Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden America, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 08-2334

ASTRO-MED, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

NIHON KOHDEN AMERICA, INC. AND KEVIN PLANT,

Defendants, Appellants.

No. 08-2335

ASTRO-MED, INC.,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

NIHON KOHDEN AMERICA, INC. AND KEVIN PLANT,

Defendants,

and

BRUCE W. GLADSTONE, ESQ. AND
E.P. MICHAEL KARCIS, ESQ.,

Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
 Before

Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges,

and Woodcock*, District Judge.

E.P. Michael Karcis with whom Mark A. McLean, McLean & McLean
LLP, Bruce W. Gladstone, and Cameron & Mittleman LLP were on brief
for appellants.
Stacey P. Nakasian with whom Duffy & Sweeney, Ltd., Craig M.
Scott, and Scott & Bush, Ltd. were on brief for appellee.

October 22, 2009

*
Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.

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 WOODCOCK, District Judge. Astro-Med, Inc. (Astro-Med)

and Nihon Kohden America, Inc. (Nihon Kohden) are rivals in the

highly competitive life sciences equipment market, and in October

2006, when Nihon Kohden hired away Kevin Plant, a valuable Astro-

Med employee, Astro-Med reviewed its legal options. When first

hired at Astro-Med in 2002, Plant signed an employee agreement that

contained non-competition and non-disclosure provisions. Relying

in large part on those provisions, in December 2006, Astro-Med

filed suit against Plant alleging breach of contract and

misappropriation of trade secrets. Astro-Med later added a third

claim of unfair competition against Plant and joined Nihon Kohden

as a defendant, against whom it alleged claims of tortious

interference and misappropriation of trade secrets.1 The lawsuit

was especially hard-fought, and Nihon Kohden and Plant were

disappointed on April 7, 2008, when a jury returned a verdict

against them, awarding $375,800 in damages in favor of Astro-Med.

Following the verdict, on July 25, 2008, the district court awarded

exemplary damages against Nihon Kohden and Plant in the amount of

$560,000, added an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and imposed

a sanction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. All

told, the judgment against Nihon Kohden and Plant equals

1
Astro-Med originally filed suit in Kent County Superior Court
in Rhode Island. Asserting diversity jurisdiction, Plant timely
removed the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island.

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$1,159,823.60. On appeal, Nihon Kohden and Plant wage a frontal

assault against the judgment, itemizing nine separate claims of

legal error. After careful consideration, we reject each of Nihon

Kohden’s and Plant’s contentions and affirm.

I.

Background

Astro-Med is a Rhode Island corporation with its

principal place of business in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Its

Grass Technologies product group manufactures, sells, and

distributes instruments for sleep and neurological research and

clinical applications of sleep science and brain wave recording and

analysis. Although the identity of some of its customers is well

known, Astro-Med’s financial arrangements with its sales people,

its marketing strategy, and its pricing and cost structures are all

highly confidential, and Astro-Med makes strenuous efforts to

protect its trade secrets and other confidential information.

In October 2002, even though Plant had no prior

experience in the medical industry or in medical equipment sales,

Astro-Med hired him as a Product Specialist, responsible for the

demonstration and training of its Grass Technologies product line.

Astro-Med provided Plant with extensive training about its

business, products, customers, and competitors, and it was Astro-

Med’s training that later made him marketable to Nihon Kohden.

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When Astro-Med hired Plant, he signed an Employee Agreement, which

contains a non-competition clause:

I recognize that the Company sells its
products throughout North America and Europe;
as such, upon termination of my employment at
the Company, for whatever reason, I shall not
directly or indirectly enter into or engage in
a business that competes with the Company, in
a territory consisting of North America, and
Europe, either as an individual, partner,
joint venturer, employee, agent or salesman
for any person, or as an officer, director or
stockholder of a corporation or otherwise, for
a period of one year thereafter.

And a trade secrets clause:

[I hereby agree] [t]hat any inventions,
discoveries or improvements and any technical
data, trade secrets, (including, but not
limited to, customer lists), information or
know-how, made, discovered or conceived or
acquired by me during the period of my
employment, whether patentable, patented or
not, are to be and remain the property of the
Company; that, without the written
authorization of the Company, I will neither
use nor disclose to any person other than my
superiors in the Company, any information,
trade secrets, technical data or know-how
relating to the Company’s products, processes,
methods, equipment and business practices,
which I have acquired during my employment.

The Employee Agreement also contained a choice-of-law and forum-

selection clause, which stated that it shall be governed by the

laws of the state of Rhode Island and that Plant consented to

jurisdiction in Rhode Island for any dispute arising out of the

Agreement.

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 Subsequently, Plant asked to be transferred to the state

of Florida and become a field sales representative; Astro-Med

granted his request and paid to relocate him to Florida. On July

12, 2004, Astro-Med promoted Plant to District Sales Manager for

sales of Grass Technologies products. As District Sales Manager,

Plant had access to and used Astro-Med’s trade secrets, including

confidential marketing, pricing, and customer information. He

became intimately familiar with Astro-Med’s customers and their

preferences as well as Astro-Med’s pricing strategy and cost data.

He also learned about Astro-Med’s suppliers, products they

supplied, and the customers who purchased these products. Finally,

he was informed about Astro-Med’s research and development efforts

with respect to its Grass Technologies product line.

Nihon Kohden, a California corporation, has its principal

place of business in Foothill Ranch, California. As a manufacturer

of instrumentation for patient monitoring, sleep assessment, and

neurology, Nihon Kohden competes directly with Astro-Med. In 2006,

Brian Kehoe, the Florida sales representative for Nihon Kohden, was

about to leave the company, and on July 21, 2006, he emailed Gary

Reasoner, the Director of the Neurology Business Unit for Nihon

Kohden, and informed him that he had met a man, Kevin Plant, who

was a potential replacement for the Florida sales territory. Plant

was indeed interested in employment with Nihon Kohden and in

subsequent discussions, he emphasized his Astro-Med experience. He

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reminded Nihon Kohden that he was “coming from the industry and one

of the competitors in the field” and in his employment application,

he touted his “in-depth knowledge of neurology-based applications.”

In September 2006, Plant sent a resume to Reasoner, and

Reasoner interviewed Plant several times over the telephone. In

late September 2006, Plant traveled to Foothill Ranch and met with

Michael Ohsawa, the Director of Operations for Nihon Kohden, and

with Reasoner. Directly after the interview, Nihon Kohden made

Plant a job offer, which he accepted. After Plant accepted the

Nihon Kohden position, Kehoe emailed Plant: “I will be interested

in seeing what you have in the works with Grass [Technologies].”

