Noah S. Bunker, Paul Carrell, Everett Brew Houston, Jr., W. Andrew Buchholz, Scott J. Leighty, Jad L. Davis, and Holly Clause v. Tracy D. Strandhagen

ACCEPTED
03-14-00510-CV
3762693
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/14/2015 11:07:21 AM

____________________________________________
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK

No. 03-14-00510-CV
_____________________________________________
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 1/14/2015 11:07:21 AM
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS JEFFREY D. KYLE
AT AUSTIN Clerk
_______________________________________________

Noah S. Bunker, Paul Carrell, Everett Brew
Houston, Jr., W. Andrew Buchholz, Scott J.
Leighty, Jad L. Davis, and Holly Clause,
Appellants

v.

Tracy D. Strandhagen,
Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY,
353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-13-002811,
THE HONORABLE ORLINDA NARANJO PRESIDING

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF

Amanda G. Taylor
ataylor@textaxlaw.com
Texas Bar No. 24045921
MARTENS, TODD, LEONARD, TAYLOR & AHLRICH
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1950
Austin, Texas 78701
Tele: (512) 542-9898
Fax: (512) 542-9899

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLANTS APPELLEE

Noah S. Bunker, Paul Carrell, Tracy D. Strandhagen
Everett Brew Houston, Jr., W.
Andrew Buchholz, Scott J. Leighty,
Jad L. Davis, and Holly Clause

Appellate Counsel: Trial and Appellate Counsel:
Amanda G. Taylor Daniel Byrne
ataylor@textaxlaw.com DByrne@FBHH.com
Texas Bar No. 24045921 Lessie Fiztpatrick
MARTENS, TODD, LEONARD, LFitzpatrick@FBHH.com
TAYLOR & AHLRICH Christine E. Burgess
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1950 CBurgess@FBHH.com
Austin, Texas 78701 FRITZ, BYRNE, HEAD
Tele: (512) 542-9898 & HARRISON, PLLC
Fax: (512) 542-9899 98 San Jacinto Blvd, Suite 2000
Austin, TX 78701
Tele: (512) 476-2020

Trial Counsel:
Kelly McDonald
kmcdonald@cmcdlaw.com
Carla Garcia Connolly
cconnolly@cmcdlaw.com
CARLS, MCDONALD &
DALRYMPLE, LLP
901 South MoPac Expressway
Barton Oaks Plaza
Building 1, Suite 280
Austin, Texas 78746
Tele: (512) 472-4845
Fax: (512) 472-8403

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ..................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................. ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... ix

RECORD ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................... x

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT........................................ xi

ISSUES PRESENTED ................................................................................. xii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................... 1

I. The Parties Entered a Series of Contracts Governing
Their Medical Practice. .................................................................... 2

A. The Partners Promised to Stay With the Practice
for a Defined Period for Important Financial
Reasons. .................................................................................. 4

B. The Partners Agreed to be Bound by a Liquidated
Damages Provision Regulating Early Departure
from their Practice. ................................................................. 5

II. Strandhagen Departed the Practice Five Years Earlier
than She had Contractually Agreed.................................................. 8

III. Strandhagen Filed Separate Proceedings Against the
Company and her Physician Partners. ............................................. 9

IV. The District Court Dismissed Part and Granted Part of
the Declaratory Relief Strandhagen Sought Against the
Physicians....................................................................................... 10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.............................................................. 12

ii
ARGUMENT................................................................................................ 14

I. The District Court Erred by Granting Strandhagen’s
Motion for Summary Judgment..................................................... 14

A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review. .............................15

B. Strandhagen Failed to Satisfy her Summary-
Judgment Burden on the Essential Elements of
her Claim............................................................................... 16

1. Strandhagen was required to conclusively
establish two elements. ................................................ 17

2. Strandhagen conceded her inability to prove
the “difficulty of estimation” element.......................... 22

3. Strandhagen failed to conclusively prove the
“unreasonable forecast” element. ................................ 23

(a) No evidence of actual damages. ......................... 23

(b) Plain language of contract shows
reasonable forecast. ........................................... 30

(c) Fact issue exists regarding
modification. ...................................................... 33

C. Strandhagen Failed to Satisfy her Summary-
Judgment Burden Regarding the Physicians’
Status as Third-Party Beneficiaries. ..................................... 35

1. The Operations Agreement Provides a
Direct Line of Liability................................................. 36

2. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Remains
about the Physicians’ Third-Party
Beneficiary Status. ....................................................... 37

iii
 II. The District Court Erred by Denying Part of the
Physicians’ Plea to the Jurisdiction................................................ 38

A. Texas Law Prohibits Advisory Declarations on
Potential Defenses to Hypothetical Disputes. ...................... 38

B. Strandhagen’s Claim Is Not Ripe. ......................................... 43

PRAYER ...................................................................................................... 44

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................. 45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE....................................................................... 45

APPENDIX:

1. Order Granting Summary Judgment (CR.212)

2. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plea to the
Jurisdiction (CR.184-185)

3. Order Denying Motion for New Trial (CR.271)

4. Operations Agreement (CR.162-183)

iv
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alvarado v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
389 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ....... 37

Atmos Energy Corp. v. Abbott,
127 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) ........................... 40

Baker v. Int’l Record Syndicate, Inc.,
812 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ)......................... 18, 25

BHP Petro. Co. v. Millard,
800 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1990) .............................................................. 42

Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n,
141 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. 2004) ................................................... 39, 40, 41

California Prods. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc.,
334 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1960) .............................................................. 40

Chenault v. Phillips,
914 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1996) ............................................................... 39

City of Euless v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd.,
936 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied) ..................... 39

City of Pasadena v. Smith,
263 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) .. 39

Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Rodriguez,
366 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) 41

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk,
361 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2012) .......................................................... 16, 17

v
Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd.,
185 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2005)............................................................... 16

GPA Holding, Inc. v. Baylor Health Care Sys.,
344 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) .............. passim

Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. Bellos,
No. 11-02-00346-CV, 2003 WL 22411873 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Oct. 23, 2003, no pet.) ................................................................. 20, 24

In re City of Dallas,
977 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, orig. proceeding) ........ 40

In re Kasschau,
11 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999,
orig. proceeding) ................................................................................ 34

In re Poly-Am., L.P.,
262 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2008) .............................................................. 33

Khan v. Meknojiya,
No. 03-11-00580-CV, 2013 WL 3336874 (Tex. App.—Austin
June 28, 2013, no pet.) ........................................................... 16, 19, 21

Landry's Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Waterfront Cafe, Inc.,
49 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. dism’d) ....................... 17

LHR Enters., Inc. v. Geeslin,
No. 03-05-00176-CV, 2007 WL 3306492 (Tex. App.—Austin
Nov. 7, 2007, pet. denied) ............................................................ 40, 42

Murphy v. Cintas Corp.,
923 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied) .......... 21, 28, 30

vi
Nexstar Broad., Inc. v. Gray,
No. 09-07-00364-CV, 2008 WL 2521967 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2008, no pet.) ......................................................................... 21, 41, 42

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood,
971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) ............................................................... 40

Paulsen v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found.,
23 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) ......................... 40

Phillips v. Phillips,
820 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1991) ....................................................16, 23, 24

Sealock v. Texas Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc.,
755 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1988) ................................................................. 25

Southern Union Co. v. CSG Sys., Inc.,
No. 03-04-00172-CV, 2005 WL 171349 (Tex. App.—Austin
Jan. 27, 2005, no pet.) ............................................................... passim

State v. Margolis,
439 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.)........ 42

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) .............................................................. 39

Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Moore,
985 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) ............................ 39

Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice-Cmty. Justice Assistance Div. v. Campos,
384 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. 2012)............................................................... 14

Thomas v. Graham Mortg. Corp.,
408 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied)......................15

vii
Transcont’l Realty Investors, Inc. v. Orix Capital Markets, LLC,
353 S.W.3d 241 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) ...................... 41

