J-A28032-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
J&D BROTHERS, INC., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
OSCAR J. CRIST, DOROTHY G. CRIST,
WILLIAM SIMON, CAROLYN SIMON,
STEVEN SCHNEIDER, CHERYL S.
SCHNEIDER,
Appellees No. 562 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order February 12, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Civil Division at No.: 2013-C-0310
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JANUARY 26, 2017
Appellant, J&D Brothers, Inc., appeals from the order entered in this
case on February 12, 2016, following this Court’s November 4, 2015 remand
of it. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
In our previous decision in this matter, we adopted the trial court’s
underlying findings of fact. (See J&D Brothers Inc. v. Finnegan, 1014
EDA 2015, unpublished memorandum at *2 (Pa. Super. filed November 4,
2015); Trial Court Opinion, 11/06/14, at 2-5). We take the procedural
history in this matter from this Court’s prior decision.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A28032-16
Appellant filed a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether an easement existed with regard to Beacon Road. A
non-jury trial was held on July 15, 2014. The trial court entered
judgment on November 6, 2014, finding, inter alia, that
Appellant possessed a prescriptive easement over Beacon Road
as it transverses over Appellant’s properties. The court found
that Appellant “as owner of the dominant estate, has the right to
unobstructed use of Beacon Road for any purpose related to the
communications tower on [Appellant’s] property or for
recreational activity up to two times per month.” Appellant filed
post[-]trial motions on November 17, 2014. Appellees filed
post[-]trial motions on December [1], 2014. The trial court
entered a clarification order on March 13, 2015 which provided
that Appellant had unobstructed and unlimited use of Beacon
Road for the purposes of maintaining the road, for a reasonable
amount of time for recreational use, and for two days per month
for any purpose related to the communications tower.
(J&D Brothers Inc., supra at * 2 (record citations omitted)).
On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court had wrongly
constrained its “unobstructed use of the subject easement to an unlimited
number of times two days per month for any purpose related to the
communications tower[.]” (Id. at *3). After a thorough review, this Court
found Appellant was entitled to “limited relief.” (Id. at *6) (emphasis
added). We stated:
. . . the trial court abused its discretion in entering an order
which restricted the use of the prescriptive easement to two
days per month in light of its finding that Appellant leased the
communications tower to AT&T for telephone, cellular and
emergency communications services. The prescriptive easement
had been used for modifications of the communications tower,
following Hurricane Sandy and for emergency repairs. AT&T had
not been limited in its access to the property via Beacon Road
during the prescriptive period. Denying access to the
prescriptive easement for emergency repairs and to effect
changes to comply with the law would be unreasonable. We
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reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with this
memorandum.
(Id. at **8-9) (record citations and case citations omitted).
On December 23, 2015, the trial court issued an order directing both
parties to submit proposed orders consistent with this Court’s opinion. (See
Order, 12/23/15, at unnumbered page 1). This Court is unable to determine
from the record whether the parties complied. On February 12, 2016, the
trial court issued an order, which stated, in pertinent part:
[Appellant], as owner of the dominant estate, has the right to
unobstructed use of Beacon Road for purposes related to the
communications tower on [Appellant’s] property a reasonable
number of times two days per month. This limitation shall not
apply in the event that emergency repairs are required or to
effect changes in the communications tower made necessary by
changes in the law[,] which cannot be accomplished within the
two days per month.
(Order, 2/12/16, at unnumbered pages 1-2 ¶ 3) (emphasis added).
On February 19, 2016, Appellant filed the instant, timely appeal. On
March 3, 2016, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On March 31,
2016, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement. See id. On April 20,
2016, the trial court issued an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
1. [Did] the trial court err[] when it limited Appellant, its agents
and/or its[] lessees unobstructed use of the subject easement to
a reasonable number of times two days per month for any
purpose related to the communications tower located on
Appellant’s property[?]
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2. [Did] the trial court err[] when it limited Appellant, its agents
and/or its lessees unobstructed use of the subject easement
despite holding that it had not been limited in its access to the
property during the prescriptive period[?]
3. [Did] the trial court err[] when it limited Appellant, its agents
and/or its lessees unobstructed use of the subject easement to a
“reasonable number of times two days per month”, contrary to
the status quo which has always been 24/7 access for anything
and everything related to the communications tower enjoyed by
Appellant, its agents and/or lessees during the prescriptive
period; creating limitations to access that never existed[?]
4. [Did] the trial court err[] when it limited Appellant, its agents
and/or its lessees unobstructed use of the subject easement to
“a reasonable number of times two days per month, except in
the event that emergency repairs are required or to effect
changes in the communications tower made necessary by
changes [in] the law”[?]
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Because Appellant’s four issues are closely related, we address them
together. In essence, Appellant complains that the trial court improperly
interpreted the scope of our remand order, and its February 12, 2016 order
improperly limited Appellant’s access to the communications tower. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 11). The issue of whether a trial court properly
interpreted the scope of a remand order is a matter of law. See In re
Lokuta, 11 A.3d 427, 438 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 242 (2011).
Here, as in all appeals raising matters of law “our standard of review is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d
885, 891 (Pa. 2007).
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When a case is remanded, “a trial court has an obligation to comply
scrupulously, meticulously, and completely with an order of [the appellate
court] remanding a case to the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Williams,
877 A.2d 471, 474 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 895 A.2d 1261 (Pa.
2006) (citation omitted). The trial court is required to “strictly comply with
the mandate of the appellate court.” Id. at 474-75 (citation omitted).
Issues not included in the mandate cannot be considered by the trial court.
See id. at 475.
Here, Appellant complains that the remand order wrongly limited its
unobstructed use of the communications tower to two days per month, even
though it had not been previously limited in its use of the property, thus the
order raised limitations that had not previously existed. (See Appellant’s
Brief, at 4). This is virtually identical to the claim Appellant made in the first
appeal. (See J&D Brothers Inc., supra at *3).
In our previous memorandum, the sole concern we expressed with the
trial court’s decision was the need to access the tower for emergency repairs
and to effect changes to comply with the law. (See id. at **8-9). For this
reason, we noted that our remand was “limited,” and we remanded for the
narrow purpose of the entry of an order that addressed our concerns. (Id.
at *6, *9). Thus, the scope of the remand only allowed the trial court to
address the issues of emergency repair and access to comply with changes
of law. (See id.). The trial court issued an order in compliance with the
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remand, stating that the restrictions did not apply to cases of emergency
repairs or to situations where alterations in the tower were necessary
because of changes of law. (See Order, 2/12/16, at unnumbered pages 1-2
¶ 3). Therefore, the trial court properly limited its order to the issues we
highlighted and appropriately addressed our concerns. See
Commonwealth v. Tick, Inc., 246 A.2d 424, 426 (Pa. 1968) (“It was the
duty of the court below, on remand, to comply strictly with our mandate and
such compliance required the court to proceed in a manner consistent with
the views expressed in our opinion[.]”) (citation omitted); Williams, supra
at 474-75. Appellant’s general attack on the portions of the April 12, 2016
order, which were identical to those we found acceptable in the March 13,
2015 order, are simply beyond the scope of the remand and cannot be
reviewed in this appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 789 A.2d 252,
253 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“where a case is remanded to resolve a limited
issue, only matters related to the issue on remand may be appealed.”)
(citation omitted). Thus Appellant’s claims, which do not challenge the trial
court’s handling of the emergency repairs and change of law issues, are not
properly before us. See id.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/26/2017
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