Plant replied, “Sounds good.”

Before offering Plant employment, Nihon Kohden became

aware of the Astro-Med Employment Agreement with Plant and referred

the contract to counsel for review. Nihon Kohden’s lawyer advised

Nihon Kohden that there was some minimal risk in hiring Plant;

notwithstanding that advice, Nihon Kohden hired Plant to sell its

products in competition with Astro-Med in the sales territory he

had covered for Astro-Med.

II.

Discussion

A. The Jurisdictional Issue

From the very outset of this litigation, Nihon Kohden has

vigorously maintained that, as a California business, it should not

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have been haled into court in Rhode Island to defend its hiring of

a Florida resident to sell its product in Florida.2 In support of

its contention that it lacks sufficient contacts with Rhode Island

to be subjected to jurisdiction, Nihon Kohden marshals evidence

that it contends demonstrates an absence of any contacts between it

and Rhode Island, between Plant and Rhode Island, and between its

deal with Plant and Rhode Island.

1. Legal Standards

To hear a case, a court must have personal jurisdiction

over the parties, “that is, the power to require the parties to

obey its decrees.” United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d

30, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). Early on, Nihon Kohden moved to dismiss

the lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) on the

ground that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction.

The district court denied the motion. On a motion to dismiss for

want of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff ultimately bears the

burden of persuading the court that jurisdiction exists. McNutt v.

Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Mass. Sch.

of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Amer. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st

Cir. 1998). Faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, a district court “‘may choose from among several

methods for determining whether the plaintiff has met [its]

2
Neither Nihon Kohden nor Plant contests the district court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over Plant.

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burden.’” Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007)

(quoting Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole,

P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2002)).

Here, the district court used the “prima facie method” or

the “prima facie evidentiary standard,” rather than adjudicating

the jurisdictional facts. Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox

Can., 46 F.3d 138, 145-47 (1st Cir. 1995) (describing the prima

facie, preponderance, and likelihood standards). The district

court considered “only whether the plaintiff has proferred evidence

that, if credited, [was] enough to support findings of all facts

essential to personal jurisdiction.” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51.

Where, as here, the district court employed the prima facie

standard, we review “both the district court’s decision to use the

prima facie standard and its conclusion under that standard de

novo.” Adelson, 510 F.3d at 48; Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51; Nowak v.

Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 712 (1st Cir. 1996). In this

case, the parties “do not object to the court’s choice of method;

the defendant contends only that it was misapplied.” Adelson, 510

F.3d at 48.

Applying the prima facie standard, we “‘must accept the

plaintiff’s (properly documented) evidentiary proffers as true for

the purpose of determining the adequacy of the prima facie

jurisdictional showing.’” Id. (quoting Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at

145). We “accept those facts as true, irrespective of whether the

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defendant disputes them, and in so doing, construe them in the

light most congenial to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.” Id.

(internal quotation omitted). The facts put forward by the

defendant “become part of the mix only to the extent that they are

uncontradicted.” Id.

In assessing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident

defendant, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is

“the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum

state.” N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 24 (1st

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). To establish personal

jurisdiction over Nihon Kohden, Astro-Med must demonstrate that

Rhode Island’s long-arm statute grants jurisdiction and that the

exercise of jurisdiction under the statute is consistent with the

Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Daynard, 290

F.3d at 52. The Rhode Island long-arm statute is coextensive with

the permissible reach of the Due Process Clause.3 N. Am. Catholic

Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8, 16 (1st

Cir. 2009); Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806 F.2d 305, 306-07 (1st Cir.

1986); Cerebus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 A.2d

1113, 1118 (R.I. 2003); Almeida v. Radovsky, 506 A.2d 1373, 1374

(R.I. 1986). Thus, the due process inquiry controls. Due process

“requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment

in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the

3
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33(a).

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forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,

463 (1940)); N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25.

There are two means of establishing jurisdiction over a

defendant’s person available under the Fourteenth Amendment:

specific and general jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, the

plaintiff’s claim “must be related to the defendant’s contacts.”

Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005). For

general jurisdiction, “in which the cause of action may be

unrelated to the defendant’s contacts, the defendant must have

continuous and systematic contacts with the state.” Id. Here, the

district court concluded that it had both specific and general

jurisdiction. Since we conclude that the district court correctly

concluded it had specific jurisdiction, we will address only that

issue.

2. Specific Jurisdiction

This circuit “divides [the] minimum contacts analysis

into three inquires: relatedness, purposeful availment, and

reasonableness.” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25; Cardinale, 567

F.3d at 16 (stating that “personal jurisdiction under International

Shoe, allowing jurisdiction to be asserted as to a specific claim,

can be established where the defendants availed themselves of the

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opportunity to do business in the state, the claim in question is

related to that access and the so-called gestalt factors are

consistent with requiring an out of-state defendant to defend

within the state”); Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 27

(1st Cir. 2008); Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d at 57. “Questions of

specific jurisdiction are always tied to the particular claims

asserted.” Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc.,

196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999). Astro-Med’s claims against

Nihon Kohden sound in tort,4 and in tort cases, a court “charged

with determining the existence vel non of personal jurisdiction

must probe the causal nexus between the defendant’s contacts and

the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id.

(a) Relatedness

The first inquiry, relatedness, asks whether “‘the claim

underlying the litigation . . . directly arise[s] out of, or

relate[s] to, the defendant’s forum-state activities.’” N.

Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25 (quoting United Elec. Workers v. 163

Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992)). The

relatedness test is a “‘flexible, relaxed standard.’” Id. (quoting

Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1994)).

4
The claims against Nihon Kohden sound only in tort, but the
claims against Plant include a breach of contract claim, which was
submitted to the jury by special interrogatory and resulted in a
verdict against Plant.

