Debra Warren v. Christopher P. Muenzen

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1949-15T4

DEBRA WARREN, Executrix
of the ESTATE OF ROBERT
WARREN and DEBRA WARREN, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Individually,
December 7, 2016

Plaintiffs-Respondents, APPELLATE DIVISION

v.

CHRISTOPHER P. MUENZEN, M.D.,
CHARLES CAREY, P.A., and
CHRISTOPHER P. MUENZEN, M.D.,
P.A.,

Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________________________

Argued October 6, 2016 – Decided December 7, 2016

Before Judges Messano, Guadagno and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket
No. L-0207-13.

William L. Brennan argued the cause for
appellants (The Law Office of William L.
Brennan, attorneys; Mr. Brennan, of counsel
and on the briefs; John Kilbride and Abbey
True Harris, on the briefs).

John J. Ratkowitz argued the cause for
respondents (Starr, Gern, Davison & Rubin,
P.C., attorneys; Mr. Ratkowitz, of counsel
and on the briefs; Robert C. Sanfilippo, on
the briefs).

Andres & Berger, P.C., attorneys for amicus
curiae New Jersey Association for Justice
 (Kenneth G. Andres, Jr., of counsel and on
the brief; Tommie Ann Gibney and Abraham
Tran, on the brief).

Drinker Biddle & Reath, L.L.P., attorneys
for amicus curiae New Jersey Hospital
Association (Ross A. Lewin, of counsel and
on the brief; James C. Jones, on the brief).

Hill Wallack, L.L.P., attorneys for amicus
curiae Property Casualty Insurers
Association of America (Todd J. Leon, of
counsel and on the brief; James Harry
Oliverio, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MESSANO, P.J.A.D.

By leave granted, defendants Christopher P. Muenzen, M.D.,

and Christopher P. Muenzen, M.D., PA (collectively, defendant),

appeal from the Law Division's December 1, 2015 order denying

partial summary judgment based on the statute of limitations

(SOL) applicable to the New Jersey Survivor Act (the Survivor

Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3.1 For purposes of our review, we consider

the motion record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Debra

Warren, who brought suit individually and as executrix of the

estate of her late husband, Robert Warren. Steinberg v. Sahara

Sam's Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 366 (2016); R. 4:46-2(c).

1
Defendant Charles Carey, P.A. (Carey), was granted summary
judgment for reasons unrelated to the issues raised on appeal,
but was named as a moving party when defendant sought leave to
appeal. Plaintiff has not cross-appealed as to Carey.

2 A-1949-15T4
 In 2007, complaining of migraine headaches, Robert was seen

by defendant, his personal physician.2 As part of the

examination, blood samples were taken and sent for testing.

Robert's PSA3 level was 15.4, significantly higher than normal,

and recognized by defendant in his deposition as indicative of

prostate cancer. It is disputed whether defendant conveyed the

significance of the reading to Robert at this time.

In September 2009, Robert's complaints of groin pain caused

another visit to defendant. At this point, Robert's PSA reading

was 1244.88. Following further examination in October,

defendant diagnosed Robert with prostate cancer, which was later

confirmed by biopsy. Over the ensuing two years, despite

chemotherapy and other treatment, the cancer progressed and

metastasized to Robert's brain and spine. He died on September

27, 2011, as a result of complications from the cancer.

Plaintiff filed suit on January 18, 2013, alleging

defendant was medically negligent. In counts one and two,

plaintiff sought pecuniary damages on behalf of her husband's

estate pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -

6 (the WDA). In count three, plaintiff sought damages for

2
To avoid confusion, we may use plaintiff's decedent's first
name. We intend no disrespect by this informality.
3
PSA stands for Prostate-Specific Antigen.

3 A-1949-15T4
Robert's pain, suffering, medical expenses and lost earnings

while alive, and, in count four, she sought damages for her loss

of consortium during her husband's life. Finally, in count

five, plaintiff sought damages for the severe emotional distress

she suffered from witnessing the effects of her husband's

illness. Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980). In addition to

his general denial, defendant affirmatively pled the SOL as a

defense.

