United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1154
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
RICHARD VILLAR,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
and Saris,* District Judge.
Mark L. Stevens, Esq., for appellant.
Aixa Maldonado-Quiñones, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Michael J. Gunnison, Acting United States Attorney, was
on the brief for appellee.
November 10, 2009
*
Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
SARIS, District Judge. After a jury trial, Defendant-
appellant Richard Villar, a Hispanic man, was convicted of bank
robbery. Hours following his conviction, defense counsel received
an e-mail message from one of the jurors disclosing that during
deliberations another juror said, “I guess we’re profiling but they
cause all the trouble.” When defense counsel filed a motion for a
court inquiry into the validity of the verdict, the court held a
hearing in which the juror was asked only to authenticate the e-
mail. Concluding that an allegation of ethnically biased
statements within the jury room was not, as Villar argued, an
external matter open to post-verdict inquiry, the district court
held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precluded the court from
engaging in any further examination beyond the mere authentication
of the e-mail.
Appellant now challenges the conviction on the grounds that
the district court erred when it ruled that Rule 606(b) prohibited
it from taking juror testimony about ethnically biased comments
during the course of deliberations, and that the appellant was
denied the right to due process and the right to an impartial jury
in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.
While we agree with the trial court that Rule 606(b) precludes
inquiry into juror prejudice, we hold that the court has the
discretion to conduct such an inquiry under the Sixth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
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Accordingly, the Court reverses the district court’s order denying
appellant’s motion to make an inquiry into the validity of the
verdict, and remands to the trial court. Appellant also argues
that the District Court incorrectly applied the four-level
enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual §
2B3.1(b)(2)(D), an argument that we find has no merit.
BACKGROUND
On April 26, 2006, Richard Villar was indicted on charges of
conspiring with Joshua Gagnon and Dedra Scott to commit bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(a), and
committing a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
Trial commenced on August 21, 2007. During jury selection, neither
party requested the court to ask the potential jurors voir dire
questions regarding bias based upon race or ethnicity.
1. Evidence Introduced at Trial
At trial, the government introduced testimony from fifteen
witnesses, including Dedra Scott, Villar’s girlfriend and co-
conspirator, and Shauna Harrington, Gagnon’s girlfriend.1 Neither
of the bank tellers who testified could positively identify the
Appellant as one of the men who robbed the bank. Based on this
evidence, particularly the testimony of Dedra Scott and Shauna
Harrington, the jury could reasonably find the following facts.
1
Joshua Gagnon and Dedra Scott, the Appellant’s co-
conspirators, pleaded guilty to the charges prior to Appellant’s
trial.
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On April 18, 2006, a teller at St. Mary’s bank in Hudson, New
Hampshire, was returning from her lunch break when a man wearing a
hooded sweatshirt and a ski mask jumped over the nearby chain link
fence, stuck something against her side, and told her to get inside
the bank. The man had a “Hispanic accent.” He told the teller to
remain quiet and no one would get hurt. Eventually, the teller saw
that the man was holding a gun. Once inside the bank, the teller
saw that her assailant was not alone. Another man, who was white,
was asking tellers to place money inside a bag. The Hispanic
robber holding the gun pointed it at another teller who was hiding
underneath her desk and told her to stand in the middle of the bank
lobby. Later, he told the two tellers to get down on their knees
before both men fled the bank. The two men stole a total of
$17,429.
According to Shauna Harrington’s testimony, planning for the
robbery began a few days prior to April 18, 2006. While they were
getting high on drugs, Villar suggested to Scott, Gagnon, and
Harrington that they all rob a bank. The four shared an apartment
at the time in Nashua, New Hampshire. According to Harrington,
Scott and Gagnon seemed interested in the idea. In addition, two
or three days before the robbery, Villar showed Harrington two BB
guns: one black and the other silver and black. Responding to
Villar’s inquiry, Harrington told him that the black one looked
more realistic.
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On the morning of the robbery, one of Dedra Scott’s friends
asked her to go to Patrick Kagwa’s home because he was suffering
from a prolonged diabetic seizure. When she found Kagwa
unconscious and comatose, she called 911. Scott then followed the
ambulance in Kagwa’s light blue minivan. After learning that Kagwa
had suffered permanent brain damage and would not wake up, Scott
left the hospital and returned to the apartment she shared with
Villar, Gagnon, and Harrington. At that time, Villar asked Scott
to use Kagwa’s minivan to drive him to Villar’s brother’s house.