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 Focusing on the tortious interference with a contractual

relationship claim, to prove such a claim, a plaintiff in Rhode

Island must establish the following elements: “‘(1) the existence

of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the

contract; (3) his intentional interference; and (4) damages

resulting therefrom.’” Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653

A.2d 740, 752 (R.I. 1995) (quoting Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow

Enters., Inc., 308 A.2d 477, 482 (R.I. 1973)). Before Nihon Kohden

hired Plant, it knew that Astro-Med was located in Rhode Island,

that Plant had entered into the Employee Agreement in Rhode Island,

that the contract specified it would be governed by Rhode Island

law, that the contract contained non-competition and non-disclosure

provisions, and that by virtue of the contract, Plant had consented

to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Rhode Island over

any disputes related to the contract. Further, Nihon Kohden had

sought and obtained legal advice that by hiring Plant, it was

exposing itself to some legal risk. Thus, Nihon Kohden knew that

by employing Plant, it was running the risk that Plant would

thereby have breached his Rhode Island contract with a Rhode Island

company and any ensuing suit would be initiated in Rhode Island and

interpreted under Rhode Island law.

Despite this formidable array of Rhode Island

connections, Nihon Kohden insists that because it is a California

corporation and because all its direct dealings with Plant, a

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Florida resident, took place either in Florida or in California,

jurisdiction cannot lie in Rhode Island. Nihon Kohden’s argument,

however, emphasizes too fine a point. Consistent with Calder v.

Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984), a defendant “need not be

physically present in the forum state to cause injury (and thus

‘activity’ for jurisdictional purposes) in the forum state.” N.

Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25. Nihon Kohden's conduct in Florida

and California was a cause of the breach of contract – the actual

injury – that occurred in Rhode Island. That in-forum injury was

clearly related to Astro-Med's tortious interference claim,

satisfying the first prong of the minimum contacts analysis.

(b) Purposeful Availment

To satisfy the second requirement, “the defendant’s in-

state contacts must represent a purposeful availment of the

privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby

invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and

making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s

courts foreseeable.” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 25 (quoting

United Elec. Workers, 960 F.3d at 1089). The focus is on

“voluntariness and foreseeability.” Id. (quoting Sawtelle v.

Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir. 1995)). Here, Nihon Kohden

was fully aware of the Astro-Med – Plant Employee Agreement,

including its Rhode Island provisions, and persisted in

negotiations in the face of legal advice from its own counsel that

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to do so would pose a risk. It must have been foreseeable to Nihon

Kohden that it “might be held accountable for [its actions] in a

[Rhode Island] forum.” Id. at 26.

(c) Reasonableness

To evaluate the reasonableness requirement, the Supreme

Court has provided a set of “gestalt factors” to consider. N.

Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 26; United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at

1089. These factors include: the defendant’s burden of appearing,

the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,

the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most

efficient resolution of the controversy, and the shared interest of

the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social

policies. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477

(1985); N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 26. Nihon Kohden contends

that Rhode Island’s assertion of jurisdiction imposed a substantial

burden on Nihon Kohden, because inter alia it has no offices or

employees in the state of Rhode Island and all percipient witnesses

to the hiring of Plant and other information about the

misappropriation of trade secrets were located either in California

or Florida.

Nihon Kohden’s position becomes manifestly untenable when

Astro-Med’s companion litigation against Plant is factored into the

mix. As Nihon Kohden concedes, Astro-Med had the legal right to

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initiate a lawsuit for breach of the Employment Agreement against

Plant in Rhode Island, the state where the contract was formulated

and executed. Once Rhode Island asserted uncontested jurisdiction

over the breach of contract claim and the related misappropriation

of trade secrets and unfair competition claims, the Florida and

California witnesses and evidence were heading for trial in Rhode

Island. Nihon Kohden’s earnest complaint about undue burden rings

hollow, when its alternative would have resulted in two separate

cases in two jurisdictions on opposite ends of the country – either

Rhode Island and Florida or Rhode Island and California. Contrary

to Nihon Kohden’s position, the gestalt factors militate strongly

in favor of jurisdiction in Rhode Island.

(d) Specific Jurisdiction – Conclusion

Applying the specific jurisdiction tripartite analysis,

we conclude that the district court properly asserted jurisdiction

over Astro-Med’s claims against Nihon Kohden. We need go no

further.

B. Venue

Nihon Kohden argues that Rhode Island was not the proper

venue for Astro-Med’s lawsuit, and the district court should have

either dismissed the claim or transferred the case to a different

district in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1404.5

5
Plant has not challenged the court’s venue decision.

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 1. Determining Venue

The applicable venue provision of Title 28 states:

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded
only on diversity of citizenship may, except
as otherwise provided by law, be brought only
in (1) a judicial district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the same
State, (2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated, or (3) a
judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction at the time
the action is commenced, if there is no
district in which the action may otherwise be
brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Although Nihon Kohden is a California

business, it resides for purposes of venue in Rhode Island.6 Plant

is a resident of Florida. As the defendants reside in different

states, subsection (1) does not apply.

Under subsection (2), the question becomes whether the

District of Rhode Island is “a judicial district in which a

substantial part of the events . . . giving rise to the claim

occurred.” Id. In determining whether Rhode Island is a district

in which a substantial part of the events occurred, we look “not to

6
With regard to corporations, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides
that, “[for] purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that
is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district
in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the
action is commenced.” Because we have concluded that Nihon Kohden
is subject to personal jurisdiction in Rhode Island, we can also
conclude that Nihon Kohden, a corporation, “resides” in Rhode
Island pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

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a single ‘triggering event’ prompting the action, but to the entire

sequence of events underlying the claim.” Uffner v. La Reunion

Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Mich.

Corp. v. Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260, 263-264 (6th Cir. 1998)). In

addition, we do not focus on the actions of one party. Rather, our

approach takes a “holistic view of the acts underlying a claim.”

Id. at 43 n.6. Furthermore, we are not required to determine the

best venue, merely a proper venue. See id. at 42 (quoting Bates v.

C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 867 (2nd Cir. 1992), for the

proposition that venue may be proper in any number of districts).

Thus, even though Plant was a resident of Florida when he was hired

by Nihon Kohden, a California corporation, venue in Rhode Island

may still be proper. Id. at 43 (stating that Ҥ 1391 contemplates

that venue may be proper in several districts”).

Astro-Med and Plant entered into an employment contract

in Rhode Island, the district in which Astro-Med was headquartered,

that contained the non-compete and non-disclosure clauses at issue

here. With full knowledge of the Employee Agreement and its

contents, Nihon Kohden hired away Plant, thereby interfering with

Astro-Med’s contract and misappropriating its trade secrets.

Because Astro-Med was headquartered in Rhode Island, this district

is one of the places where the tortious interference and

misappropriation of trade secrets occurred and where the harms from

these torts were felt. See Bates, 980 F.2d at 868 (2nd Cir. 1992).

