NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOREN J. LARSON, Jr., No. 15-35544
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00043-RRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF ALASKA, Department of
Corrections; AMY RABEAU,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 16, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Loren J. Larson, Jr., an Alaska state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his action under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
2004). We reverse and remand.
Defendants do not dispute on appeal that the policy regarding non-
removable wristband identification imposed a substantial burden on Larson’s
religious exercise. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment when it found that defendants established that the non-
removable wristband identification was the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling governmental interest in security. However, defendants submitted the
declaration of L. Dean Marshall explaining that “some inmates, such as those
inmates who serve on work crews or on special projects,” still wear removable
identification tags. The declaration does not indicate whether the security concerns
underlying the wristband identification requirement are inapplicable to the
individuals allowed to wear removable identification tags. Thus, the record shows
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the non-removable wristband
identifications are the least restrictive means. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (stating
that under RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise” of a prisoner unless the government establishes that the burden
furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive
2 15-35544
means”). Accordingly, we reverse summary judgment for defendants and remand
for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
3 15-35544