IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 2021 Term FILED
_______________ October 28, 2021
released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
No. 20-0065 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
_______________
ERIC PARKS,
Petitioner
v.
MUTUAL BENEFIT GROUP,
Respondent
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Monongalia County
The Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot, Judge
Civil Action No. 19-CAP-31
REVERSED AND REMANDED
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: October 6, 2021
Filed: October 28, 2021
Kevin T. Tipton, Esq. Jeanette H. Ho, Esq.
Tipton Law Offices Thomas, Thomas & Hafer LLP
Fairmont, West Virginia Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Respondent
JUSTICE ARMSTEAD delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. The appellate standard of review for a circuit court order either
granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law in a bench trial, made pursuant
to Rule 52 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, is de novo. On appeal, this Court,
after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party, will
sustain the granting of a judgment as a matter of law when only one reasonable conclusion
as to the verdict can be reached. But if reasonable minds could differ as to the importance
and sufficiency of the evidence, a circuit court's ruling granting a directed verdict will be
reversed. Syllabus Point 1, Waddy v. Riggleman, 216 W. Va. 250, 606 S.E.2d 222 (2004).
2. The plain language of Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
Magistrate Courts of West Virginia provides the exclusive methods of discovery in West
Virginia’s magistrate courts. Requests for admission are not a proper form of discovery in
magistrate courts.
i
Armstead, Justice:
Eric Parks (“Petitioner”) appeals the Circuit Court of Monongalia County’s
final order granting judgment as a matter of law 1 in the amount of $5,589.11 in favor of
Mutual Benefit Group (“Respondent”). The circuit court conducted a trial de novo from a
magistrate court judgment, in which Respondent brought an action against Petitioner as the
result of an automobile accident. The circuit court’s basis for its grant of judgment as a
matter of law was that Petitioner had failed to respond to requests for admissions that
Respondent had served upon Petitioner in the magistrate court. Because the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure for Magistrate Courts provide the exclusive means of discovery
in magistrate courts and clearly do not provide for parties to serve requests for admission,
we reverse the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2017, Petitioner and Renee Dillow (“Dillow”) were involved
in an automobile accident. Respondent was Dillow’s insurer and paid to her the sum of
1
Respondent sought “directed verdict and . . . judgment in its favor.”
Following the 1998 amendments to the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, a directed
verdict is now known as judgment as a matter of law. W. V. R. C. P., Rule 50 and W. V.
R. C. P., Rule 52. “As a result of amendments to the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1998, the legal phrase ‘directed verdict’ has been replaced . . . by the phrase
‘judgment as a matter of law.’” Mumaw v. U.S. Silica Co., 204 W. Va. 6, 10 n.4, 511
S.E.2d 117, 121 n.4 (1998). “[W]e note that these vestigial terms continue to occasionally
litter both this Court’s opinions and the arguments of attorneys.” Fredeking v. Tyler, 224
W. Va. 1, 4, 680 S.E.2d 16, 19 (2009). We will use the proper legal phrase contemplated
by Rules 50 and 52 throughout this opinion.
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$5,089.11 for the damage to her automobile. Dillow had a $500 deductible. Respondent
then brought suit in Monongalia County Magistrate Court to recover the monies it paid
Dillow and for Dillow’s deductible.
The magistrate court conducted a bench trial and found in favor of
Respondent in the amount of $5,589.11, plus court costs and interest. Petitioner appealed
that judgment to circuit court. The appeal of the magistrate court bench trial to circuit court
resulted in a trial de novo before the circuit court. See W. Va. Code § 50-5-12(d) (1994).
In the circuit court trial, Respondent presented its evidence first. Following
the close of Respondent’s case, Respondent moved for directed verdict 2 on the grounds
that Petitioner did not respond to requests for admission that were served in magistrate
court. During the course of the proceedings in magistrate court, Respondent served
requests for admission upon Petitioner and Petitioner did not answer them. 3 Petitioner
objected to the circuit court entering judgment against his client during the trial on the
grounds that the magistrate court has very limited discovery. This argument was detailed
in Petitioner’s written objection to entry of the circuit court’s final order. Nonetheless, the
circuit court agreed with Respondent and deemed the following matters admitted:
a) The accident between [Petitioner] and [Dillow] was caused
by [Petitioner’s] negligence;
2
See footnote 1.
3
As there is no record of bench trials conducted in West Virginia magistrate
courts we rely upon the representations of the parties. See W. Va. Code § 50-5-8(f) (1994).
2
b) The cost of repairs which were performed on [Dillow’s] car
total $5,589.11;
c) The repairs that were performed on [Dillow’s] car were
reasonable and necessary;
d) [Respondent] paid $5,089.11 for the repairs to [Dillow’s]
car;
e) [Dillow] paid the $500.00 deductible required under her
insurance policy for the repairs that were made to her car; and
f) The cost of repairs to [Dillow’s] car as well as the amounts
paid by [Dillow] and [Respondent] were fair and reasonable.
