United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1058
XHEVDET YMERI; JULIANA YMERI;
BESMIR YMERI; BIRSEN YMERI,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Susanna L. Shafer, for petitioners, with whom Daniel F.
Cashman, Cashman & Lovely, P.C., was on brief, for petitioners.
Alison M. Igoe, United States Department of Justice,
Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Peter D. Keisler,
Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice,
Civil Division, and Christopher C. Fuller, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for
respondent.
October 20, 2004
*
Hon. John R. Gibson, of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. Xhevdet and
Juliana Ymeri and their two children, Besmir and Birsen, are
natives and citizens of Albania, seeking review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals' order of removal, including its denial of
their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny review.
Xhevdet Ymeri filed an asylum application, and the other
family members rely on his application as derivative applicants.
The Ymeris arrived in Boston on a flight from Italy on
May 4, 1999. They carried counterfeit Greek passports using false
names. They had arrived in the United States under the transit
without visa program, under which aliens from certain countries
were allowed to board a plane bound for the United States and be
admitted to the United States without a visa pursuant to agreements
with transportation carriers, who guaranteed the aliens' immediate
and continuous passage to another country.1 See 2 Charles Gordon,
et al., Immigration Law & Procedure §§ 15.02[3], 15.03 (2004).
Availability of the transit without visa privilege at the time in
question depended on nationality and the privilege was available to
Albanians only in a restricted form, requiring them to be on a
direct through flight. 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(i) (1999). Greek nationals
were not subject to such a restriction. The Ymeris presented their
1
The transit without visa program was suspended effective
August 2, 2003, for national security reasons. 68 F.R. 46948-01
(Aug. 7, 2003) (amending 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(i)).
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false Greek passports to the Immigration Inspector at Logan
airport, who detected the documents as counterfeit. The Ymeris
then admitted the documents were false.
On May 6, 1999, the INS charged all four Ymeris with
removability on the ground that they did not have a valid passport
or visa. Additionally, the INS charged the adults, Xhevdet and
Juliana, with removability on the ground that they sought by
willfully misrepresenting a material fact to procure admission or
other benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Xhevdet
Ymeri filed for asylum and withholding of removal, alleging that he
had been beaten on account of his membership in the Democratic
Party in Albania and that if he returned to Albania, his life and
the lives of his family would be in danger.
At an initial hearing on November 2, 1999, the Ymeris
denied the two charges of removability against them and denied the
underlying factual charges--that they had no visa or passport and
that they had sought to procure Immigration benefits by willfully
misrepresenting a material fact. Xhevdet Ymeri testified as
follows:
Q: When you entered the United States, did you
attempt to enter using a [passport from
Greece]?
A: Yes.
Q: And did your wife also enter with a Greek
passport?
. . .
A: Yes.
Q: And you're not from Greece, are you?
A: No.
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INS counsel showed Juliana Ymeri a Greek passport and asked, "Is
that the passport that you used to try to come into the United
States?" She answered, "Yes." The Ymeris' counsel admitted that
they had no proof that they had a valid, unexpired visa or other
valid entry document. The Immigration Judge found that the Ymeris
were removable.
At the asylum hearing on July 6, 2000, Xhevdet Ymeri
testified that he became involved with the Democratic Party in
Albania in 1990 and that he joined the party in 1992. Xhevdet said
the Democratic Party was in power from 1992 to 1997, but in 1997
the Communists took the government by force. On September 12,
1998, a Democratic Party leader, Azim Hydari, was assassinated.
Following the assassination, Ymeri participated in demonstrations.
He said that ten days after the assassination, the police picked
him up at a "party place" and took him to the police station, where
they beat him until he "fainted and [he] was like a slave." He
said the beating dislocated his shoulder, and his ears were
"horning" several times a day, even at the time of the hearing.
Then two weeks later, police again picked him up and took him to
the station, where they kept him overnight. He said they beat him
until he fainted. He was revived with cold water four or five
times, until his tormentors finally threw him outside on the
street. He said he was bedridden for "like three weeks," and that
when he recovered, he walked to Greece. He said he stayed in
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Greece for two or three months, but came back when he heard that
"they started having pressure on my wife and I heard that people
and women were disappearing." He said he returned to Albania, sold
his house, and left within twenty-four hours, with his wife and
children. They went to Athens, where a friend "fixed" them some
passports, and then on to Italy where they caught a flight to
Boston. Once in Boston, Ymeri said that the police stopped him and
he told them he was going to Toronto. He said the police then
told him that he had false documents and he admitted they were
false.
