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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RONALD A. SCOTT
Appellant No. 781 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000295-2009,
CP-36-CR-0000734-2010, CP-36-CR-0000736-2010,
CP-36-CR-0000739-2010, CP-36-CR-0000752-2010,
CP-36-CR-0001859-2013, CP-36-CR-0002081-2013,
CP-36-CR-0002083-2013, CP-36-CR-0002085-2013,
CP-36-CR-0002088-2013, CP-36-CR-0002229-2013,
CP-36-CR-0003563-2014, CP-36-CR-0003573-2014,
CP-36-CR-0003693-2014, CP-36-CR-0003795-2014,
CP-36-CR-0003796-2014, CP-36-CR-0003799-2014,
CP-36-CR-0003805-2014, CP-36-CR-0004108-2014,
CP-36-CR-0004544-2014, CP-36-CR-0004636-2009,
CP-36-CR-0005578-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MARCH 15, 2016
Ronald Scott files this direct appeal from his judgment of sentence of
15-30 years’ imprisonment on 28 felony charges and 28 misdemeanor
charges. We affirm.
In 2012 and 2013, Scott was charged with criminal offenses at the
following dockets: 5578-2012 (Theft of a Motor Vehicle1); 1859-2013 (Theft
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa. C.S. § 3934(a).
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by Deception2); 2081-2013 (Forgery,3 2 counts; Access Device Fraud,4 two
counts); 2083-2013 (Forgery; Access Device Fraud; Theft by Unlawful
Taking5); 2085-2013 (Forgery; Access Device Fraud, two counts; Theft by
Unlawful Taking); and 2088-2013 (Forgery; Access Device Fraud; Theft by
Unlawful Taking) (“2012-13 charges”). After completing a drug and alcohol
assessment and review, Scott was accepted into the Lancaster County Adult
Drug Court Program. As part of his acceptance into this program, Scott pled
guilty to the 2012-13 charges. The court deferred sentencing pending
Scott’s successful completion of the Drug Court program.
At the same time, Scott appeared for a parole and probation violation
hearing on the following dockets: 0295-2009 (Theft by Deception); 4636-
2009 (Theft by Unlawful Taking); 0734-2010 (Access Device Fraud); 0736-
2010 (Access Device Fraud); 0739-2010 (Use of Stolen Credit Cards,6 12
counts); and 0752-2010 (Access Device Fraud, three counts) (“the PV
convictions”). The court found Scott in violation of his parole and probation
and recommitted him to serve the unexpired balance of his parole sentences
____________________________________________
2
18 Pa. C.S. § 3922(a)(1).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(a)(2).
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(1)(i).
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).
6
18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(1)(i).
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while leaving all periods of probation intact on each docket. Finally, Scott
was ordered to successfully complete the aforementioned treatment
program.
On May 21, 2013, Scott was paroled to a representative of the White
Deer Run-Cove Forge Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Center. He completed
his treatment there on June 27, 2013 and entered the Gatehouse for Men
the same day.
On July 16, 2013, Scott pled guilty at No. 2229-2013 (Access Device
Fraud, three counts; Receiving Stolen Property), and that docket was also
brought into Drug Court. On August 1, 2013, Scott was unsuccessfully
discharged from the Gatehouse for altering a prescription. Following this
discharge, Scott began outpatient treatment at Human Services Associates
(“HAS”) on August 2, 2013.
Scott worked for Lancaster Asphalt from August 22, 2013 until
September 5, 2013. On October 14, 2013, he obtained employment at L &
S Sweeteners. Over the next several months, he successfully advanced into
Phase III of the Drug Court Program. N.T., 4/2/15, at 13.
On April 9, 2014, however, Scott tested positive for cocaine despite
denying that he used this substance. On April 11, 2014, a laboratory study
confirmed his use of cocaine. On April 29, 2014, the court issued a bench
warrant for Scott for his failure to report for a Drug Court review hearing.
On May 18, 2014, Scott was arrested on new charges. On June 3, 2014,
Scott was released from prison.
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On June 9, 2014, Scott again missed an appointment with his
probation officer. On June 17, 2014, Scott failed to report for a Drug Court
review hearing, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. On July
15, 2014, he was again arrested on new charges.
