently prosecuting” any of Plaintiffs’ claims; and (3) whether the district
court correctly considered evidence outside the pleadings. Defendant contends
that this appeal involves only the scope of § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar,
while Plaintiffs argue that we should also consider whether the district court
correctly applied the statute in the first place.
Interlocutory appeals originate from the district court’s order itself, not the
specific question certified by the district court or the specific question framed by
the appellant. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 677 (1987). An
appellate court can and should address a different legal question if it controls the
disposition of the certified order. Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 17 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 1994).
Thus, it appears that the correct test for determining if an issue is
appropriate for interlocutory review is (1) whether that issue was raised in the
certified order; and (2) whether the issue can control the disposition of the order.
The issue of whether Oklahoma law is comparable to the Clean Water Act meets
this test. The district court order extensively considered this issue and concluded,
based on a standard set forth in McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248,
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1256 (11th Cir. 2003), that comparability existed. Any contrary conclusion this
court might reach would undoubtedly control the disposition of the order because
if we were to find that comparability did not exist, there would be no need to
address the issue Defendant raises: whether § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)’s jurisdictional
bar extended to claims for equitable relief.
Similarly, the issue of whether the district court properly considered
evidence outside the record during a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) is
properly before the court. This issue was raised in the order below because the
court looked to extrinsic evidence such as the notice of violation and consent
order. Also, this issue can control the disposition of the order because if the
district judge erred, then the order must be reversed and the case should be
considered under the summary judgment standard. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 1991).
In contrast, the issue of whether ODEQ was “diligently prosecuting” CCC
for its alleged environmental abuses is not properly before us. While the issue
was mentioned in the interlocutory order, it was not directly adjudicated. Instead,
the district court states that “Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Oklahoma
Department of Environmental Quality has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an administrative action under state law against defendant.”
To summarize, then, there are three issues properly before us on appeal:
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(1) Whether the district court correctly considered outside
evidence when deciding Defendant’s motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b).
(2) Whether Oklahoma law is comparable to the Clean Water Act.
(3) Whether the jurisdictional bar contained in 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) applies to claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief.
II. Consideration of outside evidence
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when it considered evidence
outside the pleadings in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without
first converting the motion to one for summary judgment. This argument is a
non-starter, however, because it appears that the order granting the dismissal was
based on Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of jurisdiction) and not Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to
state a claim).
As a general rule, Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
take one of two forms: (1) facial attacks; and (2) factual attacks. Holt v. United
States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1995). Under a facial attack, the movant
merely challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, requiring the district court to
accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. at 1002. In a factual attack
such as we have here, however, the movant goes beyond the allegations in the
complaint and challenges the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction
depends. Id. In such a situation, the court must look beyond the complaint and
has wide discretion to allow documentary and even testimonial evidence under
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Rule 12(b)(1). Id.; Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987).
However, “a court is required to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss into a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 summary judgment motion when resolution of
the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case.” Holt, 46
F.3d at 1003. “[T]he underlying issue [in determining whether the jurisdictional
question is intertwined with the merits] is whether resolution of the jurisdictional
question requires resolution of an aspect of the substantive claim.” Pringle v.
United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000).
The jurisdictional issue here is raised by 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). To resolve
that issue, a court must answer three questions: (1) whether the state commenced
an action; (2) whether that action is being diligently prosecuted; and (3) whether
that action is being prosecuted under a comparable state law. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).
Turning to the substantive cause of action under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1),
there is only one issue: whether the defendant is in violation of an effluent
standard or limitation under the chapter. Id. There is no overlap between the
cause of action and the jurisdictional section. We conclude, therefore, that it was
appropriate for the district court to consider extra-pleading evidence in its
resolution of the Rule 12(b)(1) motion without first converting the motion into
one for summary judgment.
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III. Comparability
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii),
any violation . . . with respect to which a State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this
subsection [3] . . . shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action
under subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this title or
section 1365 of this title.
Id. (emphasis, footnote added). The Tenth Circuit has never set forth the
appropriate factors to consider in determining comparability, but a number of
other circuit courts have weighed in. See, e.g., McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256;
Lockett v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 319 F.3d 678, 683-84 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v.