When they drove by St. Mary’s Bank, Villar asked Scott to turn
around and pick Gagnon up from the apartment. After they had done
so, the three returned to the bank, where Villar told Scott to
drive around the building to verify whether it had a second exit.
Villar instructed Scott where to turn, and then he and Gagnon
exited the vehicle.
Scott eventually picked Gagnon and Villar up near a stop sign
a few blocks away from the bank. As they drove away, Scott saw a
police cruiser with its lights on driving in the opposite
direction. When they stopped at a gas station, Gagnon threw a bag
of money on the front seat. Villar opened the bag and showed Scott
all of the money. Scott became upset because the police knew that
she had Kagwa’s minivan. She told Gagnon and Villar that she would
drop them off in Lowell, Massachusetts, but Villar burned her with
a cigarette, telling her that she was “not going anywhere.” Once
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they arrived at Villar’s brother’s home, they all counted the
stolen money. Villar told Scott that she would receive $3,000.
When they returned to their shared apartment, Scott told
Harrington, “We just robbed an F-ing bank.” Villar then threw
Harrington a backpack containing thousands of dollars. Gagnon gave
her $1,000, which Harrington claimed she immediately returned to
him. Later, Villar told Harrington that during the robbery, he had
done all of the talking and that he had carried a gun. That night,
a few hours after the robbery was committed, Villar, Scott, Gagnon,
and Harrington went to a hotel in Manchester, New Hampshire. While
there, they counted the money again, and Gagnon and Villar each
took $7,000. They spent the evening at the hotel getting high.
Police recovered the ski mask and the weapon used during the
robbery in a wooded area near St. Mary’s Bank. Eyewitnesses Rino
Giordano and Melissa Nichols separately observed two men acting
suspiciously around the time of the robbery in the vicinity of St.
Mary’s Bank. They both described one of the subjects as Hispanic
and as being shorter than his companion. A third eyewitness,
Michael Febonio, saw two men acting suspiciously and described one
as having darker skin than the other. Nichols also described the
getaway vehicle as a light blue minivan.
The defense attacked the credibility of two of the
government’s key witnesses, Shauna Harrington and Dedra Scott,
based on their drug use, criminal histories, prior lies and
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inconsistent statements.2 In addition, Dedra Scott was impeached
as a cooperating witness. Appellant pointed out the government’s
lack of physical evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA, implicating
him in the robbery. Finally, defense counsel argued that the
testimony of one bank teller, along with a surveillance photograph
taken during the robbery, indicated that the Hispanic robber was
taller than Mr. Gagnon. Appellant noted that Villar is, in fact,
shorter than Gagnon. Appellant also introduced alibi witnesses.
2. Postverdict Juror Inquiry
Appellant was convicted on both counts on August 24, 2007
after a jury trial. Hours after the verdict was delivered, defense
counsel returned to his office and received an e-mail entitled
“Juror No. 66.” In the e-mail, the juror stated:
I felt compelled to send this to you. I don’t know if I
should even be doing this but I don’t care. I know it’s
late but I want you to know that there were at least 3
people on that jury who actually listened to the
testimony with an open mind. We tried to make the rest
pay attention. We made them go through every piece of
evidence and every witness. Between us we pointed out
every discr[e]p[a]ncy. They made up some story to
explain it away. I want you to know that I will go to
jail before I ever serve on another jury. It was awful.
I’m sorry we couldn’t do anything. We finally decided to
not prolong that young man’s hope any longer. We could
have stayed there for another week. Their minds were
made up from the first day. Here’s one example, A man
said “I guess we’re profiling but they cause all the
trouble.” Well I won’t keep you longer. Again I am
sorry we couldn’t do more. You know if I thought he
2
Some of the details provided by these witnesses were
corroborated by lay witnesses who saw the robbers and the getaway
vehicle.
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would have gotten a different kind of jury the next time
I think [I] would have kept them there. These people are
the salt of the earth and there is no gray in their
lives. I really hope they never get into the scales of
blind justice because she isn’t. God bless you and Mary
keep you safe.