Defendant subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing

that counts three, four and five were barred by the two-year SOL

applicable to medical malpractice claims. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-

2(a) (requiring a claim for personal injury to be brought within

two years of accrual).4 After considering oral argument, the

judge granted the motion as to count five but denied the motion

as to counts three and four, explaining his reasoning in a

written opinion we discuss more fully below.

4
For purposes of the motion and this appeal, defendant
acknowledges applicability of the discovery rule. See, e.g.,
Guichardo v. Rubinfeld, 177 N.J. 45, 51 (2003) ("Although the
discovery rule does not require 'knowledge of a specific basis
for legal liability or a provable cause of action,' it does
require 'knowledge not only of the injury but also that another
is at fault.'") (quoting Martinez v. Cooper Hosp.-Univ. Med.
Ctr., 163 N.J. 45, 52 (2000)). Plaintiff's cause of action,
therefore, did not accrue until September or October 2009.

4 A-1949-15T4
 We granted defendant's motion for leave to appeal. 5

Additionally, we permitted amici New Jersey Association for

Justice, New Jersey Hospital Association (NJHA) and Property

Casualty Insurers Association of America to file briefs.

I.

We set forth the legal framework. Although actions under

the WDA and the Survivor Act "arise from the identical

occurrence, i.e., the death of the plaintiff, they serve

different purposes and are designed to provide a remedy to

different parties." Smith v. Whitaker, 160 N.J. 221, 231 (1999)

(citing Soden v. Trenton & Mercer Cty. Traction Co., 101 N.J.L.

393, 398-99 (E. & A. 1925)). "[T]he [WDA] provides to

decedent's heirs a right of recovery for pecuniary damages for

their direct losses as a result of their relative's death due to

the tortious conduct of another." Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J.

587, 593 (2011). Any recovery passes directly to the decedent's

heirs, not through his or her estate. Ibid. (citing Alfone v.

Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 107-08 (1981); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:31-4).

"Unlike a wrongful death action, which is a derivative

action arising in favor of beneficiaries named under that act,

the Survivor[] Act preserves to the decedent's estate any

5
Plaintiff has not cross-appealed from the dismissal of count
five of the complaint.

5 A-1949-15T4
personal cause of action that decedent would have had if he or

she had survived." Smith, supra, 160 N.J. at 233 (internal

citation omitted). "The survival action merely 'perpetuat[es]

the right of action which the deceased himself would have had,

to redress his own injuries, but for his death.'" Alfone, supra,

87 N.J. at 108 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)

(quoting 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 24.2 at 1287

(1956)). As in this case, the two distinct claims are

frequently pled together in one action, and the WDA claim is

cognizable even when the Survivor Act claim is barred by the

SOL. Gershon, Adm'x Ad Prosequendum for Estate of Pietroluongo

v. Regency Diving Ctr., 368 N.J. Super. 237, 245-246 (App. Div.

2004) (citing Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 386-87

(2001)).

The WDA has always included a specific SOL. See L. 1848 p.

151, § 2 (providing "every action shall be commenced within

twelve calendar months after the death of such deceased

person"). Currently, the WDA provides:

Every action brought under this chapter
shall be commenced within [two] years after
the death of the decedent, and not
thereafter, provided, however, that if the
death resulted from murder, aggravated
manslaughter or manslaughter for which the
defendant has been convicted, found not
guilty by reason of insanity or adjudicated
delinquent, the action may be brought at any
time.

6 A-1949-15T4
 [N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 (emphasis added).]

The portion we emphasize was the result of an amendment enacted

by the Legislature in 2000. L. 2000, c. 157 (Nov. 17, 2000).

At the time, the Legislature made clear that the bill's purpose

was to "enable the family of a murder victim to sue if at some

time in the future the person who committed the murder acquires

substantial assets." Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to

S. 1125 (June 22, 2000); see also Assembly Judiciary Committee,

Statement to A. 1934 (June 8, 2000) ("Eliminating the statute of

limitations for these wrongful death suits will preserve the

right of murder and manslaughter victims' families to sue at

some future date.").

