IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0520
Filed November 9, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KELLY DEAN WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Rose Anne
Mefford, District Associate Judge.
A defendant convicted of operating while intoxicated challenges the ruling
on his motion to suppress evidence. AFFIRMED.
Steven Goodlow, Albia, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.
Kelly Dean Wilson appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated.
He argues a deputy with the Appanoose County Sheriff’s Office impermissibly
stopped his car and the district court should have granted his motion to suppress
evidence from the traffic stop. Because the evidence at the suppression hearing
showed the deputy had probable cause for the stop, we agree with the district
court’s ruling and affirm Wilson’s conviction.
On patrol in the early morning hours of April 24, 2015, Deputy Dennis
Daniels saw a blue Nissan stopped in the traveled portion of a roadway on the
outskirts of Centerville. The deputy, a twenty-six-year veteran of the force,
recognized stopping or standing in the roadway is a traffic violation. After the
deputy turned his patrol car around to check on the Nissan, the driver pulled into
the parking lot of a closed factory. The driver then pulled out of the lot and
appeared to speed away from the deputy. The deputy “activated [his] red lights
and pulled the vehicle over to see what they were up to.”
When the deputy approached the driver’s side window, he saw an open
can of Budweiser in the center console. The driver, Wilson, had glassy and
bloodshot eyes. Wilson admitted having “too much” alcohol to drink. The
DataMaster breath test measured Wilson’s blood alcohol at .257.
The State charged Wilson with operating while intoxicated, first offense, in
violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2015). The defense filed a motion to
suppress, alleging the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. Deputy Daniels was the sole witness at the suppression
hearing held on September 16, 2015. The district court issued a ruling denying
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the motion to suppress on the day of the hearing. Wilson waived his right to a
jury trial and stipulated to the minutes of evidence. The court found him guilty
based on the minutes and entered judgment on the serious misdemeanor
offense.1 Wilson now appeals, challenging only the suppression ruling.
Wilson alleges the traffic stop violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. “Our review is de novo when we assess an alleged violation of
constitutional rights.” See State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2006).
On appeal, Wilson claims the deputy was not justified in conducting the
investigatory stop. Wilson contends “a complete review of the deputy’s testimony
reveals that the deputy found no reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime
was taking place but rather he wanted ‘to see what Wilson was up to.’” Wilson
takes that snippet of the deputy’s testimony out of context.
The experienced deputy testified he was about two blocks away when he
noticed Wilson’s car was stopped in the traveled portion of the roadway. The
deputy further testified that “stopping, standing or parking” in the traveled portion
of a roadway is a violation of chapter 321. The deputy was correct. Iowa’s traffic
laws provide “a person shall not stop, park, or leave standing an attended or
unattended vehicle upon any highway . . . when it is practical to stop, park, or
leave the vehicle off that part of the highway.” Iowa Code § 321.354(1)(a).
“[T]he prohibition found in section 321.354 against stopping a vehicle on a
highway applies to momentary, as well as extended, stops.” State v. Bevard, No.
1
Wilson’s brief asserts he was convicted of operating while intoxicated, second offense.
This assertion appears to be an error.
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05-0484, 2005 WL 2990636, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005) (citing Pinckney
v. Watkinson, 116 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Iowa 1962)).
A traffic violation, no matter how minor, gives an officer probable cause to
stop a motorist. See Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d at 726. “If a traffic violation actually
occurred and the officer witnessed it, the State has established probable cause.”
State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Iowa 2013). In its suppression ruling, the
district court recognized these legal concepts and credited the deputy’s testimony
he had observed a traffic violation. From the deputy’s credible account, the
district court concluded: “Deputy Daniels had probable cause to stop the
defendant’s vehicle, and the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and article 1 section 8 of the Iowa Constitution
have not been violated.” In our de novo review, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion.
AFFIRMED.