RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4430-15T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.W., Sr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF
K.W., Jr., a minor.
____________________________________
Submitted February 28, 2017 – Decided March 14, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County,
Docket No. FG-15-4-15.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Beryl Foster-Andres,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Angela
Melchionna, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (James J. Gross,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant K.W., Sr. appeals from a May 31, 2016 Family Part
order, terminating his parental rights to his son K.W., Jr.,
(Keith),1 who was about three-year-old at the time of the
guardianship trial. The order also terminated the parental rights
of the mother, D.W., who choose not to appeal. Defendant argues
the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) did not
prove the required statutory factors by clear and convincing
evidence. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The Law Guardian supports
the termination. After reviewing the record in light of the
contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth by Judge Joseph L. Foster in his written opinion
issued with the order.
The history and evidence are set forth at length in Judge
Foster's opinion and need not be repeated here. A brief summary
will suffice. Defendant is a registered sex offender as a result
of a conviction for unlawful sexual contact with a minor, and was
also convicted for failing to register. In addition, he was
1
We use a pseudonym to protect his identity pursuant to Rule 1:38-
3(d)(12).
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convicted of two other crimes: offensive touching for grabbing and
kissing a minor, and child endangerment involving his then
girlfriend's five-year-old son. Defendant has mental health
issues dating back to his adolescence that have been pinpointed
as the cause of episodes of domestic violence. He fathered three
other children but did not parent them.
Defendant has never cared for Keith and has no bond with him.
Keith was removed from his mother's care and custody upon being
released from the hospital after his birth, and since then has
remained with his resource parents who are willing to adopt him.
Defendant failed to successfully engage in services - counseling
for sexual offenses, domestic abuse, mental health, and parenting
- offered by the Division in its initial effort to further
reunification. Throughout the Division's involvement with Keith,
defendant lacked stable and suitable housing. The Division
presented uncontroverted expert testimony that defendant did not
eliminate his risk of future sexual, physical, or domestic abuse,
and he was unable to parent Keith. Following the conclusion of
the trial, Judge Foster determined that the Division had proven
all four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a),
by clear and convincing evidence.
On appeal, defendant presents the following points of
argument:
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I. THE JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE FOUR
PRONGS OF THE BEST INTERESTS TEST FAVORED
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS BECAUSE K.W.
SR. DID NOT HARM HIS SON OR PLACE HIM AT A
RISK OF HARM, HAS BEEN CONSISTENT WITH
PARENTING TIME AND EXHIBITED APPROPRIATE
BEHAVIOR, COMPLIED WITH THERAPY, AND WAS READY
TO PARENT, WHILE THE DIVISION NEGLECTED TO
OFFER HIM APPROPRIATE PARENTING TIME.
A. The trial judge erroneously ruled that
the first prong of the best interests test
had been satisfied because K.W. Sr. never
harmed his son and was appropriate during
his parenting time.
B. The trial judge erroneously ruled that
the second prong of the best interests
test had been satisfied because K.W. Sr.
was compliant with therapy and the
Division was required to provide the
parents with housing assistance.
C. The trial judge erroneously ruled that
the third prong of the best interests test
had been satisfied because K.W. Sr. was
not offered sufficient parenting time.
D. The trial judge erroneously ruled that
the fourth prong of the best interests
test had been satisfied because K.W. Sr.
was ready to parent.
Those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Judge
Foster's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence.
See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448
(2012).
Affirmed.
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