(Appellee’s Br. App. at 1 (emphasis added).) On August 27, 2007,
defense counsel moved to set aside the jury’s verdict, arguing that
there was the possibility of bias and prejudice on the part of at
least one juror based upon Villar’s Hispanic ethnicity. The court
subsequently summoned the juror who contacted defense counsel to
appear at a special hearing on August 28, 2007 to inquire about the
e-mail.
With respect to the motion to set aside the verdict, the trial
court stated:
I don’t believe that [United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d
16 (1st Cir. 2003)] or [Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.
107 (1987)] give me the authority if I choose to because
I, for example, attach – I personally believe that ethnic
bias is so reprehensible in the deliberative process and
so damaging and dangerous, that if it were up to me, if
I had a hint of juror bias based on a statement from one
juror that another juror made a comment which could
reflect racial bias, if I were balancing the
constitutional interests versus the interests that
underlie the rule, I might balance that interest
differently. But it’s not up to me. If you think it is,
let me know. I don’t believe I’m free to inquire simply
because I attach relatively greater weight to the Sixth
Amendment interest in a fair trial free from ethnic bias
than does the Supreme Court or the drafters of the rule.
He concluded that based on the evidence he had available, Rule
606(b) did not give him “discretion to act.” He also noted that
his “instinct as a trial judge” was to develop the record
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immediately “rather than waiting 18 months to do it.” Defense
counsel argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment,3 racial bias
constitutes an exception to Rule 606(b). However, there was no
separate discussion about the constitutional issues. Concluding
that he did not have the authority or power under the Rule to
inquire into the matter further than verifying that the juror had,
in fact, sent the e-mail to defense counsel, the trial judge held:
I ultimately have to apply the Rules of Evidence and the
Supreme Court and First Circuit case law applying those
rules to the facts of this case, and doing that I
conclude that I am constrained from breaching the
confidentiality of the deliberative process in
questioning the juror on the basis of the e-mail, which
is all we have at this time to call into question the
integrity of the jury’s deliberative process.
A limited voir dire of the juror followed to authenticate the e-
mail.
On August 31, 2007, Villar filed a motion to set aside the
jury’s verdict, to which the government objected. On October 2,
2007, the court issued an endorsed order denying Villar’s motion.
On November 27, 2007, the Court sentenced defendant, and this
timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Rule 606(b)
Contending that the juror’s e-mail created a possibility that
the jury was racially or ethnically biased against him, appellant
3
On appeal he has recast the constitutional right as arising
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well.
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asserts that the district court erred in its legal conclusion that
Rule 606(b) barred any inquiry into the possibility of bias within
the jury room.
A threshold issue is the appropriate standard of review. The
parties argue that the abuse of discretion standard governs the
trial judge’s application of Rule 606(b). The district court’s
response to an allegation of juror misconduct is generally reviewed
only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Connolly, 341
F.3d 16, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Ortiz-
Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993); Mahoney v.
Vondergritt, 938 F.2d 1490, 1492 (1st Cir. 1991)). Here, however,
the trial court judge seemed to be making a ruling of law, because
he found he lacked “discretion to act” or make any inquiry under
Rule 606(b) based only on the juror e-mail. Therefore, the
appropriate standard of review of that legal ruling is de novo.
Janeiro v. Urological Surgery Prof’l Ass’n, 457 F.3d 130, 139 (1st
Cir. 2006).
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1)
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention, (2) whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror,
or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the
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verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or
evidence of any statement by the juror may not be received on a
matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Rule 606(b) codifies the “‘firmly established
common-law rule’ that prohibits admission of juror testimony to
impeach a jury verdict.” United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16,
34 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
117 (1987)). There are important policy considerations underlying
the Rule, including “finality, maintaining the integrity of the jury
system, encouraging frank and honest deliberations, and the
protection of jurors from subsequent harassment by a losing party,”
and ensuring public confidence in the justice system. Id.