Triton 88, LP v. Star Electricity, LLC,
411 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ..... 20, 24

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett,
164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) ...............................................................15

Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson,
22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000)................................................................ 40

STATUTES & RULES

TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.................................................................................. 40

Tex. R. App. P. 39.1 ...................................................................................... xi

Tex. R. App. P. 39.2 ...................................................................................... xi

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2 ..................................................................................... 14

Tex. R. App. P. 43.3 ..................................................................................... 14

Tex. R. App. P. 43.4 ..................................................................................... 44

Tex. R. Civ. P. 139 ........................................................................................ 44

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a .......................................................................................15

Tex. R. Civ. P. 94 ......................................................................................... 16

OTHER AUTHORITIES
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 ......................................... 28, 29

viii
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of This appeal arises from Appellee Dr. Tracy
the Case Strandhagen’s declaratory judgment claims against
seven of her former partners in the Austin
Anesthesiology Group (“AAG”), Appellants Drs.
Noah S. Bunker, Paul Carrell, Everett Brew Houston,
Jr., W. Andrew Buchholz, Scott J. Leighty, Jad L.
Davis, and Holly Clause (collectively, “the
Physicians”). Strandhagen sought declarations
against them that (1) she was terminated without
cause, meaning the liquidated damages provision in
the parties’ contract would be inapplicable to her;
and (2) the liquidated damages provision was an
unenforceable penalty. (CR.4-9).

Course of The Physicians filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction
Proceedings seeking dismissal of Strandhagen’s claims. (CR.77-
84). The trial court granted the Plea as to ground (1)
and denied it as to ground (2). (CR.184; Appx. 2).

Strandhagen then filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on ground (2). (CR.154-159).

Trial Court The trial court granted Strandhagen’s Motion,
Disposition declaring the liquidated damages provision to be an
unenforceable penalty. (CR.212; Appx. 1). This
resulted in a Final Judgment.

The Physicians filed a Motion for New Trial, urging
in regard to ground (2) of Strandhagen’s claim that it
was error to deny the Physicians’ Plea and to grant
Strandhagen’s Motion. (CR.213-227). Following a
hearing, the trial court denied the Physicians’ Motion
for New Trial. (CR.271; RR.1-29; Appx. 3). The
Physicians timely perfected appeal. (CR.272-273).

ix
 RECORD ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Meaning

“CR” The primary Clerk’s Record, pages 1-286, filed on
10/15/14.

A “supplemental” clerk’s record was subsequently
filed on 10/30/14 (for reasons unknown to the
Physicians) containing duplicates of documents
already in the primary CR.

A second “supplemental” clerk’s record was filed on
12/22/14 containing the order directing transfer of
the sealed documents referenced below.

The Physicians do not cite to either portion of the
“supplemental” record.

“Sealed.CR” A sealed document (Strandhagen’s Employment
Agreement), filed as an original exhibit on 12/22/14.

The Physicians’ citations to the Sealed.CR correlate to
the actual portions of the Employment Agreement,
whether it be a numbered page of the contract or an
Appendix thereto, because the District Clerk did not
assign separate “record pages” to this original
document.

“RR” The Reporter’s Record, pages 1-29, which was filed on
9/25/14. This is the transcript from the hearing on
the Physicians’ Motion for New Trial.

x
 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument should be granted because it will aid the decisional

process by allowing the Court clarify and further develop the unique facts

and legal issues in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.1, 39.2.

This case presents unique facts borne from Strandhagen’s decision to

file a preemptive lawsuit against the Physicians while simultaneously

pursuing a separate yet related claim in a different forum against their

parent company. This case also presents important and unsettled legal

questions as applied to these facts, including: (1) What elements of proof

are required to prevail on an affirmative defense of “unenforceable

penalty?”, and (2) When is a declaratory judgment claim sufficiently ripe

for review?

xi
 ISSUES PRESENTED

Issue 1: Was it reversible error for the district court to grant
Strandhagen’s traditional motion for summary judgment
declaring the parties’ liquidated damages provision to be an
unenforceable penalty?

Issue 2: Was it reversible error for the district court to deny the portion
of the Physicians’ Plea to the Jurisdiction contending that
Strandhagen’s claim was not yet ripe for decision?

xii
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr. Tracy Strandhagen, an anesthesiologist, left her medical practice

group approximately five years prior to the expiration of the seven-year

term that she had contractually agreed to work. (CR.160; Sealed.CR.12).

Before Strandhagen’s partners decided whether to sue her for breach of

contract or other claims, Strandhagen filed this preemptive lawsuit seeking

judicial declarations that would preclude her partners from recovering

against her under the liquidated damages provision of the parties’ contract

if they decided to bring a future claim against her. (CR.4-9). Strandhagen

named as defendants seven individual partners, who were the then-current

members of the practice group’s Advisory Board (Appellants Dr. Noah S.

Bunker, Dr. Paul Carrell, Dr. Everett Brew Houston, Jr., Dr. W. Andrew

Buchholz, Dr. Scott J. Leighty, Dr. Jad L. Davis, and Dr. Holly Clause)

(collectively, “the Physicians”). (CR.1-3, 162, 179). 1 The trial court

granted declaratory relief in favor of Strandhagen. (CR.212, 271). The

Physicians urge this Court to reverse that decision.

1 Although Strandhagen appears to have chosen these defendants based on their
prior service on the Board, she sued them in their individual capacities, not in their
capacities as Board members.

1
I. THE PARTIES ENTERED A SERIES OF CONTRACTS
GOVERNING THEIR MEDICAL PRACTICE.

Tracy Strandhagen and approximately sixty other anesthesiologists

were members of the Austin Anesthesiology Group (“AAG”). (CR.38, 160).

In October 2011, they collectively decided to sell 100% of their outstanding

interests in AAG to American Anesthesiology of Texas (“AAT” or “the

Company”)2 pursuant to a Membership Interest Purchase Agreement

(“the Purchase Agreement”). (CR.38, 77, 155, 162). 3 The

anesthesiologists thereby became “physician partners” of AAT (“the

Partners”). 4 (CR.162). In connection with this transaction, the Company

and the Partners entered two types of additional contracts. (CR.162, 186-

187).

First, the Company and the Partners entered an Advisory Board and

Internal Operations Agreement (“the Operations Agreement”). (CR.77,

162-183; Appx. 4). This agreement (1) established the duties, powers, and

2 AAT is an indirect subsidiary of a national medical services provider, Mednax,
Inc. (CR.6, 80; Sealed.CR.11).
3 A copy of the Purchase Agreement is not included in the record. It is referenced,
however, by the other contracts contained therein. (See CR.162; Sealed.CR.1).

4 Under the assorted agreements, the anesthesiologists are referred as the
“Physicians,” “Partners,” and/or “Physician Partners.” Herein, when referenced as an
entire group, they will be called the “Partners.” To distinguish this from references to
the seven, individual physicians named as defendants in this lawsuit, the latter will be
called the “Physicians.”

2
procedures of the Partners’ Advisory Board, Medical Director, and Partners’

Representative; (2) identified the individuals who would serve the initial

terms of those positions; and (3) set forth the obligations owed by each

physician to the other Partners and the Company. (Id.).

Second, the Company entered separate Employment Agreements

with each of the Partners “to protect the business interests and goodwill of

[the Company] and to promote the effective administration and

continuation of the Practice.” (Sealed.CR.1, 3, 12; see also CR.111, 155, 166-

167).5 As shown by Strandhagen’s contract, the Employment Agreements

set forth, inter alia, (1) the duties, services, and standards of conduct that

the Partners promised to provide; (2) the parties’ billing and compensation

agreements; and (3) the terms of the Partners’ non-competes.