Prior to 2010, the Survivor Act contained no explicit SOL.

It provided in full:

Executors and administrators may have an
action for any trespass done to the person
or property, real or personal, of their
testator or intestate against the
trespasser, and recover their damages as
their testator or intestate would have had
if he was living.

In those actions based upon the wrongful
act, neglect, or default of another, where
death resulted from injuries for which the
deceased would have had a cause of action if
he had lived, the executor or administrator
may recover all reasonable funeral and
burial expenses in addition to damages
accrued during the lifetime of the deceased.

7 A-1949-15T4
 [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3 (2009).]

The language of the first paragraph has remained virtually

unchanged from when the statute was first enacted in 1855. See

Canino v. New York News, Inc., 96 N.J. 189, 192 n.1 (1984). The

second paragraph, which spoke specifically to causes of action

"where death resulted from injuries[,]" was not added by the

Legislature until 1969. L. 1969, c. 266 (Jan. 12, 1970).6

In 2009, however, the Legislature added the following

provision to the Survivor Act (the 2009 Amendment):

Every action brought under this chapter
shall be commenced within two years after
the death of the decedent, and not
thereafter, provided, however, that if the
death resulted from murder, aggravated
manslaughter or manslaughter for which the
defendant has been convicted, found not
guilty by reason of insanity or adjudicated
delinquent, the action may be brought at any
time.

[L. 2009, c. 266 (Jan. 17, 2010).]

The intent of the Legislature was quite clear. Recognizing that

the 2000 amendment to the WDA "applied to only one of the two

types of civil actions that may be brought against persons

responsible for a wrongful death[,]" the Legislature intended to

6
The 1969 amendment also added funeral and burial expenses as
cognizable damages due the estate. The Legislature added
similar language to N.J.S.A. 2A:31-5 in 1967. See Schmoll v.
Creecy, 104 N.J. Super. 126, 138-39 (App. Div.), rev'd on other
grounds, 54 N.J. 194 (1969).

8 A-1949-15T4
"address[] the other type of civil action[,]" by "amend[ing] the

'Survivor[] Act' to eliminate the two-year statute of

limitations for cases where the death resulted from murder,

manslaughter or aggravated manslaughter and, thus, conform this

action to the provisions of [the WDA]." Senate Judiciary

Committee, Statement to S. 2763 (May 18, 2009) (emphasis added);

see also Assembly Judiciary Committee, Statement to A. 4158

(Jan. 4, 2010) (noting the bill was intended to "address[] th[e]

oversight" when the WDA was amended in 2000 "by eliminating the

[SOL] for certain actions brought under the 'Survivor[] Act'")

(emphasis added).

II.

A.

The motion judge determined the SOL began to run in October

2009, which was when Robert knew or should have known that

defendant's alleged failure to warn him earlier of the

significance of the elevated PSA reading gave rise to a claim

for medical negligence. As a result, plaintiff's suit should

have been brought by October 2011 at the latest, but it was not

filed until January 2013. Plaintiff argued the plain language

of the Survivor Act meant her claim was timely, because it was

filed within two years of Robert's death. The judge rejected

that contention because accepting plaintiff's literal reading

9 A-1949-15T4
would yield an absurd result — "[c]laimants would be filing

lawsuits years after the cause of action accrued and . . . the

[SOL] would be inutile and . . . incompatible with the

legislative design."

However, also rejecting defendant's contentions, the judge

reasoned:

When one reads the [Survivor Act] as a
whole, it seems clear . . . that what the
[L]egislature intended is that the decedent
must have a cause of action that is not
barred by the statute of limitations when he
dies. If the person dies with a claim not
time-barred, then from the date of death,
the administrator or executor has the
extended two years from the date of death to
file survival actions (it being understood,
however, that the two[-]year limitation does
not apply when the death resulted from
murder, aggravated manslaughter or
manslaughter for which the defendant has
been convicted, found not guilty by reasons
of insanity or adjudicated delinquent).

