United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 18, 2006
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 05-10486 Clerk
))))))))))))))))))))))))))
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY FIELDS,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:04-CR-166-ALL
Before DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:
A jury found Defendant-Appellant Anthony Fields guilty of
drug related charges and of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. At trial, Fields moved to suppress evidence found in
his vehicle, which the police searched on three separate
occasions around the time of his arrest. The district court
denied Fields’ motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that
the challenged search of Fields’ vehicle was a valid search
incident to an arrest. We conclude that the warrantless search
of Fields’ vehicle was valid under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, and AFFIRM the district court’s denial
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of Fields’ motion to suppress.
I. Facts
Michael Neff, a narcotics officer, received information from
a confidential source that an individual named “T-Bone” was
selling illegal narcotics out of a duplex in Ft. Worth. After
further investigation, Neff determined that T-Bone was Anthony
Fields, who owned a black Impala. On August 24, 2004, Neff went
to an address in Arlington, Texas, which he believed to be
Fields’ residence. Neff watched Fields leave the residence and
drive away in his Impala. He tried to follow Fields, but he was
unsuccessful. Another narcotics officer, Kevin Turner, located
Fields and followed him to a duplex. This was the same duplex
described by the confidential source.
Narcotics officers maintained visual surveillance of the
duplex and Impala, which was parked in the driveway of the
duplex. During 45 minutes to one hour of surveillance of Fields,
narcotics officer Jerry Brown saw eight to ten cars arrive at the
duplex at different times. The car’s occupants would talk to
Fields briefly. After that, Fields would go into the duplex and
return to the occupants of the cars. Fields would shake their
hands and then the occupants of the cars would leave. Brown
concluded that Fields was engaging in narcotics transactions.
After the last car left, Brown observed Fields make three
trips to the Impala. On the first trip, Fields carried a black
bag. On the second trip, Fields had an electronic device. On
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the third trip, Fields put a small cooler in the Impala. Fields
then drove away in the Impala.
Neff and Brown decided they should pull Fields over. Brown
radioed Chuck Wiesman, an officer who was in a marked police car.
Brown instructed Wiesman to follow Fields and to pull him over if
he committed a traffic violation. Weisman saw Fields run a stop
sign, so he turned on his overhead lights to pull Fields over.
Instead of stopping, Fields accelerated. Fields began driving
at high speed, drove across two vacant lots, lost control of his
car, and ran the Impala into the side of the same duplex that he
had just left.
Fields exited the Impala through the driver’s side window
and ran on foot. Wiesman pursued Fields initially, but stopped
after Fields jumped over a fence. Wiesman then went back to the
Impala and opened the passenger door to see if anyone else was in
the car (“first search”). No one was inside, so Wiesman shut the
door. A few minutes after the first search, Wiesman heard over
the radio that Fields had been taken into custody. He went back
to the Impala and again opened the passenger door (“second
search”). Wiesman saw a black bag in the passenger door pocket.
The bag was open and contained narcotics.
Meanwhile, Officer Brown chased and arrested Fields. The
Government contends that Fields was arrested one and a half
blocks away from the Impala. Fields contends he was arrested
three to four blocks from the Impala. Officers handcuffed
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Fields, placed him in the back of a patrol car, and returned him
to the Impala. Fields remained in the squad car about 30 feet
away from the Impala while crime scene officers photographed and
searched the car (“third search”). In addition to the black bag
with narcotics, the crime scene officers found narcotics in the
cooler and a handgun in the front passenger seat.
Officer Neff obtained a search warrant to search the duplex.
It did not appear that anyone lived there. The duplex contained
minimal furniture. One bedroom was filled with yard equipment and
trash. The bathroom had no toiletries or towels. There were a
few articles of clothing in the duplex. The windows were covered
with foil or black plastic. There were twenty-two boxes of
sandwich bags inside the duplex.
II. Procedural History
Fields was charged in a three count indictment with three
drug related charges. On December 15, 2004, a superceding
indictment added a fourth count, charging Fields with being a
felon in possession of a firearm, and on December 20, 2004, the
Government filed a sentencing enhancement information.