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In addition, Rhode Island was the forum selected by the Employee

Agreement to resolve disputes. See Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d

1110, 1118 n.11 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding forum selection clause).

Taken together, these facts constitute a substantial part of Astro-

Med’s claims against Nihon Kohden.

Further, Plant did not contest venue in Rhode Island and

that portion of the lawsuit was, for venue purposes, going to

proceed in Rhode Island. Thus, the convenience of the parties

strongly militated in favor of retention of venue in Rhode Island.

Uffner, 244 F.3d at 43 (“[T]he general purpose of the venue rules

is ‘to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will

select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial.’”) (quoting LeRoy

v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979)). Given that

a substantial part of Astro-Med’s claims involved Rhode Island and

proceeding in Rhode Island would not thwart the underlying purpose

of the venue statute, we conclude that the district court did not

err in refusing to dismiss the claims pending against Nihon Kohden

in Rhode Island for improper venue.

2. Transfer of Venue

Nihon Kohden also appeals the district court’s denial of

its motion for change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Section

1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to

adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized,

case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart

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Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van

Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). Where the contract

between the parties, here speaking of Astro-Med and Plant, contains

a forum-selection clause, the clause “will be a significant factor

that figures centrally in the District Court’s calculus.” Royal

Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda.,

906 F.2d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29).

We review a “district court’s decision on transfer of venue for an

abuse of discretion.” Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11

(1st Cir. 2000); Cianbro Corp. v. Curran-Lavoie, Inc., 814 F.2d 7,

11 (1st Cir. 1987). Not only does the burden of proof rest with

the party seeking to transfer; there is a “strong presumption in

favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Coady, 223 F.3d at 11.

In the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Nihon Kohden’s motion for transfer of

venue.

C. The Verdict

Following the verdict, Nihon Kohden and Plant moved for

judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

50(b) and moved for new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59 or in the alternative for remittitur. The district court denied

each post-trial motion. Defendants object both to a number of the

district court’s legal rulings and to the verdict, claiming that

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“the evidence strongly supported (almost mandated) a defense

verdict.” We disagree.

1. Legal Standards

“We review the district court’s denial of a motion for

judgment as a matter of law, including legal decisions made

therein, de novo.” Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT

Phototherapeutics, Inc., 552 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2009). However,

a jury’s verdict “must be upheld ‘unless the facts and inferences,

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, point so

strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that a

reasonable jury could not have [returned the verdict].’” Borges

Colon v. Roman-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration in

original) (quoting Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir.

1993)). We must affirm “‘unless the evidence, together with all

reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, could lead a

reasonable person to only one conclusion, namely, that the moving

party was entitled to judgment.’” N. Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at

26 (quoting Sheils Title Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.,

184 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 1999)).

An appellant’s “hurdle is no lower on an appeal of a

denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial.” Transamerica Premier

Ins. Co. v. Ober, 107 F.3d 925, 929 (1st Cir. 1997). The evidence

is again viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Baron

v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 402 F.3d 225, 245 (1st Cir.

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2005). A new trial is warranted “only if the verdict, though

rationally based on the evidence, was so clearly against the weight

of the evidence as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.”

Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 104 F.3d 472, 482 (1st Cir.

1996) (internal quotation omitted). We reverse only if “the

verdict is so seriously mistaken, so clearly against the law or the

evidence, as to constitute a miscarriage of justice.” Levesque v.

Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702, 703 (1st Cir. 1987).

Similarly, a district court’s denial of a motion for remittitur

will be reversed only if “the jury’s verdict exceeds ‘any rational

appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based on the

evidence before the jury.’” Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19 (1st

Cir. 1999) (quoting Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37

(1st Cir. 1988)). The jury’s damage award must endure unless it is

“‘grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the

court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it

to stand.’” Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st

Cir. 1995) (quoting Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78,

81 (1st Cir. 1984)). We review a denial of a motion for new trial

or remittitur for an abuse of discretion. Mendez-Matos v.

Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2009).

2. The Non-Competition Provision

Astro-Med’s Employee Agreement with Plant contained a

one-year non-competition provision:

- 22 -
 I recognize that [Astro-Med] sells its
products throughout North America and Europe;
as such, upon termination of my employment at
the Company, for whatever reason, I shall not
directly or indirectly enter into or engage in
a business that competes with the Company, in
a territory consisting of North America, and
Europe, either as an individual, partner,
joint venturer, employee, agent or salesman
for any person, or as an officer, director or
stockholder of a corporation or otherwise, for
a period of one year thereafter.

Defendants argue that the non-competition provision was

unenforceable until it was modified by the district court, that

changes in Plant’s employment status voided the agreement, that

Astro-Med’s own breach of the employment agreement voided Plant’s

obligations under the agreement, that the non-competition provision

was unenforceable since it did not protect legitimate business

interests, and that Nihon Kohden cannot be liable for interfering

with an unenforceable contract. We address each contention.

(a) Partial Enforcement

In the district court, defendants objected to the

territorial breadth of this provision, which included not only all

of North America but also all of Europe, and to the breadth of the

activity captured by the provision. Defendants cited Rhode Island

state law, which disfavors non-competition covenants. See, e.g.,

Cranston Print Works Co. v. Pothier, 848 A.2d 213, 220 (R.I. 2004);

Koppers Prods. Co. v. Readio, 197 A. 441, 444-45 (R.I. 1938)

(stating that “noncompetitive employment contracts are carefully

scrutinized by the court and only enforced when reasonable and when

- 23 -
the restriction does not extend beyond what is apparently necessary

for the protection of those in whose favor they are made”).

Consistent with Rhode Island law, the district court partially

enforced the non-competition provision, restricting its territorial

application to the state of Florida and to a limited subset of

Astro-Med customers. See Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559

A.2d 1051, 1058-59 (R.I. 1989).

Defendants do not complain about the trial court’s more

restrictive interpretation of the Employee Agreement. Instead,

they argue that the non-competition provision was not enforceable

until the district court modified it to make it enforceable. We

have no quarrel with defendants’ general contention that under the

partial enforcement rule, an overly-broad non-competition provision

cannot be enforced until it is modified, a proposition that seems

self-evident. But, defendants’ real contention is that a party to

a non-competition agreement cannot breach the agreement until it is

judicially modified, and specifically that it was impossible for

Plant to breach his agreement with Astro-Med until the district

court modified the provision to make it enforceable. 7

7
Defendants cite two cases in support of the proposition that
a non-competition clause cannot be breached until it is modified:
Durapin and Hawkins v. daly.commerce, inc., No. 2000-5740, 2003
R.I. Super. LEXIS 14 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2003). Neither
Durapin nor Hawkins says such a thing. In Durapin, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island affirmed a trial court decision to invalidate
a non-competition provision in its entirety. Durapin, 559 A.2d at
1056-59. Durapin does not say that a party to a non-competition
agreement cannot violate it until it is modified; it says that,

- 24 -
 Defendants’ contention does not withstand analysis.