(Sealed.CR.1-12, 24). Importantly, the Employment Agreements specified a

set number of years that each Partner agreed to work for the practice (“the

Initial Term”). (CR.167; Sealed.CR.12). Strandhagen’s contract specified

that “the term of [the Employment Agreement] shall be a period of seven

(7) years,” which would expire in approximately October 2018.

(Sealed.CR.12). 6

5 Strandhagen’s Employment Agreement was submitted as a sealed, in camera
“Exhibit A-1” as part of the summary-judgment record and in connection with the
Motion for New Trial. (CR.146-147, 150-152, 271; Sealed.CR; RR.23-24, 28).

3
 A. The Partners Promised to Stay With the Practice for a
Defined Period for Important Financial Reasons.

The Partners’ agreements to stay with the practice for a designated

period of time was tied to the amount of monetary consideration they

received under the Purchase Agreement. (See CR.144, 167-168). Their

collective agreements to stay for a designated number of years also had

important financial implications for the practice. First, each of the

physicians brought to the practice many years of experience and goodwill

that could not be readily replaced in the event of an early departure. (See

Sealed.CR.1). Strandhagen’s Employment Agreement reflects that she, like

her Partners, “ha[d] practiced medicine in the Specialty for many years and

[] developed substantial personal goodwill, including business contacts,

reputation, and other relationships in the health care industry.”

(Sealed.CR.1).

Beyond the Partners’ goodwill value, the profitability of their practice

also depended on each Partner working a designated shift schedule, as

determined by the Medical Director. (CR.168; Sealed.CR.2-3). They

worked in “units” to fulfill the schedule, which required the cooperation

and dedication of each Partner. (Sealed.CR.2, 7, Annex A, B). Fulfillment

6 It appears that the majority of the Partners, like Strandhagen, agreed to seven-
year terms while seven of them negotiated shorter terms of employment. (See CR.168;
Sealed.CR.12).

4
of these obligations allowed the practice to earn annual gross profits, which

directly affected the Partners’ ability to earn annual incentive bonuses.

(CR.187; Sealed.CR.9, Annex A, B).

B. The Partners Agreed to be Bound by a Liquidated
Damages Provision Regulating Early Departure from
their Practice.

In recognition of the financial importance of the Partners remaining

with the practice for the entire duration of their agreed-upon terms, they

collectively agreed to be bound by a liquidated damages provision stating

that, if a Partner departed the practice early, he or she would be liable to

the remaining Partners for a specified amount of damages, subject to

certain exceptions. (CR.168). More specifically, the Operations Agreement

provided that—given (1) the consideration received by the Partners under

the Purchase Agreement and the calculation of bonuses based upon the

profits of the Company, and (2) the Partners’ agreements to work for a

specified Initial Term—if any Partner departed early, the others “may suffer

harm, including, without limitation, increased workloads necessitated by

such termination, material impairment of the ability of the Physicians to

earn bonuses, . . . material impairment of the Physicians’ relationships with

hospitals and other [parties] . . ., and hiring and training costs related to

replacement physicians.” (CR.167-168, 187).

5
 The Partners “acknowledge[d] and agree[d]” that such that damages

would be difficult to prove, and that it would otherwise be inconvenient or

non-feasible to obtain another adequate remedy. (CR.168). Thus, they

agreed that if any Partner terminated his or her employment prior to the

expiration of the Initial Term (with some exceptions, as discussed below),

then he or she would pay the remaining Partners “as liquidated

damages and not as a penalty, the amount set forth below.” (CR.168)

(emphasis added).

The majority of the sixty Partners agreed to be bound by a liquidated

damage amount of $500,000. (CR.156, 168). Seven others negotiated

individual liquidated damages amounts between $240,000 and $400,000,

presumably tied to having negotiated shorter “Initial Terms” of

employment. (CR.168). The Partners “each acknowledge[d] and

agree[d] that the Liquidated Damages Amount is reasonable in

light of the anticipated harm which would be caused by a Terminating

[Partner’s] breach of or default under this Agreement, the difficulty of proof

of loss, the inconvenience and non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an

adequate remedy, and the value of the transactions to be consummated

under the Purchase Agreement and the other Transaction Documents.”

(CR.168) (emphasis added).

6
 The Partners agreed to several exceptions in which the liquidated

damages provision would not be enforced. First and foremost, a Partner

would not be liable for liquidated damages if the Company terminated the

Partner’s employment without cause prior to expiration of the Initial Term.

(CR.168). The Employment Agreement specified events that would provide

the Company “cause” for termination. (Sealed.CR.13-18). Second, a Partner

would not be liable for liquidated damages if his or her employment ended

early due to the Partner’s death or disability, a down-sizing of the company,

or similar specified exceptions. (CR.169). Finally, each Partner had the

option of petitioning for permission by the majority to terminate his or her

employment early without payment of liquidated damages in the event of

“unforeseen circumstances” or “to provide other services to the Company or

its Affiliates.” (CR.169).

The Partners expressly acknowledged the importance of these

provisions. The Operations Agreement states that their “agreement to be

bound by the covenants set forth herein, which [] are narrowly tailored and

necessary to protect the Physicians’ legitimate interests as a group,”

constituted a “significant inducement to [the Partners] entering into the

Purchase Agreement and consummating the transaction contemplated

thereby.” (CR.162).

7
II. STRANDHAGEN DEPARTED THE PRACTICE FIVE YEARS
EARLIER THAN SHE HAD CONTRACTUALLY AGREED.

Under Strandhagen’s Employment Agreement, the initial seven-year

term of her employment was not set to expire until approximately October

2018. (Sealed.CR.12). Strandhagen’s employment was terminated five

years early, between July-September 2013. (CR.88, 160, 187).

Strandhagen claimed she was constructively discharged on the basis

of gender discrimination in July 2013. (CR.88, 93, 101). If that were true,

it would provide a “terminated without cause” exception to her liability

under the liquidated damages provision. (CR.168). To the contrary, the

Company claimed that, following a series of disciplinary infractions,

Strandhagen quit or was terminated with cause in September 2013.

(CR.103, 144). Under that circumstance—whether Strandhagen resigned

without first obtaining permission from the majority of her partners for an

early departure or was rightfully terminated for engaging in detrimental

conduct, failing or refusing to adhere to specified policies and standards, or

breaching other terms of her Employment Agreement—Strandhagen would

be liable for payment of liquidated damages. (CR.167-169; Sealed.CR.13-

15).

8
III. STRANDHAGEN FILED SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE COMPANY AND HER PHYSICIAN PARTNERS.

In approximately December 2013, Strandhagen filed an employment-

discrimination complaint against the Company with the Texas Workforce

Commission, Civil Rights Division and the EEOC. (CR.39, 80, 85-87, 91-

92). Despite having not made any representation of discrimination in

connection with the buyout just two months earlier, Strandhagen now

claimed that she had suffered such discrimination “for many years.”

(CR.93, 144). The primary issue in Strandhagen’s proceeding against the

Company was, therefore, whether she was terminated with or without cause

(i.e., whether Strandhagen’s termination resulted from her misconduct or

was based on gender discrimination).

While those administrative claims were pending, Strandhagen

initiated this suit in the Travis County District Court against seven of her

Partners: Drs. Bunker, Carrell, Houston, Buchholz, Leighty, Davis, and

Clause (“the Physicians”). (CR.4). Strandhagen’s sole cause of action was a

declaratory judgment claim. (CR.40). She sought declarations that:

9
 (1) she was terminated without cause, meaning the liquidated
damages provision is inapplicable to her; and

(2) the liquidated damages provision is an unenforceable
penalty because:

(a) the resulting harm from Strandhagen’s early
termination was not incapable or difficult of
estimation,

(b) the liquidated damages amount is not a reasonable
forecast of just compensation, and

(c) it purports to render her liable to the Physicians for
a breach of her Employment Agreement to which
they are not parties or third-party beneficiaries.

(CR.40-41).

