Nixon v. Epps

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 31, 2005

_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
NO. 02-60385
_______________________

JOHN B. NIXON, SR., also known as John B. Nixon, Jr.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, COMMISSIONER,
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before JONES, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

This habeas appeal arises out of the January 1985 murder

for hire of Virginia Tucker. John B. Nixon, Sr. was convicted of

capital murder by a Rankin County, Mississippi, jury after a three-

day trial. In the penalty phase of the trial the jury returned a

death penalty verdict, finding that the capital offense was

committed for pecuniary gain, that the murder was especially

heinous, atrocious and cruel, and that the defendant had previously

been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence

to a person. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the

Mississippi Supreme Court. Nixon v. State, 533 So. 2d 1078 (Miss.

1987). Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court in
1989. Nixon v. Mississippi, 492 U.S. 932, 110 S. Ct. 13 (1989).

Nixon exhausted his state post-conviction remedies. Nixon v.

State, 641 So. 2d 751 (Miss. 1994), cert. denied, Nixon v.

Mississippi, 513 U.S. 1120, 115 S. Ct. 922 (1995). Nixon then

filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district

court, in a series of three decisions between 1998 and 2002, denied

habeas relief. The case first came to this court on appeal from

the district court’s grant of a certificate of appealability (COA)

on Nixon’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and on

Nixon’s motion to this court for a COA on ten other grounds. In a

previous, unpublished opinion, we denied COA on eight of the

grounds requested by Nixon but granted a COA on Nixon’s Batson/

Powers claim and his claim regarding the introduction of a prior

statutory rape conviction as an aggravator.1 After reviewing the

record and briefs on the additional COA-granted issues, we now

AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 22, 1985, Nixon and two other individuals

arrived at the home of Thomas and Virginia Tucker. Upon entering

the house, Nixon pulled out a .22 caliber pistol and said, “I

brought y’all something.” Thomas Tucker, who had married his wife

six months earlier (a scant three months after her divorce was

finalized), immediately surmised that the men had been hired by his

1
We denied relief on the Batson/Powers claim in the earlier opinion,
and requested additional briefing on the two issues addressed here.

2
wife’s former husband, Elster Joseph Ponthieux. Mr. Tucker offered

Nixon money to spare their lives, but Nixon replied, “[t]hat’s not

what I’m after. The deal’s already been made.” Nixon and one of

his associates then shot at Thomas Tucker, who managed to escape

despite being hit in the side. Mr. Tucker made his way to his

nearby place of work and asked a co-worker to check on his wife.

Meanwhile, Nixon took the gun back from his associate, held the gun

one inch behind Virginia Tucker’s ear and fired a shot into her

head. Nixon and his associates fled. Mrs. Tucker was soon

discovered by Tucker’s co-worker and was taken to the hospital,

where she died the next day. Nixon was arrested after being

identified in a lineup by Thomas Tucker.

At trial, as noted above, Nixon was convicted of capital

murder and sentenced to death. Following completion of his direct

appeal and state post-conviction proceedings, Nixon filed a federal

habeas petition that was denied by the district court. His appeal

to this court followed.

II. DISCUSSION

This opinion addresses two issues raised by Nixon on

which COA has been granted: his ineffective assistance claim, and

his claim regarding the introduction of a prior violent felony

conviction before the jury as an aggravator. We first set forth

the applicable standards of review and then turn to these two

issues.

3
A. Standard of Review

Because Nixon’s original federal habeas petition was

filed in 1995, before the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), pre-AEDPA standards

apply to the district court’s review of the petition as well as to

appellate review. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117

S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

481, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1602 (2000) (noting that “Lindh requires a

court of appeals to apply pre-AEDPA law in reviewing the trial

court’s ruling, for cases commenced there pre-AEDPA”). In

evaluating the district court’s resolution on the merits of issues

presented to it, we review the district court’s findings of fact

for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Finley v.

Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2001). We review its

determination of a procedural bar de novo. Johnson v. Puckett, 176

F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1999).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Nixon first contends he received ineffective assistance

of counsel in violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

108 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), at both the guilt/innocence and sentencing

phases of his trial.

