FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 08 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VITALE & ASSOCIATES, LLC, ) No. 15-16928
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01400-JAD-VCF
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
SUE LOWDEN, )
)
Defendant-Appellee, )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Cam Ferenbach, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 18, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and FERNANDEZ and MURGUIA, Circuit
Judges.
Vitale & Associates, LLC (“Vitale”) appeals the district court’s grant of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
summary judgment in favor of Sue Lowden on its claim in this diversity action1
that Lowden breached a contract for its polling services. We affirm.
Lowden sought a seat in the United States Senate, and created the “Sue
Lowden for U.S. Senate” committee (hereafter “the Committee”), whose purpose
was securing that seat for her. Vitale provides polling services to political
campaigns, and entered into a contract with the Committee for the provision of
those services.2 When it was not paid for those services, Vitale brought this action
for breach of contract against Lowden personally.
Vitale cannot maintain an action against Lowden based upon the theory that
she entered into a contract with it. As it conclusively admitted, any contract was
with the Committee. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d
616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, the elements of a contract with Lowden personally
were not spelled out. See Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 899
(9th Cir. 2013). And, in general, “a contract cannot bind a nonparty.” EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S. Ct. 754, 764, 151 L. Ed. 2d 755
1
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Galam v. Carmel (In re Larry’s Apartment, L.L.C.),
249 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2001).
2
By failing to respond to Requests for Admission, Vitale was deemed to
have admitted that Lowden “never signed a written contract” for its services and
that “if a contract exists, the parties to the contract are [Vitale] and [the
Committee].” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3), (b).
2
(2002); see also W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Nev.
1992). Of course, an agent can sometimes bind a principal. See Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Gen. Builders, Inc., 934 P.2d 257, 261 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam). Vitale
asserts that J3 Strategies, LLC (hereafter “J3”), which contacted Vitale to obtain its
services, was an agent of Lowden, but that assertion is infirm. When Vitale
admitted that its contract, if any, was with the Committee, it necessarily admitted
that it was the Committee that was bound by J3’s action, if anyone was. By the
same token, Vitale’s claim that the Nevada law of promissory estoppel would bind
Lowden must fail because Vitale did not point to a definitive promise from
Lowden or her agent to sustain its promissory estoppel claim. See Vancheri v.
GNLV Corp., 777 P.2d 366, 369 (Nev. 1989) (per curiam); Lear v. Bishop, 476
P.2d 18, 21–22 (Nev. 1970). At best, Vitale pointed to general public comments
by Lowden. And as to agency, Vitale’s admission that its contract was with the
Committee elides a claim that J3 was speaking as her agent as opposed to the agent
of the Committee. In any event, the statements of J3’s officer (Robert Uithoven)
were similarly general rather than definitive.
That leaves Vitale with its assertion that the district court erred when it
determined that Lowden was not liable on the contract entered into by the
Committee, which was an unincorporated nonprofit association (UNA) under
3
Nevada law. We disagree. Nevada has adopted the Revised Uniform
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act of 2008. See 2009 Nev. Stat. 692,
codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 81.700–.890; see also Rev. Uniform Unincorp.
Nonprofit Ass’n Act (2008) §§ 1–36, 6D U.L.A. 375–420 (2008) (hereafter
“RUUNAA”). Under the provisions of the Nevada statute, a UNA’s debt is its
own and not that of its members or managers. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 81.770(1); see
also RUUNAA § 8 cmt. 1, 6D U.L.A. at 390–91. Lowden was undoubtedly a
member3 of the Committee, as a result of which she is not liable for its debts for
her acts as a member, which, again, is the only source of liability on which Vitale
can now rely.4
Thus, Vitale is reduced to arguing that the Committee is not a UNA.
However, as the district court noted, Vitale submitted no substantial evidence to
that effect. See Galen v. Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). Beyond
3
See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 81.725.
4
Vitale seeks to impose liability upon Lowden by relying on a case which
applied the law of the State of Texas to impose liability upon a candidate for the
United States Senate. See Karl Rove & Co. v. Thornburgh, 39 F.3d 1273, 1284–85
(5th Cir. 1994). However, the case was not decided under the law of Nevada or
pursuant to the provisions of the RUUNAA, which Texas had not adopted. That
case is inapposite. Moreover, it was receded from when the principles set forth in
the predecessor of RUUNAA were adopted by the Texas Legislature. See MT
Falkin Invs., L.L.C. v. Chisholm Trail Elks Lodge No. 2659, 400 S.W.3d 658,
664–67 (Tex. App. 2013).
4
that, the coverage of the statute is very broad;5 so broad, in fact, that it specifically
and carefully excludes groups of individuals (for example married couples)6 that
we would not usually think of as UNA’s at all. In this case there can be no real
doubt that at least two persons were joined for a specific nonprofit purpose. See
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 81.740. Furthermore, the record indicates that there was
structure to the Committee—specific duties and lines of authority, that is, general
governing principles7 and established practices.8
As a last gasp, Vitale argues that because J3 was hired without the approval
of the Committee’s members,9 the Committee is not a UNA. However, Vitale
neither presented evidence that the existing members did not approve, nor showed
that they had to.10
In fine, the district court did not err when it determined that Lowden was not
personally liable to Vitale.
AFFIRMED.
5
See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 81.740.
6
Id. § 81.740(2); see also RUUNAA § 2 cmts. 1–8, 6D U.L.A. at 380–83.
7
See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 81.715.
8
See id. § 81.710; see also RUUNAA § 2 cmts. 1, 2, 6D U.L.A. at 380–81.
9
See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 81.805(1)(b).
10
See id.; see also RUUNAA § 2 cmt. 4, 6D U.L.A. at 381.
5