[(Emphasis in original).]

The judge further stated that "[n]owhere does the statute

require that the administrator or executor must bring suit

within the original [two-]year limitation of time nor is there

case law to support such a position."

The judge concluded Robert had a cognizable cause of action

against defendant for medical negligence that was not time-

barred when Robert died in September 2011. The judge determined

as a result that plaintiff's Survivor Act claims, filed within

10 A-1949-15T4
two years of Robert's death, should not be dismissed. He

entered a conforming order, and we granted defendant's motion

for leave to appeal.

B.

Defendant argues that as a result of the 2009 Amendment,

the Survivor Act is "internally inconsistent" because it limits

the executrix's claims to those a decedent would have had if he

had lived, but permits suit to be filed years thereafter, as

long as a complaint is brought within two years of death.

Defendant asserts the motion judge's interpretation of the

statute fails to avert the absurd and unfair result that claims

could be made by administrators and executors many years after

the alleged tortious act that resulted in damages. Defendant

urges us to consider the legislative history of the 2009

Amendment in order to properly construe the statute and ensure

the Legislature's intent, which he argues was only to permit

Survivor Act claims resulting from criminal homicides to be

brought at any time.

Plaintiff urges us to affirm, continuing to assert, as she

did before the motion judge, that the plain language of the 2009

Amendment demonstrates the Legislature's intent to provide a

two-year SOL to "[e]very action" brought under the Survivor Act.

N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3. She argues that such a construction results

11 A-1949-15T4
in no more absurd a result than occasioned by the WDA's SOL. In

other words, pursuant to the WDA, the Legislature permitted

heirs of a decedent to bring suit for tortious conduct that may

have occurred years earlier, requiring only that the conduct

have caused death and the suit be filed within two years of

death. Amicus New Jersey Association for Justice essentially

echoes plaintiff's arguments.

Amicus Property Casualty Insurers Association of America

reiterate defendant's contentions and further argues that the

2009 Amendment creates uncertainty for both insurers and

insureds as to the coverage provided by their policies.

Finally, the NJHA argues that proper construction of the

Survivor Act requires consideration of not only N.J.S.A. 2A:14-

2, but also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, the six-year SOL governing all

claims for damages to real and personal property, and N.J.S.A.

2A:14-23.1, which tolls the operation of all statutes of

limitation for six-months following death.

We have considered these arguments in light of the record

and applicable legal standards. We reverse.

C.

"An appellate court reviews an order granting summary

judgment in accordance with the same standard as the motion

judge." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (citing W.J.A.

12 A-1949-15T4
v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237-38 (2012); Henry v. N.J. Dep't of

Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010)). We "identify whether

there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether

the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law." Ibid. (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142

N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c)). We review the judge's

interpretation of "the law de novo and owe no deference to the

trial court . . . if [it has] wrongly interpreted a statute."

Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 512 (2009).

"The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is

to identify and promote the Legislature's intent." Parsons v.

Mullica Twp. Bd. of Educ., 226 N.J. 297, 307 (2016) (citing

State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482 (2008)) (citing DiProspero v.

Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "In construing any statute, we

must give words 'their ordinary meaning and significance,'

recognizing that generally the statutory language is 'the best

indicator of [the Legislature's] intent.'" Tumpson v. Farina,

218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting

DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492).

"However, not every statute is a model of clarity. When

the statutory language is sufficiently ambiguous that it may be

susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation, we may

turn to such extrinsic guides as legislative history, including

13 A-1949-15T4
sponsor statements and committee reports." Wilson ex rel.

Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012) (citing

Burns v. Belafsky, 166 N.J. 466, 473 (2001)). "We may also turn

to extrinsic guides if a literal reading of the statute would

yield an absurd result, particularly one at odds with the

overall statutory scheme." Ibid. (citing Burnett v. Cty. of

Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 424-25 (2008); State v. Provenzano, 34

N.J. 318, 322 (1961)).