In Nixon’s state post-conviction application, the

Mississippi Supreme Court held his ineffective assistance claim

4
procedurally barred based on MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-39-21.2 See

Nixon, 641 So. 2d at 756. Under Mississippi law, as it existed at

the time of Nixon’s trial, a petitioner waives his ineffective

assistance claim when he uses different counsel on direct appeal

and fails to raise the ineffective assistance claim on direct

review. Evans v. State, 485 So. 2d 276, 280-81 (Miss. 1986);

Lockett v. State, 614 So. 2d 888 (Miss. 1992); see also Sones v.

Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 416 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995). As Nixon employed

different counsel on direct appeal, his failure to raise this issue

at that time constituted procedural default. A procedural default

represents an “adequate and independent” state ground, which

precludes reconsideration of the issue unless the petitioner can

demonstrate cause and prejudice, or that failure to consider the

claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565

(1990). The district court initially agreed with the state habeas

court’s procedural default determination.

In his brief in this court, Nixon has not attempted to

overcome the procedural bar by demonstrating cause and prejudice or

that failure to consider his ineffective assistance claim will

2
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-21 (SUPP. 1993) provides in part that “failure
by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors
either in fact or law which were capable of determination at trial and/or on
direct appeal, regardless of whether such are based on the laws and the
Constitution of the State of Mississippi or of the United States, shall
constitute a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred . . . .” The
procedural law also states that the doctrine of res judicata “shall apply to all
issues, both factual and legal, decided at trial or [on] direct appeal.”

5
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.3 Any such argument

is now considered waived. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A) & (B); Foster

v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210, 212 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001) (issues

inadequately briefed are deemed waived). The fact that the

district court later held an evidentiary hearing, resolved the

ineffective counsel claims against Nixon, and granted a COA on this

issue in no way resolves the procedural bar in Nixon’s favor.4

See Soffar v. Dretke, 391 F.3d 703, 703-04 (5th Cir. 2004)

(clarifying on rehearing that a court’s decision to grant COA on an

issue neither precludes consideration of a procedural default nor

resolves any questions concerning procedural default in the

petitioner’s favor). We thus affirm the district court on the

basis of Nixon’s procedural default. See, e.g., Foreman v. Babcock

& Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 804 (5th Cir. 1997) (court of appeals

can affirm the district court based on any ground raised in the

district court and supported by the record).

Nevertheless, the district court went on to assess the

merits of (and ultimately to reject) Nixon’s ineffective assistance

claim. Even if, like the district court, we considered Nixon’s

3
Notably, Nixon did not attempt to argue that he met the cause and
prejudice requirements in the district court either. In the district court,
Nixon argued only that the procedural bar did not apply to him, and did not even
raise the cause and prejudice argument in the alternative.
4
The state has not challenged, and we do not review, whether the
district court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on Nixon’s claims
comported with pre-AEDPA requirements for holding an evidentiary hearing on
collateral review. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S. Ct. 1715,
1721 (1992).

6
ineffective assistance claim on the merits, we would nonetheless

affirm the district court. “[T]he ultimate question of effective

assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact” reviewed

de novo by this court, see Lockett, 230 F.3d at 699, but we afford

a presumption of correctness to all district court factual findings

if they are supported by the record. Id. at 710-11.

Nixon asserts that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel in violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 108

S. Ct. 2052 (1984), at both the guilt/innocence and sentencing

phases of his trial. To prevail, he has the burden to demonstrate

both “deficient performance” and “prejudice.” Belyeu v. Scott, 67

F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 1995). The “deficient performance” prong

“requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. If this first hurdle is cleared, the defendant then has the

burden to show that because of counsel’s deficient performance

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A “reasonable

probability” is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome of the proceeding. Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th

Cir. 1990); Loyd v. Smith, 899 F.2d 1416, 1426 (5th Cir. 1990).

Nixon alleges three grounds of ineffective assistance

during the guilt/innocence phase: (1) failure to adjust trial

7
strategy based upon the state’s evidence that the crime was

committed for pecuniary gain, including testimony by Tommy Tucker;

(2) failure to protect Nixon’s Sixth Amendment rights during voir

dire by failing to object to the state’s use of peremptory

challenges; and (3) failure to interview a prospective witness,

Wade Carpenter, who testified that he sold Nixon the murder weapon.