Rule 606(b) contains three exceptions, two of which –
“extraneous prejudicial information” and “outside influence” – are
relevant to our analysis. We have warned that courts generally
“‘should be hesitant to haul jurors in after they have reached a
verdict to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct, or
extraneous influences.’” Id. (quoting Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d
1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1988)) (alterations omitted). A “court should
only conduct such an inquiry when ‘reasonable grounds for
investigation exist,’ i.e., ‘there is clear, strong, substantial and
incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative
impropriety has occurred which could have prejudiced the trial of
a defendant.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210,
1234 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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The key case in this area is Tanner v. United States, which
involved allegations, brought to light after conviction, that
several jurors had consumed alcohol and drugs during lunch breaks,
causing them to sleep through the afternoon sessions of a trial and
possibly affecting their reasoning ability. 483 U.S. at 117. The
Court there recognized the common law exception to the bar against
post-verdict juror testimony in cases involving an “extraneous
influence.” Id. at 117 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140, 149 (1892)). The “external/internal distinction” employed by
the Tanner Court is not a “locational distinction” but rather is
“based on the nature of the allegation.” Id. at 117-18. Juror
testimony about a matter characterized as “external” to the jury is
admissible under Rule 606(b), while testimony about “internal”
matters is barred by the Rule. See id. Explaining that juror
intoxication does not fit within the exception to Rule 606(b) for
“outside influence[s],” but rather was more properly labeled an
internal issue, the Tanner Court held that the district court did
not err when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 125,
127.
Using this framework, most courts have concluded that juror
testimony about race-related statements made by deliberating jurors
does not fall within either the “extraneous prejudicial information”
or the “outside influence” exceptions of Rule 606(b), but does fall
squarely within Rule 606(b)’s prohibition of post-verdict juror
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testimony. See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236-38
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to admit evidence of racial comments in the jury room
under Rule 606(b)’s exceptions); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155,
1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Rule 606(b) was intended to
preclude evidence of racial slurs during jury deliberations, because
“[w]e cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions
of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies”)
(internal citations omitted); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d
369, 373 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (stating that “juror testimony
regarding the possible subjective prejudices or improper motives of
individual jurors” is inadmissible under the Rule). But see United
States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Even
without characterizing racial bias as ‘extraneous,’ a powerful case
can be made that Rule 606(b) is wholly inapplicable to racial bias
because . . . ‘[a] juror may testify concerning any mental bias in
matters unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called
upon to decide.’”) (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 n.5
(1983) (per curiam) and adding emphasis)).
We are persuaded by the courts that have held that Rule 606(b),
by its express terms, precludes any inquiry into the validity of the
verdict based on juror testimony regarding racial or ethnic comments
made “during the course of deliberations.” As such, the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law when he held
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that Rule 606(b) precluded further juror inquiry.
2. Due Process and Sixth Amendment Rights
Appellant’s more powerful argument is that the application of
Rule 606(b) to prevent juror testimony about racial or ethnic
statements made in jury deliberations is unconstitutional, violating
a defendant’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, and
to a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.4 U.S. Const. amends V, VI. Constitutional issues are
reviewed de novo. United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F.3d 54, 70
(1st Cir. 2000).
The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
a “fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors. The
failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the
minimal standards of due process.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722
(1961) (internal citations omitted). One touchstone of a fair trial
is an impartial trier of fact – “‘a jury capable and willing to
4
The Appellant asserts violations of both his due process
rights and his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury.
Courts that have dealt with the issue of possible racial and ethnic
bias during jury deliberations have framed their discussions
primarily in the context of the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (“Petitioners' Sixth Amendment interests in
an unimpaired jury, on the other hand, are protected by several
aspects of the trial process.”); Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240 (“We
must remember that the Sixth Amendment embodies a right to a fair
trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.”).
Other courts have considered a challenge to bias in juror
deliberations as encompassing both due process and Sixth Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1159. The parties do
not distinguish between the two rights for purposes of the
analysis.
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decide the case solely on the evidence before it.’” McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (quoting Smith
v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (habeas case involving claims
of denial of due process due to juror bias)). When questions of
juror bias are raised, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
“it would not be safe to lay down any inflexible rule because there
might be instances in which such testimony of the juror could not
be excluded without ‘violating the plainest principles of justice.’
This might occur in the gravest and most important cases . . . .”