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSED PART AND GRANTED
PART OF THE DECLARATORY RELIEF STRANDHAGEN
SOUGHT AGAINST THE PHYSICIANS.

The Physicians filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction seeking dismissal of

both grounds of Strandhagen’s declaratory judgment claim. (CR.70, 77).

The Physicians argued: (1) Strandhagen’s request to declare whether or not

she was terminated for cause duplicated the primary issue pending before

the TWC/EEOC, and she was required to exhaust her administrative

remedies first; and (2) Strandhagen’s challenge to the liquidated damages

provision was not ripe because the Physicians had not made any demand

nor sued her to collect such damages. (CR.79-80). The district court (the

10
Honorable Steven Yelenosky presiding) granted the first argument, thereby

dismissing ground (1) of Strandhagen’s declaratory judgment claim, and

denied the second, maintaining jurisdiction over ground (2) of

Strandhagen’s claim. (CR.184). Strandhagen does not appeal the dismissal

of ground (1) of her claim.

Strandhagen then moved for a traditional summary judgment

granting ground (2) of her claim. In so doing, she abandoned her

contention that (a) the resulting damages would be incapable or difficult of

estimation, instead arguing only that the liquidated damages provision was

unenforceable as a matter of law because (b) the amount to be paid was not

a reasonable forecast of just compensation, and (c) the Physicians were not

third-party beneficiaries of her Employment Agreement. (CR.154, 196).

Following the Physicians’ Response, further briefing by both parties, and a

hearing, the district court (the Honorable Orlinda Naranjo presiding)

granted Strandhagen’s motion. (CR.186-212). Without specifying any

grounds, the Court “declare[d] that the $500,000 purported liquidated

damages clause in the . . . Operations Agreement is an unenforceable

penalty,” and denied all other relief not expressly granted. (CR.212). This

resulted in a final judgment. (CR.212).

11
 The Physicians filed a Motion for New Trial urging several reasons

why the grant of summary judgment was improper, as argued below.

(CR.213-250). The Court denied the motion following a hearing on its

merits. (CR.271; RR.1-29). The Physicians appealed. (CR.272-78).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court must decide whether to uphold the plain language of a

contract that was mutually-agreed to by parties of equal sophistication or,

instead, allow one of those parties (Strandhagen) to secure a premature

avoidance of the contractual liability provision before any actual dispute

has arisen and without sufficient evidence to support her request. The

district court improperly refused to enforce the parties’ contract and

granted Strandhagen advisory relief. This Court should reverse those

errors.

The first issue is whether the district court erred in granting

Strandhagen a traditional summary-judgment when she failed to satisfy her

burden of conclusively proving each element of her affirmative defense that

the liquidated damages provision in the parties’ Operations Agreement is

an unenforceable penalty. The answer is yes. The summary-judgment

order should be reversed.

12
 Strandhagen failed to establish the two essential elements of her

claim. She unequivocally abandoned the first element (that damages

resulting from her breach would be difficult to estimate), and she failed to

offer conclusive proof of the second element (that the liquidated amount

was an unreasonable forecast of the actual damages). In regard to the

latter, Strandhagen (a) offered no evidence of the actual damages to

establish an unreasonable disparity; (b) her contentions ignore the plain

language of the contract; and (c) in any event, a fact issue exists about

whether the court should modify the liquidated amount rather than strike it

all together.

Strandhagen also failed to establish that it was necessary for the

Physicians to be third-party beneficiaries of her Employment Agreement to

enforce the liquidated damages provision under their own Operations

Agreement. Even had such status been required, Strandhagen did not

satisfy her summary-judgment burden of conclusively negating its

existence.

The second issue is whether the district court erred in denying the

portion of the Physicians’ Plea to the Jurisdiction arguing that

Strandhagen’s declaratory judgment claim was unripe. Again, the answer is

yes. The partial denial of the Plea should be reversed. This presents an

13
alternative basis to reverse the summary judgment because such relief

should not have been granted in the absence of jurisdiction. Strandhagen’s

claim misuses the Declaratory Judgment Act by seeking an advance ruling

on a potential affirmative defense to a dispute that has not yet (and may

never) come to exist. As such, the district court’s grant of a declaration in

her favor was advisory and improper.

ARGUMENT
In two issues, the Physicians respectfully request that this Court

reverse the district court’s (1) grant of Strandhagen’s traditional Motion for

Summary Judgment on her declaratory judgment claim, and (2) partial

denial of the Physician’s Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction. If the latter is

reversed, then a judgment dismissing Strandhagen’s claims should be

rendered in favor of the Physicians. See Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice-

Cmty. Justice Assistance Div. v. Campos, 384 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. 2012).

Otherwise, the case should be remanded for further proceedings. Tex. R.

App. P. 43.2, 43.3.

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING
STRANDHAGEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Strandhagen’s Motion for Summary Judgment should have been

denied because she failed to conclusively establish (1) the essential

14
elements of her claim and (2) that the status of the Physicians as third-

party beneficiaries to her Employment Agreement had any impact on the

enforceability of the liquidated damages provision. In any event, as argued

under Issue 2, the court erred in granting summary judgment on a

hypothetical (unripe) question because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

to do so.

A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review.
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. Valence

Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Appellate

courts “review the evidence presented in the motion and the response in the

light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was

rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors

could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could

not.” Thomas v. Graham Mortg. Corp., 408 S.W.3d 581, 588 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2013, pet. denied). “A movant is entitled to traditional summary

judgment if (1) there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and (2)

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Tex.

R. Civ. P. 166a(c)).

15
 B. Strandhagen Failed to Satisfy her Summary-Judgment
Burden on the Essential Elements of her Claim.
Strandhagen moved for a traditional summary judgment declaring

that the liquidated damages provision in the Operations Agreement is an

unenforceable penalty. (CR.154). “The term ‘liquidated damages’ ordinarily

refers to an acceptable measure of damages that parties stipulate in

advance will be assessed in the event of a contract breach.” Flores v.

Millennium Interests, Ltd., 185 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tex. 2005).

Although Strandhagen was the plaintiff, her declaratory judgment

claim—which was filed preemptively in attempt to avoid potential liability

under the liquidated damages provision—was in the nature of an

affirmative defense. “Whether a contractual provision is an unenforceable

penalty and not a liquidated damage clause is an affirmative defense.” GPA

Holding, Inc. v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 344 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; Phillips v. Phillips, 820

S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tex. 1991)); Khan v. Meknojiya, No. 03-11-00580-CV,

2013 WL 3336874, *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 28, 2013, no pet.) (same).

When a movant seeks a traditional summary judgment on an affirmative

defense, the movant carries the burden of demonstrating her entitlement to

judgment as a matter of law by conclusively proving each element of the

affirmative defense. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602,

16
609 (Tex. 2012); Landry's Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Waterfront Cafe,

Inc., 49 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. dism’d).

Strandhagen agrees that she bore the burden of proof on her

affirmative defense of penalty. (CR.195-196, 262). Strandhagen and the

Physicians disagree, however, about which elements she was required to

prove to be entitled to summary judgment. The Physicians argue she had

to prove two elements, while Strandhagen claims she had to prove only one

or the other. (CR.188-189, 196, 262).

Although the Texas Supreme Court has not definitively answered this

legal question, several intermediate courts—including this one—have

reached the conclusion urged by the Physicians. See infra. In any event,

because Strandhagen failed to conclusively prove both elements, the orders

granting her summary judgment and denying the Physicians’ Motion for

New Trial should be reversed. (RR.14).

1. Strandhagen was required to conclusively
establish two elements.

The most on point opinion is GPA Holding, 344 S.W.3d at 476. Like

Strandhagen, GPA moved for summary judgment urging that the liquidated

damages clause in its contract with Baylor was an unenforceable penalty.

Id. The Dallas Court held that, “[t]o obtain summary judgment on the

17
affirmative defense of penalty, GPA [as the party seeking to avoid

enforcement of the provision] must prove each element of the defense.”