Nixon’s specific allegations of deficient performance are

unpersuasive. The theory of Nixon’s trial counsel was that the

state’s evidence was insufficient to convict their client of murder

for hire. When Virginia’s husband Thomas Tucker testified that

Nixon told them “the deal’s already been made,” Nixon’s attorneys

were surprised. They objected and argued to the trial court that

the government improperly withheld this evidence. The trial court

overruled the objection, leaving defense counsel to attack this

testimony — and corroborating testimony by accomplice Jimenez —

through cross-examination. The jury made the ultimate credibility

determination on this issue. That the jury disagreed with Nixon’s

counsel as to who was being truthful in no way demonstrates the

inadequacy of counsel’s attempt to persuade them otherwise.

Nixon’s other claims of ineffective assistance during the

guilt/innocence phase warrant less attention. The claim that

counsel were deficient in failing to object to the prosecution’s

alleged racial use of peremptory strikes during voir dire must fail

because Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), had

not been decided at the time of Nixon’s trial. Even so, Nixon

8
raised (and lost) this claim on direct review, so even assuming

deficient performance, Nixon suffered no prejudice through

counsel’s failure to object.5 As to Nixon’s claim regarding

counsel’s failure to interview Wade Carpenter, we agree with the

district court’s appraisal of the claim: Presentation of

testimonial evidence is a matter of trial strategy, and,

particularly on federal habeas review, claims concerning what a

witness might have testified if called at trial are largely

speculative. See McCoy v. Cabana, 794 F.2d 177, 183 (5th Cir.

1986); Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1984);

Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1978). In

any event, we repeat the observation in our COA opinion that

Nixon’s identification as the culprit, which counsel might have

undermined in questioning Carpenter, “was not a significant issue

at trial.” COA Op. at 15. Nixon failed to demonstrate deficient

performance on his ineffective assistance claim regarding the

guilt/innocence phase.

Additionally, Nixon asserts four areas of deficient

performance on the part of counsel during the sentencing phase:

(1) failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence;

(2) presenting an unprofessional and prejudicial closing argument;

(3) failure to research the facts or law regarding an aggravating

5
Further, even if Powers had been the law at the time of his trial,
the Mississippi Supreme Court has held, and this court has agreed, that Powers
is not a new rule of law that may be applied retroactively. COA Op. at 8-11.

9
circumstance; and (4) failure to object to the state’s statements

made during sentencing.

Nixon now presents several incidents that could have

supported mitigation: In 1966, he risked his own life to pull a

woman from the burning wreckage of a plane crash; he once rescued

a drowning boy from a flooded irrigation ditch; he volunteered to

serve in both the Army and Navy and received honorable discharges

from each service; he left the Army at his mother’s request because

his father abandoned his mother and sisters; he left school in

seventh grade, but ultimately earned a GED in prison, and learned

a trade, which he taught other prisoners; he suffered child abuse;

and he struggled throughout life with alcohol abuse and “a severe

personality disorder.” Pet’r’s Merits Br. at 6-7. Nearly all of

this mitigating evidence was discovered through the course of

habeas litigation.

During trial and sentencing, Nixon was of little or no

help to his counsel; in fact, counsel had to convince Nixon’s

sisters to testify on his behalf. This court has held that “a

defendant who does not provide any indication to his attorneys of

the availability of mitigating evidence may not later assert an

ineffective assistance claim.” Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86,

99-100 (5th Cir. 1992).6 However, that does not mean trial counsel

6
See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126
(1987) (finding reasonable defense counsel’s choice to interview only those
witnesses called to his attention by the defendant); James v. Butler, 827 F.2d
1006 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim when petitioner

10
did no independent investigation whatsoever. In fact, Nixon told

his lawyers that he did not want the mitigation evidence they did

possess — that Nixon had saved a woman from a plane crash —

presented on his behalf.7 At the federal evidentiary hearing, the

district court determined that Nixon was not “acting emotionally

and irrationally” to such a degree that his attorneys ethically had

to disregard his objection to presenting this evidence. There is

no basis to disregard this finding. See also Amos v. Scott, 61

F.3d 333, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting ineffective assistance

claims when the defendant objected to his counsel’s desire to call

certain witnesses on his behalf during sentencing). Precedent also

prohibits a Janus-like defense strategy: A defendant cannot block

his counsel from attempting one line of defense at trial, and then

on appeal assert that counsel was ineffective for failing to

introduce evidence supporting that defense. See Roberts v. Dretke,

356 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2004); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.2d

733, 748-49 (5th Cir. 2000).