In this case, plaintiff's contention, premised upon the

literal language of the statute, leads to an absurd result that

ignores the historical purposes of the Survivor Act and existing

precedent. As the Court made clear in Canino, both the WDA,

first adopted in New Jersey in 1848, and the Survivor Act, first

adopted in 1855, were intended to abrogate the common law maxim

that death abated all causes of action. 96 N.J. at 191-92.7

However, "[t]here is an elementary difference between the two

remedies . . . ." Id. at 194.

7
The Court in Canino said the WDA "created a new cause of
action." 96 N.J. at 194 (quoting Alfone, supra, 87 N.J. at 107).
However, in Lafage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 438 (2001), the Court
held that New Jersey recognized a cause of action for wrongful
death at common law. The Court has since reiterated that the
WDA created "a remedy that did not exist at common law." Beim
v. Hulfish, 216 N.J. 484, 498 (2014) (citing Johnson v.
Dobrosky, 187 N.J. 594, 605 (2006) (citing Negron v. Llarena,
156 N.J. 296, 308 (1998)); Alfone, supra, 87 N.J. at 107).

14 A-1949-15T4
 One difference is that, unlike the WDA, which recognizes a

cause of action only "[w]hen the death of a person is caused by

a wrongful act, neglect or default," N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, a claim

brought under the Survivor Act need not be based on tortious

conduct that results in death. For example, pursuant to the

first paragraph of the Survivor Act, an executor or

administrator may bring "an action for any trespass done to the

person or property, real or personal," of the decedent as the

decedent "would have [brought] if he was living." N.J.S.A.

2A:15-3 (emphasis added).

In Canino, supra, 96 N.J. at 198, the Court recognized that

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3, a cause of action for libel or

slander was not abated by the claimant's death and could be

prosecuted by his executrix. Similarly, in Fricke v. Geladaris,

Inc., 221 N.J. Super. 49, 50 (App. Div. 1987), we held that a

malicious prosecution claim did not abate upon death and was

actionable under the Survivor Act.

Under the construction of the Survivor Act urged by

plaintiff, a libel, slander or malicious prosecution that

occurred during the decedent's life would be actionable decades

after the offending conduct, as long as it was filed within two

years of death. Indeed, under plaintiff's interpretation of the

2009 Amendment, an action for personal injury that never

15 A-1949-15T4
resulted in death would be actionable decades later if brought

by a plaintiff's estate within two years of his or her death.

We are certain the Legislature never intended such absurd

results when it amended the statute in 2009.

For a number of reasons, we also disagree with the motion

judge's interpretation of the 2009 Amendment. Initially, the

judge failed to recognize significant precedent to the contrary

when he wrote there was no "case law to support . . .

[defendant's] position" that prior to the 2009 Amendment, the

Survivor Act incorporated the SOL from the underlying cause of

action. In Soden, supra, 101 N.J.L. at 399, the court

specifically recognized the different SOLs in the WDA and the

Survivor Act: "It is significant . . . that the limitation

under the [WDA] runs from the death, while under the [Survivor

Act] the limitation runs from the time of the injury inflicted."

In Kotkin v. Caprio, 65 N.J. Super. 453, 458 (App. Div. 1961),

we said

[u]nder our statutes, when the injured
person dies as a result of the accident
while he still has a cause of action for his
injuries, the cause of action for his
injuries passes to his estate, while a new
and separate cause of action, with its own
statute of limitations, arises in favor of
the beneficiaries named in the [WDA].

[(Emphasis added).]

16 A-1949-15T4
 In a case bearing some factual similarities to this, we

held that a medical malpractice claim, filed by a decedent more

than two years after being diagnosed with melanoma and

prosecuted by his executrix after his death, was time-barred by

application of the SOL contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).

Silverman v. Lathrop, 168 N.J. Super. 333, 334-36 (App. Div.

1979); see also Troum v. Newark Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 338 N.J.