Before granting the motion for judgment as a matter of law, Petitioner was
not afforded the opportunity to present any evidence at the trial de novo in the circuit court
despite having witnesses, including Petitioner, available and ready to testify. The circuit
court found that “the [Petitioner] failed to respond [to the requests for admission], therefore
they’re admitted.” In its order, after having made the findings regarding the specific
admissions noted above, the circuit court found “that the motions [for a directed verdict
and judgment in its favor] are meritorious.”
It is from the circuit court’s entry of its final order granting judgment as a
matter of law that Petitioner appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Petitioner asserts that we should apply the de novo he standard of review
applicable to a circuit court’s grant of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law:
“The appellate standard of review for the granting of a
motion for a [judgment as a matter of law] pursuant to Rule 50
3
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is de novo. On
appeal, this court, after considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant party, will sustain the
granting of a [judgment as a matter of law] when only one
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict can be reached. But if
reasonable minds could differ as to the importance and
sufficiency of the evidence, a circuit court’s ruling granting a
directed verdict will be reversed.” Syllabus Point 3, Brannon
v. Riffle, 197 W.Va. 97, 475 S.E.2d 97 (1996).
Syllabus Point 5, Smith v. First Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., 212 W. Va. 809, 575 S.E.2d 419
(2002).
Respondent does not dispute whether Rule 50 applies but argues that we
should consider the standard of review applicable after a circuit court conducts a bench
trial, citing to a memorandum decision for this proposition. See Wiekle v. Bolling, No. 12-
0549, 2013 WL 3184956 (W. Va. June 24, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Upon consideration of the parties’ positions and the procedural posture of
this matter, we believe the circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
Rule 52 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Under that rule, the appropriate
standard of review, as under Rule 50, is de novo:
The appellate standard of review for a circuit court order
either granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of
law in a bench trial, made pursuant to Rule 52 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, is de novo. On appeal, this
Court, after considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant party, will sustain the granting of
a judgment as a matter of law when only one reasonable
4
Rule 52 specifically applies “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury.” This was a trial de novo tried before the circuit court without
a jury.
4
conclusion as to the verdict can be reached. But if reasonable
minds could differ as to the importance and sufficiency of the
evidence, a circuit court's ruling granting a directed verdict will
be reversed.
Syllabus Point 1, Waddy v. Riggleman, 216 W. Va. 250, 606 S.E.2d 222 (2004).
III. ANALYSIS
This case calls upon us to examine the proper scope of discovery in our
state’s magistrate courts. The Rules of Civil Procedure for the Magistrate Courts in West
Virginia were first promulgated by this Court in 1988 pursuant to our rulemaking authority
under Article VIII, § 3 of the West Virginia Constitution 5 and the provisions of West
Virginia Code § 51-1-4 (1935). 6 On their face, these rules clearly and unequivocally
5
Article VIII, § 3 of the Constitution of West Virginia states, in pertinent
part:
The court shall have power to promulgate rules for all
cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts
of the state relating to writs, warrants, process, practice and
procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.
W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3.
6
West Virginia Code § 51-1-4 provides:
The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time,
make and promulgate general rules and regulations governing
pleading, practice and procedure in such court and in all other
courts of record of this state. All statutes relating to pleading,
practice and procedure shall have force and effect only as rules
of court and shall remain in effect unless and until modified,
suspended or annulled by rules promulgated pursuant to the
(continued . . .)
5
provides the exclusive means of formal discovery in our magistrate courts. Rule 13 of
those rules provides:
Discovery shall be limited to the following methods:
(a) Production of Documents and Entry Upon Land. If the
parties are otherwise unable to agree, upon motion of any party
showing good cause and upon notice to all parties, the
magistrate may order another party to the action to:
(1) Produce and permit the inspection and photocopying by the
moving party of any designated documents or records or
tangible items which contain relevant evidence which are not
privileged, and which are in the possession, custody or control
of the party from whom production is sought; or
(2) Permit entry upon designated land or other property in the
possession or control of a party for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying or photographing the property if the
subject matter is relevant to the pending action.
The court order shall specify the time, place, and manner of
making the inspection and making the copies and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(b) Physical Examination. If the parties are otherwise unable to
agree, upon motion showing good cause and upon notice to all
parties, the magistrate may order another party to submit to a
physical examination by a physician, under the following
circumstances:
(1) A plaintiff claiming relief for physical injury caused by the
defendant’s actions may be ordered to submit to an
examination upon motion of the defendant.
(2) A defendant placing the defendant’s physical condition in
issue by way of defense or otherwise may similarly be ordered
to submit to an examination, upon motion of the plaintiff.
provisions of this section. Such rules and regulations shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade or class; but any court
of the state other than the Supreme Court of Appeals may adopt
rules of court governing its local practice, but such rules of
local practice shall not be inconsistent with any general rule of
court then in existence or thereafter promulgated, and shall be
effective only after approval by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
W. Va. Code § 51-1-4 (1935).
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(3) Notice shall be given to the party to be examined and to all
other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions and scope of any such examination and the person
or persons by whom it is to be made.