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915); see also United
States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating
the rule “that possible internal abnormalities in a jury will not
be inquired into except ‘in the gravest and most important cases’”)
(quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269) (emphasis added). “The obvious
difficulty with prejudice in a judicial context is that it prevents
the impartial decision-making that both the Sixth Amendment and
fundamental fair play require.” United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d
1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing jury verdict based on a voir
dire of deliberating jurors where the “religious prejudice displayed
by the jurors . . . is so shocking to the conscience and potentially
so damaging to public confidence in the equity of our system of
justice, that we must act decisively to correct any possible harmful
effects on this appellant”); see also United States v. McClinton,
135 F.3d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The Fifth and Sixth Amendments
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protect a criminal defendant from a jury’s lynch mob mentality
through the guarantees of due process of law and trial by an
impartial jury.”).
Tanner did not address the issue of racial bias but instead
involved issues of juror competence. The Supreme Court recognized
that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to an unimpaired jury,
but concluded that, because there were “several aspects of the trial
process” that could protect this right, the district court’s
invocation of a rule of evidence to bar juror testimony did not
amount to a constitutional violation. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126-27.
The Court listed voir dire, observations of the jury by counsel and
the court during trial, opportunities for jurors to report
inappropriate juror behavior prior to rendering a verdict, and the
admissibility of non-juror testimony as to wrongdoing as examples
of “other sources of protection” for a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights. Id. at 127.
After Tanner, courts have struggled with its application to
cases involving the possibility of Sixth Amendment violations during
jury deliberations. In two habeas challenges involving state court
convictions, two circuits have suggested that the use of juror
testimony may be appropriate in the rare case where due process and
Sixth Amendment concerns are implicated. In Shillcutt, the Seventh
Circuit held that the intent of Rule 606(b) was to preclude post-
verdict juror testimony, but nonetheless proceeded to address the
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constitutional question:
The rule of juror incompetency cannot be applied in such
an unfair manner as to deny due process. Thus, further
review may be necessary in the occasional case in order
to discover the extremely rare abuse that could exist
even after the court has applied the rule and determined
the evidence incompetent. In short, although our scope
of review is narrow at this stage, we must consider
whether prejudice pervaded the jury room, whether there
is a substantial probability that the alleged racial slur
made a difference in the outcome of the trial.
827 F.2d at 1159 (involving the following comment made by a juror
during the last twenty minutes of six hour deliberations: “Let’s be
logical; he’s a black, and he sees a seventeen year old white girl
– I know the type.”). See also Anderson v. Miller, 346 F.3d 315,
327-29 (2d Cir. 2003) (raising constitutional concerns regarding
scope of Rule 606(b)’s preclusion of juror testimony if there were
credible allegations that a juror’s safety was threatened by fellow
jurors); but see Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 225-35 (3d Cir.
2003) (Alito, J.) (applying the narrow habeas standard in a case
involving allegations that one juror called another a “nigger
lover,” the court stated that Tanner “implies that the Constitution
does not require the admission of evidence that falls within Rule
606(b)’s prohibition,” and as such, “the state courts did not
violate ‘clearly established Federal law’ in refusing to consider
those statements.”).
Many courts have recognized that Rule 606(b) should not be
applied dogmatically where there is a possibility of juror bias
during deliberations that would violate a defendant’s Sixth
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Amendment rights. See, e.g., Heller, 785 F.2d at 1527 (involving
a voir dire of jurors who made anti-Semitic comments); Wright v.
United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Certainly,
if a criminal defendant could show that the jury was racially
prejudiced, such evidence could not be ignored without trampling the
[S]ixth [A]mendment’s guarantee to a fair trial and an impartial
jury.”); Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289-90 (W.D.N.Y. 1979)
(requiring an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner presented a
juror affidavit describing two racially charged statements allegedly
made during deliberations, including the remark “[y]ou can’t tell
one black from another. They all look alike.”); Smith v. Brewer,
444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (“Where . . . an offer of
proof showed that there was a substantial likelihood that a criminal
defendant was prejudiced by the influence of racial bias in the jury
room, to ignore the evidence might very well offend fundamental
fairness”); Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97, 571 N.E.2d
371, 376 (1991) (concluding that, although juror bias could not be
considered admissible as an extraneous matter under the state’s non-
impeachment rule (which is similar to Fed. R. of Evid. 606(b)), a
hearing on the question of ethnic slurs against Hispanics was
nevertheless required to determine whether the ethnically-biased
statements were made because the “possibility raised by the
affidavit that the defendant did not receive a trial by an impartial
jury, which was his fundamental right, cannot be ignored”). See
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generally Racist Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 1595, 1597 (1988) (“Although few courts have admitted juror
testimony of racist jury misconduct, most courts at least
acknowledge that [R]ule 606(b) could not be applied to exclude such
evidence if, taken at face value, the evidence established a
constitutional violation.”).
