IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
ROSSI DEJOUR ARMSTEAD,
Appellant,
v. CASE NO. 1D13-4728
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed August 28, 2017.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Michael C. Overstreet, Judge.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Joanna A. Mauer, Assistant Public Defender,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
PER CURIAM.
We previously affirmed appellant’s sentences based on our en banc decision
in Walton v. State, 106 So. 3d 522, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Walton I), where this
court held that “any mandatory minimum term required by section 775.087(2) –
whether the defendant fires a gun, or only carries or displays it – shall be imposed
consecutively to any other term imposed for any other felony.” However, the
Florida Supreme Court quashed our decision in this case and remanded for
reconsideration in light of its decisions in Walton v. State, 208 So. 3d 60 (Fla.
2016) (Walton II), and Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 2016).
In Williams, the supreme court said that “consecutive sentencing of
mandatory minimum imprisonment terms for multiple firearm offenses is
impermissible if the offenses arose from the same criminal episode and a firearm
was merely possessed but not discharged.” 186 So. 3d at 993; accord Walton II,
208 So. 3d at 64. However, Williams distinguished between consecutive sentences
imposed for two “qualifying felonies” pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute as
codified in section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2012), and consecutive sentences
imposed for “qualifying felonies” and “non-qualifying felonies.” Williams, 186 So.
3d at 992. The supreme court noted that the 10-20-Life statute “expressly mandates
. . . that a qualifying felony sentence run ‘consecutively to’ any sentence imposed
for a non-qualifying felony.” Id.
Here, appellant was convicted of (1) principal to home invasion robbery
with a firearm; (2) principal to kidnapping; and (3) principal to grand theft of a
motor vehicle. Though both robbery and kidnapping may be qualifying offenses
pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute, in the current case, the State charged appellant
pursuant to the 10-20-Life statute only on the home invasion robbery count. §
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775.087(2)(a)1g, Fla. Stat. The kidnapping in appellant’s case, then, was
considered a “non-qualifying offense.” Martin v. State, 190 So. 3d 252, 255 (Fla.
1st DCA 2016). Thus, pursuant to Williams, because appellant was convicted of
one “qualifying felony” and two “non-qualifying felonies,” the trial court would
have been required to run the sentences consecutively.
Here, the trial court properly ordered the sentences to run consecutively. We,
therefore, affirm. See Martin, 190 So. 3d at 255.
WOLF, MAKAR, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
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