City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Citizens for a
Better Env’t-Calif. v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 1996); Ark.
Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1994); N. & S.
Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir.
1991).
The district court below adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s “rough
comparability” standard. See, McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256. Applying that standard
Subsection 1319(g) deals largely with procedural mechanisms for imposing
3
administrative penalties. These mechanisms may be subdivided into three general
categories: (1) penalty-assessment provisions, see § 1319(g)(2); (2) public-
participation provisions, see § 1319(g)(4); and (3) judicial-review provisions, see
§ 1319(g)(8). See also McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1254 (categorizing provisions of
§ 1319(g) in this manner).
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to the facts of the case, it found that Oklahoma’s statutory scheme was
comparable to the Clean Water Act. In reviewing the district court’s decision,
then, we have two questions before us: (1) whether the court selected the correct
standard of comparability; and (2) whether, under that standard, the court
correctly concluded that comparability existed. As both issues involve questions
of statutory interpretation by the lower court, our standard of review is de novo.
Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004).
A. The correct standard of comparability
Most courts that have addressed this issue have been fairly deferential to
the state law and tend to find comparability. See, e.g., Lockett, 319 F.3d at 684;
Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 381; Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555. One key
consideration, often cited by these courts, is the policy of the federal government
to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibility and rights of States
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted in dicta that “[t]he bar on citizen suits
when governmental enforcement action is under way suggests that the citizen suit
is meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental action.” Gwaltney
of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)
(emphasis added). Finally, the plain meaning of the word “comparable” in the
statute does not suggest a rigid standard. See Webster’s Third New International
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Dictionary 461 (1986) (defining “comparable” as “capable of being
compared; . . . having enough like characteristics or qualities to make comparison
appropriate”).
Taken together, these principles suggest that the Clean Water Act calls for
something less than a rigorous comparability standard. We agree with the district
court that the Eleventh Circuit’s “rough comparability” approach is the most
appropriate to the case at bar. Under that approach, we focus on the three
categories of provisions contained in 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g): penalty assessment,
public participation, and judicial review. McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1254. Each
category of federal provisions must have a “roughly comparable” provision under
state law in order for the bar against citizen suits to apply. Id. at 1256. A court
operating under the “rough comparability” standard engages in an independent
analysis for each category of state-law provisions; if one is found to be lacking,
then the citizen suit cannot be precluded. See id.
The “rough comparability” approach stands in contrast to the more
forgiving “overall comparability” standard used by the First and Eighth Circuits.
See Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556 (noting that correct legal standard for comparability
is “whether corrective action already taken and diligently pursued by the [state]
government seeks to remedy the same violations as duplicative civilian action.”);
Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 381 (“[T]he comparability requirement may be
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satisfied so long as the state law . . . has the same overall enforcement goals as
the federal CWA . . . .”). The “overall comparability” approach also places
special emphasis on the comparability of the state’s penalty-assessment and
public-participation provisions. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555; Ark. Wildlife Fed’n,
29 F.3d at 381. We believe that “rough comparability” is most consistent with the
statutory text of § 1319(g). Title 33, U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) requires that a
state must take action under a statute comparable to “this subsection” in order to
preclude a citizen suit.
Unlike many other paragraphs in § 1319(g), paragraph (6) makes no
references to particular paragraphs within the subsection. Instead,
paragraph (6) refers to the subsection as a whole, which includes not
only penalty-assessment provisions but also public-participation and
judicial-review provisions. This is strong textual evidence that
Congress intended courts to consider all three classes of provisions
when deciding whether state law is “comparable” to § 1319(g) of the
CWA.
McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1254 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, an “overall”
balancing test forces judges to “weigh incommensurable values—for example, the
positive value of penalty-assessment provisions against the negative value of
starkly dissimilar public-participation provisions.” Id. at 1255 (footnote omitted).
“Rough comparability,” which requires an independent analysis of each class of
provisions, reduces uncertainty not only for courts but also for potential litigants,
administrative agencies, and state legislatures. See id.