The new 2014 offenses were at the following docket numbers: 3563-
2014 (Theft by Unlawful Taking; Access Device Fraud (two counts);
Forgery); 3573-2014 (Theft by Unlawful Taking; Access Device Fraud (two
counts); Forgery); 3693-2014 (Theft by Unlawful Taking; Access Device
Fraud (two counts)); 3795-2014 (Retail Theft7); 3796-2015 (Access Device
Fraud); 3799-2014 (Access Device Fraud); 3805-2014 (Access Device
Fraud); 4108-2015 (Access Device Fraud (two counts); Forgery (two
counts)) (“the 2014 charges”)8. On August 5, 2014, as a result of these new
criminal charges, Scott was discharged from the Drug Court Program. On
November 6, 2014, a capias was filed charging Scott with violating his parole
and probation by failing to successfully complete the Drug Court Program.
On January 27, 2015, Scott pled guilty to the 2014 charges. At the
same time, the court held a probation and parole violation hearing on Scott’s
PV convictions. The court found Scott in violation but deferred sentencing
____________________________________________
7
18 Pa.C.S. § 3929.
8
Scott was also charged with theft by unlawful taking at No. 4544-2014.
The court later sentenced him to restitution without imprisonment at this
caption number.
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pending completion of a pre-sentence investigation on dockets by the Office
of Adult Probation and Parole Services.
On April 2, 2015, the court sentenced Scott on the 2012-2013 charges
pursuant to his termination from Drug Court. He also stood for sentencing
on the PV convictions and the 2014 charges. Scott received an aggregate
sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration, plus costs and restitution. N.T.,
4/2/15, at 21-22. On Monday, April 13, 2015, Scott filed a timely motion to
modify sentence claiming that his sentence constituted a manifest abuse of
discretion and was clearly unreasonable. On April 24, 2015, the court
denied Scott’s post-sentence motion. Scott filed a timely appeal, and both
Scott and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Scott raises a single issue in this appeal: “Whether the imposition of
consecutive sentences resulting in an aggregate period of incarceration of
not less than 15 and no more than 30 years’ imprisonment was manifestly
excessive and an abuse of discretion?”
[Scott]’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of sentence. Our
standard of review for discretionary aspects of sentencing claims is as
follows:
If this Court grants appeal and reviews the sentence, the
standard of review is well-settled: sentencing is vested in the
discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent a
manifest abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion involves
a sentence which was manifestly unreasonable, or which
resulted from partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. It is more than
just an error in judgment.
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Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252-53 (Pa.Super.2006)
(citations omitted). “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing
do not entitle a petitioner to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Allen,
24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super.2011). Before this Court can address such a
discretionary challenge, an appellant must comply with the following
requirements:
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of
appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider
and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4)
whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Allen, 24 A.3d at 1064. Here, Scott satisfied the first three prongs of this
test by filing a timely appeal, preserving his claim of excessiveness in a
post-sentence motion and providing a concise statement in his brief for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence. In
addition, the issue Scott raises – imposition of consecutive sentences is
disproportionate to his crimes, in combination with allegations that the court
disregarded rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the offense in
handing down its sentence – presents a substantial question for appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa.Super.2014) (en banc)
(defendant set forth substantial question for review with respect to
consecutive nature of his sentence, as would support right to appeal from
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discretionary aspect of sentence, where defendant asserted that imposition
of consecutive sentences was disproportionate to crimes and that sentencing
court disregarded rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the
offense in handing down its sentence).
We conclude, however, that Scott’s challenge to the excessiveness of
his sentence is devoid of merit. We agree with the trial court’s excellent
analysis of this issue, which we reprint below:
I begin by noting that sentencing is within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Wall, [] 926 A.2d 957, 961
(Pa.2007). An abuse of discretion is more than an error in
judgment. A sentencing court has not abused its discretion
‘unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will.’ Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, [] 673
A.2d 893, 895 (Pa.1996)).
In considering whether a sentence was manifestly excessive or
unreasonable the appellate court must give great weight to the
sentencing judge’s discretion, as he or she is in ‘the best position
to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based
upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it.’
Wall, [] 926 A.2d at 961 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ward, []
568 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Pa.1990)). See also Commonwealth v.
Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 958 (Pa.Super.1997) (noting that the
sentencing court is in the best position to measure various
factors such as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s
character, and the defendant’s display of remorse, defiance or
indifference) …
The assertion that [Scott]’s sentence is manifestly excessive and
an abuse of the court’s discretion is without any support in the
record or the facts of this case. Given the sheer number of
criminal acts committed in this case, as well as [Scott]’s total
exposure as far as lawful maximums and potential consecutive
sentences, the judgment exercised in this case was neither
manifestly unreasonable, nor the result of partiality, prejudice,
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bias or ill-will, and, as such, the Court did not abuse its
discretion. The sentence imposed was neither ‘clearly
unreasonable’ nor so manifestly excessive as to constitute too
severe a punishment. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, [] 812
A.2d 617, 625 (Pa.2002).
Reduced to its essence, [Scott]’s sole claim on appeal is that the
only ‘reasonable’ sentence that he could have received for his
many crimes at the 22 different dockets at issue in this appeal is
one that runs entirely concurrently. [Scott] was facing
sentencing on 28 felony charges and 28 misdemeanor charges.
The number of crimes which he committed between 2012 and
2014 could not be ignored by making all of the sentences
concurrent with one another.
Although Pennsylvania’s system stands for individualized
sentencing, the court is not required to impose the ‘minimum
possible’ confinement. Wall, [] 926 A.2d at 965. In fact, our
appellate courts have expressed disapproval of routinely running
sentences concurrently lest criminals receive a ‘volume discount’
for their separate criminal acts. See Commonwealth v.
Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super.2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hoag, [] 665 A.2d 1212 (1995) (stating an
appellant is not entitled to ‘volume discount’ for his crimes by
having all sentences run concurrently)). Consecutive sentences
will be overturned only if the sentence imposed was ‘clearly
unreasonable.’ Commonwealth v. Fiascki, 886 A.2d 261, 264
(Pa. Super. 2005). ‘A sentence is ‘clearly unreasonable’ if it
‘violates the requirements and goals of the [Sentencing] Code.’
Id.
Long standing precedent recognizes that 42 Pa. C.S. § 9721
affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence
concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed
at the same time or to sentences already imposed, upon
consideration of the individual circumstances concerning the
defendant and the many crimes he committed. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877, 880
(Pa.Super.2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d
608, 612 (Pa.Super.2005)). See also Commonwealth v.
Diaz, 867 A.2d 1285, 1288 (Pa.Super.2005) (affirming
aggregate sentence of 12 to 24 years imposed upon 74-year-old
appellant where court did not sentence on all forty-two counts,
but rather, sentenced him to three consecutive terms for each
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year of three year span of criminal activity); Commonwealth
v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa.Super. 2004), affd, [] 891
A.2d 1265 (Pa.2006) (affirming aggregate sentence of 26 to 100
years of imprisonment for ten robbery and related convictions
where court considered pre-sentence report and the particular
circumstances of the crimes).
It should be noted that many of [Scott]’s sentences were made
concurrent. The sentences on Docket Nos. 5578-2012 and
1859-2013 were made concurrent to each other, as were the
sentences on Nos. 3693-2014 and 3795-2014, Nos. 3796-2014,
3799-2014 and 3805-2014, and Nos. 0295-2009, 4636-2009,
0734-2010, and 0736-2010. As explained to [Scott] at his
sentencing:
Mr. Scott, do you understand that the ... sheer
number of victims and the number of cases compel
me as a judge, in the proper exercise of my duty, to
impose a sentence that some would say is harsh.
Frankly, some would say is light. As we discussed at
the time of your guilty plea, the maximum potential
sentences if all of these charges, just the new
charges, not the PV charges, not the Drug Court
charges, just the new charges, if they were
sentenced consecutively, is 174 years. ... I honestly,
in 15 years on the bench, can’t think of another case
where I have had to impose a sentence involving so
many different charges, nonviolent offenses, that
simply by the volume of them requires me to impose
the sentence that I am about to impose.
(N.T., Sentencing, at 10-11.) This Court’s decision to impose
some consecutive sentences rather than all concurrent sentences
resulted from a dispassionate, balanced and scrupulous review of
the entire record in this case. [Scott]’s sentence was neither so
manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment
nor unreasonable given the sheer volume of the crimes
committed and the circumstances of the cases.