The district court explored many of Nixon’s mitigation

claims at the evidentiary hearing. Nixon’s claim that he was

subject to child abuse was rejected by the district court, which

instead found only that Nixon received “strict discipline.” 194 F.

failed to alert counsel to the possibility of a defense based on mental
impairment due to drugs).
7
Nixon’s lawyers learned of this story not from Nixon, but through
their own, independent pretrial investigation.

11
Supp. 2d at 510. Similarly, Nixon’s claim that his parents were

alcoholics was not corroborated. Nixon’s sister did testify that

she became aware of her mother’s drinking problem in 1957, when

Nixon was almost 30 years old. This in no way supports Nixon’s

contention that he was raised by abusive, alcoholic parents.

Further, Nixon’s sister could not vouch for his claim that he drank

heavily as a child. Finally, Dr. Doyle Smith, who testified about

Nixon’s adult alcoholism, was ultimately deemed of “little value”

by the district court (id.), largely because Dr. Smith could not

testify whether alcoholism played any role in Nixon’s committing

the crime, and Dr. Smith had a very different picture of Nixon’s

childhood than that offered by Nixon’s own family members. The

presumption of correctness shields these findings of fact beyond

Nixon’s criticisms.

Nixon’s claim that his lawyers “prepared no mitigation

case” is belied by trial counsel’s pretrial investigation and

pretrial request for a psychological expert. During the punishment

phase, however, Nixon’s attorneys chose to plead for his life

rather than offer flimsy “mitigating” evidence. As a strategic

decision, this was not unreasonable. To fault Nixon’s counsel for

failing to call additional witnesses during sentencing would be

engaging in second-guessing of strategic decisions, which, as

already discussed, we are loath to do. See McCoy v. Cabana, supra;

Martin v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1986). Further,

this claim ignores the dearth of options trial counsel had at their

12
disposal: Both of Nixon’s sons were willing to testify against him

at trial and maintained this preference on habeas. None of Nixon’s

children were willing to testify on his behalf either at trial or

at the federal evidentiary hearing. One of the witnesses called at

the federal evidentiary hearing, but not called at trial, was one

of his sisters, Mary Walden. Although she corroborated little of

Nixon’s alleged mitigating evidence, she had knowledge of a key

fact that would have devastated her testimony at trial: Nixon

raped his stepdaughter. Given Nixon’s lack of cooperation and a

severe shortage of “humanizing” evidence, trial counsel were not

ineffective for foregoing the attempt to offer mitigating evidence.

Nixon amplifies his ineffective assistance claim concern-

ing mitigation evidence by analogizing his case with Lockett v.

Anderson. In Lockett, this court granted habeas relief based in

part on trial counsel’s failure to investigate and discover

evidence of a major personality disorder (and additional symptoms

of paranoid schizophrenia), brain abnormality, and the defendant’s

lengthy, documented history of seizures. 230 F.3d at 713.8

Lockett’s counsel also represented Nixon at trial. Indeed, the

8
The district court may have reconsidered its procedural bar
determination based in part on this court’s holding in Lockett. In that case,
however, the portion of the district court’s determination that rested on a
procedural bar was indeed affirmed. See Lockett, 230 F.3d at 709-10. Further-
more, because we review de novo all procedural bar determinations, to the extent
that the district court’s later, amended opinions can be read to resolve the
procedural bar issue in Nixon’s favor, we reject those implied determinations and
thus affirm the district court on alternative grounds. As discussed in our COA
determination and numerous cases in this court and the Supreme Court of the
United States, we cannot engage in constitutional second-guessing of state courts
where adequate and independent state grounds are dispositive of a claim of error.

13
trials occurred virtually back-to-back, and counsel testified that

his inability adequately to prepare Lockett’s mitigation evidence

was due in part to his simultaneous work on Nixon’s case. Id. at

711. That the consequence for Lockett was ineffective counsel in

the penalty phase does not, of course, mandate the same conclusion

in Nixon’s quite different situation.