Id. (emphasis added). GPA’s required elements were that: (1) the harm

resulting from a breach was not incapable or difficult of estimation, and (2)

the amount of liquidated damages provided by the contract was not a

reasonable forecast of actual damages. Id.; see also Baker v. Int’l Record

Syndicate, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ)

(“Evidence related to the difficulty of estimation and the reasonable

forecast must be viewed as of the time the contract was executed.”).

“The difficulty (or lack of difficulty) in estimation as well as

the unreasonableness of the damages estimate were GPA’s to

prove. General statements about a ‘more reasonable’ or ‘modest’ rate are

not evidence that the harm from late payment is difficult to estimate, or

that the normal billed charges were an unreasonable forecast of the loss

actually sustained.” GPA Holding, 344 S.W.3d at 476 (emphasis added).

“Because GPA did not meet its burden of establishing that the clause . . .

was an unenforceable penalty,” the trial judge did not err in denying GPA’s

motion for summary judgment on this issue.” Id.

This Court reached the same conclusion following a jury trial in

Southern Union Co. v. CSG Systems, Inc., No. 03-04-00172-CV, 2005 WL

18
171349, *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 27, 2005, no pet.). Southern Union

argued that the damages provision was an unenforceable penalty. Id. This

Court held that “[t]he party challenging the award of liquidated damages

has the burden to establish that the two-prong test is not satisfied

and that, instead, the award of liquidated damages is an unenforceable

penalty.” Id. at *4 (emphasis added). The Court then discussed whether

Southern Union satisfied the “first part of its burden” regarding “difficulty

of estimation” and the “second part of its burden” regarding “reasonable

forecast of just compensation.” Id. at *4-6. Concluding that Southern

Union failed to prove either essential element, the Court affirmed the award

of liquidated damages, subject to a partial remittitur on another issue. Id.

at *7-8.

More recently, in Khan v. Meknojiya, 2013 WL 3336874 at *2,

Mekonjiya moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of

penalty. In considering whether the district court properly denied that

motion, this Court stated that, “to be entitled to summary judgment,

Meknojiya had to conclusively establish every element of this defense,”

and then set forth the two elements regarding (1) incapable or difficult of

estimation, and (2) reasonable forecast of compensation. Id. at *2-3

19
(emphasis added) (ultimately holding that the provision was not one for

liquidated damages and thus the penalty analysis was inapplicable).

The Eastland Court of Appeals also held that a party seeking to avoid

enforcement of a liquidated damages provision on summary judgment

must prove both elements of the penalty affirmative defense. Healix

Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. Bellos, No. 11-02-00346-CV, 2003 WL 22411873,

*2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 23, 2003, no pet.). The Court held that “the

burden Healix [as the party claiming penalty] must bear [is] that at the time

the agreement was made damages could be easily ascertained and that the

amount of the liquidated damages award was not a reasonable forecast of

just compensation.” Id. (emphasis added). Healix’s contention “that the

award of liquidated damages is disproportionate to actual damages” was

insufficient on its own. Id. “Healix still must show that, at the time the

agreement was made, the amount of the liquidated damages was not a

reasonable forecast.” Id. “Healix failed to meet his burden of proof on the

penalty issue.” Id. at *3.

Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See Triton 88, LP v.

Star Electricity, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 42, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2013, no pet.) (favorably citing GPA Holding and concluding “Triton failed

to raise a fact question on its claim that the . . . clause constituted an

20
impermissible penalty,” where Triton “did not present any evidence

regarding the parties’ ability to estimate actual damages . . . or what a

reasonable forecast of damages would have been at the time the contract

was formed.”); Murphy v. Cintas Corp., 923 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. App.—

Tyler 1996, writ denied) (“For the provision to be an unenforceable penalty,

the uncertainty of the damages and the reasonableness of the stipulation

must have existed at the time when the contract was executed.” Where

neither element was proven, the clause was held enforceable.) (emphasis

added).

The Physicians acknowledge that contrary authority exists in which

courts have not required proof of both elements before concluding the

provision to be a penalty. See, e.g., Nexstar Broad., Inc. v. Gray, No. 09-

07-00364-CV, 2008 WL 2521967 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.)

(holding liquidated damages provision to be an unenforceable penalty

because it was an unreasonable forecast of just compensation without

discussion of the difficulty of estimation element); (RR.9-10).

However—given the black-letter law that a movant seeking traditional

summary judgment on its affirmative defense is required to prove every

element of its defense, coupled with prior holdings of this Court (Southern

Union and Kahn) and the case most on point (GPA Holdings) requiring

21
proof of both elements to prevail on the affirmative defense of penalty—the

Physicians urge this Court to conclude Strandhagen was required to

establish both elements, and decline to follow opinions to the contrary.

Consequently, this Court should reverse the judgment if it concludes that

Strandhagen failed to conclusively establish either one of the two required

elements that (1) the harm resulting from a breach was not incapable or

difficult of estimation (i.e., the harm could be easily and accurately

estimated), or (2) the amount of liquidated damages provided by the

contract was not a reasonable forecast of actual damages (i.e., the

liquidated damages amount was excessive compared to the actual damages

resulting from a breach).

But even if this Court were to conclude that Strandhagen was

required to prove only one element of her affirmative defense, reversal of

the judgment is still necessitated by the fact that Strandhagen failed to

conclusively prove both of the foregoing elements.

2. Strandhagen conceded her inability to prove the
“difficulty of estimation” element.

Strandhagen unequivocally admitted that “[s]he does not seek to

negate the element concerning the difficulty of estimation . . .; she only

seeks to negate the second element.” (CR.196, 263). The record leaves no

22
doubt that Strandhagen failed to carry her burden of proof on this element.

The summary judgment should be reversed accordingly.

3. Strandhagen failed to conclusively prove the
“unreasonable forecast” element.

Strandhagen did not satisfy her summary-judgment burden of

proving that the liquidated damages amount failed to reasonably forecast

actual damages because (a) she offered no evidence to demonstrate what

the actual damages were or that there was an excessive disproportion

between the amounts; (b) to accept her argument, this Court must

disregard the plain language of the contract; and (c) a genuine issue of

material fact remains about whether the liquidated damages clause should

be modified rather than struck as unenforceable.

(a) No evidence of actual damages.
(i) Texas law requires proof of actual damages.

Although the question of “[w]hether a contractual provision is an

enforceable liquidated damages provision or an unenforceable penalty is a

question of law for the court to decide, [s]ometimes . . . factual issues must

be resolved before the legal question can be decided.” Phillips v. Phillips,

820 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. 1991). Our supreme court identified a typical

fact issue in connection with the “unreasonable forecast” element arising

23
from the movant’s requirement to “prove what the actual damages were” in

comparison to “the amount contracted for.” Id. The party claiming the

provision is a penalty “must prove actual damages, if any, to show that the

actual loss was not an approximation of the stipulated sum.” Healix, 2003

WL 22411873 at *2.

Where a party fails to offer any evidence of actual damages in

comparison to the liquidated amount, the court may conclude that the

party has failed to carry its burden of proof and uphold the liquidated

damages provision. See e.g., Triton, 411 S.W.3d at 62 (“Triton did not

present any evidence regarding what a reasonable forecast of damages

would have been at the time the contract was formed, nor did it present any

evidence of StarTex’s actual damages. Thus, . . . [the] liquidated damages

[clause] provided a reasonable forecast of just compensation.”).

Additionally, vague averments of “unreasonableness” not supported

by actual evidence will not suffice to establish the defense of penalty. The

movant cannot meet its burden simply by claiming that the actual damages

are not yet ascertainable and therefore tantamount to “zero.” Healix, 2003

WL 22411873 at *2. And as noted by this Court, a liquidated damages

amount awarding two to three times the amount of actual damages is not

per se unreasonable. Southern Union, 2005 WL 171349 at *6 (citing

24
Sealock v. Texas Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 755 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1988)

(“uph[olding] a trial court’s judgment awarding $790,000 in liquidated

damages, which was twice the $395,000 found as actual damages”); Baker

v. Int’l Record Syndicate, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991,

no writ) (“approv[ing] a liquidated damages award of $51,000, which was

more than triple the $15,000 found as actual damages”).