Their logic would give the promisor in a non-competition agreement

one free breach, requiring a prior judicial order before the

provision could be said to have been violated. Such a proposition,

the validity of which is without authority, would eviscerate all

but the most narrowly tailored non-competition agreements, since a

modification of any term of the provision would justify a breach of

all its terms. Further, because most breaching employees gain the

full benefit of the breach the first time they compete with their

former employer, a second breach after judicial warning would in

most cases be cumulative. Also, once a court restricts the scope

of the non-competition agreement, the breaching party is being held

to a more narrowly circumscribed agreement than the one he signed,

and the more restrictive terms of the agreement remain as effective

as the day they were agreed to. Finally, contrary to defendants’

under the circumstances, there was no need to modify an
unenforceable restrictive covenant. Id. at 1059. In Hawkins,
daly.commerce, inc., Richard Hawkins’s former employer, argued that
he violated the provisions of a non-competition agreement by
accepting employment with a business “of the type and character”
similar to daly’s. Hawkins, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 14, at *4-5.
The Superior Court concluded that the new employment was not of the
type and character engaged in by daly, and refused to enforce the
non-competition provision. Hawkins, at *13-14. The Hawkins court
quoted the familiar teaching that restrictive covenants “will only
be enforced when reasonable and where restrictions do not extend
beyond what is apparently necessary for the protection of the
employer’s business,” id., but this statement, which defendants
quote, does not begin to suggest that a non-competition provision
cannot be violated until after there has been a judicial
determination of its proper scope.

- 25 -
contention, the courts in Rhode Island have consistently issued

orders against prior breaches of modified provisions. R.J. Carbone

Co. v. Regan, 582 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.R.I. 2008) (modifying a non-

competition agreement and issuing a preliminary injunction against

the former employee); Nestle Food Co. v. Miller, 836 F. Supp. 69

(D.R.I. 1993) (granting injunctive relief on the basis of a

modified non-competition agreement and awarding nominal damages for

conduct occurring prior to modification); Cranston Print Works, 848

A.2d at 221 (reversing a preliminary injunction, directing the

trial court to determine the reasonableness of a non-competition

covenant and to decide “what remedies, if any, are appropriate for

any proven violations of the settlement agreement”); Aim High

Acad., Inc. v. Jessen, No. KC-2008-1384, 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS 152

(R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2008) (modifying geographic range and

issuing a preliminary injunction against former employees);

Carcieri v. Creative Servs., Inc., No. 92-0726, 1992 R.I. Super.

LEXIS 25 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 6, 1992) (modifying geographic scope

and issuing preliminary injunction against former employees).

(b) Changes in Plant’s Employment

Defendants next contend that after Astro-Med hired Plant,

it made material changes in his employment, which voided the non-

competition provision. They note that Plant’s job changed in 2004

from product specialist in Rhode Island to salesperson in Florida,

and in 2006, Astro-Med substantially reduced his sales territory.

- 26 -
Regarding the job change, defendants point out that the

introductory paragraph of the employment agreement states that it

applies only to employees involved in the “design, development or

manufacture of products for the Company.” Defendants argue that

once Plant became a salesman, this definitional language did not

apply to him.

Turning first to material change, defendants cite AFC

Cable Sys. Inc. v. Clisham, 62 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Mass. 1999)

(applying Massachusetts law), for the proposition that a change in

an employee’s job can void a non-competition agreement. It is

apparently correct that under Massachusetts law, “[e]ach time an

employee’s employment relationship with the employer changes

materially such that they have entered into a new employment

relationship a new restrictive covenant must be signed.” Lycos,

Inc. v. Jackson, No. 2004-3009, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 348 (Mass.

Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2004). The genesis of the Massachusetts

material change rule is F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v.

Barrington, 233 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1968). However, as interpreted

in Massachusetts, “in both Bartlett Tree and AFC Cable Systems, the

court found that the conduct of the parties clearly showed that

they had abandoned and rescinded by mutual consent the earlier

employment agreement containing the pertinent non-compete provision

and had entered into a new employment relationship that included no

such non-compete provision.” Intertek Testing Servs. N.A., Inc. v.

- 27 -
Curtis-Strauss LLC, No. 98-903-F, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 354, at

*20 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2000). Further, “in both cases, the

employer provided the employee with a new employment agreement,

which the employee refused to sign.” Id. at *21; see Iron Mountain

Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Taddeo, 455 F. Supp. 2d 124, 133 (E.D.N.Y.

2006) (applying Massachusetts law and stating that “[i]n

determining whether there has been a material change to the

employment relationship, courts have considered it extremely

significant that the employer sought to have the employee sign a

new non-compete agreement”). The question, according to Intertek,

is whether the employment agreement had been “mutually abandoned

and rescinded.” Intertek, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 354, at *21;

Slade Gorton & Co. v. O’Neil, 242 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Mass. 1968)

(describing the question as whether the contract was “abandoned or

superseded by the conduct of the parties prior to [the employee’s]

resignation”); Bartlett Tree, 233 N.E.2d at 587 (observing that

changes in the employee’s remuneration and sales area, memorialized

in a new contract that the employee refused to sign, “strongly

suggest that the parties had abandoned their old arrangement and

had entered into a new relationship”). Finally, “whether there has

been such a modification of a previous agreement, rather than an

implied revocation or termination of the agreement as the result of

such a subsequent change, depends upon the intention of the

parties.” Mail-Well Envelope Co. v. Saley, 497 P.2d 364, 369 (Or.

- 28 -
1972); see Bartlett Tree, 233 N.E.2d at 587 (noting that parties’

conduct subsequent to changes in employee’s position was

inconsistent with an intention that the original remained in

effect).

Assuming that Rhode Island would adopt Massachusetts’

material change rule, the evidence in this case is insufficient to

generate its application. See Elizabeth Grady Face First, Inc. v.