At Nixon’s evidentiary hearing, Dr. Gerald O’Brien

admitted on cross-examination that Nixon’s purported personality

disorder would “probably not” have caused him to commit the crime

or prevented him from knowing the difference between right and

wrong. By contrast, Lockett’s experts specifically linked his

temporal lobe epilepsy, which was evident in his confessions and

through a long paper trail of prior medical problems, to Lockett’s

crime. Two different experts stated explicitly that they did not

believe Lockett would have committed his crimes if he did not have

severe mental problems. Id. at 713-14. Even assuming Nixon’s

personality disorder claim had been uncovered by counsel and

believed by the jury, Dr. O’Brien’s testimony does not rise to the

level of the experts used in Lockett. Specifically, Nixon’s own

expert would not corroborate his claim that any purported mental or

personality problem interfered with Nixon’s willingness or ability

14
to commit the crime. Nixon’s attempt to hold his counsel liable

because counsel fell short in Lockett is unavailing.9

Nixon’s claim concerning his counsel’s closing argument

at sentencing also fails. Counsel’s simple, sincere request for

sympathy and appeal to the jury’s sense of religious compassion was

in keeping with counsel’s strategic decision to plead for their

client’s life rather than attempt to re-argue the facts of the case

they had just lost. As already mentioned, this strategy, while

ultimately unsuccessful, was a reasonable choice given the facts of

the case and the age of their client. Similarly, when defense

counsel mentioned other “heinous, cruel atrocious crimes” during

closing argument, this rhetoric was in keeping with the strategic

decision to plead for Nixon’s life.10 Contrary to Nixon’s claim

that this argument “all but invited a death sentence” (Pet’r’s

Merits Br. at 35), defense counsel was merely acknowledging the

9
Lockett is also inapposite to Nixon’s other penalty phase evidence
because, as noted above, Nixon could have but did not inform his trial counsel
of the evidence about his prior good deeds that might have been introduced.
10
In a similar case, where defense counsel gave an extremely brief
closing argument and never mentioned any mitigating evidence, we observed the
following:

Given his difficult situation, we are not prepared to fault [trial
counsel’s] effort to highlight the heavy responsibility of the jury
by not burdening them with the obvious and avoiding the risk of
losing them by arguing the absurd. To do so comes close to
insisting on a pro forma argument in every case. Had the jury
returned a life sentence the strategy might well have been seen as
a brilliant move. That it did not does not mean that it was outside
the range of reasonable professional assistance.

Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 877 (5th Cir. 1989). In another case, we found
no prejudice where defense counsel chose to give no closing whatsoever. Martin
v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1986).

15
jury’s verdict and asking for mercy. See Stamps v. Rees, 834 F.2d

1269, 1275 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Florida v. Nixon, 534 U.S. __,

125 S. Ct. 551, __, No. 03-931 (Dec. 13, 2004) (rejecting a claim

of ineffective assistance where defense counsel strategically chose

to concede guilt during trial and focus on begging for his client’s

life).

We also reject Nixon’s claim that trial counsel failed

properly to research and dispute the admission of his prior rape

conviction, which was used as an aggravator at sentencing. At the

time of trial, controlling Mississippi Supreme Court precedent

appeared to preclude any objection on the basis now claimed.

See Phillips v. State, 421 So. 2d 476 (1982). Further, the issue

was raised, fully briefed, and determined in the state’s favor on

direct review. See Nixon, 533 So. 2d at 1099. Even assuming that

counsel’s failure to research and investigate fully this aspect of

the case constitutes deficient performance, Nixon suffered no

prejudice. He remains convicted of two other aggravating factors,

each of which sufficiently compels a death sentence in Mississippi

law. Further discussion of this issue will be subsumed in our

analysis of the aggravating factor itself, infra.

Nixon’s final ground for ineffective assistance, that his

lawyers erroneously failed to object to the state’s closing

argument at sentencing, also fails. In light of precedent,

see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986), the

district court concluded that there was no prosecutorial misconduct

16
during the closing statement at sentencing. We agree. Because an

objection by Nixon’s counsel would have been fruitless, there can

be no claim of deficient performance under Strickland. If

anything, counsel’s decision not to object, and thereby highlight

the prosecution’s arguments to the jury, was a prudent trial

decision.

Assuming trial counsel had obtained the mitigation

evidence not presented by Nixon until the district court’s

evidentiary hearing, had excluded Nixon’s Texas rape conviction,

and had objected to the prosecutor’s statement, the result of

Nixon’s sentencing hearing would have been the same. Juxtaposing

Nixon’s scant potential mitigating evidence against the calculated,

vicious nature of his crime, Nixon did not demonstrate a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the sentencing phase would have

been different if not for trial counsel’s purported deficient

performance. As an alternative to procedural bar, we affirm the

district court’s rejection of Nixon’s ineffective assistance claim.

