MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Feb 28 2017, 8:41 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kay A. Beehler Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Terre Haute, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Matthew B. Mackenzie
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Timothy F. Watkins, February 28, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
84A04-1609-CR-2129
v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John T. Roach,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
84D01-1602-F6-439
84D01-1602-F6-323
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1609-CR-2129 | February 28, 2017 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] Timothy F. Watkins admitted to violating his probation by failing to return to a
treatment center at the end of a weekend pass. The trial court revoked his
probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his previously suspended
sentence. Watkins now appeals, arguing that the trial court should have
inquired more fully as to the circumstances surrounding his failure to return to
the treatment center because those circumstances could have impacted its
decision to revoke his probation. We find that the trial court gave Watkins an
adequate opportunity to offer mitigating evidence that his violation did not
warrant revocation and did not need to inquire further. We therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In June 2016, Watkins pled guilty to Level 6 felony battery by bodily waste in
Cause No. 84D01-1602-F6-439 and Level 6 felony theft in Cause No. 84D01-
1602-F6-323. Pursuant to the plea agreement, several other counts, including a
habitual-offender enhancement, were dismissed. The trial court sentenced
Watkins to consecutive terms of two years for each conviction, suspended the
time (except for time served), and placed Watkins on formal probation. See
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 38-41. The court also ordered Watkins to
complete treatment at Lighthouse Recovery Center, a nine-month to two-year
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transitional housing/rehabilitation program for addiction, in Washington,
Indiana.1 Id. at 36.
[3] Approximately two months later, on Friday, August 5, 2016, Watkins was
given a forty-eight-hour pass to leave Lighthouse. On Monday, the probation
department filed a notice of probation violation under both cause numbers
alleging that Watkins violated his probation by failing to return to Lighthouse.
A bench warrant was issued for Watkins’ arrest, and he was arrested on that
warrant on August 15. Watkins, however, was “too intoxicated” to appear in
court that day, so his initial hearing on the notice of probation violation was
continued. Id. at 48.
[4] The next day, Watkins appeared in court for his initial hearing without an
attorney. After the trial court advised Watkins of his rights, including his right
to an attorney, Watkins waived them.2 Watkins then explained that he wanted
to admit to violating his probation and “go ahead with [his] sentence” because
“[b]ottom line” he “relapsed” and “violated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 4; Tr. Vol. III p. 4.
The trial court told Watkins that if he admitted to violating his probation, he
“could go to DOC or the Vigo County Jail for the balance of [his] time,” and
Watkins said he understood that and was willing to proceed. Tr. Vol. III p. 6.
1
Watkins began treatment at Lighthouse before sentencing, on April 11, 2016. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II
p. 33.
2
Watkins does not challenge the waiver of his rights on appeal. Indeed, the trial court strongly encouraged
Watkins not to represent himself.
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The trial court then asked Watkins if he understood the allegations against him,
and Watkins said yes. Watkins then elaborated:
I left on a [forty-eight-hour] pass, and I didn’t have a ride back
and . . . found out shortly after that – there’s a warrant out for my
arrest. I walked up to the police Saturday night, Sunday night,
and turned myself in.
Id.; see also id. at 4 (“I messed up, relapsed, I left for a weekend.”).
[5] The trial court revoked Watkins’ probation and “sentenced [him] to the balance
of his time in the Department of Correction.” Id. at 7; see also Appellant’s App.
Vol. II pp. 49-50.
[6] Watkins now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Watkins contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Probation
revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must determine that a
violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Woods v. State, 892
N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Second, the court must determine if the violation
warrants revocation of probation. Id.
[8] Where, as here, a probationer admits to the violation, the court can proceed to
the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants
revocation. Id. But even a probationer who admits the allegations against him
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must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that
the violation does not warrant revocation. Id.
[9] Watkins argues that the trial court “should have inquired more fully as to the
circumstances which surrounded [his] failure to return to treatment at the end
of [his] week-end pass” because had the court done so, it “may well have”
decided not to revoke his probation. Appellant’s Br. p. 7, 9 (emphasis added).
We, however, find that the trial court gave Watkins an adequate opportunity to
offer mitigating evidence that his violation did not warrant revocation and did
not need to inquire further. Watkins explained that, two months after being
ordered to complete treatment at Lighthouse, he was given a forty-eight-hour
pass, left the center, “messed up,” “relapsed,” and then was arrested on a
warrant a week after the pass expired (at which point he was too intoxicated to
appear in court). Tr. Vol. III p. 4. In addition, Watkins did not ask for an
opportunity to present additional testimony about his progress at Lighthouse up
to that point or the circumstances surrounding his relapse, nor does he tell us
what that testimony would have been had he asked for and been given such an
opportunity. We therefore affirm the revocation of Watkins’ probation and the
imposition of the balance of his previously suspended sentence.
[10] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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