Escavich, 321 F. Supp. 2d 420, 424 (D. Conn. 2004) (stating that

Bartlett Tree and AFC Cable “stand for nothing more than the

unremarkable proposition that contracting parties are free to

abandon their prior contracts and form new ones, and an intention

to do so may be evidenced not only by words or writing but also by

the parties’ conduct”). Plant’s job change from product specialist

to district sales manager does not reflect a mutual abandonment and

rescission of the non-competition provision; there is no suggestion

that Astro-Med approached Plant with a new employment agreement;

and, there is no evidence of intent on either Astro-Med’s or

Plant’s part to revoke or supersede the employment agreement.

Regarding the supposed restriction in the Employee

Agreement to work “involving design, development or manufacture of

products for the Company,” defendants’ reading of the agreement is

much too narrow. The introductory paragraph of the Employee

Agreement provides, in part: “I am now or am about to be employed

by Astro-Med, Inc. . . . and in connection with such employment, I

- 29 -
am, may, or will be engaged in work relating to the Company’s

business, involving design, development or manufacture of products

for the Company.” On the basis of this recital and in exchange for

continued employment and compensation, a signatory of the

Agreement, here Plant, makes various promises, including not to

compete. The recital cannot fairly be read to apply only to those

employees involved in design, development, or manufacture of

products for Astro-Med. The subordinate clause, “design,

development or manufacture of products”, describes the nature of

Astro-Med’s business; it does not limit the type of work an

employee must perform at Astro-Med to become subject to the

Agreement.

(c) Astro-Med’s Breach

Defendants claim that by substantially reducing Plant’s

sales territory, Astro-Med materially breached the Employee

Agreement, thereby releasing Plant from its non-competition

provisions. However, as the district judge observed, during trial,

Plant admitted that when he accepted the sales position in Florida,

Astro-Med informed him that his sales territory might be partly

reallocated in the future. When Astro-Med later reduced his sales

territory, it was acting in accordance with the agreement of the

parties, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict, Astro-Med cannot be said to have breached the contract

by implementing its agreed-upon terms.

- 30 -
 (d) Legitimate Business Interests

Defendants’ final argument against the enforceability of

the non-competition provision is that it was not designed to

protect Astro-Med’s legitimate business interests. Rhode Island

law requires that a party seeking to enforce a non-competition

agreement demonstrate that “there exists a legitimate interest that

the provision is designed to protect.” Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1053;

Max Garelick, Inc. v. Leonardo, 250 A.2d 354, 357 (R.I. 1969).

While “the desire to be free from competition, by itself, is not a

protectable interest,” Durapin, 559 A.2d at 1057, protecting a

business’s confidential information and goodwill—such as the

special relationship its sales force has developed with

customers—may qualify as a legitimate interest. R.J. Carbone, 582

F. Supp. 2d at 225; Nestle, 836 F. Supp. at 74-75; Dial Media, Inc.

v. Schiff, 612 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (D.R.I. 1985); Rego Displays,

Inc. v. Fournier, 379 A.2d 1098, 1102 (R.I. 1977). At trial,

Astro-Med produced evidence of the proprietary nature of the

information it disclosed to Plant, including strengths and

weaknesses of its products, its pricing strategies, the new

products under development, and its customers. The evidence is

sufficient to sustain the verdict.

(e) Interference with an Enforceable Agreement

Because defendants have failed to demonstrate that the

non-competition provision in the Employee Agreement is

- 31 -
unenforceable against Plant, the argument that Nihon Kohden could

not have interfered with the Employee Agreement also fails.

3. Evidence of Trade Secret Misappropriation

Based largely on the testimony of Astro-Med employees,

defendants insist that there is no evidence that either Plant or

Nihon Kohden ever used any of Astro-Med’s confidential information.

They contend that this failure dooms Astro-Med’s misappropriation

claim, which they say requires proof that Astro-Med “shared a

confidential relationship with the defendant, possessed a trade

secret, disclosed it to the defendant, and that the defendant made

use of the disclosure in breach of the confidence reposed in him.”

Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 463 (1st Cir. 1985).

Defendants’ reliance on our discussion of Massachusetts

tort law in Burten is misplaced. Astro-Med’s misappropriation

claim arises under the Rhode Island Uniform Trade Secrets Act, R.I.

Gen. Laws § 6-41-1 et seq., which defines “misappropriation” as

follows:

(i) Acquisition of a trade secret of another
by a person who knows or has reason to know
that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or
(ii) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of
another without express or implied consent by
a person who:
(A) Used improper means to acquire
knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of disclosure or
use, knew or had reason to know that
his or her knowledge of the trade
secret was:

- 32 -
 (I) Derived from or
through a person who had
utilized improper means
to acquire it;
(II) Acquired under
circumstances giving rise
to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use;
or
(III) Derived from or
through a person who owed
a duty to the person
seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or
(C) Before a material change of his
or her position, knew or had reason
to know that it was a trade secret
and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake[.]

R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-1(2). The Act’s definition of “improper

means” includes “breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to

maintain secrecy.” Id. § 6-41-1(1). Misappropriation thus

includes disclosure of a trade secret by one who acquired it while

under a duty to maintain its secrecy and the acquisition of a trade

secret by one who knows that it was acquired by breach of a duty to

maintain secrecy. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, Astro-Med

need not have shown that either Plant or Nihon Kohden “used” Astro-

Med’s trade secrets; disclosure or acquisition is sufficient to

constitute misappropriation, subjecting defendants to liability for

actual loss and unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation.

Id. § 6-41-3(a).

Here, there was ample evidence that the very reason Nihon

Kohden hired Plant was to obtain access to his intimate knowledge

- 33 -
of Astro-Med’s business.8 Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, it is a logical inference that a

competitor who hires away a rival’s valued employee with access to

inside information has done so in order to use that inside

information to compete with the rival, and it is an equally logical

inference that once Plant became a Nihon Kohden employee, he sought

to justify its hiring decision by revealing and using the

information Nihon Kohden had bargained for.

4. Damages

Defendants next say that Astro-Med failed to produce

evidence of direct sales that Astro-Med lost to Nihon Kohden as a

consequence of its hiring Plant, and that to prove damages, Astro-

Med instead relied on sales quotations, not actual sales.

Defendants contend that to rely on sales quotations, not actual

sales, required the jury to assume a damages verdict based on

speculation and conjecture in violation of law. Nestle, 836 F.