Recently, the Tenth Circuit held that Tanner precluded inquiry
into claims that racist statements were made in the jury room during
the trial of a Native American defendant for assaulting an officer
with a dangerous weapon. Several days after the defendant was
convicted, a juror reported to defense counsel that, during
deliberations, the foreman insisted that “‘[w]hen Indians get
alcohol, they all get drunk’ and that when they get drunk, they get
violent.” Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231. Several jurors apparently
discussed the need to “send a message back to the reservation.” Id.
at 1232. After considering juror affidavits, the trial court held
that two jurors lied during voir dire about their experiences with
Native Americans and that a new trial was warranted. Id. The Tenth
Circuit reversed, asserting that it is “not necessarily in the
interest of overall justice” to attempt to cure “defects” such as
possible racial prejudice in the jury process:
As the Court said in Tanner, “There is little doubt that
postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in
some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts
reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior.
It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system
could survive such efforts to perfect it.”
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Id. at 1240 (quoting Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120). The Tenth Circuit
turned to the four protections the Tanner Court characterized as
protective of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights: the voir dire
process, the ability of the court and counsel to observe jurors
during the trial, the ability of jurors to make pre-verdict reports
of misconduct, and the availability of post-verdict impeachment
through non-juror evidence of misconduct. Id. (“[I]n most if not
all cases [these protections] serve to protect the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right without breaching the ban on post-verdict juror
testimony.”). Acknowledging that at least two of Tanner’s listed
protections might not be effective at identifying racist (as opposed
to drunken) jurors, the Benally court concluded that, because “jury
perfection is an untenable goal,” the safeguards noted in Tanner
were sufficiently protective. Id. (noting, however, that a judge
may not be able to easily identify racist jurors through observation
and that “voir dire might be a feeble protection if a juror is
determined to lie.”). The court rejected the defendant’s attempt
to distinguish Tanner on the grounds that racial bias is a more
serious danger to the justice system than intoxicated jurors.
Acknowledging, though, that the constitutional argument was the
“most powerful” one, the court nonetheless was skeptical of the
Shillcutt approach, concluding on an appellate record that this was
not a “case . . . where the verdict itself was shown to be based on
the defendant’s race rather than on the evidence and the law.” Id.
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at 1239, 1241.
While the issue is difficult and close, we believe that the
rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as
to bar juror testimony in those rare and grave cases where claims
of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a
defendant’s right to due process and an impartial jury. In our
view, the four protections relied on by the Tanner Court do not
provide adequate safeguards in the context of racially and
ethnically biased comments made during deliberations. While
individual pre-trial voir dire of the jurors can help to disclose
prejudice, it has shortcomings because some jurors may be reluctant
to admit racial bias.5 In addition, visual observations of the jury
by counsel and the court during trial are unlikely to identify
jurors harboring racial or ethnic bias. Likewise, non-jurors are
more likely to report inappropriate conduct – such as alcohol or
drug use – among jurors than racial statements uttered during
5
See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Because the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror
himself, ‘partly because the juror may have an interest in
concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware
of it,’ . . . it necessarily must be inferred from surrounding
facts and circumstances.” (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at
221-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring))). As the trial judge in this
case pointed out based on his many years of dealing with jury
trials, many defense attorneys have sound tactical reasons for not
proposing specific voir dire questions regarding racial or ethnic
bias because it might be viewed as insulting to jurors or as
raising an issue defense counsel does not want to highlight. As
the government pointed out, voir dire using questions about race or
ethnicity may not work to a defendant’s benefit where one of the
robbers was described as Hispanic.
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deliberations to which they are not privy.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court here did have
the discretion to inquire into the validity of the verdict by
hearing juror testimony to determine whether ethnically biased
statements were made during jury deliberations and, if so, whether
there is a substantial probability that any such comments made a
difference in the outcome of the trial. The experienced trial judge
in this case suggested that he might have conducted such an inquiry
if he had possessed the discretion to do so.