[Scott] further claims that the Court failed to impose an
individualized sentence which took into consideration [Scott]’s
circumstances (See Motion to Modify Sentence, at ¶¶ 19 -32.)
This Court is very familiar with [Scott]’s circumstances having
supervised him on a weekly basis since his admission into Drug
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Court in May of 2013. Still, [Scott] argues that the Court failed
to consider certain factors that would have mitigated against a
sentence in the state correctional institution. First, [Scott argues
that his] conduct was entirely motivated by his drug addiction’
and ‘all offenses involved were related to [Scott]’s overwhelming
desire to purchase to [sic] drugs, as opposed to a desire to
cause harm.’ (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26; see also N.T., Guilty
Plea/Sentencing, at 10.) Second, ‘[Scott] voluntarily sought
entry into the Drug Court Program, evidencing his
acknowledgment of a drug problem.’ (Id. at ¶ 23; see also
N.T., Sentencing, at 7.) Third, ‘[Scott] has shown his ability and
desire to seek help,’ ‘his ability to follow rules of supervision,’ ‘an
ability to function as a member of society,’ ‘a significant work
history,’ and he ‘is educated.’ (Id. at ¶¶ 28-32; see also N.T.,
Sentencing, at 6-7.) Fourth, ‘[Scott] has no history of violence,’
and ‘[a]ll dockets and crimes for which [Scott] was sentenced
involved a theft related offense and not a single crime of
violence.’ (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20; see also N.T., Sentencing, at 7.)
Lastly, ‘[Scott] accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading
guilty on all dockets.’ (Id. at ¶ 22; see also N.T., Sentencing,
at 6-7.)
It is clear that in fashioning this sentence the Court did consider
the individual circumstances concerning [Scott] and the many
crimes he committed. As noted at the sentencing hearing, the
Court took into account the following factors: [Scott]’s age (55);
his family history; his adult criminal record starting in 1994; his
educational background; having completed college; his alcohol
and substance abuse history, starting with his use of alcohol and
marijuana while in college, cocaine at the age of 27, and crack
cocaine at the age of 30; and his employment history. With
regard to his extensive criminal history, [Scott]’s sentencing in
April 2015 marked his sixteenth appearance before the Court,
including seven prior probation/parole violations. (N.T.,
Sentencing at 23 -24.)
It is also clear from the record that this Court carefully
considered the entire pre-sentence investigation report. (N.T.,
Sentencing at 24 -25.) As our Superior Court noted:
Since the sentencing court had and considered a
presentence report, this fact alone was adequate to
support the sentence, and due to the court’s explicit
reliance on that report, we are required to presume
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that the court properly weighed the mitigating
factors present in the case. Commonwealth v.
Boyer, 856 A.2d 149 (Pa. Super.2004). In Boyer,
we stated: ‘In imposing sentence, the trial court is
required to consider the particular circumstances of
the offense and the character of the defendant. The
trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior
criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and
potential for rehabilitation. However, where the
sentencing judge had the benefit of a presentence
investigation report, it will be presumed that he or
she was aware of the relevant information regarding
the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory
factors....’
Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 766-67
(Pa.Super.2006).
Furthermore, the Court took into consideration [Scott]’s
comments at the sentencing hearing and his letter of February
18, 2015 to the Court, as well as defense counsel’s comments on
behalf of [Scott]. (N.T., Sentencing at 4-10.) Defense counsel
reiterated that [Scott] has struggled with a drug addiction
throughout most of his adult life. (Id. at 5.) He stressed that
[Scott]’s prior criminal history is related to his drug addiction.
(Id.) To the extent that [Scott] argues that the trial court did
not adequately consider these mitigating factors which were
presented in the pre-sentence investigation report and by
counsel, such a claim is not supported by the record and, in any
case, does not raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v.
Hanson, 856 A.2d 1254, 1257-58 (Pa.Super.2004).
