MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 07 2017, 8:27 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jacob P. Wahl Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Ripstra Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
Jasper, Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sammy Dale Joles, September 7, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
63A01-1704-CR-813
v. Appeal from the Pike Circuit Court
The Honorable Jeffrey L.
State of Indiana, Biesterveld, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
63C01-1609-F5-628
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Sammy Dale Joles appeals his conviction for home improvement fraud as a
level 5 felony. Joles raises one issue which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him; and
II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Joles, a home improvement supplier, entered into a home improvement
contract involving over $10,000 with Dennis Johnson, a person over sixty years
of age, and misrepresented a material fact relating to the terms of the home
improvement contract.
[3] On September 23, 2016, the State charged Joles with home improvement fraud
as a level 5 felony. The trial court scheduled a jury trial for March 1, 2017. On
February 13, 2017, the court held a final pretrial conference. On February 16,
2017, Joles filed a motion to continue, and the court granted the motion and
rescheduled the jury trial to March 21, 2017.
[4] On February 24, 2017, Joles filed a Motion to Vacate Jury Trial and Set
Change of Plea Hearing. On February 28, 2017, the court held a hearing, Joles
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pled guilty, and the court accepted his plea and entered judgment of
conviction.1
[5] On March 28, 2017, the court held a sentencing hearing. Mary McCandless
testified that she had been engaged to Joles for two years and shared a
residence with him, that he helped pay bills, that they live with her elderly
mother, and that he was employed at McCandless Septic at the time of his
arrest. Joles testified:
Um, well, Your Honor, I was – just to be – I mean I was tired of
the way that I was living and I know I made a lot of mistakes in
the past. And I was ready to accept responsibility for my actions
and change the way that I was living um, and get this [taken]
care of. Get Mr. Johnson paid back. And be able to, you know,
get a job and provide for my family. And uh, I do apologize to
everybody. And, you know, Mr. Johnson. My – my family, for
– for the way that I was. And uh, I – I just hope that whatever
your sentence is that I can still pay restitution to Mr. Johnson
and still provide for my family. I mean I – I – I – my drug
problem has, you know, come and go over the years. At the time
I was working for Mr. Johnson, it kind of flared up, so that I
wasn’t able to complete the job in a – in a reasonable amount of
time. That’s why the job never got finished and why Mr.
Johnson got upset with me, so.
Transcript Volume II at 16.
1
The record does not contain a transcript of this hearing. In his notice of appeal, Joles requested a transcript
of only the March 28, 2017 sentencing hearing.
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[6] The court considered the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) which stated
his criminal history, that he was a high risk to reoffend, prior lenient treatment
had not been successful, he was on parole or probation at the time of the
offense, the harm suffered by the victim was significant and greater than the
elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense, he has a history of
similar offenses involving theft and financial exploitation of elderly or disabled
individuals, his attitude during the presentence investigation showed little
remorse for his actions, and Joles has a history of non-appearance and has been
extradited on two occasions for failure to appear in Missouri. The court found
Joles’s guilty plea and diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as
mitigating factors and found that the aggravating factors substantially
outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced him to six years executed in
the Department of Correction. The court also ordered Joles to pay restitution
in the amount of $34,524.
Discussion
I.
[7] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Joles.
We review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of
discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing
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statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of
aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the
reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers
reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-491. If the trial court
has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we cannot say
with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had
it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491.
The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those
which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion.
Id.
[8] Joles appears to argue that the trial court improperly failed to consider his
ability to work and willingness to pay restitution with his ability to work and
the hardship upon his dependents as mitigators. The State argues that there
was no reason for the trial court to credit these circumstances as mitigating.
[9] The determination of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the
trial court. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied. The court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s argument as to what
constitutes a mitigating factor, and the court is not required to give the same
weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant. Id. An allegation
that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the
defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly
supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. If the court does not
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find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, it is
not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist. Id.
[10] “[A]bsent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that
imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d
1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999); see also Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247-248 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that incarceration “almost always” works a
hardship on others and concluding that the defendant failed to show “special
circumstances” because there were other people who could take care of the
defendant’s mother while she was incarcerated), trans. denied. The PSI states
that Joles was earning approximately $600 to $800 per week, was living rent
free with his fiancée, and yet owed $813.13 in child support arrears. Under the
heading “Dependents,” the PSI indicates that Joles and his ex-wife have two
children who live with Joles’s mother in Wisconsin due to Joles’s history of
crimes and drug abuse. Appellant’s Confidential Appendix Volume II at 63.