Super. 1, 27 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff's

survival action was barred by the SOL where he failed to file a

malpractice claim within two years of knowing a tainted blood

product was administered during surgery); Lawlor v. Cloverleaf

Mem'l Park, Inc., 101 N.J. Super. 134, 148 (Law Div. 1968)

("[U]nder the Survival Act, an action must be commenced by the

decedent, or his estate, within two years of the alleged

wrongful act."), rev'd on other grounds, 106 N.J. Super. 374

(App. Div. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 56 N.J. 326 (1970).

In Miller, supra, 166 N.J. at 372, the plaintiff brought a

malpractice suit under the WDA against the doctor who had

treated his wife more than a decade earlier. The Court

recognized that at the time of her death, plaintiff's wife's

malpractice suit would have been time-barred because the two-

year SOL in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) had long expired. Id. at 373-

74. In reversing the grant of summary judgment on the

17 A-1949-15T4
plaintiff's WDA claim, the court held that "a wrongful death

claim is an independent cause of action that cannot be

extinguished by the failure of a decedent to maintain a medical

malpractice action within the applicable limitations period . .

. ." Id. at 372. In short, prior to the 2009 Amendment, our

case law made clear that the SOL applicable to a particular

cause of action was equally applicable to a Survivor Act claim

maintained after death.

We acknowledge that the motion judge thoughtfully struggled

to give import to all the language contained in the 2009

Amendment. See, e.g., DKM Residential Props. Corp. v. Twp. of

Montgomery, 182 N.J. 296, 307 (2005) ("When interpreting a

statute . . . we endeavor to give meaning to all words . . . .")

(citing Franklin Tower One L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613

(1999)). He reasoned plaintiff had a potential cause of action

under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3 if, at the time of his death, Robert had

a cause of action "if he had lived." The judge further reasoned

that the 2009 Amendment defined a new SOL, i.e., plaintiff had

two years after Robert's death to bring suit. This construction

avoided the absurd result plaintiff urged since every claim

brought under the Survivor Act could not be maintained unless

two conditions were met: decedent must have possessed a viable

claim at the time of death and suit was brought within two years

18 A-1949-15T4
of death. However, the judge's construction nullifies existing

SOLs found elsewhere in our statutes, ignores prior legislation

intended to address the impact of death upon existing SOLs and

greatly expands the Legislature's express, limited purpose for

enacting the 2009 Amendment.

Amicus NJHA notes that, in certain cases, the judge's

construction of the 2009 Amendment has the unintended

consequence of nullifying SOLs contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 and

2A:14-2. We agree.

For example, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 provides in pertinent part:

Every action at law for trespass to real
property, for any tortious injury to real or
personal property, for taking, detaining, or
converting personal property, for replevin
of goods or chattels, [or] for any tortious
injury to the rights of another not stated
in [N.J.S.A.] 2A:14-2 and 2A:14-3 . . .
shall be commenced within 6 years next after
the cause of any such action shall have
accrued.

This SOL applies to numerous causes of action that are, per

force, actionable under the Survivor Act, because they seek

damages for a "trespass done to the person or property, real or

personal . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3. For example, if a

decedent's property was flooded by his neighbor's diversion of

storm water, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, his estate would be

required to file suit for trespass within six years of the

event. However, under the motion judge's construction of the

19 A-1949-15T4
2009 Amendment, if the decedent died one day before the six-year

statue expired, his estate could file suit any time within the

next two years, thereby effectively expanding the SOL to eight-

years minus one day.

Similarly, the SOL in personal injury actions would be

extended in circumstances where the tortious conduct did not

result in death. By way of example, assume the decedent is

significantly injured in an automobile accident, but lives for

one year and 363 days before dying from an unrelated heart

attack. Under the judge's construction of the 2009 Amendment,

plaintiff's executor could file suit for the injuries sustained

by plaintiff in the car accident nearly four years after the

event, even though N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) requires suit to be filed

within two years.

