[Cite as In re M.I., 2017-Ohio-1524.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: M.I. : APPEAL NO. C-160466
TRIAL NO. 12-7570X
:
: O P I N I O N.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 26, 2017
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee State of Ohio,
Timothy J. McKenna, for Appellant M.I.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MYERS, Judge.
{¶1} In 2012, in Gallia County, M.I. was adjudicated delinquent for
committing acts which, had they been committed by an adult, would have
constituted gross sexual imposition. M.I. was 16 years old when he attacked his
guardian ad litem, groping and grabbing her. The case was transferred to Hamilton
County for disposition. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court committed M.I. to the
Department of Youth Services. The parties stipulated to M.I.’s classification as a Tier
I juvenile offender registrant, the lowest classification. At the end-of-disposition
hearing in 2016, M.I. argued that his mandatory classification as a Tier I offender
was unconstitutional. The magistrate determined that she had no authority to
declassify M.I., and continued his Tier I classification. M.I. objected. The juvenile
court adopted the magistrate’s decision continuing M.I.’s classification as a Tier I
juvenile offender registrant. M.I. has appealed.
{¶2} M.I.’s sole assignment of error alleges that the mandatory
classification of 16- and 17-year-old sex offenders under R.C. 2152.83(A) and
2152.84(A)(2)(c) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio
Constitutions, because there is no rational basis for treating juvenile sex offenders
differently based upon their ages. Under the juvenile-sex-offender laws, sex
offenders 13 or younger may not be classified, classification is discretionary for 14-
and 15-year-old sex offenders, and 16- and 17-year-old sex offenders must be
classified. R.C. 2152.83. The juvenile court has the discretion to determine the
appropriate tier in which to place 16- and 17-year-old sex offenders, but the court
must classify them. Id. Once a juvenile sex offender has been classified, the juvenile
court may lower the classification at the end-of-disposition hearing, but the court has
no authority to declassify the juvenile. R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(c). Nor may the court
increase the classification. Id.; R.C. 2152.84(B)(2).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶3} Statutes validly enacted by the General Assembly are presumed to be
constitutional. State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). As
the party challenging the legislation, M.I. has the burden to prove that it is
unconstitutional. State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 664 N.E.2d 926
(1996). The parties agree that under M.I.’s equal-protection argument, the statutes
are subject to rational-basis review. Therefore, M.I. must prove that the statutory
classifications are not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. Id.;
State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 13; State
v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000).
{¶4} M.I. argues that there is no rational basis for treating juvenile sex
offenders differently based on their ages. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Eleventh Appellate Districts have considered and rejected this argument. See In
re R.G., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0064, 2016-Ohio-8426; In re T.M., 11th Dist.
Geauga No. 2016-G-0060, 2016-Ohio-8425; In re D.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
103854, 2016-Ohio-4571; In re D.D., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA0043, 2015-Ohio-
3999; In re A.W., 5th Dist. Knox No. 15CA3, 2015-Ohio-3463; In re M.R., 7th Dist.
Jefferson No. 13 JE 30, 2014-Ohio-2623; In re Forbess, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-09-
20, 2010-Ohio-2826; In re C.P., 4th Dist. Athens No. 09CA41, 2010-Ohio-1484,
rev’d on other grounds, 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. We
have found no Ohio appellate court case holding that treating juvenile sex offenders
differently based upon their ages violates equal protection.
{¶5} As set forth in R.C. 2950.02, the purpose of sex-offender registration is
to protect the public. Those appellate courts finding no equal-protection violation
have reasoned that the legislature’s concerns for recidivism and public safety provide
a rational basis for treating juvenile sex offenders differently based on their ages. Id.
The courts have reasoned that it is a core premise of the juvenile court system that as
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the juvenile ages, he is more responsible and accountable for his actions. A juvenile
who is almost an adult has less time in the juvenile system to be rehabilitated and
may be less responsive to rehabilitation. Therefore, more tracking is needed after the
juvenile ages out of the system. It is not irrational to conclude that younger children
are less culpable and accountable for their actions and less dangerous than older
offenders. Younger children have more time in the juvenile system to be
rehabilitated and may be more susceptible to rehabilitation than older children.
{¶6} We agree with this reasoning and hold that the juvenile-sex-offender-
classification system is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of
protecting the public from sex offenders. Therefore, it does not violate M.I.’s right to
equal protection of the law.
{¶7} We note that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that under the Due
Process Clause of the Ohio Constitution, a juvenile has a right to “fundamental
fairness” that is violated where mandatory provisions in the juvenile statutes
eliminate the “ ‘essential element of the juvenile process’—the judge’s discretion.”
See In re D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 30 (holding
that imposition upon a juvenile of sex-offender registration and notification
requirements that extend beyond age 18 or 21 does not violate due process because
the juvenile judge decides whether to impose the penalty), citing In re C.P., 131 Ohio
St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 77 (holding that R.C. 2152.86, which
imposed automatic, lifelong sex-offender registration and notification requirements,
violated a juvenile’s due-process rights because the requirements were imposed
“without the participation of a juvenile judge” and, therefore, failed “to meet the due
process requirement of fundamental fairness”); State v. Aalim, ___ Ohio St.3d ___,
2016-Ohio-8278, ___ N.E.3d ___ (holding that mandatory transfer of a juvenile to
adult court without providing the protection of a discretionary determination by the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
juvenile judge violates the juvenile’s right to due process, and that discretionary
transfer of a juvenile over the age of 14 to adult court after an amenability hearing
does not). But we make no determination as to whether the mandatory provisions in
the juvenile-sex-offender-classification system violate M.I.’s right to due process,
because M.I. has attacked his classification only on the basis of equal protection.
{¶8} M.I.’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOCK, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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