In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3540
M ICHAEL R. M EJIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C OOK C OUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 06 C 6214— Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 23, 2011 — D ECIDED A PRIL 22, 2011
Before K ANNE, W OOD , and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
K ANNE, Circuit Judge. Michael Mejia sued Cook County
and a number of its jail officer-employees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming that the officers used excessive force
against him in violation of his constitutional rights. His
case proceeded to trial, where a jury returned a verdict
against him. After the verdict, Mejia filed a motion for a
new trial, which the district court ultimately denied. In this
appeal, Mejia contends that the district court applied an
2 No. 09-3540
incorrect standard of law in ruling on his motion for a new
trial and that this error requires—at the least—vacatur and
remand for reconsideration under the correct standard.
Mejia’s excessive force complaint stems from a single
incident that occurred on October 9, 2005, at the Tier BJ
section of the Cook County Jail. On that day, inmate Mejia
was resting on the floor of a cell, recovering from medical
complications related to a lung infection. What happened
next is sharply disputed by the parties, and both sides’
versions of events were steeped with inconsistencies.
Several jail officers claimed that a Tier BJ officer, Kachet
Edwards, sent out a distress call when she was surrounded
by inmates housed near Mejia, but Edwards ultimately
denied ever being in distress that day. After a number of
officers arrived to allegedly assist Edwards, a shake-
down—a search of the inmates and their living units—was
initiated. The officers contended that Mejia was disobedi-
ent when ordered to rise and face the wall during the
shakedown. Some officers testified Meija went so far as to
try to punch one of the officers, while another officer stated
that Mejia never swung a punch at all. Multiple officers
claimed that Mejia was struck in an effort to restrain his
attack on another officer, while others stated that he was
never struck at all. Mejia himself testified that a glut of
officers severely beat him over an extended period, a claim
supported by similarly conflicting testimony from other
inmates. Following the incident, Mejia received medical
care for his injuries; the doctor’s report and subsequent
testimony indicated that Mejia suffered minor-to-moderate
contusions, lacerations, and bruising to his face and torso.
No. 09-3540 3
The jury found against Mejia, and Mejia moved for a new
trial. As relevant here, Mejia argued that a new trial was
warranted because the verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. The district court conceded that the
weight of the evidence (but maybe not the manifest weight,
as we shall see) swung against the County, but held that it
could not set aside the verdict on weight-of-the-evidence
grounds “unless the testimony is such that reasonable
persons could not believe it, because it contradicts indis-
putable physical facts or laws.” Expressing the belief that
it was bound by this language, the court denied Mejia’s
motion.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a
district court can grant a motion for a new trial if
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
433 (1996); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356
U.S. 525, 540 (1958); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan,
311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). In passing on a motion for a new
trial, the district court has the power to get a general
sense of the weight of the evidence, assessing the credibil-
ity of the witnesses and the comparative strength
of the facts put forth at trial. See, e.g., Byrd, 356 U.S. at 540
(“The trial judge in the federal system has powers denied
the judges of many States to comment on the weight
of evidence and credibility of witnesses . . . .”); United States
v. Washington, 184 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 1999) (“In consid-
ering the weight of the evidence, the court must necessarily
consider the credibility of the witnesses.”); Bob Willow
Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 872 F.2d 788, 798 (7th
Cir. 1989) (“In ruling on a motion for a new trial, the judge
4 No. 09-3540
may consider the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the
evidence, and anything else which justice requires.”). If,
after evaluating the evidence, the district court is of the
opinion that the verdict is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, a new trial is appropriate.1 King v. Harrington,
447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2006).
The “indisputable facts” language applied by the district
court here does have a place—albeit a limited one—in a
court’s consideration of a motion for a new trial on weight
grounds. In conducting its own assessment of the evidence
presented, the district court cannot remove a piece of
evidence from the calculus merely because the court
believes it was not credible and then, with that piece
excluded, grant a motion for a new trial because the verdict
is now against the weight. Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310,
315–17 (7th Cir. 1995). In weighing the facts, the district
1
The district court’s power to grant a new trial on weight
grounds is not unlimited: a certain deference to the jury’s
conclusions is appropriate. Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja,
546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 2008); Foster v. Cont’l Can Corp., 783
F.2d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1986). This deference is encompassed
within the manifest weight standard, which balances “a decent
respect for the collective wisdom of the jury” against a duty not
to “approve miscarriages of justice.” 11 Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2806, at 74 (2d ed. 1995). “Only when a verdict is
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence should a motion
for a new trial challenging the jury’s assessment of the facts
carry the day.” Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 424 (7th
Cir. 2000).