C. Prior Violent Felony Claim

Nixon asserts that his prior Texas conviction for rape

should not have been introduced before the jury to satisfy the

“prior violent felony” aggravating circumstance because he pled

guilty to statutory rape,11 not rape involving the use of force.

11
Nixon pled guilty to raping his stepdaughter in 1958. The jury heard
no testimony about the identity of the victim other than her name, which she did
not share with Nixon.

17
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(b) (Mississippi law allows as an

aggravating circumstance a prior conviction for “another capital

offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to

the person.”). At trial, although he objected on other grounds,

Nixon’s counsel failed to object to introduction of this prior

conviction as an invalid aggravating circumstance. The 1958 Texas

indictment to which Nixon pled guilty accused him of “ma[king] an

assault and . . . ravish[ing] and hav[ing] carnal knowledge” of a

woman under eighteen years of age. The Mississippi Supreme Court

upheld this conviction as a prior violent felony based on the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Rodrigues v. State, 308

S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). Nixon, 533 So. 2d at 1098-99.

The federal district court independently reviewed the claim and

agreed with the Mississippi court, reading Rodrigues to stand for

the proposition that because an indictment including the terms

“ravish” and “assault,” could support a conviction for rape by

force as well statutory rape, and because the terms were not

necessary to a conviction for statutory rape, Nixon’s guilty plea

qualified the conviction as a prior violent felony.

Rodrigues indicates that under Texas law,

[t]he word “ravish” implies force and want of consent,
and its use in the indictment in connection with the
allegation of rape of a female between the ages of 15 and
18 years, as here, renders the indictment sufficient to
support a conviction for rape by force as well as for
statutory rape.

18
Rodrigues, 308 S.W.2d at 40. However, as Nixon points out, the

Texas court went on to hold that “[t]he word ‘ravish’ is not,

however, descriptive of the offense, and it is therefore not

necessary that force be proven in order to sustain a conviction

under such indictment.” Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, in

Rodrigues, the Texas court rejected the state’s argument that such

an indictment could only support a conviction for rape by force.

Id. As a result, the court held that the defendant should have

been permitted to submit a jury instruction indicating that the

previous unchaste behavior of the accuser would constitute a valid

defense to the indictment — a defense that was only available in

statutory rape cases under Texas law at the time. Id.

Finding this claim “at least debatable among jurists of

reason,” we granted a COA on this issue: whether a guilty plea to

such an indictment can support a jury finding that Nixon had

committed a prior violent felony and whether such finding may

support the imposition of the death penalty.

For the first time on appeal, the state concedes that

Nixon’s prior rape conviction should not have been submitted to the

jury, but it asserts that this constituted only harmless error.12

That standard, affirmed in Brecht v. Abrahamson, is whether the

state court trial error, submission of an invalid aggravating

circumstance for the jury to weigh, can be said to have had a

12
This concession is in contrast to the state’s COA brief, in which it
claimed that the district court’s resolution of the claim was not debatable.

19
“substantial and injurious effect on the verdict reached by the

jury.” 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (1993) (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253

(1946)).13 Under Brecht, “a constitutional trial error is not so

harmful as to entitle a defendant to habeas relief unless there is

more than a mere reasonable possibility that it contributed to the

verdict. It must have had substantial effect or influence in

determining the verdict.” Billiot, 135 F.3d at 318 (emphasis

added). Further, if, after evaluating the claim in light of the

entire record, our minds are in “virtual equipoise as to the

harmlessness” of the error, “we must conclude that it was harmful.”

Id. (citing O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 433-36, 115 S. Ct.

992, 994 (1995)).