Although we conclude that the district court erred when it
concluded that it had no discretion to hold an inquiry into possible
bias in jury deliberations, we emphasize that not every stray or
isolated off-base statement made during deliberations requires a
hearing at which jury testimony is taken. As courts and
commentators have highlighted, the need to protect a frank and
candid jury deliberation process is a strong policy consideration.
Still, at the other extreme, there are certain rare and exceptional
cases involving racial or ethnic prejudice that require hearing jury
testimony to determine whether a defendant received a fair trial
under the Sixth Amendment. The determination of whether an inquiry
is necessary to vindicate a criminally accused’s constitutional due
process and Sixth Amendment rights is best made by the trial judge,
who is most familiar with the strength of the evidence and best able
to determine the probability of prejudice from an inappropriate
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racial or ethnic comment. There is nothing about the evidence in
this case that allows us to make this determination on appeal.
We need not decide here what procedures the trial judge should
follow if he decides to make such an inquiry on remand. See United
States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A] district
court maintains significant discretion in determining the type of
investigation required by a juror misconduct claim.”); Ortiz-
Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d at 443 (noting that a trial judge is “not . .
. shackled to a rigid and unyielding set [of] [sic] rules and
procedures” but rather is “vested with the discretion to fashion an
appropriate and responsible procedure to determine whether
misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial”);
Mahoney v. Vondergritt, 938 F.2d at 1492 (upholding trial judge’s
decision not to go beyond a preliminary inquiry, held without
counsel present, into post-verdict allegations that jurors did not
confine their deliberations to evidence presented at trial).
Despite our view that there is a constitutional outer limit,
we stress that the policies embodied in Rule 606(b) and underscored
in Tanner are extremely important; the rule itself is rooted in a
longstanding concern about intruding into jury deliberations and the
problems that would be caused if jury verdicts could be easily
undermined by post-judgment comments volunteered by (or in some
cases) coaxed from jurors with second thoughts. In this case, we
do not say that we would necessarily have pressed for further
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inquiry based on the somewhat terse and perhaps ambiguous report of
a single juror if the district judge had not indicated his interest
in doing so but for the bar of Rule 606(b), which he deemed
absolute. But, as we have said, the district judge is in the best
position to make the initial judgment. If in this case he thinks
further inquiry appropriate, he is free to proceed; if he thinks the
passage of time alters that initial disposition, that too is within
his province.
3. Sentencing
In the event the trial court concludes that the jury verdict
is valid, we address Appellant’s second argument. Villar contends
that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence by four levels
for “otherwise us[ing]” a pellet gun. In his view, his conduct of
sticking the gun into the bank teller’s side amounted to no more
than a “brandish[ing]” of a dangerous weapon and warrants only a
three-level adjustment. He argues that he should have only received
a three-level enhancement for “brandish[ing]” a weapon. We review
de novo the district court’s interpretation of the language used in
the Sentencing Guidelines. Its findings of fact are reviewable for
clear error. See United States v. LaFortune, 192 F.3d 157, 160 (1st
Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Nuñez-Rodriguez, 92 F.3d 14, 19
(1st Cir. 1996)).
After a sentencing hearing on January 22, 2008, the district
court sentenced the Appellant to 188 months imprisonment. The total
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offense level was 32, including a four-level enhancement for
“otherwise use” of a gun. In addition, with respect to the
Appellant’s criminal history categorization, the trial court
departed downward one level from Level VI to Level V, resulting in
a guideline range of 188 to 232 months.
Section 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides
that a four-level adjustment is appropriate “if a dangerous weapon
was otherwise used” during a robbery. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) (2008) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.). Under the
version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the
sentencing hearing, a dangerous weapon is “otherwise used” if the
“conduct did not amount to a discharge but was more than
brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dangerous
weapon.” Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(I).6 A weapon is “brandished” if
all or part of the weapon was displayed, or the presence
of the weapon was otherwise made known to another person,
in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether
the weapon was directly visible to that person.
Accordingly, although the dangerous weapon does not have
to be directly visible, the weapon must be present.
Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(C).