[Scott] also contends that the sentence was not consistent with
the protection of the public, the gravity of the offenses, and his
rehabilitative needs. (See Motion to Modify Sentence at ¶¶ 35 -
36.) I begin by noting that when ‘sentencing an appellant, the
trial court is permitted to consider the seriousness of the offense
and its impact on the community.’ Commonwealth v. Roden,
730 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa.Super.1999). [Scott] has a 20-year
history of committing crimes against innocent victims. (N.T.,
Sentencing at 24 -25.) Many new charges occurred during the
year while [Scott] was under the care and supervision of Drug
Court. (Id. at 14.) Such behavior, while an active participant in
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the Drug Court Program, shows society needs to be protected
from [Scott].
[Scott] suggests that the Court should have sentenced him to a
lesser time of incarceration and allowed him ‘the possibility of ...
becoming a contributing member of society.’ (See Motion to
Modify Sentence at ¶ 27.) The fact that [Scott] disagrees with
the sentencing court’s conclusion regarding his rehabilitative
potential does not render the sentence imposed an abuse of
discretion. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 716 A.2d 1275,
1279 (Pa.Super.1998) (sentence of 10 to 20 years’
imprisonment imposed for convictions of controlled substance
possession with intent to deliver and conspiracy, which was
outside sentencing guidelines, was appropriate where defendant
was extensively involved in drugs at an early age, disregarded
earlier opportunity to reform, failed to comply with court’s
previous sentencing orders, lost his job due to use of drugs, and
spent his money on drugs rather than support his children).
This Court obviously considered the fact that [Scott] was
accepted into the Drug Court Program in 2013 and provided with
an opportunity to get clean and sober and live a law-abiding,
productive life. A treatment plan was developed specifically for
[Scott]. He was offered many chances to remain on probation in
the Drug Court program, but he failed to take advantage of
them. [Scott] continued to make extremely poor decisions and
chose to reject the opportunities provided to him in Drug Court.
He made the conscious decision to hold on to his addictive
behaviors and to commit crimes. However, instead of being
incarcerated for his new felony offenses committed while under
supervision, [Scott] was allowed to remain in the community.
Despite many warnings from this Court and several sanctions,
including jail time, [Scott] did not comply with the terms of his
treatment plan.
[Scott] has exhausted his rehabilitative opportunities at the
County level. Furthermore, his history demonstrates he is simply
not amenable to further community supervision. [Scott] will
continue to be involved with drugs and is a significant risk to
commit crimes if not incarcerated. Therefore, a sentence was
imposed to protect the community from [Scott]’s criminal
behavior, as well as to protect [Scott] from his own self-
destructive behavior. I note that [Scott]’s sentence was
structured to allow him to receive further drug and alcohol
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treatment at the state level and to hold him accountable for his
lifestyle choices. (See N.T., Sentencing at 23.)
[Scott]’s rehabilitative needs clearly have been considered by
virtue of his original admission into the Drug Court program and
by his continued participation in the program for over one year
despite his relapses and criminal activity. It is clear from the
record that the more structured environment of state
incarceration has become necessary for [Scott] and is clearly
warranted in this case.
Lastly, [Scott] claims the Court erred in sentencing him outside
of the sentencing guidelines. The standard range guidelines for
the 20 felony 3 charges, the 8 felony 2 charges, the 26
misdemeanor 1 charges, and the 2 misdemeanor 2 charges were
between 6 and 18 months. Each of [Scott]’s sentences of 12
months incarceration for these felonies and misdemeanors was
clearly within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.
This issue, therefore, lacks merit.
In conclusion, [Scott]’s assertion that his sentence is manifestly
excessive and an abuse of the court’s discretion is without any
support in the record or the facts of this case. Given the sheer
number of criminal acts committed in this case, as well as
[Scott]’s total exposure as far as lawful maximums and potential
consecutive sentences, the judgment exercised in this case was
neither manifestly unreasonable, nor the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will, and, as such, the Court did not abuse
its discretion. The sentence imposed was neither ‘clearly
unreasonable’ nor so manifestly excessive as to constitute too
severe a punishment. Mouzon, 812 A.2d at 625.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, at 8-16 (with minor revisions in citation form).
For the reasons articulated by the trial court, we conclude that it acted
within its discretion in sentencing Scott to an aggregate term of 15-30 years’
imprisonment.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/15/2016
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