Juliana Ymeri also testified at the asylum hearing. The
Immigration Judge revisited the question of removability, asking
the Ymeris' counsel:
Q: Do you have anything to offer this Court
showing that the mother did not by fraud or by
willfully misrepresenting material facts seek
to procure or have procured a visa or other
documentation for admission into the United
States? Do you have anything to offer to this
court?
Counsel responded, "No."
Juliana testified that the first time Xhevdet was beaten,
she cared for him at home because she was a nurse, and she used
medicines she had at home for the children. He had a shoulder
injury and some bruises that "weren't that important." The second
time Xhevdet was beaten was worse because he could not stand on his
feet and it took three or four days until he stopped bleeding. She
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said she did not take him to a hospital because she could not drive
their car and she did not call a taxi because they did not have a
phone and it would have taken half an hour. She said that after
Xhevdet went to Greece, the police would ask about his whereabouts;
when she refused to say where he was, they "started offending me
with different rude words that I couldn't even mention in here."
She said that the policemen's conversation was sexual in nature.
Juliana identified a letter she said she received from
the Democratic Party. The document was a form letter, with blanks
for name and date, filled in as Xhevdet Ymeri and April 20, 1999.
The letter stated that Xhevdet Ymeri was a member of the Democratic
Party and one of its "fist [sic] activists." It concluded, "With
the government falling into the hands of the communist Party, the
residence of the democrats is in danger." Juliana said that as
soon as she got this letter, she became alarmed and asked Xhevdet
to come home from Greece.
The Ymeris introduced the testimony of Professor Nicholas
Pano, an expert on conditions in Albania. Prof. Pano testified
that Xhevdet Ymeri's account of arrest and beating by police was
consistent with police procedure in Albania. He testified that
late 1998 was "a period of extreme confrontation between the
Socialist Government that had just come to power and the Democratic
Party." He said that although the Albanian government has tried to
restrain the police and "these kinds of arrests" are less frequent
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now than in 1998, there was a possibility that Ymeri would be
arrested again if he returned to Albania.
The government introduced the November 1998 Country
Report for Albania by the State Department's Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor. The report stated:
The settling of accounts persists but
individuals are rarely targeted for
mistreatment on political grounds. The
government lacks the resources and will to
carry out such retribution.
The Immigration Judge began by determining that
removability was established as to all four Ymeris.
The Immigration Judge found that there was no evidence
that the police who allegedly made sexual comments to Juliana did
so because of Xhevdet's political opinions or activity.
The Immigration Judge found that Xhevdet's testimony
about his treatment at the hands of Albanian police was incredible
or at least exaggerated. First, the Immigration Judge pointed out
that Xhevdet stated in a sworn statement taken upon his arrival in
the United States that he had never been arrested anywhere in the
world for anything. This statement conflicted with Xhevdet's
crucial testimony that he had been arrested twice by Albanian
police. The Immigration Judge concluded that Xhevdet was not able
to explain the inconsistency and that the inconsistency cast doubt
on his story about what actually occurred in Albania. Second, the
Immigration Judge pointed to conflicts in Xhevdet's accounts of how
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seriously he was injured by the first police beating and to a
conflict between Xhevdet's account and Juliana's account.
Similarly, the Immigration Judge concluded that Juliana's testimony
concerning the minor medical treatment required after the second
police beating did not accord with Xhevdet's account of an
extremely severe beating. Third, the Immigration Judge found that
Xhevdet's testimony that he came home from Greece for one day only
and was able to sell his house and wind up his affairs within
twenty-four hours was "curious," and even if true, was inconsistent
with a claimed fear of persecution. The Immigration Judge
emphasized Xhevdet's testimony that he was able to register the
house sale with governmental officials, which was inconsistent with
his claimed fear that the government would detain him. The
Immigration Judge concluded that it was more likely that Xhevdet
was never arrested in Albania.