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Therefore, we hold that for state law to be “comparable,” under 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), each category of state-law provisions—penalty assessment,
public participation, and judicial review—must be roughly comparable to the
corresponding class of federal provisions.
B. Applying rough comparability to the case at bar
As an initial matter, we conclude that Oklahoma’s penalty-assessment and
judicial-review provisions are roughly comparable to federal law. Under 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2), Class I penalties may not exceed $10,000 per violation up to
an aggregate penalty of $25,000. Class II penalties may not exceed $10,000 per
day up to an aggregate penalty of $125,000. Under Oklahoma law, the civil
penalties are identical to the federal law’s Class II penalties. Okla. Stat. tit. 27A,
§ 2-6-206(E). While Oklahoma does not provide for Class I penalties
specifically, there is enough commonality between the state and federal provisions
to provide a basis for rough comparability.
Similarly, the judicial-review provisions of Oklahoma law are comparable
to those of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). Both statutes allow an aggrieved party to
petition for review in the district court. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8); Okla. Stat.
tit. 27A, §§ 2-6-206(I)(1), 2-3-502(I). The only apparent difference is the fact
that under the federal system, a commenter can seek judicial review, while
Oklahoma limits the right of review to those who have been harmed. Such a
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difference does not preclude a determination of comparability between Oklahoma
law and 33 U.S.C. § 1319 with respect to judicial review.
Thus, the only remaining question is whether Oklahoma’s public-
participation provisions are comparable to federal law. The public-participation
provisions regarding federal administrative penalty actions are covered in 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4). Essentially, the Clean Water Act provides for public
participation in three ways: (1) a reasonable notice and opportunity to comment
before the issuance of the proposed order assessing a civil penalty; (2) the right to
present evidence if a hearing is held; and (3) the right to petition for a hearing if
one is not held. Id.
Under Okla. Stat. tit. 27A § 2-6-206(B), any person having an interest has
the right to intervene as a party in any administrative proceeding before the
ODEQ or in any civil proceedings involving the same environmental violations.
This is roughly comparable to 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(4)(B), which allows for
commenters to participate and present evidence at evidentiary hearings. Although
the Oklahoma statute is limited to persons having an interest, the basic right of
interested parties to present evidence and be heard is preserved. Furthermore,
under Okla. Stat. tit. 27A § 2-3-502(I), “[a]ny party aggrieved by a final order
may petition the [ODEQ] for rehearing, reopening, or reconsideration.” This
provision is roughly comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(C), allowing an
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interested person to petition for a hearing after issuance of an order if none was
held previously.
We also conclude that the Oklahoma law is roughly comparable to the
public-notice provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(B). Title 33, U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(4)(A) requires notice and a reasonable opportunity to comment on the
proposed assessment. While the statute does not define what counts as a
reasonable opportunity to comment, EPA regulations implementing § 1319
mandate that public notice must be provided within thirty days after a complaint
is issued (but forty days before a penalty is assessed). 40 C.F.R. § 22.45(b)(1).
In addition, the notice must provide detailed information about the name and
location of the facility, the nature of the violation, and the specific remedy the
EPA seeks. Id. § 22.45(b)(2). In contrast, neither Okla. Stat. tit. 27A § 2-3-502
nor § 2-6-206 require notice of an assessment to anyone other than the violator.
However, provisions of the Oklahoma Open Meetings Act provide
additional mechanisms of public notice that are roughly comparable to the notice
provisions under § 1319(g) (and the regulations implementing it). 4 “Public
bodies” under the Open Meetings Act must give the public notice of regularly
4
Plaintiff has not argued before this court that the Oklahoma Open
Meetings Act would not apply to ODEQ proceedings. Therefore, for the purposes
of this opinion, we assume without deciding that the Open Meetings Act applies
to actions of the ODEQ.
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scheduled meetings by December 15th of the preceding calendar year, and
“special” meetings require forty-eight-hour notice. Okla. Stat. tit. 25 § 311(A)(1),
(11). Agendas for such meetings must be posted no later than twenty-four hours
before the meeting. Id. § 311(A)(9), (11). In addition, Oklahoma law requires
direct notice to interested parties forty-eight hours in advance of any “special
meetings.” Id. § 311(A)(11). This is similar to 40 C.F.R. § 22.45(b)(2), which
requires that notice of a complaint or consent decree be directly provided to
parties who request such notice in advance.
