In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1329
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
R OBERT L. K ENDRICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:10-cr-00079-RTR-1—Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.
A RGUED JUNE 2, 2011—D ECIDED JULY 28, 2011
Before B AUER, P OSNER and M ANION, Circuit Judges.
B AUER, Circuit Judge. Robert L. Kendrick pleaded guilty
to failing to register as a sex offender in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) but reserved his right to appeal the
constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) under the Commerce Clause.
We affirm.
2 No. 11-1329
I. BACKGROUND
In 1989, Kendrick pleaded guilty in Illinois state court
to eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault of
a seven-year-old girl. The judge sentenced him to six and
a half years in prison and ordered him to register as a
sex offender.
In 2001, Kendrick was convicted of failing to register
as a sex offender and was sentenced to thirteen months
of probation, which he completed satisfactorily. He
thereafter complied with registration requirements until
July 23, 2007, the date of his last registration filing with
the State of Illinois. In that filing, he initialed various
statements, including, “If you move to another state,
you must register with that state within five days. You
must notify the agency with whom you last registered
in person of your new address, at least 5 days before
moving.” This filing also reminded him of his yearly
obligation to update his registration in July and his on-
going obligation to report any changes in employ-
ment status.
In June 2008, Kendrick moved to Milwaukee, Wisconsin
and was hired by Triad Group—a company located
in Hartland, Wisconsin—but he did not report his
change of address or employment status to the State of
Illinois or Wisconsin. Kendrick then failed to update
his registration in July 2008. His whereabouts re-
mained unknown until August 2009, when he was
arrested by the Milwaukee Police Department for
soliciting a prostitute.
No. 11-1329 3
In April 2010, Kendrick was indicted for failing
to register as a sex offender. He moved to dismiss the
indictment “for lack of jurisdiction under the Commerce
Clause,” but the district court denied his motion. Kendrick
then entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The
district court judge sentenced him to one year and
one day of imprisonment and three years of supervised
release.
II. DISCUSSION
SORNA requires sex offenders to register in the juris-
dictions in which they live, work, or go to school. 42 U.S.C.
§ 16913; 18 U.S.C. § 2250. It also requires sex offenders
to update their registration within three business days
of a “change of name, residence, employment, or student
status.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). A failure to do so may
result in criminal punishment. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
Kendrick concedes that (1) he moved from Illinois to
Wisconsin in June 2008 without updating his registra-
tion to reflect his change of address; (2) he obtained
employment at Triad Group without updating his reg-
istration to reflect his change in employment; and (3) he
did not update his registration in July 2008 or any
time thereafter. He argues only that SORNA’s registra-
tion requirements exceed Congress’ authority under the
Commerce Clause.
We explicitly rejected Kendrick’s argument in United
States v. Vasquez, stating, “[w]e conclude a rational basis
4 No. 11-1329
existed under the Commerce Clause for Congress to
enact § 2250.” 611 F.3d 325, 329-331 (7th Cir. 2010).
We affirmed this holding in United States v. Sanders. 622
F.3d 779, 782-83 (7th Cir. 2010). Instead of distinguishing
his case from Vasquez and Sanders, Kendrick simply
asks us to overrule them. We decline to do so.
We require a “compelling reason” to overrule circuit
precedent. Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th
Cir. 2006) (quoting McClain v. Retail Food Emp’rs Joint
Pension Plan, 413 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005)). Kendrick
has presented none. At best, he has articulated a solid
defense of the arguments that we rejected in Vasquez,
Sanders, or both. This does not amount to a compelling
reason to revisit two cases that we decided only one
year ago. See Guerrero v. Holder, 407 Fed. Appx. 964, 966
(7th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[s]imply rehashing . . . previ-
ously considered arguments . . . does not provide a com-
pelling reason to [overrule circuit precedent]”). We there-
fore affirm the district court’s denial of Kendrick’s
motion to dismiss the indictment.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of our recent decisions in Vasquez and Sanders,
we hold that SORNA’s registration requirements do not
exceed Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause
and A FFIRM the judgment of conviction.
7-28-11