The Immigration Judge also found that there was no
credible evidence that Xhevdet played a major role in the
Democratic Party. The letter referring to him as an "activist" was
suspect because it was only a form letter and because it had some
indicia of fraudulence, such as misspelling of the party name.
Furthermore, Xhevdet's vague and unreliable testimony about party
history and ideology cast doubt on the extent of his involvement
with the party. The Immigration Judge found that Xhevdet "has had
a very small role in the Democratic Party."
-8-
The Immigration Judge also concluded that Xhevdet had
found a safe haven in Greece and that Xhevdet had not shown why he
could not safely relocate within Albania.
Based on the findings that Xhevdet had exaggerated his
role in the party and that he had not shown that he had been
arrested, the Immigration Judge found Xhevdet had not proved he was
eligible for asylum or entitled to withholding of removal or relief
under the Convention Against Torture.
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration
Judge's decision without opinion.
I.
We review the removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4),
according to which we may reverse the Board of Immigration Appeals'
factual determinations only if any reasonable factfinder viewing
the evidence as a whole would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary of the findings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see El Moraghy
v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 202 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). We must uphold factual
determinations of the Board that are supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence. El Moraghy, 331 F.3d at 202.
A finding (including a credibility finding) is not supported by
substantial evidence if it is based on inferences or presumptions
that are not reasonably grounded in the record. Id.; Cordero-Trejo
v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994). When, as here, the Board
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has affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision without rendering its
own opinion, we review the Immigration Judge's decision as the
decision of the Board. Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 373 (1st
Cir. 2003).
We review the Board's legal conclusions de novo, though
we give deference, where appropriate, to the agency's
interpretation of the underlying statute, in accordance with
administrative law principles. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 372. We
must judge the action of an administrative agency based only on the
reasoning provided by the agency, not based on substitute grounds
we construct ourselves to salvage the agency's action. El Moraghy,
331 F.3d at 203; Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378.
The Ymeris contest both the decision that they are
removable and the decision that they are not eligible for asylum or
withholding of removal. The Ymeris have not been admitted to the
United States. Unadmitted aliens are deemed applicants for
admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). As applicants for admission,
they bear the burden of proving that they are clearly and beyond
doubt entitled to be admitted and are not inadmissible under 8
U.S.C. § 1182. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A). As applicants for
asylum, they bear the burden of establishing eligibility by proving
that they are refugees. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); El Moraghy, 331
F.3d at 202. They also bear the burden of proof on their claims
for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against
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Torture. El Moraghy, 331 F.3d at 205.
II.
Xhevdet and Juliana Ymeri challenge the Immigration
Judge's finding that they were ineligible for admission under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i),2 for having, by fraud or willful
misrepresentation of a material fact, sought to procure a visa,
other documentation, admission into the United States, or other
benefit under the Immigration laws. The Immigration Judge's
determination of removability rested on a separate and independent
ground, that the Ymeris lacked the documentation necessary for
admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). The Ymeris do not challenge
the finding that they lacked the necessary documentation. However,
because the finding that Xhevdet and Juliana were guilty of fraud
or willful misrepresentation also has the effect of barring them
from the United States permanently (unless they obtain a waiver),3
2
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) provides:
Any alien who, by fraud or willfully
misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to
procure (or has sought to procure or has
procured) a visa, other documentation, or
admission into the United States or other
benefit provided under this chapter is
inadmissible.
3
Before the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 6, 100 Stat. 3537, 3543-44, the permanent bar
of section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) only applied to fraud in connection
with obtaining documents, not entry. See Matter of Y-G-, 20 I&N
Dec. 794, 796-97 (B.I.A. 1994). It now applies to fraud or willful
misrepresentation in order to obtain admission or other benefit
under the Immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2000);
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we must determine whether the finding is supported by substantial
evidence, even though the Ymeris are removable on another ground.
See Matter of Y-G-, 20 I&N Dec. 794, 796-97 (B.I.A. 1994).