Although the Oklahoma notice provisions are not as detailed as those found
in 40 C.F.R. § 22.45, we are still compelled to conclude that they provide
reasonable notice. Notably, § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) only requires state law to be
“comparable” with the federal statute. Regulations implementing the statute may
offer us some guidance as to what constitutes reasonable notice, but they are not
controlling.
Furthermore, we note that the EPA’s delegation of enforcement authority to
Oklahoma under the Clean Water Act through the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) significantly mitigates any concerns that
Oklahoma law is not comparable to subsection 1319(g). In order for the EPA to
delegate enforcement authority under the CWA to a state, the state must meet
certain public participation requirements, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 123.27(d):
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Any State administering [an NPDES] program shall provide for
public participation in the State enforcement process by
providing either:
(1) Authority which allows intervention as of right in any
civil or administrative action to obtain remedies
specified in paragraphs (a)(1), (2) or (3) of this section
by any citizen having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected; or
(2) assurance that the State agency or enforcement authority
will:
(i) Investigate and provide written responses to
all citizen complaints submitted pursuant to
the procedures specified in § 123.26(b)(4);
(ii) Not oppose intervention by any citizen
when permissive intervention may be
authorized by statute, rule, or regulation;
and
(iii) Publish notice of and provide at least 30
days for public comment on any proposed
settlement of a State enforcement action.
Id. (emphasis added). As the regulation makes clear, before the EPA can delegate
to a state the authority to enforce the CWA, the state must provide public
participation in one of two ways: (1) it may provide for intervention as of right
for aggrieved persons; or (2) it may provide assurances of public participation,
including a thirty-day notice and comment period. That the federal regulation is
phrased in the disjunctive is critical to our analysis. Despite the fact that
Oklahoma does not provide for the sort of notice and comment period found in 40
C.F.R. §§ 22.45(b)(2) or 123.27(d)(2)(iii), its public participation provisions are
still deemed sufficient to permit enforcement of the CWA by virtue of a statute
providing intervention for aggrieved persons:
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Any person having any interest connected with the geographic area or
waters or water system affected, including but not limited to any
aesthetic, recreational, health, environmental, pecuniary or property
interest, which interest is or may be adversely affected, shall have the
right to intervene as a party in any administrative proceeding before
the Department, or in any civil proceeding, relating to violations of
the Oklahoma Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Act or rules,
permits or orders issued hereunder.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 27A § 2-6-206(B). Oklahoma’s public-participation
provisions are comparable enough to permit a delegation of CWA enforcement
authority, and we conclude they should also be deemed comparable for the
purposes of imposing the jurisdictional bar under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).
Accord Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1146-47
(E.D. Ark. 1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that Arkansas law
that provided intervention as of right to anyone with an interest in state
enforcement proceedings provided for “public participation” comparable to that
afforded under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4), “especially in view of 40 C.F.R.
§ 123.27(d)”).
Accordingly, we conclude that all three categories of state
provisions—penalty assessment, public participation, and judicial review—are
roughly comparable to the corresponding class of federal provisions outlined in
33 U.S.C. 1319(g).
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IV. Scope of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)
Having determined that Oklahoma law is comparable to the CWA for
purposes of imposing the jurisdictional bar contained in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), we now decide which claims for relief are barred by the
statute. Specifically, we must determine if the jurisdictional bar applies only to
the civil penalties Plaintiffs seek, or whether the bar also extends to the equitable
relief sought.
In its order below, the district court determined that the provisions of 33
U.S.C. § 1319 operated only to bar civil-penalty relief. Plaintiffs’ claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief, it held, were not barred by the statute. Despite
the fact that two other circuit courts have considered and rejected the district
court’s view, our reading of the statutory language and relevant precedent
persuades us that the district court’s conclusion is correct.