We cannot say that he has demonstrated that hardship on his dependents is
both significant and clearly supported by the record.
[11] As to his argument regarding his willingness to pay restitution, the charging
information alleged that Joles entered into a home improvement contract
between June 26, 2015, and October 15, 2015, and he does not point to the
record to indicate that he paid any restitution prior to the date of the sentencing
hearing on March 28, 2017. The PSI states:
During the interview, [Joles] minimized the offense and
demonstrated little to no remorse when discussing how his
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actions have impacted the victim. He stated, “I would have
finished the job, but he fired me before I could”. When I read the
Victim Impact Statement to [Joles], he made reference that,
although he shouldn’t have kept all of the defendant’s [sic]
money, the victim shouldn’t be suffering from that much
hardship. During the entire interview, [Joles] showed absolutely
no emotion.
Id. at 64. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its
discretion in not finding Joles’s willingness to pay restitution as a mitigator or
that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
II.
[12] The next issue is whether Joles’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offense and his character. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we
“may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the
trial court’s decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, the
burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her
sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
[13] Joles points to his PTSD, his guilty plea, his willingness and ability to pay
restitution, and the hardship upon his dependents in arguing that he should
receive less than the maximum sentence or a sentence that includes some
portion on community corrections. The State argues that his sentence is not
inappropriate to his offense and character.
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[14] Our review of the nature of the offense reveals that Joles, a home improvement
supplier, entered into a home improvement contract involving over $10,000
with Dennis Johnson, a person over sixty years of age, and misrepresented a
material fact relating to the terms of the home improvement contract. The
victim impact statement states:
I paid Sammy Dale Joles a total of $34,524.00. I paid $24,000.00
for a special ordered new shed which I never received. I paid for
labor and items such as building materials more than once, for
the same items. I feel I should receive compensation for my
losses. I have experienced financial hardship, stress and a
distrust of strangers. I don’t think this man should be allowed to
go free to scam others.
Appellant’s Confidential Appendix Volume II at 67.
[15] Our review of the character of the offender reveals that Joles, who was born on
January 7, 1980, pled guilty five months after being charged. He was convicted
of theft as a class C felony in 2004 and theft as a misdemeanor in 2012. he PSI
indicates that he was charged with failure to support child as a felony in 2012,
but lists the disposition as unknown. He was convicted of “Financial
Exploitation-Elder” and theft as class C felonies in 2014. Id. at 62. That same
year, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance as a
misdemeanor. The PSI states that Joles has convictions in Indiana, Missouri,
Iowa, and Wisconsin, that he had an active warrant with full extradition in
Missouri for a probation violation, he had a pending misdemeanor charge in
Missouri, and that he reported he had been extradited twice to Missouri for
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failure to appear for hearings. The PSI further states that his overall risk
assessment score using the Indiana risk assessment system places him in the
high risk to reoffend category.
[16] Under the heading “Mental Health,” the PSI indicates that Joles reported he
was diagnosed with having PTSD in early 2015 and that he stated: “I was on an
extradition bus that crashed on the interstate. I had four guys on top of me; one
was bloody and not moving.” Id. at 64. He reported he was prescribed
Alprazolam for PTSD treatment, but he had not been taking his medication as
prescribed.
[17] Joles reported he had been addicted to illegal drugs for a majority of his adult
life and had spent approximately $70,000 to $100,000 on illegal drugs. He was
a daily user of methamphetamine prior to his arrest, and his substances of
choice are opiates and Xanax. He has also used or abused “Adderall,
Barbituates, cocaine powder, amphetamines, codeine, Librium/Valium,
Ativan, crack cocaine, inhalents [sic], Morphine, synthetic marijuana, bath
salts, Xanax, Oxycontin, Lortabs, Hydrocodone, Klonopin, and Salvia.” Id. In
2014, a Polk County court ordered Joles to complete a drug/alcohol evaluation,
but no treatment was recommended. He reported to the probation officer
completing the PSI that he had intentionally lied and was dishonest to the
counselor because he did not want to attend treatment. He reported that he
would be willing to participate in any type of substance abuse treatment so he
could start living a sober life.
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[18] The PSI states that Joles “minimized the offense and demonstrated little to no
remorse when discussing how his actions have impacted the victim.” Id. The
PSI also states that prior leniency from the courts has not deterred Joles’s
criminal behavior.
[19] After due consideration, we conclude that Joles has not sustained his burden of
establishing that his sentence of six years is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offense and his character.
Conclusion
[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Joles’s sentence.
[21] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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