UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4437
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARL WAITES, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00062-IMK-RWT-1)
Submitted: December 20, 2016 Decided: December 22, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley, Assistant
United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carl Waites, III, appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a sentence
of 10 months’ imprisonment followed by 26 months’ supervised
release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Waites was informed of his right
to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
Finding no error, we affirm.
“We review a district court's ultimate decision to revoke a
defendant's supervised release for abuse of discretion” and its
“factual findings underlying a revocation for clear error.”
United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). Waites admitted to the charged
violations of his supervised release and noted no objection to
any part of the hearing. We discern no error in the district
court’s decision to revoke Waites’ supervised release. Moreover,
we conclude that the district court complied with the
requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 in conducting the
revocation hearing.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
sentence that “is within the statutory maximum and is not
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plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). In evaluating a revocation sentence,
we assess it for reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and
substantive considerations” employed in evaluating an original
criminal sentence. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438
(4th Cir. 2006). A revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court has considered the policy
statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors enumerated
in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). Id. at 439.
The district court also must provide an explanation for its
chosen sentence, but the explanation “need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if
we find a sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at
439.
After giving Waites the opportunity to allocute and
considering the parties’ arguments and the relevant statutory
factors, the district court sentenced Waites within the policy
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statement range. The district court provided an explanation
tailored to Waites, focusing on the fact that Waites committed
multiple violations less than two months after his term of
supervised release began. We therefore conclude that Waites’
sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
This court requires that counsel inform Waites, in writing,
of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Waites requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Waites. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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