A. Statutory language
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act is found at 33 U.S.C. §
1365 and states in relevant part:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in . . . section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen
may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A)
an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter . . . .
....
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The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce such an effluent
standard or limitation, or such an order, . . . and to apply any appropriate
civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
Id. (emphasis added).
The exception to this jurisdictional provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), states in
the relevant part:
(g) Administrative penalties
....
(6) Effect of order
(A) Limitation on actions under other sections
[A]ny violation—
....
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting an action under State law
comparable to this subsection . . .
....
shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action
under . . . section 1365 of this title. (emphasis added)
As an initial matter, we note that Congress chose to use the words “civil
action” in § 1365 authorizing citizen suits but chose the narrower term “civil
penalty action” in the § 1319 exclusion from the §1365 grant. Cheng Fan Kwok
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 392 U.S. 206, 212 (1968) (jurisdictional
statutes should be construed “with precision and with fidelity.”). Thus, Congress’
choice of allowing all “civil actions” in § 1365 must be limited by its concurrent
choice to eliminate “civil penalty actions” when a diligent state prosecution
occurs under a comparable state law. Furthermore, the terms of the statute make
clear that civil penalties are distinct from other remedies. In § 1365(a), Congress
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explicitly grants jurisdiction to “enforce” an effluent standard or limitation (by
presumably issuing a declaratory judgment or an injunction) and to “apply any
appropriate civil penalties” (by assessing the appropriate fine). A strict reading
of the statute, then, indicates that while § 1365 grants jurisdiction over all types
of civil remedies, the limitation in § 1319 only strips jurisdiction with regard to
the district court’s ability to impose civil penalties.
In fact, there is a separate jurisdiction-stripping provision for injunctive
remedies. Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), no private action may be filed if a
“State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of . . . a State to require compliance with the standard.” Again, there is a
difference in language between § 1365(b)(1)(B) and § 1319(g)(6). Section
1365(b)(1)(B) precludes any civil action when a state initiates judicial
proceedings against a polluter. However, if a state only opts for administrative
enforcement, then § 1365(b)(1)(B) will not apply. At that point, we look to
§ 1319, and that section says that the violation may not be the subject of a civil
penalty action.
What results from these statutes is a two-tiered claim preclusion scheme.
The broadest preclusion exists when a state commences and diligently prosecutes
a court action to enforce the standard. If this happens, § 1365 indicates that “no
action” may be commenced by a private person. A narrower preclusion exists
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when the state does something less than judicial enforcement, such as enter into a
consent order. All that is available to a defendant in those cases is §
1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), which specifically excludes civil penalties from the scope of
permissible private enforcement remedies, but does not preclude other equitable
relief.
B. Relevant precedent
CCC’s argument that 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) bars equitable relief is
largely grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gwaltney. In that case, the
specific question on appeal was whether civil penalties could be sought for
wholly past violations of the Clean Water Act. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 52. The
plaintiffs argued that since the EPA administrator is permitted to pursue civil
penalties for past violations under the authority granted her by 33 U.S.C. § 1319,
the provision for citizen suits, which has similar statutory language, should be
construed in the same manner. Id. at 58. The Court ultimately rejected this
argument after a close examination of the statutory language. Id. at 58-59. It
first noted that § 1319 (the agency enforcement provision) provides for civil
penalties and equitable relief in wholly different sections. Id. at 58.
In contrast, [§ 1365(a)] does not authorize civil penalties separately
from injunctive relief; rather, the two forms of relief are referred to
in the same subsection, even in the same sentence. The citizen suit
provision suggests a connection between injunctive relief and civil
penalties that is noticeably absent from the provision authorizing
agency enforcement.
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
Contrary to the position taken by CCC in its brief, the Court in Gwaltney
did not hold that civil penalties and injunctive remedies are “inextricably
intertwined.” The Supreme Court held that a civil penalty may only be sought
when the citizen is also seeking injunctive relief. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59. Put
another way, the Court held that a civil penalty suit cannot be maintained when
the citizen cannot seek an injunction. The issue before us is instead the mirror
image of the Supreme Court’s holding: whether a suit seeking injunctive relief
can be maintained when the plaintiff cannot seek civil penalties.