The record as a whole supports a finding that the Ymeris
presented fraudulent passports to United States Immigration
officials to obtain admission to the United States or other benefit
under the Immigration laws. Both Xhevdet and Juliana admitted in
the sworn statements taken at Logan Airport that they presented
Greek passports to the Immigration Inspector and that they were
citizens of Albania, not Greece. Xhevdet stated that the passport
was not his true passport, and Juliana stated that she had bought
her passport through a friend in Greece. The passports bore the
names Vasileios Papadopoulos and Viktoria Megarisiotou. Xhevdet
testified at the hearing that the Immigration Inspector stopped him
and during their conversation told Xhevdet that he had false
documents. Xhevdet then admitted the documents were false.
A person who knowingly presents a false passport as if it
were genuine has engaged in a willful misrepresentation. See
Esposito v. INS, 936 F.2d 911, 912 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991). There is
no doubt from the record that the Ymeris knew their documents were
counterfeit and listed false names and nationality.
see Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments, 100 Stat. at 3543-44
(adding "or other benefit provided under this Act"); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Title III, § 308(f)(1)(D), 110 Stat. 3009-
621 (1996)(substituting "admission" for "entry").
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The Ymeris argue that they admitted to the Inspector that
their passports were false, and they contend that they therefore
were not guilty of misrepresentation, citing In re Kasinga, 21 I&N
Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. 1996), and Matter of Y-G-, 20 I&N Dec. 794,
797 (B.I.A. 1994). In both those cases and in Matter of D-L- & A-
M-, 20 I&N Dec. 409, 412-13 (B.I.A. 1991), aliens who possessed
fraudulent passports were not rendered inadmissible by section
1182(a)(6)(C)(i) because they did not present the passports to
United States officials to gain admission to the United States, but
admitted the falseness of the documents immediately and
voluntarily. The Ymeris' testimony in this case is that they
presented the false passports to the Immigration Inspector. The
Inspector detected that the documents were false, and the Ymeris
then admitted the passports were false. The Ymeris did not confess
the falseness of their documents until the Inspector had caught
them. This is substantial evidence to support the Immigration
Judge's determination that they sought to procure admission or
other Immigration benefit by a willful misrepresentation.
The Ymeris contend that they intended to proceed to
Canada under the transit without visa program and therefore did not
intend to enter the United States. Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) covers
aliens who have sought by fraud or misrepresentation to procure one
of several kinds of benefits: a visa, other documentation,
admission into the United States, or other benefit under the
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Immigration laws. The Ymeris contend that they did not try to
obtain any of the covered types of benefits. The government
counters that the Ymeris only wanted to get to Boston and then
apply for asylum, thus making fraudulent use of the transit
without visa program to gain admission into the United States
without ever intending to proceed to Canada.4 This issue of
whether the Ymeris intended to go to Canada or stay here was not
argued before the Immigration Judge, and the Immigration Judge
therefore made no findings on whether the Ymeris ever intended to
4
The government cites Matter of Shirdel, 19 I&N Dec. 33
(B.I.A. 1984), contending that participating in the transit without
visa program without intent to proceed to a third country falls
within § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Shirdel held that arriving in this
country under transit without visa status amounted to an "entry"
covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19)(1982), the predecessor to §
1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 19 I&N Dec. at 36-37. This holding is in
apparent tension with our holding in United States v. Kavazanjian,
623 F.2d 730, 736-37 (1st Cir. 1980), that neither arriving in this
country as a transit without visa participant nor obtaining parole
pending an asylum determination amounts to "entry." We need not
resolve that tension here for two reasons. First, the statute now
refers to "admission," rather than "entry," so the exact question
has changed somewhat. See note 4, supra. Second, and more to the
point, § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) now covers aliens who seek "admission or
other benefit provided under this chapter." (Emphasis added.) The
version of the statute in effect when Shirdel was decided did not
contain the "other benefit" language. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19).
The transit without visa privilege is a benefit provided under the
Immigration laws. An alien who transits through this country as a
transit without visa participant has obtained one of the benefits
listed in § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), regardless of whether the alien
effects an "entry." We therefore rely on the amended statute,
rather than Shirdel.