In GPA Holding, 344 S.W.3d at 476, the movant “offered evidence

comparing the discounted rates to the hospital’s normal billed rates for the

charges at issue,” including an affidavit with an attached chart showing “the

percentage difference between the discounted rate and the normal billed

charge for each of the charges at issue,” and presented argument about an

alternative damage calculation that the movant contended would be more

reasonable. Even this was not enough. The court held that movant failed

to carry its burden of proof on the “unreasonable forecast” element because

it failed to attach evidence in support of the alternative calculation. Id.

(ii) Strandhagen offered no proof of actual
damages, and her “one size fits all” argument
fails.

Strandhagen offered no evidence of what the Physicians’ actual

damages were or would be in the event that they brought a future suit

against her for breach of contract nor did she establish any alternative

25
damages calculation that she would contend is more reasonable. Instead,

Strandhagen claimed that, as a matter of law, the liquidated damage

amount was unreasonable because it was a “one size fits all” provision, i.e.,

the same amount of damages would be owed regardless of when she

terminated her employment. (CR.157, 197-98, 264). This contention is

insufficient without any proof of how the liquidated damage amount was

calculated or what the actual damages were.

Strandhagen relied on cases holding that a liquidated damages

provision may be unenforceable if it imposes the same amount of liability

for breaches that are both trivial and severe. (CR.198). This is not the case

under the Operations Agreement. Here, the liquidated damages provision

applies to only one form of breach: a Partner’s early departure from the

practice. (CR.167-168). It does not apply, for example, to non-material

breaches like the Advisory Board’s failure to hold a regular meeting

(CR.163) or its failure to take a written vote upon request (CR.164).

Strandhagen attempts to transform the time of the breach into a

measure of its materiality. But Strandhagen presented no evidence to

establish that the financial impact on the remaining Partners would be

substantially greater or lesser depending on the timing of another Partner’s

early departure. As previously discussed, important financial reasons

26
supported the Partners’ agreement to be bound by this liquidated damages

clause, including the anticipated impact that one’s early departure would

have on the practice’s gross profits and the Partners’ abilities to earn annual

bonuses, as well as the resulting loss of experience and goodwill, which

could not be easily or quickly replaced. Supra, Statement of Facts Section

I.A. These financial considerations could be the same whether Strandhagen

quit on day 1 or day 1,000. Strandhagen offered no evidence to prove

otherwise. Instead, she simply claimed that “the consequences of Dr.

Strandhagen’s employment terminating obviously varies over time.”

(CR.157). This unsupported allegation does not suffice to meet her burden.

Strandhagen’s “one size fits all” contention also fails in light of the

several exceptions to the liquidated damages provision. (CR.167-169).

Several types of “early departures” were carved out from application off the

provision. These exceptions eliminate the imposition of any liability for

early termination scenarios that would not constitute a material breach of

the contract (such as early termination based on disability or with

permission by the majority). Hence, the clause was narrowly drafted, not

an unenforceable “one size fits all” provision.

Moreover, relevant legal authorities are contrary to Strandhagen’s

contention. The fact that a liquidated damages provision awards a uniform

27
amount for the breach of a term agreement regardless of the date of the

breach is not per se unreasonable. In Murphy v. Cintas Corp., 923 S.W.2d

663, 666 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied), Murphy claimed that the

liquidated damages provision was an unenforceable penalty because it

imposed the same amount of damages for early cancellation of the parties’

agreement whether it resulted from his failure to pay for one of the

contemplated goods (at the end of the contract’s term) or all of them (at the

beginning). Id. The court rejected this argument and enforced the

provision. Id. at 666-667.

The Restatement of Contracts regarding liquidated damages is

consistent with Murphy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356,

Liquidated Damages and Penalties (1981). Comment (b), “Test of

Penalty,” states that a liquidated damages amount “is reasonable to the

extent that it approximates the actual loss that has resulted from the

particular breach, even though it may not approximate the loss that might

have been anticipated under other possible breaches.” Id. (emphasis

added). Thus, this Court needs to determine only whether Strandhagen

conclusively established that the liquidated amount was an unreasonable

forecast of the actual damages resulting from this particular breach (her

28
five-year premature departure from the practice). Strandhagen offered no

prove to establish this element.

According to Restatement Section 356, whether the liquidated

amount reasonably forecast other breaches that may have occurred is not a

basis to deny the provision’s enforceability in this case. Id. This is

confirmed by Illustration 2 to Section 356. In that example, partners A, B,

and C formed a veterinary practice promising to remain as a partnership for

ten years. Id. The liquidated damages clause provided that, if one partner

terminated early (and the others continued the business), and the

terminating partner breached his duty of non-competition, he would be

liable for $50,000. This provision is enforceable because “[e]ven though

$50,000 may be unreasonable in relation to the loss that may have resulted

in other circumstances, it is not unreasonable in relation to the actual loss.”

Id.

In the absence of any evidence from Strandhagen to support her

claim that the liquidated damages amount was not a reasonable forecast of

just compensation—and especially considering that all inferences must be

construed in favor of the Physicians as nonmovants—the record fails to

conclusively demonstrate that Strandhagen satisfied her burden of proof on

29
this element. This Court should reject Strandhagen’s facial challenge just

as the court did in Murphy, 923 S.W.2d at 666.

(b) Plain language of contract shows reasonable
forecast.
Beyond the lack of evidence in support of Strandhagen’s contention

that the liquidated damages amount was an unreasonable forecast of the

actual damages, the plain language of the parties’ contract demonstrates

that it was not. The Court would be required to disregard or render

meaningless certain portions of the contract to accept Strandhagen’s

argument.

In determining whether Strandhagen has satisfied her burden on the

affirmative defense of penalty, this Court must keep in mind the basic rules

of contract construction, as recognized in GPA Holding, 344 S.W.3d at 471.

“The court’s primary concern in interpreting a written contract is to

determine the mutual intent of the parties as manifested in the contract, . . .

and the agreement must be enforced as written.” Id. Terms should be given

their plain and ordinary meaning, and interpretations that render any

portion meaningless should be avoided. Id.

This Court considered the plain language of the contract as a basis for

rejecting a penalty defense and enforcing a liquidated damages provision in

Southern Union Co. v. CSG Systems, Inc., No. 03-04-00712CV, 2005 WL

30
171349, *4-6 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 27, 2005, no pet.). There, the contract

stated that the damages provision was included “[b]ecause of the difficulty

in ascertaining CSG’s actual damages for a termination or other breach of

the Agreement,” and that “CSG would have been unwilling to provide the

Services at the fees set forth in the Agreement” had Southern Union not

promised “certainty of revenue” by obligating itself to pay the

discontinuance fee in the event that it breached the contract.” Id. at *4.

The damages provision also “expressly state[d] that it ‘is not a penalty’ and

that it ‘is a reasonable estimation of the actual damages which CSG would

suffer if CSG were to fail to receive the amount of processing business as

contemplated by this Agreement.’” Id. at *6. The Court clarified that,

“[a]lthough parties cannot avoid a challenge to a liquidated damages

provision simply by characterizing it as ‘reasonable,’ such express language

is instructive of the parties’ intent when the terms are mutually bargained

for between equally competent parties.” Id.

This Court also put weight on the fact that the “provision was a

bargained-for exchange, negotiated and approved by both companies.” Id.

“When a provision is mutually bargained for by equally competent parties,

we give deference to its enforcement. . . . From the face of the contract,

Southern Union understood at the time it entered the agreement that CSG’s

31
damages would be difficult to estimate and therefore agreed a liquidated

damages provision was necessary.” Id.