No. 09-3540 5
court is bound to the same evidence the jury considered,
and can strike a piece of evidence from its weighing
process only if “reasonable persons could not believe” it
because it “contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws.”
Id. at 315. Put simply, if the evidence was admitted before
the jury, the district court is usually stuck with it in ruling
on a motion for a new trial, for better or worse.
The question of admissibility, however, is analytically
distinct from the question of weight. The “indisputable
facts” language applies only when the district court seeks
to remove evidence from the weighing process; the lan-
guage has no application when the court merely weighs the
evidence itself. See Washington, 184 F.3d at 657–58; United
States v. Morales, 902 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir.), amended, 910
F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1990). As far as we can tell, the district
court never sought to exclude evidence from the calculus
here, so the rigorous “indisputable facts” language should
not have been included in its analysis.
While this distinction may seem overly technical, it is
anything but. A motion for a new trial can be granted when
the district court—in its own assessment of the evidence
presented—believes that the verdict went against the
manifest weight. Cefalu, 211 F.3d at 424. On the other hand,
a motion for a judgment as a matter of law can be granted
only if the court—after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-movant—believes that the
evidence “supports but one conclusion—the conclusion
not drawn by the jury.” Ryl-Kuchar v. Care Ctrs., Inc., 565
F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2009). Indiscriminate application
of the “indisputable facts” language would elevate the
6 No. 09-3540
standard for a motion for a new trial to something approxi-
mating the standard applied to a motion for judgment as
a matter of law. The standards applied to these two
motions differ significantly, so much so that a motion for
a new trial may be granted even if a motion for judgment
as a matter of law must be denied. See Smart Mktg. Grp.
v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 624 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010).
Because our review of the standard of law applied in a
motion for a new trial is plenary, Baptist v. City of Kankakee,
481 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2007), the use of the wrong
standard would normally make a remand appropriate.
The County claims, however, that the district court’s
discussion of the “indisputable facts” language was an
afterthought in its analysis. The court generally applied the
proper standard, says the County, and thus any error was
harmless. But the district court did not merely mention the
“indisputable facts” language in passing; it specifically
held that it could not grant a motion for a new trial unless
that language was satisfied. Applying that language, the
district court appeared to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the County (rather than neutrally),
concluding that the verdict could not be set aside unless
the evidence supporting it was impossible. The court went
on to note that the facts here were similar to the facts in
another case, Ruffin v. Fuller, 125 F. Supp. 2d 105 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), but because the Southern District of New York was
not bound to the standard employed in the Seventh
Circuit, the district court could not grant the motion for a
new trial. This discussion makes clear that the district court
wrongly believed that its power to weigh the evidence was
limited by the “indisputable facts” language.
No. 09-3540 7
The County also seems to claim that any remand would
be futile, as the district court could not grant a motion for
a new trial on the facts here without abusing its discretion.
We do not reach that conclusion as this case stands, and
express no opinion as to the correct outcome on remand.
We note only that, once the district court applies the
correct law, its discretion is wide and our review deferen-
tial. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., No. 10-2193, 2011
WL 781469, at *5 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2011); Arreola v. Choudry,
533 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2008). While we do not abjectly
defer to the district court’s judgment, “it is possible for two
judges, confronted with the identical record, to come to
opposite conclusions and for the appellate court to affirm
both.” United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1437 (7th
Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted).
In a similar vein, Mejia argues that, because the district
court already concluded that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence, it would be proper for us to vacate
the district court’s decision and remand with an order to
grant his motion for a new trial. But the district court never
concluded that the verdict was against the manifest weight
of the evidence; it observed only that the evidence tended
to favor Mejia, given the inconsistencies in the officers’
testimony and the medical evidence presented at trial.
Maybe this observation indicates that the district court
would grant the motion for a new trial under the proper
standard, and maybe not. The outcome in this case is not
certain.
In the end, the district court is in the best position to
evaluate the evidence and determine whether the verdict
8 No. 09-3540
was against the manifest weight; it heard the witnesses
testify, saw the evidence presented, and gained a better
appreciation of the nuances of the case than could be
gleaned from a cold, written record. Smith v. Ne. Ill. Univ.,
388 F.3d 559, 569 (7th Cir. 2004); Valbert v. Pass, 866
F.2d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1989). We accordingly vacate the
district court’s denial of Mejia’s motion for a new trial and
remand the case for reconsideration under the proper
standard of law.
V ACATED AND R EMANDED
4-22-11