The case proceeded to trial. At a bench conference after
jury selection and prior to presenting the indictment to the
jury, Fields made an oral motion to suppress evidence because he
contended that the second search of the Impala, conducted without
a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. After a presentation
of the case law outside the presence of the jury, the district
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court denied the motion to suppress, stating:
The opening of the door was a perfectly legitimate thing
to do to see if there was anybody else in the vehicle, to
see if there was anything that could pose an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers. Even the search of
the vehicle after they brought the man back was
consistent with the Thornton case because of his
proximity to the vehicle that was being searched. Plus,
once the drugs fell out of the vehicle, there was a
basis, a constitutional basis, for searching the vehicle
at that time because it was apparent that contraband was
in the vehicle.
A jury found Fields guilty on all four counts alleged in the
superceding indictment. Fields was sentenced to a total
aggregate sentence of 300 months imprisonment, a ten year term of
supervised release, and a $100.00 mandatory special assessment.
Fields timely filed his notice of appeal on April 7, 2005.
III. Discussion
Fields argues that the second search of his vehicle by
officer Wiesman was an unreasonable warrantless search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. He contends that, as a
result, the evidence seized from his vehicle should be
suppressed. “This court reviews the district court’s
fact-findings on a motion to suppress for clear error and reviews
de novo the ‘ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.’” United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 104
(5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102,
1006 (5th Cir. 1993)).
The district court concluded that the warrantless search of
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Fields’ vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it
was a valid search incident to an arrest. The search incident to
an arrest exception to the warrant requirement “allows police to
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a
lawful custodial arrest of both ‘occupants’ and ‘recent
occupants’” of the vehicle. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 622 (2004)(citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460
(1981)). An arrestee’s status as a recent occupant turns on “his
temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the
arrest and search.” Id. However, the Thornton Court “never
specified the physical distance between the defendant and his car
at the time he was arrested”1 that would constitute a “recent
occupant.”2 At first blush it seems that Fields did not have a
close spatial relationship to his vehicle at the time of the
arrest and search because he was anywhere from one and a half to
four blocks away from his vehicle when he was arrested and during
the contemporaneous search. See United States v. Pittman, 411
F.3d 813, 815-17 (7th Cir. 2005)(questioning whether an arrest a
half a block away from the vehicle searched is too great a
1
United States v. Jones, 155 F. App’x 204, 207 (6th Cir.
2005) (holding that an arrest ten to fifteen feet from the car is
a close spatial relationship).
2
The Thornton Court declined to address whether a “recent
occupant” of a vehicle needed to be within reaching distance of
the car to constitute a close spatial relationship. Thornton,
541 U.S. at 622 n.2.
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distance to constitute a search incident to an arrest under
Thornton, but upholding the validity of the search under the
automobile exception).3 However, we need not decide this issue
because the search was valid under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement.4
The automobile exception allows police to search a vehicle
if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999). There
3
Pittman also raises doubts as to the Seventh Circuit’s
holding in United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir.
1989). In that case, the court upheld the validity of a search
of the defendant’s vehicle when he was a mile away at the time of
the arrest. Notably, Arango precedes Thornton.
4
Fields contends that the government cannot raise the
automobile exception for the first time on appeal. The
government did not raise the automobile exception in the district
court because that court found that the search in question was a
valid search incident to an arrest. The issue underlying both
the automobile exception and the search incident to an arrest
exception to the warrant requirement is the ultimate
reasonableness of a warrantless search. See Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809
(1982) (“[An automobile] search is not unreasonable if based on
facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a
warrant has not actually been obtained.”); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)(stating that a search incident
to an arrest is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment). At trial, the Government opposed Fields’ motion to
suppress and argued that the search of Fields’ vehicle was
reasonable. We review a search for Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, and that issue has been preserved for appeal.
Sinisterra, 77 F.3d at 104. The Government was not required to
“raise innumerable issues despite an apparent lack of necessity
to do so.” United States v. Cardona, 955 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir.
1992).