The Sentencing Guidelines were amended to reflect the
applicable definition of “brandished” on November 1, 2000. Under
6
“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or
explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
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the earlier version,7 this Court drew the following line between
“brandish[ing]” and “otherwise us[ing]” a weapon during a robbery:
As we view it, a person may “brandish” a weapon to
“advise” those concerned that he possesses the general
ability to do violence and that violence is imminently
and immediately available. A general, or even pompous,
showing of weapons, involving what one would consider an
arrogant demonstration of their presence, constitutes the
generalized warning that these weapons may be, in the
future, used and not merely brandished. Altering this
general display of weaponry by specifically leveling a
cocked firearm at the head or body of a bank teller or
customer, ordering them to move or be quiet according to
one's direction, is a cessation of “brandishing” and the
commencement of “otherwise used.”
LaFortune, 192 F.3d at 161-62 (finding that a defendant “otherwise
used” a weapon by pointing a gun at bank tellers and customers,
7
Prior to November 1, 2000, the Guidelines provided that
“brandished” meant that the weapon was “pointed or waved about, or
displayed in a threatening manner.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(C)
(1999) (amended Nov. 1, 2000). Under that definition, some courts
drew a distinction between explicit and implicit threats
accompanying the display of a weapon in order to distinguish
between “brandish[ing]” and “otherwise us[ing].” See, e.g., United
States v. Moerman, 233 F.3d 379, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that “pointing the firearm in a threatening manner” without the use
of verbal threats was “brandish[ing]” of a weapon). The majority
of circuits that have analyzed this issue under the amended
definition have noted that the explicit/implicit distinction is no
longer useful. Since the amended definition, courts have instead
focused on the “specific” as opposed to “general” use of the weapon
in determining which enhancement is appropriate. See generally
United States v. Dunigan, 555 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that “otherwise use[]” requires that “[t]he threat to the
victim must be specific rather than general”); United States v.
Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that
defendant “otherwise used” a weapon when he “employed the gun to
convey a threat directed at [a] specific teller which was intended
to intimidate her into complying with his demands”); United States
v. Orr, 312 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Neither the guidelines
nor the caselaw requires . . . a verbalized threat to harm the
victim in order to constitute ‘otherwise used’”).
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telling them to “get down”). See also United States v. Cover, 199
F.3d 1270, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, under the pre-
2000 Guidelines, “the use of a firearm to make an explicit or
implicit threat against a specific person constitutes the ‘otherwise
use’ of the firearm”); United States v. Wooden, 169 F.3d 674, 676
(11th Cir. 1999) (holding a semi-automatic handgun one-half inch
from victim’s forehead in the course of a robbery constitutes
“otherwise use” of the weapon); United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d
531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating the majority view that the “key
consideration [about ‘otherwise use’] is whether a gun . . . was
pointed at a specific person in an effort to create fear so as to
facilitate compliance with a demand, and ultimately to facilitate
the commission of the crime”).
Although LaFortune was decided under an earlier version of the
guidelines, the parties do not argue that the November 1, 2000
amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines, which changed the definition
of “brandished,” undermines this Court’s holding in LaFortune. The
LaFortune court focused on the “specific[] leveling” of a weapon at
another person as opposed to a “general display of weaponry” as the
demarcation between “brandish[ing]” and “otherwise us[ing].” 192
F.3d at 161. As such, the reasoning in LaFortune is fully
consistent with the amended definition of “brandished.” Compare
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(C) (1999) (describing a brandished weapon
as one that was “pointed or waved about”) with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt.
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n.1(C) (2008) (defining “brandish[ing]” as the “display” of the
weapon, or whether “the presence of the weapon was otherwise made
known to another person”).
Appellant argues that the trial court should have applied the
three-level enhancement for “brandish[ing]” because the robbers made
no reference to the gun or explicit threats to shoot it. He adds
that the teller did not know it was a gun when she felt something
in her side. According to the bank teller’s testimony at trial,
while at first she only felt a hard object at her side, once inside
the bank, she saw that it was a gun. The robber also pointed the
gun at another teller, ordering her to get up from her desk and move
to the center of the bank. The tellers were later told to “get on
the floor” before the robbers exited the bank. The trial judge
found the tellers’ versions of the event to be credible.
This “specific” use of the weapon to make an unmistakably clear
and specific threat falls within the definition of “otherwise used”
under LaFortune and the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the
district court properly concluded that Appellant “otherwise used”
a weapon for the purposes of enhancing the sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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