Finally, under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3, every action for libel or

slander must be commenced within one year of publication of the

libel or slander. As already noted, the Court in Canino

recognized the estate's right to pursue a survival action for

libel or slander. Under the reasoning employed by the motion

judge, if a plaintiff died within one year of the libelous

20 A-1949-15T4
publication, his estate would have two more years to bring the

action.8

In short, the motion judge's construction of the 2009

Amendment effectively extends the SOL applicable to numerous

causes of action, not themselves dependent on death, based

solely upon the happenstance of death within the limitations

period. Such an interpretation does not serve the well-

recognized purposes of every SOL, namely "to reduce uncertainty

concerning the timeliness of a cause of action[,]" McGrogan v.

Till, 167 N.J. 414, 426 (2001), and "eliminat[e] stale claims

and creat[e] repose." Sasco 1997 Ni L.L.C. v. Zudkewich, 166

N.J. 579, 591 (2001). Nothing in the legislative history of the

2009 Amendment suggests the Legislature intended that result.

Additionally, the judge failed to consider N.J.S.A. 2A:14-

23.1. That statute, enacted in 1977, specifically extends for

six months after death the applicable SOL for any "cause of

action belonging to a decedent which had not been barred as of

the date of his death," and for any "cause of action which . . .

would have been barred less than [six] months after death."

8
The Court recently rejected an invitation to extend the one-
year SOL applicable to defamation actions on equitable grounds
and left any amendment to the Legislature. Nuwave Inv. Corp. v.
Hyman Beck & Co., 221 N.J. 495, 500-01 (2015). It is
inconceivable that the 2009 Amendment intended to essentially
triple the SOL period in defamation claims.

21 A-1949-15T4
Ibid. The legislation was intended to adopt a provision of the

Uniform Probate Code that had been approved by the National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the

American Bar Association, Introductory Statement to A. 1709,

210th Leg. (Feb. 4, 2002), and serves the salutary purpose of

providing executors and administrators with a limited period of

time after death to evaluate potential claims available to the

estate.

The motion judge's interpretation of the 2009 Amendment

would implicitly repeal N.J.S.A. 2A:14-23.1 with respect to

every cause of action cognizable under the Survivor Act. There

is nothing in the legislative history of the 2009 Amendment that

indicates the Legislature intended this result. See Brewer v.

Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 173 (1969) (noting that implied repealers

are not favored in the law). Instead of having six months after

death to commence a suit based on a cause of action the decedent

possessed at death, the executor would now have two years after

the date of death to commence the action.

As noted above, the legislative purpose for enacting the

2009 Amendment was not to establish a new two-year SOL that

commenced upon death for all claims brought under the Survivor

Act. Rather, the Legislature's stated purpose was only to

eliminate any SOL that already existed for a Survivor Act claim

22 A-1949-15T4
in certain, limited situations, i.e., those "cases where the

death resulted from murder, manslaughter or aggravated

manslaughter." Statement to S. 2763, supra; see also Statement

to A. 4158, supra, (the amendment was intended to "eliminate[e]

the [SOL] for certain actions brought under the 'Survivor[]

Act'") (emphasis added).

Lastly, we recognize a generally accepted canon of

statutory interpretation: "In interpreting a statute courts

should avoid a construction that would render 'any word in the

statute to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless, or to

mean something other than its ordinary meaning.'" Bergen

Commer. Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 204 (1999) (quoting In re

Estate of Post, 282 N.J. Super. 59, 72 (App. Div. 1995)). Our

interpretation of the 2009 Amendment renders its first phrase —

"[e]very action brought under this chapter shall be commenced

within two years after the death of the decedent, and not

thereafter" — superfluous. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3. However, we are

firmly convinced this case presents a classic example where

"[t]he spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the

literal sense of the terms." Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J.

193, 208 (2011) (quoting New Capitol Bar & Grill Corp. v. Div.

of Emp't Sec., 25 N.J. 155, 160 (1957)).

23 A-1949-15T4
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order under

review and remand the matter to the Law Division to enter an

order dismissing counts three and four of the complaint with

prejudice because they are time-barred.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

24 A-1949-15T4