In Billiot, this court evaluated the submission of an

unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance and determined

that the error would be harmless (a) if the sentence would have

been the same had the unconstitutional aggravator never been

13
The state contends that the Mississippi Supreme Court actually
performed a harmless error analysis, a point fervently contested by Nixon, who
asserts that therefore this court should conduct Chapman harmless error review
in the first instance. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct.
824, 828 (1967) (establishing a “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard).
This particular disagreement is immaterial, however, as circuit precedent
requires this court to use the more lenient Brecht review, regardless whether the
state court ever conducted a harmless error analysis. See Hogue v. Johnson, 131
F.3d 466, 499 (1997) (“Brecht, rather than Chapman, enunciates the appropriate
standard for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless in a federal
habeas challenge to a state conviction or sentence even though no state court
ever made any determination respecting whether or not the error was harmless.”).
See also Billiot v. Puckett, 135 F.3d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the same
test in reviewing a weighing state’s — Mississippi’s — use of aggravating
circumstances).

20
submitted to the jury, or (b) if the sentence would have been the

same had the unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance been

properly defined in the jury instructions. 135 F.3d at 319. Only

the first condition is applicable here. Thus, we review the record

to determine whether there exists more than a mere reasonable

possibility that the erroneous submission of the prior violent

felony aggravator during the punishment phase of trial

substantially affected or influenced Nixon’s jury.

Nixon relies on two arguments to support his contention

that this error was not harmless. First, Nixon contends that the

erroneous introduction of the rape conviction as an aggravating

circumstance cannot be harmless because under Mississippi’s

weighing statute, the conviction fell on “death’s side of the

scale.” Second, Nixon argues that the prosecutor “repeatedly”

referred to the rape conviction in his closing argument.

Bolstering Nixon’s initial contention is the fact that

Joe Ponthieux, who hired Nixon to kill his ex-wife, received a

sentence of life imprisonment.14 The Ponthieux jury apparently

considered the aggravating circumstances of “murder for pecuniary

gain” and that the “murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or

cruel.” Nixon’s jury returned the same aggravators, in addition to

the (invalid) “prior violent felony” aggravator. Thus, Nixon

alleges that the invalid aggravator tipped the scales in death’s

14
Nixon points to no record evidence to support this assertion, but we
assume, arguendo, that this representation is accurate.

21
favor, and had the jury never considered the prior rape conviction,

Nixon also would have received a sentence of life imprisonment.

As to the second supporting argument, Nixon points to the

following two statements made by the prosecutor during the closing:

Also introduced into evidence has been a prior conviction
of this man. You will be able to take it back in the
jury room with you. I encourage you to read it. This
man was convicted in the State of Texas for the crime of
rape. Certainly, in a rape, ladies and gentlemen, the
victim of that crime was faced with threats of bodily
injury, another requirement in the findings you have to
make. I submit to you that all of these have been proved
by the State by the testimony of the witnesses in the
guilt phase and by the subsequent introduction into
evidence of his prior crime.

R. 579.

The only way to protect society from John B. Nixon, Sr.
is to order that he die by lethal injection. He has
proven this over the years. He has been convicted of
rape; and that, of course, involves the use of threat of
violence.

R. 584. Nixon contends that this reiteration of the invalid

aggravator “compounded” the constitutional error.

Although Nixon’s argument has some merit, we conclude

that, had the jury not considered the invalid aggravator, it would

nonetheless have sentenced Nixon to death. This case is unlike

Billiot (135 F.3d at 319), where this court noted (without

specifically holding)15 that it was unlikely the jury would have

returned the same verdict in the absence of a constitutionally

15
In Billiot, this court relied on the second prong of the harmless
error test, ultimately holding that the jury would have sentenced the defendant
to death even if the unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance had been
properly defined in the jury instructions. Id. at 320.

22
deficient aggravator heavily emphasized by the state. The

“decisive factor” in this jury’s sentencing decision was Nixon’s

conduct and state of mind during the crime. Cf. Hogue, 131 F.3d at

500. In the prosecutor’s closing argument against Nixon, most of

the emphasis was placed on the “especially heinous” aggravator.16

This argument marshaled the numerous facts the jury heard in both

phases of the trial about the merciless killing of Virginia Tucker.