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was probable cause to believe that Fields’ vehicle contained
contraband at the time of the search at issue. Probable cause is
determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). A narcotics
officer received information from a confidential source that
Fields was selling illegal narcotics.5 Officers observed Fields
in his black Impala and followed Fields when he drove to a
duplex. The officers maintained visual surveillance of Fields
for nearly an hour. During the surveillance, the officers
observed activity that they, through their training and
experience, associated with drug transactions. Following the
observed transactions, officers watched Fields place a black bag,
an electronic device and a cooler inside his Impala. The
officers watched Fields get into his car and drive away. When
the police followed Fields, he evaded them. Instead of pulling
over when Officer Wiesman turned on his lights, Fields
accelerated, drove at a very high speed, lost control of his car
and crashed the Impala into the side of the duplex. After the
crash, Fields climbed out the driver’s side window of the car and
ran on foot and was eventually arrested. All of these events
occurred before Officer Wiesman conducted the second search of
Fields’ vehicle. The events prior to the search, taken together,
5
The confidential source informed the narcotics officer
that someone named “T-Bone” was selling illegal narcotics. The
investigating officers knew Fields as T-Bone.
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amount to probable cause. See, e.g., id. at 241 (“Our decisions
applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined
above have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of
details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.”);
United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 799 n.26 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“[Unprovoked flight] is among the relevant contextual
considerations in the probable cause analysis.”); see also
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“Headlong
flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: It is
not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly
suggestive of such.”).
First, Fields argues that the automobile exception cannot
apply because it requires that the vehicle searched be “readily
mobile,” and that due to the crash, Fields’ Impala was not
readily mobile when the officer searched it. However, Fields
mischaracterizes the automobile exception. Even where an
automobile is not immediately mobile at the time of the search,
“the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a
readily mobile vehicle justifie[s] application of the vehicular
exception.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391
(1985)(emphasis added). Fields used his Impala as a readily
mobile vehicle throughout the police chase and in all the events
leading up to his arrest and the search in question.
Furthermore, the fact that Fields crashed his car after a
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police chase does not increase his privacy interest in his
vehicle. “An essential element to a successful challenge of a
search or seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds is the existence of
a legitimate expectation of privacy.” United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1980). “[R]educed expectations of privacy
[in a vehicle] derive . . . from the pervasive regulation of
vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” Carney,
471 U.S. at 392.6 Fields disregarded these “pervasive
regulations”: the Impala was involved in a high speed police
chase immediately prior to the search; Fields ran a stop sign,
drove erratically, and crashed into the side wall of a building.
If the car was not mobile at the time of the search,7 it was
solely by virtue of Fields complete disregard of driving
regulations, and this does not entitle him to a heightened
privacy interest.
Second, Fields contends that the automobile exception does
not apply because his vehicle was located on private property,
the duplex, at the time of the search. California v. Carney
6
In California v. Carney, the Supreme Court explained that
“although ready mobility alone was perhaps the original
justification for the vehicle exception, [its] later cases have
made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the
exception . . . the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s
automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home
or office.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (internal quotations
omitted).
7
There is no evidence in the record to indicate whether the
Impala was drivable after the crash.
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clarifies that the automobile exception applies when the vehicle
searched is “found stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential purposes.” 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985). Thus, we have
concluded that automobile exception may not apply when a vehicle
is parked at the residence of the criminal defendant challenging
the constitutionality of the search. See United States v.
Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Here, the mall
parking lot was not related to anyone’s residence.”); see also
United States v. Williams, 124 F. App’x 885, 887 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“[S]ome support exists for the proposition that the automobile
exception does not apply when a vehicle is parked in the
defendant’s private driveway . . . .”).
As an initial matter, the automobile exception applies
because Fields did not regularly use the duplex for residential
purposes. While there is some indication in the record that
Fields had an ownership interest in the duplex, a search of the
duplex revealed that Fields did not use the duplex as a
residence; he used it to sell his drugs. Furthermore, Fields’
vehicle was not parked in the driveway. Rather, Fields had
crashed the car into the side of the building. The Fourth
Amendment concerns that arise when the police search a car that
is parked in the driveway of a home, without a warrant, are not
present here. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-
62 (1971); see also United States v. Orona, 166 F. App’x 765, 766
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(5th Cir. 2006) (“[E]xigent circumstances are [] required to
justify a warrantless search of a vehicle when the vehicle is
parked in the driveway of a residence.”).
The search of Fields’ vehicle was valid under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, and we AFFIRM the district
court’s denial of Fields’ motion to suppress.
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