NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0657n.06
No. 16-2438
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
ANTHONY WEST, ) Nov 28, 2017
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
MARY BERGHUIS, Warden, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
Respondent-Appellee. ) OPINION
)
)
BEFORE: GILMAN, SUTTON, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Anthony West, a Michigan inmate, pled guilty to second-
degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Receiving no
relief from his conviction in state court, West filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He appeals the judgment of the district court denying his petition. We
AFFIRM.
I. OVERVIEW
A. Background and Procedural History
1. Factual Background
This case arose from events that transpired on April 15, 2009, in Detroit, Michigan. West
had been residing with his then-girlfriend, Meesha Starks, her daughter Jasmine Godboldo, and
Goldboldo’s fiancé, Brian Garner. During the course of an argument, Starks removed West’s
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belongings from the residence, put the items on the porch, and asked West to vacate the
residence.
Godboldo testified at West’s preliminary hearing that West and Garner exited the
residence and were standing approximately 10 feet from the house when an argument ensued.
Godboldo testified that West stated “I’m not a punk as[s] nigga,” drew a gun, pointed it at
Garner, and fired five shots at close range. Garner suffered a single fatal gunshot wound to the
back.
Prosecutors and investigators obtained a sworn statement from Meesha Starks. Starks
said that once Garner had escorted West from the home, West attempted to go back, and Garner
pushed him in an effort to keep him from returning to the house. It was only after being pushed
that West pulled a gun on Garner, Starks stated, and West did not point the weapon directly at
Garner. Starks indicated that West fired five shots in rapid succession, pointing the gun at the
ground. Garner then walked into the street and collapsed, bleeding.
In support of his claim of self-defense, West points to statements made by neighbors who
observed the altercation. Brianna Williams and Andrea Skinner both gave statements to police
regarding the incident. Williams told police that the tall man (Garner) grabbed the short man
(West), started to shake him, and said “can’t nobody fuck with me.” Williams also stated that
after this altercation, West pulled out a gun and fired three times toward the ground. Similarly,
Skinner told police that Garner was returning to the house when West made a statement causing
Garner to turn toward him; Garner then grabbed West with both hands and pushed him toward
the street. Skinner stated that Garner used such force that it was “like [Garner] was playing with
a doll.” Skinner observed that West fired three times, downward towards Garner’s midsection.
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West also references his own statement to investigators that Garner pushed him to the
ground and, when West tried to walk away, Garner pursued him. West stated that “I wanted to
get him off of me so I started shooting. I thought he was going to hurt me.”
2. Legal Proceedings
West was bound over for trial on charges of first-degree premeditated murder, possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On
August 14, 2009, the trial court held a pretrial hearing at which the prosecution offered West a
plea deal of 23 years imprisonment followed by a mandatory two years of imprisonment for the
firearms offense, which he declined.
The transcript of the pretrial hearing indicates that West’s relationship with trial counsel
had soured. West had made several phone calls from jail, allegedly in an attempt to solicit
favorable testimony from Starks. Trial counsel revealed these conversations to the court and
expressed exasperation with West, stating that working with him was “impossible.” Counsel
was openly dismissive of West’s self-defense claims and expressed doubt that Skinner’s
testimony would be favorable. West also told the court that trial counsel had failed to review
discovery with him, an assertion that trial counsel vehemently denied.
On October 5, 2009, West pled guilty to the reduced charge of second-degree murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court conducted a plea
colloquy during which West stated his understanding that he was giving up his right to a trial and
that his plea was voluntary. The court inquired into the factual basis of West’s plea. West
acknowledged that he shot Garner and that his intent was to kill or cause great bodily harm. The
trial court found that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligently made.
West was sentenced to 20 to 40 years with a mandatory 2-year consecutive sentence for
the firearm offense. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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The district court denied the petition, but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) regarding
West’s claim that his guilty plea was not intelligent and voluntary because his trial counsel was
ineffective. West applied to this court to expand the COA to include other claims raised in his
habeas corpus petition, but that motion was denied. West v. Berghuis, No. 16-2438 (6th Cir.
Apr. 25, 2017) (order). The sole matter before us is whether West’s trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective, rendering West’s guilty plea unintelligent and involuntary.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s conclusions of law in a habeas corpus action de novo and
its findings of fact for clear error. Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 406 (6th Cir. 2017). Under the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), state court determinations
receive deferential review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals
considered West’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and denied leave to appeal on the
basis that West’s claims lacked merit. People v. West, No. 309821, 2013 WL 6633985, at *1
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013). The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v.
West, 847 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 2014). Because the merits of West’s claim were reached below,
AEDPA restricts the availability of habeas relief:
When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,
AEDPA restricts the availability of federal habeas relief to two circumstances.
First, habeas relief is available when a state court's decision was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. And second, habeas relief
is available when a state court's decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786 F.3d 450, 459–60 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Foster v. Wolfenbarger, 687 F.3d 702, 706 (6th
Cir. 2012). A state court decision is contrary to established federal law if the court arrives at a
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conclusion on a question of law that is opposite to that of the Supreme Court or decides a case
differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Lovins v.
Parker, 712 F.3d 283, 293–94 (6th Cir. 2013). “A state-court decision unreasonably applies
clearly established law if ‘the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the
[the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.’” Id. at 294 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
1. Legal Standard
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to plea bargaining. Missouri v. Frye,
566 U.S. 134, 140–41 (2012). The two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), frames our analysis of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising in the context of
guilty pleas. Frye, 566 U.S. at 140–41. A defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and “must ‘show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). In other words, once a defendant demonstrates that counsel’s performance was deficient,
she must “show ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Id.
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
2. Deficient Performance
West alleges that trial counsel was deficient because he failed to adequately investigate
the statements Skinner and Williams gave to police and instead coerced him into a plea bargain.