Much like the Southern Union/CSG contract, the Operations

Agreement between Strandhagen and her Partners expressly stated that the

stipulated amount was to be paid “as liquidated damages, and not as a

penalty,” and that the amount was “reasonable in light of the anticipated

harm which would be caused by a Terminating Physician’s breach or

default under this Agreement.” (CR.168). Additionally, the Partners

agreed that the contract’s provisions were “narrowly tailored and necessary

to protect the Physicians’ legitimate interests as a group,” and that they

constituted a “significant inducement to [the Partners] entering into the

Purchase Agreement, and consummating the transaction contemplated

thereby.” (CR.162).

Also like the Southern Union/CSG contract, Strandhagen and her

Partners were mutually competent parties who voluntarily and knowingly

entered this bargained-for exchange. (CR.162, 173-178). Hence, this Court

should defer to the plain language of the Operations Agreement, which

evidences the parties’ mutual intent for the liquidated damages provision to

be valid and enforceable, and not construed as a penalty. To do otherwise

would impermissibly render meaningless the express provisions of the

32
contract stating that the damages provision was reasonable, narrowly-

tailored, a necessary inducement, and not a penalty.

(c) Fact issue exists regarding modification.
Finally, to any extent the Court believes Strandhagen offered proof

that the damages provision was not a reasonable forecast of actual

damages, she has still failed to conclusively establish this element of her

defense because the “Severability” clause in the parties’ contract creates a

genuine issue of material fact.

Section 7(f) of the Operations Agreement provides:

Severability. . . . In the event that any provision of
this Agreement shall be declared by a Court of
competent jurisdiction to exceed the limits such
court deems reasonable and enforceable, said
provisions shall be deemed modified to the
minimum extent necessary to make such
provisions reasonable and enforceable.

(CR.171) (emphasis added).

“An illegal or unconscionable provision of a contract may generally

be severed so long as it does not constitute the essential purpose of the

agreement.” In re Poly-Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 357, 360 (Tex. 2008)

(recognizing that, pursuant to the parties’ contract, the arbitrator “would be

free to modify” terms found to be unconscionable rather than striking them

altogether). Severability is determined by the intent of the parties as

33
evidenced by the language of the contract. In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d 305,

313 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).

Here, the liquidated amount could be modified in a narrow fashion

without undermining the essential purpose of the parties’ contract. The

express purpose of the Operations Agreement was to “establish an Advisory

Board and set forth certain understandings and agreements among

themselves regarding the operations of their practice.” (CR.162). The

specific amount of liquidated damages applicable to any particular

physician was not the “essential purpose” of the Agreement.

In light of the Severability clause, the district court erred by declaring

the liquidated damages provision wholly unenforceable as a matter of law.

Even if the court considered $500,000 to be an unreasonable liquidated

amount, the court should have concluded that a genuine issue of material

fact exists about what modified amount or calculation would be reasonable

to enforce in its place, keeping with the parties’ express intent to modify the

term “to the minimum extent necessary.” To do otherwise, the Court

would have to impermissibly rewrite the parties’ bargained-for exchange to

strike out the final sentence of Paragraph 7(f), which is a mandatory

provision voluntarily agreed to by the parties. Alternatively, if this Court

34
concludes the Severability clause is ambiguous, then it creates a genuine

issue of material fact requiring reversal and remand. (RR.12-14, 22-23).

C. Strandhagen Failed to Satisfy her Summary-Judgment
Burden Regarding the Physicians’ Status as Third-
Party Beneficiaries.

Strandhagen also moved for summary judgment based on her

argument that the liquidated damages provision is unenforceable because it

seeks to render her liable to the Physicians for a breach of her Employment

Agreement, to which the Physicians are not parties or third-party

beneficiaries. (CR.157-158). This did not provide a valid basis for summary

judgment because (1) Strandhagen’s liability for liquidated damages arises

directly from the Operations Agreement between her and her Physician

Partners, and does not require that the Physicians be third-party

beneficiaries of her Employment Agreement; and/or (2) Strandhagen failed

to conclusively establish that the Physicians were not third-party

beneficiaries of the Employment Agreement.

35
 1. The Operations Agreement Provides a Direct Line
of Liability.

Paragraph 5 of the Operations Agreement provides:

[I]f [any Partner] terminates his or her employment
with the Company prior to the expiration of the
Initial Term, the Physicians may suffer harm [as
specified therein]. . . . In light of the foregoing, if a
[Partner’s] employment with the Company is
terminated for any reason during the Initial Term .
. . other than a termination without cause . . . then
such [Terminating Partner] shall promptly pay . . .
as liquidated damages and not as a penalty . . . the
amount set forth below.

(CR.167-168).

This provision creates a direct line of liability for liquidated damages

between an early-terminating physician and her remaining Partners based

on the direct harm that will be suffered by the remaining Partners as a

result of the early termination. (Id.). Under this provision, there is no need

for the Physicians to be third-party beneficiaries of the Employment

Agreement to enforce the liquidated damages clause. The Physicians (if

they sued Strandhagen for breach of contract) would not be attempting to

recover under the Employment Agreement as third-party beneficiaries.

Rather, they would be seeking and are entitled to directly enforce the

liability provisions contained within the four corners of their own contract

with Strandhagen. (RR.10-11).

36
 2. A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Remains about
the Physicians’ Third-Party Beneficiary Status.

Alternatively, even if the Court were to conclude that the Physicians

are required to be third-party beneficiaries of Strandhagen’s Employment

Agreement to enforce the liquidated damages clause under the Operations

Agreement, it was error to grant summary-judgment on this ground

because Strandhagen did not conclusively establish the absence of such

third-party beneficiary status.

Strandhagen’s Motion for Summary Judgment states in a single,

conclusory sentence that the Physicians “are [not] third-party beneficiaries”

to the Employment Agreement. (CR.158). She did not provide any

evidence or analysis about the intention of the Employer or herself (or any

of the other Partners) when entering their Employment Agreements, nor

about the meaning of the contract as a whole. Strandhagen failed to satisfy

her traditional summary-judgment burden on this ground. See Alvarado v.

Lexington Ins. Co., 389 S.W.3d 544, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2012, no pet.) (“It was Lexington’s burden, as movant for summary

judgment, to prove its entitlement to summary judgment against Alvarado

as a matter of law. We hold that Lexington failed to carry its burden of

conclusively negating Alvarado’s status as a third-party beneficiary to the

37
Policy. Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in rendering summary

judgment in favor of Lexington.”).

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING PART OF THE
PHYSICIANS’ PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION.

The Physicians’ Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction argued, in part, that

Strandhagen’s request for a declaration that the liquidated damages

provision was an unenforceable penalty was not yet ripe for decision

because the Physicians had not yet decided whether to sue her for breach of

contract, much less made a demand or filed suit on that basis. (CR.79-80).

In the absence of a live, justiciable controversy, the court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction over Strandhagen’s claim. (CR.79-80). On this basis,

the district court erred by denying this portion of the Physician’s Plea and

by granting an advisory summary judgment on Strandhagen’s unripe

declaratory judgment claim, and by denying the opportunity to correct this

error in response to the Motion for New Trial. (CR.184-85, 212, 271). This

Court should reverse these decisions and render judgment dismissing

Strandhagen’s claims for a lack of jurisdiction.

A. Texas Law Prohibits Advisory Declarations on
Potential Defenses to Hypothetical Disputes.

In an action for declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts that

affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has subject matter

38
jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,

446 (Tex. 1993); City of Pasadena v. Smith, 263 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). “A request for declaratory relief

alone does not establish jurisdiction in [the] Court. . . . [It is] merely a

procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction.”

Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996).