Both the First and Eighth Circuits have addressed this issue and held that
the bar contained in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) applies not only to civil
penalty relief, but also to injunctive and declaratory relief as well. 5 Scituate, 949
F.2d at 558; Ark. Wildlife Fed’n, 29 F.3d at 383. Both cases relied heavily on the
above-cited language from Gwaltney. In Scituate, the First Circuit went so far as
to say that
it is inconceivable to us that the section [1319(g)] ban is only meant
to extend to civil penalty actions. Surely if the limitation of civilian
suits is to have any beneficial effect on the enforcement of clean
5
But see Coalition for a Liveable W. Side, Inc. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 830 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) does not foreclose citizen suits for injunctions or declaratory
relief).
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water legislation, the section [1319(g)] ban must cover all civil
actions.
942 F.2d at 558. Two years later, the Eighth Circuit reached essentially the same
conclusion in Arkansas Wildlife Federation, 29 F.3d at 383.
C. Analysis
We are compelled to disagree with the First and Eighth Circuits for several
reasons. First, as noted above, the language of the statute is strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to exclude equitable remedies when it enacted 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). It is difficult to read the provisions of § 1365 and § 1319
without conceding that the terms do not support the conclusion that Appellant
asks us to make. The Scituate court justified its decision because it feared that
the result reached by a literal interpretation of the statute “would lead to deferring
to the primary enforcement responsibility of the government only where a penalty
is sought in a civilian action, as if the policy considerations limiting civilian suits
were only applicable within that context.” 949 F.2d at 558.
But this statement ignores the effect of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), which
prohibits any citizen suit (not just civil penalty suits) if the state has commenced
judicial proceedings in any court. The only situation in which the state could not
control all aspects of the enforcement of the Clean Water Act is when (1) it is
pursuing something less than judicial enforcement and (2) a citizen is pursuing an
injunction in federal court.
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Second, there is evidence in the legislative history that Congress
contemplated the position adopted by the district court and evidenced by the
statutory language. Specifically, the House Conference Committee Report states
that “[n]o one may bring an action to recover civil penalties under section . . .
[1365] for any violation with respect to which the Administrator has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an administrative civil penalty action . . . . [T]his
limitation would not apply to: 1) an action seeking relief other than civil penalties
(e.g., an injunction or declaratory judgment).” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1004, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 133 (1986).
Finally, we are not persuaded that allowing a citizen suit for an injunction
to proceed while there is an ongoing state enforcement action would lead to an
“inconceivable” result. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 558. The governing principle
behind § 1319(g) is to avoid duplicative monetary penalties for the same
violation. See Coalition for a Liveable W. Side, 830 F. Supp. at 197. That
purpose is served by the district court’s order below. However, the fact that a
state judicial proceeding can foreclose all private relief insures that conflicting or
duplicative equitable remedies are not likely to be imposed. Also, as the district
court in Coalition for a Liveable West Side points out,
the statute permits a federal district court to entertain an action for
injunctive relief for situations where, for example, a permit holder
may have paid the relevant civil penalties but continues to violate its
permit limitations or where the injunctive relief obtained in the state
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proceedings turns out to be inadequate to address the violations at
issue.
Id. Furthermore, even if there were simultaneous injunctive actions brought by
both the state and a citizen, the court can manage the actions to ensure that the
state action will predominate. Id. “It may even be appropriate to stay the citizen
action while the city can demonstrate that the State is indeed diligently
prosecuting its action and seeking adequate relief.” Id.
Because the result reached by the court below (1) is grounded in the
statutory language, (2) reflects the legislative history, and (3) leads to a rational
result, we are not inclined to interpret 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) in the same
broad manner as the First and Eighth Circuits. As a result, we hold that 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), where it applies, bars only civil penalty claims and not claims
requesting declaratory or injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
Having concluded that (1) the district court did not err in considering
evidence outside the pleadings; (2) Oklahoma law is comparable to the Clean
Water Act for the purposes of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii); and (3) the
jurisdictional bar in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) does not apply to equitable
relief, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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