15-4111
Singh v. Sessions
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A205 934 797
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
10th day of July, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
BIKRAMJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 15-4111
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,
New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S.
Ferrier, Assistant Director;
Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Bikramjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a November 27, 2015 decision of the BIA affirming
a May 6, 2015 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
Bikramjit Singh, No. A205 934 797 (B.I.A. Nov. 27, 2015), aff’g
No. A205 934 797 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. May 6, 2015). Where, as
here, the BIA does not expressly “adopt” the IJ’s decision, but
closely tracks its reasoning, we review both the IJ’s and the
BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness,” Wangchuck v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006),
applying well-established standards of review, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66
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(2d Cir. 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
In assessing an asylum applicant’s credibility, the agency
may, “considering the totality of the circumstances,” base an
adverse determination on the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or
responsiveness,” inconsistencies between an applicant’s oral
and written statements, and inconsistencies between an
applicant’s statements and other record evidence. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.
“We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless . . .
it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an
adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that
Singh was not credible. The agency identified multiple
inconsistencies between Singh’s testimony, asylum application,
and other record evidence regarding significant aspects of his
claim, including the number of times he was attacked, the date
he joined the Akali Dal Mann Party and began receiving threats
from the Badal Party, and whether the police beat him in
September 2012. These inconsistencies are reflected in the
record, and Singh’s proffered justifications compel no
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different result. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81
(2d Cir. 2005).
Singh nevertheless faults the agency’s adverse credibility
determination, arguing that a Mann Party letter—which was
deemed inconsistent with Singh’s testimony regarding the
beatings—was based upon secondhand and possibly inaccurate
information. The argument fails because Singh testified that
the letter’s author was aware of everything that had happened
to Singh. As for Singh’s omission of certain beatings, even
if this was inadvertent, see Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 90
(2d Cir. 2006) (holding asylum applicant not required to list
all instances of persecution), that would not bear on
inconsistencies in and between his accounts of a September 2012
encounter with the police, see Lianping Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d
144, 150 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that petitioner’s “asylum
application did not simply omit incidents of persecution” but
rather “described the same incidents of persecution
differently”). Nor would it mitigate Singh’s initial failure
to discuss purported threats beginning in 2010—two years before
the first alleged attack and a year before he claimed to have
joined the Mann Party. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3
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(observing that inconsistency and omission are “functionally
equivalent” for credibility purposes).
The adverse credibility determination was bolstered by
Singh’s submission of affidavits—from two different
individuals—that employed nearly identical language. See
Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding adverse
credibility determination based in part on “nearly identical
language” in affidavits). Singh’s contention that the
similarity is explained by the use of the same translator is
not compelling because Singh testified that the affiants
prepared the documents independently, and the affidavits
themselves do not acknowledge assistance in preparation. See
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81.
Finally, the agency’s reliance on Singh’s demeanor in
finding him not credible was supported by Singh’s nonresponsive
answers on cross examination. See Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d
377, 381 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that petitioner’s evasive
and nonresponsive testimony supported adverse credibility
ruling).
Given the various concerns raised by Singh’s testimony,
statements, and evidence, we conclude that the totality of the
circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility
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ruling. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because Singh’s
claims for relief were all based on the same factual predicate,
the adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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