NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 15, 2017
Decided December 19, 2017
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
No. 16‐3894
TANYA BETH CIHLAR Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
v. No. 15‐cv‐00560
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Barbara B. Crabb,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Judge.
Defendant‐Appellee.
O R D E R
Tanya Cihlar appeals a district court’s judgment upholding an Administrative
Law Judge’s determination that she is not entitled to Supplemental Security Income.
Cihlar’s only appellate argument is that the ALJ did not include her “moderate
limitations” in “concentration, persistence, or pace” in his hypothetical question to a
vocational expert. But the ALJ’s question referred to “no production or pace rate work,”
which adequately reflects Cihlar’s limitations. Because substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s decision, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
No. 16‐3894 Page 2
When Cihlar applied for Supplemental Security Income in 2010 at age 32, she
alleged that she was unable to work because of back and hip problems, numbness on
her right side, and a learning disability. She initially alleged an onset date in February
2008, but later amended that date to January 2011. An ALJ denied her application for
benefits, but the Appeals Council remanded to the ALJ, in part, for further
consideration of a report by Dr. Robert Schedgick, a consulting psychologist who
examined Cihlar in 2010. Cihlar’s arguments in this court focus on whether the ALJ
properly accounted for her difficulty, as described by Dr. Schedgick, in maintaining
work pace; Cihlar no longer contends that her physical impairments disable her.
Schedgick thought that Cihlar’s mental activity was “within normal limits.” He
amplified his opinion: “Her work pace probably has to be slowed down to allow her to
function adequately. She can attend adequately to the task if the information is
presented and not bound by time.” He further explained that Cihlar had an IQ score of
72, falling within the borderline range of intellectual functioning for people her age.
This left her with “some very mild difficulties in focusing and concentrating.”
On remand the ALJ gave “substantial weight” to Schedgick’s report. Based on
the report, the ALJ found that Cihlar had “difficulty doing tasks in a fast manner.” But
the ALJ also relied on Schedgick’s opinion that Cihlar’s memory and concentration
were within normal limits. Other evidence reinforced this conclusion. At the hearing,
the ALJ noticed no problems with her focus or concentration. And her work history and
daily activities further confirmed her ability to concentrate and complete tasks. For
example, Cihlar helped dismantle barns, kept track of her finances, and filed
self‐employment income taxes using TurboTax software on a computer. She also
gardened, read, helped her children with their homework, played games, and knitted.
Her mental impairments, the ALJ concluded, only minimally limited her ability
to work. The ALJ determined that, subject to certain physical restrictions not relevant
here, Cihlar could perform light work “that is unskilled in nature, routine with no
constant decision‐making or work place changes, [and] no production pace rate.“
Accordingly, the ALJ described to the vocational expert a hypothetical person with
those characteristics:
Let’s assume we have . . . a younger individual with an unskilled work
history. . . . she is able to use Turbo Tax and she can read a chapter in a
book, but may not remember it well, but she can read a chapter in a book.
So, I think limited education is a fair description of her educational status.
No. 16‐3894 Page 3
It’s consistent with the grades she completed and some of her functional
abilities that she’s described here. . . . Let’s assume light, the RFC,
unskilled, light . . . The work should be routine, no constant decision
making or work place changes, no production or pace rate work, and no
constant interaction with others.
The ALJ then asked the expert whether the national economy has jobs for such a
person, and the expert said yes—nationally there are over 300,000 suitable jobs as a
price marker, router, or labeler. (According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, in
these jobs workers put stickers or tags on packages that show price, delivery route,
destination, or other identifying information. See Job Codes 209.587‐034; 222.587‐038;
920.687‐126.) Cihlar’s attorney asked if the number of jobs would shrink if the worker
was limited to only occasional interaction with supervisors or coworkers. The expert
replied, “No.” The ALJ concluded that Cihlar was not disabled because she could
perform existing jobs.
The Appeals Council denied Cihlar’s request to review the ALJ’s decision. She
then sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district judge upheld the
agency’s denial of benefits, and Cihlar timely appealed.
In this court Cihlar principally contends that her work‐pace limitations were not
appropriately included in the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert. An ALJ
generally must orient the vocational expert to all of the claimant’s limitations that are
supported by the record, including deficiencies of concentration, persistence and pace.
Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014); O’Connor‐Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614,
619 (7th Cir. 2010). But the ALJ need incorporate into the questions for the expert only
those limitations that the ALJ accepted as credible. Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 521
(7th Cir. 2009); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 846 (7th Cir. 2007); Sims v. Barnhart, 309
F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2002).
The ALJ fulfilled his duty. He credited Dr. Schedgick’s opinion that Cihlar’s
“work pace probably has to be slowed down to allow her to function adequately,” and
accordingly he told the vocational expert that the jobs should have “no production or
pace rate.” Cihlar replies that the question should have limited the expert to jobs where
Cihlar herself determines the pace. She zeroes in on this sentence in Schedgick’s report:
Cihlar “could attend adequately to the task if the information is presented and not bound
by time.” (A.R. 509) (emphasis added). But in reading all sentences in the report
together, the ALJ (and the expert) reasonably understood Schedgick to mean that Cihlar
No. 16‐3894 Page 4
had “difficulty doing tasks in a fast manner.” The ALJ did not, and was not required to,
accept Cihlar’s contention that she could work only at her own pace.
No rule requires that the ALJ use a particular wording regarding pace limitations
in the hypothetical if alternative phrasing adequately accounts for the claimant’s
limitations. O’Connor‐Spinner, 627 F.3d at 619. The ALJ permissibly used the alternative
phrase “no production or pace rate work” to account for Cihlar’s work‐pace limitations.
One might wonder whether, in using this phrase, the ALJ literally limited Cihlar to jobs
where only she sets the pace, and whether price markers, routers, or labelers work only
at their own pace. No matter. As we have already explained, we understand the ALJ’s
hypothetical to exclude all fast‐paced work that the ALJ (and by extension the expert)
thought she would have difficulty doing. See O’Connor‐Spinner, 627 F.3d at 619.
Therefore the hypothetical adequately accounts for Cihlar’s limitations.
One last observation: Cihlar’s appeal focuses on her “pace” limitations, but she
also mentions “concentration” and “persistence” limitations, and argues that the ALJ
did not adequately account for these. We disagree. The ALJ put substantial weight on
Schedgick’s report that Cihlar’s memory and concentration were within normal limits.
And in questioning the expert, the ALJ also limited the hypothetical worker to “routine,
no constant decision making or work place changes, and no constant interaction with
others.” This questioning adequately accounts for Cihlar’s credible concentration and
persistence limitations. See O’Connor‐Spinner, 627 F.3d at 619. True, the ALJ did not use
the magic words “concentration” or “persistence,” but he included terms reflecting
Cihlar’s mental limitations that only minimally impacted her work ability.
The ALJ reasonably accounted for Cihlar’s concentration, persistence, and pace
limitations in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert. We therefore AFFIRM
the district court’s decision to uphold the denial of benefits.