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go to Canada.5 The evidence would support either the conclusion
that the Ymeris intended to go to Canada or the opposite conclusion
that they always intended to stay in the United States. We may not
make our own findings on disputed issues of fact that were not
resolved by the BIA. See El Moraghy, 331 F.3d at 203. However,
even accepting the Ymeris' story that they wanted to continue to
Canada and therefore did not attempt to enter this country, they
still attempted to gain another benefit under the Immigration laws-
– the privilege of traveling as transit without visa participants.
Eligibility for transit without visa status depended on
country of citizenship and required some showing of citizenship in
a participating country. 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(f) (1999) (transit
without visa required alien to be in possession of travel documents
establishing identity and nationality). The Ymeris showed
documents to the Immigration Inspector falsely indicating Greek
citizenship in an effort to benefit from the transit without visa
program, thus seeking a benefit under the Immigration laws.
The Ymeris' attempt to transit through this country
using false passports was foiled when the Immigration Inspector
detected the fraud. However, section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) expressly
covers attempts to procure admission or other Immigration law
5
The Immigration Judge did note in passing that Xhevdet Ymeri
"apparently was headed to Canada for some reason," but we do not
take this as a finding of fact on an issue that was never raised
before the Immigration Judge.
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benefits, as well as successful accomplishment of those goals.
There was substantial evidence to support the Immigration
Judge's finding of removability.
III.
The Ymeris contend that there was not substantial
evidence to support the Immigration Judge's finding that Xhevdet
was not credible in his account of the arrests and beatings that
form the basis for his persecution claim. The Immigration Judge's
credibility determination was based on numerous inconsistencies in
Xhevdet's testimony and earlier statements, inconsistencies between
his story and Juliana's, and reliance on the putative letter from
the Democratic Party that appeared to be fraudulent. These
inconsistencies concerned whether Xhevdet had been arrested at all,
how severely he was injured in the alleged beatings, and whether he
was a prominent Democratic Party activist. These inconsistencies
went to the heart of Xhevdet's claim of past persecution on account
of political opinion. Nothing in the record explains those
inconsistencies or deprives them of their power to discredit
Xhevdet's story. The Ymeris contend, relying on Akinmade v. INS,
196 F.3d 951, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1999), that Xhevdet's statement at
the airport that he had never been arrested could not be used
against him because he made that statement to get into the country,
rather than as part of his asylum application. In Akinmade the
Immigration Judge discredited an asylum applicant's testimony
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because he had used a fraudulent passport to get into the United
States. The court distinguished between misstatements an alien
might make simply in order to get into the country and statements
that pertained to asylum issues rather than admissibility. Id.;
accord Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2004). Xhevdet's
denial that he had ever been arrested goes to the heart of his
asylum claim, and he does not show any reason why he thought it
necessary to deny previous political arrests in order to be
admitted to this country. The reasons the Immigration Judge gave
for doubting Xhevdet's story of activism, arrest and beating are
cogent and well-founded in the record. See Bojorques-Villanueva v.
INS, 194 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding adverse credibility
finding based on multiple inconsistencies going to central facts of
claim).
The Ymeris contend that the Immigration Judge erred in
failing to consider all relevant incidents in the aggregate to
decide whether the Ymeris' experiences amounted to persecution on
account of political opinion. However, once the Immigration Judge
made a valid finding that Xhevdet's story was not credible, it was
no longer necessary to count the discredited statements as true in
deciding whether the Ymeris' experiences rose to the level of
persecution. The same answer disposes of the Ymeris' claim that
they were entitled to a presumption under 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(ii) that they would be unsafe anywhere in Albania;
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this presumption only arises on a showing of past persecution,
which was negated in this case by the adverse credibility findings.
The Ymeris challenge the Immigration Judge's finding that
Xhevdet had found a safe haven in Greece. This finding is not
necessary to the Immigration Judge's well-supported conclusion that
Xhevdet had not borne his burden of proof on his claim for asylum
or for withholding of removal, and so we need not belabor it.
There was substantial evidence to support the Immigration
Judge's adverse credibility findings, which were fatal to the
Ymeris' asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against
Torture claims.
IV.
The Ymeris contend that the Board's use of its summary
affirmance procedure, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2004), was erroneous
because the Immigration Judge's underlying decision was erroneous.
Because we have concluded that the Immigration Judge's decision was
not erroneous, we need not pursue this argument any further.
REVIEW DENIED.
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