For a court to have jurisdiction to consider a declaratory-judgment

action, there must be a “justiciable controversy as to the rights and status

of” the parties, and the requested declaration “must actually resolve the

controversy.” Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 163-64 (Tex.

2004). “A justiciable controversy is one in which a real and substantial

controversy exists involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests and not

merely a theoretical dispute.” Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Moore, 985

S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.); see also City of Euless v.

Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd., 936 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1996, writ denied) (if there is no actual controversy between parties,

declaratory judgment is improper).

“Section 37.004 does not . . . extend an open-ended invitation to

parties seeking interpretation of their contracts. There must be some

showing that litigation is imminent between the parties unless the

39
contractual uncertainties are judicially resolved.” Paulsen v. Texas Equal

Access to Justice Found., 23 S.W.3d 42, 46 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet.

denied); see also In re City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 1998, orig. proceeding). The Declaratory Judgments Act does not

permit litigants to “fish judicial ponds for legal advice.” California Prods.

v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex. 1960).

“The need for a justiciable controversy is related to the jurisdictional

concepts of standing and ripeness and does not supersede these concepts.”

LHR Enters., Inc. v. Geeslin, No. 03-05-00176-CV, 2007 WL 3306492, *4

(Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 7, 2007, pet. denied). Ripeness is a necessary

component of subject matter jurisdiction. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. 2000); Atmos Energy Corp. v. Abbott,

127 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). “The requirement

that a claim be ripe for review is based on the prohibition against issuing

advisory opinions.” LHR Enters., 2007 WL 3306492 at *4 (citing

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998); TEX.

CONST. art. II, § 1 (separation of powers); Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 164

(explaining that separation of powers provision bars issuance of advisory

opinions)). “[T]here must be a concrete injury for the claim to be ripe.” Id.

“A claim is not ripe if it is based on hypothetical or contingent facts that

40
may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.” Id.; see also Farmers

Ins. Exch. v. Rodriguez, 366 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (declaratory claim was not ripe where parties’

liability for damages depended on outcome of a separate proceeding, which

had not yet finalized).

Based on these concepts, a “defendant may not use a declaratory

judgment to prematurely adjudicate defenses to liability that may not yet

exist. . . . [U]nder the federal constitution, [a] party may not use a

declaratory judgment to get [an] advance ruling on an affirmative defense.”

Transcont’l Realty Investors, Inc. v. Orix Capital Markets, LLC, 353

S.W.3d 241, 245 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (emphasis added)

(noting that a declaratory claim seeking to “assess[] the success of a defense

to a potential claim (breach-of-contract or otherwise) is generally the type

of hypothetical question federal courts endeavor to avoid”). “The

declaratory judgment was not intended to permit the piecemeal trial of

lawsuits.” Id. (holding the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a premature

declaration regarding validity of contractual guarantee).

In Nexstar Broad., Inc. v. Gray, No. 09-07-00364-CV, 2008 WL

2521967, *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 26, 2008, no pet.), the court held

that it was an improper use of the DJA for a party with potential liability

41
under a contract to seek a declaration that simply restated the “penalty”

affirmative defense and sought no relief beyond what that defense would

afford (i.e., avoidance of liquidated damages). This holding was based, in

part, on the fact that the parties had no ongoing relationship—as contrasted

from declarations in other cases that would settle future disputes of an

ongoing relationship between the parties. Id. (citing BHP Petro. Co. v.

Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841-842 (Tex. 1990)).

Similarly, this Court held in LHR Enterprises that the district court

lacked jurisdiction to declare the meaning of the Insurance Commission’s

conclusion that it “may impose an administrative penalty” in certain

circumstances where there was no pending or impending action to seek

such a remedy from plaintiff. 2007 WL 3306492 at *5; see also State v.

Margolis, 439 S.W.2d 695, 697-98 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1969, writ ref’d

n.r.e.) (where plaintiff merely alleged, without any supporting proof, that

defendant had “indicated an intention” to seek statutory penalty against

plaintiff, and defendant denied that allegation in its pleadings, there was no

evidence that a bona fide controversy existed giving rise to any justiciable

issues between the parties; hence, declaratory judgment was improper).7

7 LHR Enterprises and Margolis involved statutory penalties available to the State
in specified circumstances. While the cases are procedurally similar to the instant case
in that they presented un-ripe claims for declaratory relief related to the enforcement of
these remedies prior to a pending demand for their recovery, they are substantively

42
 B. Strandhagen’s Claim Is Not Ripe.

The declaration sought by Strandhagen merely presents a

hypothetical or contingent question about what damages may be available

if the Physicians were to pursue a claim against her in the future for breach

of contract. Strandhagen only speculated that she has “learned . . . [the

Physicians] and perhaps others are seeking to pursue her for collection,”

but she failed to offer any proof that a live, justiciable controversy actually

existed. (CR.8, 112). The Physicians generally denied all of Strandhagen’s

allegations, specifically pled that her claim has not matured, and moved for

dismissal based on their specific contention to the contrary. (CR.74-75, 79).

A potential breach of contract suit against Strandhagen is not a certain,

imminent, or unavoidable controversy. At best, it is hypothetical or

contingent on other events. Hence, there is not a sufficiently ripe dispute

between these parties about which declaratory relief may be appropriately

granted. Strandhagen’s attempt to misuse the Declaratory Judgment Act to

obtain an advance ruling on her affirmative defense should be dismissed.

distinct in that they involved “penalties” rather than a liquidated damages clause as
here.

43
 PRAYER
Based on the foregoing, Appellants respectfully pray that this Court

sustain both of their issues on appeal and reverse the district court’s grant

of Strandhagen’s Motion for Summary Judgment, its partial denial of the

Physicians’ Plea to the Jurisdiction, and its denial of the Physicians’ Motion

for New Trial. If the jurisdictional ruling is reversed, then this Court should

render judgment in favor of the Physicians dismissing Strandhagen’s claim

in its entirety. Otherwise, this Court should remand to the district court for

further proceedings.

Appellants further pray that this Court tax all costs against

Strandhagen, both in this Court and below, and award the Appellants any

such other relief at law or equity to which they may be justly entitled. Tex.

R. App. P. 43.4; Tex. R. Civ. P. 139.

Respectfully submitted,

MARTENS, TODD, LEONARD, TAYLOR & AHLRICH

By: __/s/ Amanda G. Taylor____
Amanda Garrett Taylor
ataylor@textaxlaw.com
Texas Bar No. 24045921
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1950
Austin, Texas 78701
Tele: (512) 542-9898
Fax: (512) 542-9899

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

44
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this Appellants’ Brief complies with the typeface
requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a
conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for
footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of
Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i) because, according to the word-count tool of the
computer program used to prepare this document, it contains 8,855
words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).

/s/Amanda Taylor__________
Amanda Taylor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of this Appellants’ Brief was filed
electronically and served on all counsel via e-mail in compliance with Tex.
R. App. P. 9.5(b) and L.R.3 on this 14th day of January, 2015.

Daniel Byrne
DByrne@FBHH.com
Lessie Fiztpatrick
LFitzpatrick@FBHH.com
FRITZ, BYRNE, HEAD & HARRISON, PLLC
98 San Jacinto Blvd, Suite 2000
Austin, TX 78701
Telephone: (512) 476-2020

/s/Amanda Taylor__________
Amanda Taylor

45
NOTICE SENT~LOCUTORY NONE
DC BK14156 PG221

DISP PARTIES· ALL
DISP CODE: ~ CLS 'flRtCf
REDACT PGS:_ _ _-,:o-~-
NO. D-1-GN-13-002811
JUDQE OL!J CLERK.~~-
TRACYD.sT § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
PLAINTIFF §
§
v. §
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§
NOAH S. BUNKER, PAUL § 353rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CARRELL, EVERETT BREW §
HOUSTON, JR., W.ANDREW §
BUCHHOLZ, SCOTT J. LEIGHTY, §
JAD L. DAVIS, and HOLLY § ..... e"'