8
For example, email exchanges between Plant and Nihon Kohden
reveal that after Plant accepted the Nihon Kohden job offer, Brian
Kehoe, a Nihon Kohden employee, wrote to Plant that he will be
“interested to see what you have in the works with Grass” and he
will be “happy to start communication from [Nihon Kohden] if it
will help you on some Grass accounts.” (Grass is the product group
for which Plant worked.) Plant replied, “Sounds good.” Plant also
explained that Kehoe handled sales with Astro-Med customers that
Plant was precluded from contacting by a preliminary injunction
ordered by the district court. Given the understanding between
Plant and Kehoe, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Plant
disclosed to Kehoe, and Nihon Kohden (knowing the terms of Plant’s
Employee Agreement) acquired through Kehoe, trade secrets that
Plant had learned while subject to a duty of non-disclosure.

- 34 -
Supp. at 78 (reiterating the “enduring rule that damages must be

established by a reasonable certainty and may not be recovered if

purely speculative”). At the same time, Astro-Med is not required

to prove its damages “with mathematical precision.” Cordeco Dev.

Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 262 (1st Cir. 1976). “All

that is required is a reasonable basis of computation and the best

evidence obtainable.” Knightsbridge Mktg. Servs., Inc. v.

Promociones Y Proyectos, S.A., 728 F.2d 572, 575-76 (1st Cir.

1984).

The district court undertook a painstaking analysis of

the damages evidence at the trial and considered as well the

reasons why Nihon Kohden did not present evidence of actual sales.

We have reviewed the district court’s careful review of the

evidence and can add nothing. It suffices to say, as the district

court concluded, that the evidence, again when viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdict, supports the damage award.

5. An Inconsistent and Nonsensical Verdict

Defendants correctly observe that the jury issued the

following monetary awards: (1) $41,900 against Plant for breach of

contract; (2) $41,900 against Nihon Kohden for intentional

interference with the Astro-Med – Plant contract; (3) $280,000

against Plant and Nihon Kohden for misappropriation of trade

secrets; and, (4) $12,000 against Plant for unfair competition.

Nihon Kohden characterizes these awards as “non-sensical based on

- 35 -
their inconsistency and lack of evidentiary support.” Other than

strongly telegraphing its resolute disenchantment with the verdict,

defendants have not explained why these monetary awards are

inconsistent. We are left to guess. It is well settled in this

circuit that “issues ‘adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory

manner, unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed

to have been abandoned.’” Piedrahita v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 142, 144

(1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Tum v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 159, 160 (1st

Cir. 2007)). We will not attempt to supply an argument the

appellant has not articulated.9

6. Evidentiary Rulings and Jury Instruction

Nihon Kohden raises several claims of error in the

district court's evidentiary rulings. We have carefully reviewed

Nihon Kohden's contentions and conclude that Nihon Kohden failed to

preserve some of its claims, and failed to adequately develop

others; as to the remainder, we conclude the district court did not

err.

Defendants also contend that the district court erred

when it instructed the jury on Plant’s failure to produce evidence

of the commissions he received as a Nihon Kohden employee. The

district court gave the following instruction:

9
This cannot come as a surprise to defendants. Addressing the
same contention with a similar lack of specificity, the district
court came to the same conclusion.

- 36 -
 If you find that Kevin Plant failed to
produce documents or information concerning
the actual sales that he made on behalf of
Nihon Kohden in the state of Florida, you may
infer from Kevin Plant’s nonproduction that
the documents and information are unfavorable
to the defense.

Defendants did not object to the instruction and they

therefore forfeited their right to object on appeal. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 51(c)(2)(B) (stating that a party must “object[] promptly

after learning that the instruction or request will be, or has

been, given or refused”); Baron, 402 F.3d at 235. “Our

interpretation of Rule 51 is quite strict.” Connelly v. Hyundai

Motor Co., 351 F.3d 535, 544 (1st Cir. 2003). “There is a good

reason for this strictness. We enforce our object-or-forfeit rule

to compel litigants to afford the trial court an opportunity to

cure [a] defective instruction and to prevent the litigants from

ensuring a new trial in the event of an adverse verdict by covertly

relying on the error.” Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 25

(1st Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (internal quotation

omitted). We review defendants’ forfeited claim only for plain

error. Baron, 402 F.3d at 236.

Defendants acknowledge that an adverse inference

instruction may be allowed when a party fails to produce a document

that exists or should exist and is within its control. See

Grajales-Romero v. American Airlines, 194 F.3d 288, 299 (1st Cir.

1999); see also United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880

- 37 -
F.2d 579, 597 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that “[t]he failure of a

party to produce available evidence that would help decide an issue

may justify an inference that the evidence would be unfavorable to

the party to whom it is available”). But, they say that such an

instruction should not have been given in this case, because there

was no evidence that a document relating to Plant’s sales as a

Nihon Kohden employee existed. Contrary to defendants’ claim,

Plant testified that his paychecks from Nihon Kohden included a

document graphing his Florida sales and commission from these

sales. Plant also testified that he had not brought these

documents with him to court, because he was not asked to do so.

Plant’s testimony demonstrates that Nihon Kohden produced a

relevant document, and that Plant possessed this document, but had

not brought it to court. This testimony properly generated the

adverse inference instruction.

D. Miscellaneous Issues

Defendants mention other claims of legal error. They

object to the way the charge conference was held, demand a

remittitur to zero damages and an order vacating all orders

regarding post-trial awards of punitive damages and attorneys’

fees, and ask that the sanctions against counsel be reversed. But,

they fail to address any of these issues in their brief, except in

passing. Again, we will not address claims of error that

- 38 -
defendants failed to develop. Piedrahita, 524 F.3d at 145; Ryan,

916 F.2d at 734.

III.

Conclusion

The district court judgment is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

- Concurring Opinion Follows -

- 39 -
 HOWARD, Circuit Judge, concurring. Although our

conclusion that Rhode Island has personal jurisdiction over Nihon

Kohden is in my view correct, our inquiry on the relatedness prong

of specific jurisdiction may be seen by some as being in tension

with much of our precedent. That tension makes this a close case

for me, and so I think it proper to add a few words of my own about

our conclusion.

The general principles are uncontroversial. To establish

that specific jurisdiction exists over a particular defendant, a

plaintiff must satisfy, among other things, a "relatedness"

requirement. Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 27 (1st

Cir. 2008). More precisely, the plaintiff must show that the claim

directly relates to, or arises out of, the defendant's forum-based

contacts. Id.

Even nearer to the point, in determining what constitutes

sufficient contact for purposes of the relatedness inquiry,

traditionally we have focused on the defendant's in-forum conduct

or activity. See Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275, 282 (1st Cir.