By the time of closing argument, the jury had heard from live

witnesses vivid and graphic accounts of Nixon’s crime: Nixon

agreed to kill Virginia Tucker for money; Nixon brought his two

sons along to help him; Nixon rejected the Tuckers’ attempt to pay

him off instead of killing them, explaining that “the deal’s

already been made”; Nixon endeavored to kill the sole witness,

Thomas Tucker, who escaped when Nixon’s gun initially misfired;

Nixon gave the murder weapon to his son in the hope that Nixon, Jr.

would kill Tucker before he escaped; Mr. Tucker received several

16
After describing the facts, the prosecutor further argued:

Ladies and Gentlemen, if this is not heinous, if it is not cruel or
atrocious, I don’t know what is. Looking at other aspects of what
has constituted capital murder, you could not have returned a
verdict of capital murder in this case had you not found what was in
the prior jury instructions, that of the paynment [sic] of money.
There was money exchanged for this murder. That satisfies the
Court’s instruction to you that the Judge has just read. Who
actually committed this murder? Who actually pulled the trigger?
John Nixon, Sr. He is the man that fired the fatal shot, the
trigger man. . . . A plea of mercy, ladies and gentlemen, on January
the 22nd, 1985, would have availed Virginia Tucker nothing. John
Nixon, Sr., was set and determined on taking her life. A plea of
mercy in this Court today should not help John Nixon, Sr.

R. 579-80.

23
gunshot wounds while attempting to flee the crime scene; Nixon,

Jr., then returned the gun to his father, who approached Virginia

Tucker, whom another assailant held pinned to the floor; Nixon then

placed the gun one inch behind Virginia Tucker’s head and fired a

shot into her brain before running away with the other assailants.

Additionally, the jury heard that Virginia Tucker somehow initially

survived the gunshot and was discovered on the floor gasping for

breath, blood gushing from the wound in her head. Virginia Tucker

survived until following day, when she died in the hospital.

In contrast to these brutal details, the jury considered

only documentary evidence of Nixon’s rape conviction and the two

brief statements excerpted above.17 Neither the statements nor the

documentary evidence allude to the fact that Nixon was convicted

for raping his stepdaughter; if this emotionally charged fact had

been highlighted to the jury, perhaps our Brecht analysis would be

altered. Viewing the evidence in its totality, however, see Hogue,

131 F.3d at 500-02, we cannot conclude that there exists anything

beyond a mere reasonable possibility that the jury would have come

to another conclusion in sentencing Nixon. The slight possibility

that the jury might have reached a different verdict is

insufficient to provide relief under Brecht.

Finally, Nixon’s attempt to compare his death sentence

with the life imprisonment sentence received by Ponthieux is

17
We also note that Mississippi does not ask a capital sentencing jury
to consider “future dangerousness.”

24
unavailing.18 Because Ponthieux was tried and convicted in a sepa-

rate trial, comparisons between the two cases — and particularly

the juries involved — are hazardous, especially in regard to

harmless error analysis. In any event, the two men’s roles in the

crime were fundamentally different. Nixon was the paid killer and

central character in the grisly events described above, while

Ponthieux’s goal was to kill his ex-wife whom he had divorced only

three months before the crime. It is feasible that Ponthieux’s

jury considered his crime, though premeditated, one of passion, and

that it held residual doubt as to whether Ponthieux would have gone

through with the crime in the manner Nixon did. Nixon, moreover,

was engaging in heartless, calculated murder for hire and bringing

his children into the criminal enterprise as well; these facts

qualitatively distinguish Nixon’s guilt from that of Ponthieux.

The analysis ultimately depends on whether the record evidence

about Nixon demonstrates more than a mere reasonable possibility

that the invalid prior violent felony conviction could have

substantially influenced the jury’s verdict. Considering the

entire record, the absence of any significant mitigating

circumstances,19 the presence of two valid aggravating

18
We base our comparisons on record evidence produced at Nixon’s trial
and in the state courts. Cf. supra n.14.
19
Nixon urges that the court should consider “mitigating evidence that
should have been considered by the jury.” Reply Br. at 23 (emphasis added). We
are unable to do so; in determining whether the jury would have reached the same
verdict, we must examine only the record evidence the jury actually considered.
Nixon’s counsel asked for leniency from the jury and appealed to the jury’s sense
of religion. We cannot conclude that this attempt at mitigation would have been

25
circumstances, and the Brecht standard, we conclude that Nixon’s

jury would have returned the same verdict, and thus deem the error

harmless.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Nixon’s claims on which

COA was granted are DENIED, and the judgment of the district court

denying habeas relief is AFFIRMED.

Further, Nixon’s petition for rehearing of this court’s

COA determination, having been considered by this panel, and no

active judge on this court having requested a poll for rehearing en

banc, is DENIED.

any more successful had the jury never heard about Nixon’s rape conviction.

26