Had counsel adequately investigated these witnesses, West argues, he could have pursued a
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viable self-defense or accident claim and received a more favorable outcome at trial. West states
that the resolution of these claims by the Michigan courts was unreasonable in light of Tollet v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). Tollet held that “[i]f a prisoner pleads guilty on the advice of
counsel, he must demonstrate that the advice was not ‘within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases’” to obtain habeas relief. Id. at 266 (quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
The record does not reveal precisely what, if any, steps trial counsel undertook with
regard to pretrial investigation and these two witness statements in particular. West does not
dispute that Williams’s statement was in the possession of trial counsel. It is debatable on this
record, however, whether counsel was fully cognizant of Williams’s statement, which is
arguably the stronger of the two statements because it says that Garner assaulted West and that
West did not fire directly at Garner. The record reveals that counsel was aware of the statement
made by Skinner, of West’s desire to pursue an accident or self-defense claim, and West’s belief
that these defenses were viable. Skinner’s statement was helpful to West insofar as she indicated
that Garner assaulted West, shaking him so forcefully that it appeared as if he was “playing with
a doll.” Skinner’s statement to police, however, also indicated that West fired three times at
Garner’s midsection. The record is clear that although counsel knew of Skinner’s statement at
the August 14 pre-trial hearing, he believed it was not helpful, and rejected self-defense as a
viable defense.
As West notes in his petition for habeas corpus, trial counsel has been disciplined no less
than 16 times by the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board, 14 of which occurred prior to West’s
conviction. Subsequent to West’s conviction, trial counsel was suspended twice from the
practice of law, the second resulting from his 2014 criminal conviction for larceny. West also
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notes that trial counsel’s fee arrangement increased, purportedly requiring a very large additional
payment to ensure that West secured a sentence of 10 to 15 years. Counsel’s handling of the
case, his comments during the August 14 pretrial hearing—particularly his revelation to the court
that West had contacted a potential witness in an effort to secure favorable testimony— and his
limited investigation raise significant questions about the adequacy of representation. Counsel’s
actions in this case, as well as his record in prior representations, are concerning.
Although we are troubled by some of the actions of counsel, we cannot conclude that his
strong advice to West to enter the plea agreement was outside the reasonable range of
professional competence. Counsel was aware of an autopsy report showing that Garner was
killed by a single bullet to the back, along with statements showing that all four witnesses would
have testified that West was the shooter and at least one, Godboldo, had already testified that
West was the aggressor. Even though elements of the statements of Skinner and Williams might
have provided support to West’s self-defense claim, all statements indicate that Garner stepped
back and West then fired three to five shots at close range. Although Williams would have likely
testified that West did not aim at Garner, that testimony is contradicted by the testimony of
Godboldo and the statement of Skinner, on which West sought to rely. In light of the statements
of the four witnesses, if West went to trial, there was a legitimate risk of conviction on the more
serious charge of first-degree murder. Although it might have been possible for counsel to
pursue alternative strategies, Strickland provides considerable latitude to the strategic decisions
of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681. Given the risk of a full trial, advising West to plead
guilty is not outside the range of competent professional advice. The Michigan courts’
determination that counsel was not ineffective is reasonable in light of guiding Supreme Court
precedent that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.
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Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”
Id. at 689.
3. Prejudice
Even if we assumed deficient performance, to establish prejudice as required by
Strickland, West must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he would have elected to stand
trial, and had he done so, that he would have received a more favorable outcome than his plea
agreement. As the district court noted, at his pre-trial hearing, West believed that a more
favorable plea offer was forthcoming and trial counsel disagreed that such an offer would be
made. The prosecution did make a more favorable offer on the eve of trial, which West
ultimately accepted. The record does not tend to show that West desired to go to trial; it
indicates that West wanted and obtained a more favorable plea agreement. See Hill, 474 U.S. at
59 (holding that in order to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland in a plea agreement, the
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, she would
have proceeded to trial).
Had West gone to trial, moreover, we are not convinced that there was a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been more favorable. As mentioned above, although
Williams’s statement suggests that she would have testified that West fired into the ground,
Skinner stated that West fired directly at the victim. Thus, the prosecution had at least two
witnesses, Godboldo and Skinner, who would have testified that West pointed the gun at Garner
and fired three, if not five, shots at close range. The statements of Godboldo and Starks also
indicate that Garner did not physically provoke West, further undermining any claim to self-
defense. Though the statements of Williams and Skinner add some credence to West’s
contention that he acted in self-defense, they are insufficient to conclude that the outcome would
have been different at trial. Had West gone to trial, the outcome could have been much worse;
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he would have been tried on a first-degree murder charge, conviction of which would have
yielded a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See M.C.L. § 750.316. In sum, even
assuming that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, West has failed to demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome had he gone to trial. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at
163 (holding that to establish prejudice a petitioner must demonstrate that a more favorable
outcome could have been achieved with the benefit of competent counsel).
West’s claims, therefore, are unsuccessful under both prongs of Strickland. He has failed
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and he has failed to show that he was prejudiced by his decision to plead guilty. Accordingly,
we cannot say that the decisions of the Michigan courts were an unreasonable application of
federal law. Habeas relief is, therefore, not warranted under the deferential standards of
AEDPA.
B. Voluntariness of the Plea Agreement
It follows from our conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective that West’s plea was
knowing and voluntary. “[A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he
received from counsel was not within the standards” of effective representation. Hill, 474 U.S.
at 56–57 (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267). Because West has failed to demonstrate that counsel
was ineffective, his claim that his plea was involuntary also fails. The record, moreover, shows
that the trial court inquired into the factual basis of the plea and West’s responses show that he
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court and DENY West’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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