2008). And where a plaintiff alleges a tort, as Astro-Med has in

this case, we have regularly required that there be a causal nexus

between the defendant's in-forum conduct or activity and the claim

advanced by the plaintiff. Id. ("In typical tort claims, our

inquiry is 'whether the plaintiff has established cause in fact

(i.e., the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's

- 40 -
forum-state activity) and legal cause (i.e., the defendant's in-

state conduct gave birth to the cause of action).'") (quoting Mass.

Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st

Cir. 1998)); Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 284, 289 (1st

Cir. 2005) ("[T]he defendant's in-state conduct must form an

'important, or [at least] material, element of proof' in the

plaintiff's case.") (quotations omitted); Phillips Exeter Acad. v.

Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999)

("[I]n a tort case, a court charged with determining the existence

vel non of personal jurisdiction must probe the causal nexus

between the defendant's [in-forum] contacts and the plaintiff's

cause of action.").

"Although the standard for relatedness for a tort claim

is typically different from that of a contract claim," Phillips,

530 F.3d at 27, where "the tort is intentional interference with a

contractual or business relationship, the two inquiries begin to

resemble each other." Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co.,

298 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002). But even in contract cases, the

focus remains on in-forum conduct or activity. Phillips Exeter

Acad., 196 F.3d at 289 (noting that where the cause of action is

for an alleged breach of contract, we ask whether the defendant's

activity in the forum state was "instrumental either in the

formation of the contract or in its breach.").

- 41 -
 The problem here is that, from all appearances, Nihon

Kohden did not engage in any in-forum conduct or activity that is

causally connected to the alleged tort. Nihon Kohden's actual

conduct constituting the alleged interference with Astro-Med's and

Plant's contractual relationship took place in Florida and in

California, not in Rhode Island. And for aught that it appears,

neither did Plant's contract-breaching conduct, resulting from

Nihon Kohden's actions, take place in Rhode Island. These facts

necessarily narrow the relatedness inquiry in this case to a focus

that is solely on the location of the injury to Astro-Med. That

approach, however, may be thought to endorse the application of the

"effects test," a test that we have said has no place in assessing

relatedness. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610,

623 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]he 'effects' test is a gauge for

purposeful availment and is to be applied only after the

relatedness prong has already been satisfied."); see also Mass.

Sch. of Law v. ABA, 142 F.3d 36, 36 (1st Cir. 1998) ("We have

wrestled before with this issue of whether the in-forum effects of

extra-forum activities suffice to constitute minimum contacts and

have found in the negative.").

Despite our cases limiting the application of the effects

test, we have also on other occasions found the relatedness

requirement satisfied based on the in-forum effects of out-of-state

conduct. See, e.g., N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14,

- 42 -
25 (1st Cir. 2005). In the context of the specific circumstances

of this case, I believe there is justification for employing the

slightly less rigid approach exemplified by Northern Laminate. Cf.

Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd. 94 f3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 1996)

("[R]elatedness cannot merely be reduced to one tort concept for

all circumstances."). That is because the economic tort at issue

in this case was not completed until Astro-Med suffered injury in

Rhode Island.10 See Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d

740, 752 (R.I. 1995) (laying out the elements of tortious

interference with a contractual relationship claim under Rhode

Island law); see also Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202

(7th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the victim of a business tort often will

suffer an economic injury, without which there has been no tort, in

a forum that the defendant has not contacted in the classic sense.

Construing the relatedness requirement in such cases slightly more

generously than we might in others often will permit the best-

suited forum to entertain the dispute, provided, of course, that

the purposeful availment and reasonableness requirements are

satisfied.

It may also be reiterated that a showing was made in the

district court that Nihon Kohden had several commercial contacts in

10
Nothing in the record prevents a finding that the Rhode
Island-based plaintiff in this case has suffered injury in Rhode
Island, both in the fact of, and as a consequence of, the breach of
its Rhode Island-formed and -managed employment relationship with
Plant.

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Rhode Island, albeit not directly related to this cause of action,

leading the district court to find general jurisdiction. While I

do not suggest that a blending of the general and specific

jurisdiction inquiries would be appropriate, see, e.g., O'Connor v.

Sandy Lane Hotel Co. Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 319-22 (3rd Cir. 2007)

(discussing, but declining to apply, hybrid test for relatedness),

the result in this case can hardly be characterized as unfair.

Nihon Kohden had commercial contacts in Rhode Island, it knew full-

well that it was tangling with an employment relationship formed in

Rhode Island, and the purposeful availment and reasonableness

requirements are easily satisfied in this case.

- Concurring Opinion Follows -

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 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring. This case highlights

an analytical flaw in our precedent that I identified in my dissent

in United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 629 (1st

Cir. 2001), namely, confining the Calder effects test to the

purposeful availment prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry.

See id. at 623 ("[T]he 'effects' test is a gauge for purposeful

availment and is to be applied only after the relatedness prong has

already been satisfied."). It is the illogic of that precedent

that has required my concurring colleague to justify our outcome

here by raising the possibility of a special relatedness test for

business torts.

Specific jurisdiction may be established based

exclusively on the in-forum effects of the defendant's extra-forum

conduct. That is the essence of Calder. Where the jurisdictional

inquiry is necessarily focused only on effects because there is no

in-forum conduct to consider, those effects must count in the

relatedness inquiry or the effects test may become a jurisdictional

dead end. That is, we will never get to the purposeful availment

prong, except where the in-forum effects can also be deemed an

"injury," as is the case here. See id. at 631, 633. Calder should

not be restricted in that way. Indeed, Swiss American illustrates

that a bright-line rule excluding effects from the relatedness

inquiry will foreclose jurisdiction even in the face of substantial

in-forum effects where the injury is presumed by law to occur

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elsewhere. See id. at 624 (noting that the "legal injury of

conversion occurs where conversion takes place"). Such an outcome

is at odds with "the flexible nature of our due process analysis,"

id. at 633, as exemplified by Calder.

The ultimate question in evaluating specific jurisdiction

is whether the plaintiff's cause of action relates to the

defendant's contacts within a forum. The effects test enlarges the

concept of in-forum contacts to include the in-forum impacts of

conduct undertaken outside the forum. I can see no rationale, in

any type of case, for considering such effects in evaluating

purposeful availment but excluding them from the relatedness

inquiry. In my view, therefore, there should be no need for a

special category of economic or business tort.

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