(4) If requested by the person examined, the party causing any
such examination to be made shall deliver to the person
examined a copy of a detailed written report of the examining
physician setting out the physician’s findings and conclusions.
(5) After such request and delivery, the party causing the
examination to be made shall be entitled upon request to
receive from the party examined a like report of any
examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same
physical condition.
(6) If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the
court on motion and hearing may order delivery on such terms
as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a
report the court may exclude the physician’s testimony if
offered at the trial.
(c) Failure to Comply. If any party refuses to obey an order
made under subdivision (a) or (b) of this rule, the magistrate
may:
(1) Order that the matters regarding the character or description
of the property or the contents of the paper, or the physical
condition of the party, or any other designated facts shall be
taken to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(2) Refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibit such party from
introducing in evidence designated documents or items of
testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical
conditions; or
(3) Stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed.
W. V. R. C. P. Mag. Ct., Rule 13.
In examining provisions of the companion West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, we have consistently stated that we must apply their plain language. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“The plain language of Rule 56(c)
7
mandates the entry of summary judgment. . . .”); Chichester ex rel. Estate of Cook v. Cook,
234 W. Va. 183, 188, 764 S.E.2d 343, 348 (2014) (applying plain language of Rule 56);
Mason v. Smith, 233 W. Va. 673, 678, 760 S.E.2d 487, 492 (2014) (applying plain language
of Rule 56); McComas v. ACF Industries, LCC, 232 W. Va. 19, 23, 750 S.E.2d 235, 239
(2013) (applying plain language of Rule 56); Motto v. CSX Transp., Inc., 220 W. Va. 412,
419-20, 647 S.E.2d 848, 855-6 (2007) (applying plain language of Rule 56); Powderidge
Unit Owners Ass’n v. Highland Properies, Ltd., 196 W. Va. 692, 702, 474 S.E.2d 872, 882
(1996) (cautioning litigants to heed the plain language of Rule 56(f)); Pettry v. Chesapeake
& O. Ry. Co., 148 W. Va. 443, 452, 135 S.E.2d 729, 734 (1964) (discussing the plain
language of Rule 81(a)(1)). Neither the briefs of the parties nor a plain reading of the
relevant procedural rules provides support for authorizing requests for admission to be
served in magistrate courts. To the contrary, the plain language of this rule limits discovery
to three methods and we must simply apply it.
Additionally, the relevant discovery provisions of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure do not apply in a circuit court appeal from magistrate court. See W. V.
R. C. P., Rule 81(a)(1) (“[I]n a case on appeal from a magistrate court, Rules 26 through
37 may not be used. . . .”). We have previously discussed how Rule 81 applies in trials de
novo in the circuit court:
It is provided under Rule 18(d), in part, that “[a]n appeal
of a civil action tried before a magistrate without a jury shall
be by trial de novo in circuit court without a jury.” Rule 18(d)
of the magistrate court rules is quite clear in limiting a circuit
court’s de novo jurisdiction over an appeal of a case tried in
8
magistrate court without a jury. See Burr v. Elmore, No. 13–
1078, 2014 WL 5328638, at *2 (W. Va. Oct. 20, 2014)
(memorandum decision) (“[T]he circuit court held a de novo
bench trial on respondent’s complaint and petitioner’s
counter-claim.” (emphasis added)). The jurisdiction of the
trial court in that situation does not extend to affording a
litigant a jury trial on an appeal. See Robin Davis and Louis J.
Palmer, Jr., “Handbook on the Rules of Civil Procedure for
West Virginia Magistrate Courts,” § 18(d), pg. 258 (2010).
It is further provided under W. Va. Code § 50–5–12(d)
that on an appeal of a magistrate decision “[t]he exhibits,
together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding,
constitute the exclusive record for appeal and shall be made
available to the parties.” See Davis and Palmer, “Handbook,”
§ 18(d) at 260. This statute is clear in prohibiting a trial court
from allowing discovery in a case appealed from magistrate
court. This limitation is consistent with Rule 81(a)(1) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 81(a)(1)
provides, in part:
When the appeal of a case has been granted or perfected,
these rules apply, except that, in a case on appeal from a
magistrate court, Rules 26 through 37 may not be used[.]
(Emphasis added.) See Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin Jean
Davis, and Louis J. Palmer, Jr., “Litigation Handbook on the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,” § 81(a)(1), pg. 1433
(2012) (“The rule also recognizes that all rules of civil
procedure, other than Rule 26 through Rule 37, apply in an
appeal to circuit court.”). It is clear that Rule 81(a)(1) also does
not allow the discovery provisions of Rules 26 through 37 to
be used in an appeal from a magistrate decision. See Cordell v.
Jarrett, 171 W.Va. 596, 599, 301 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1982)
(“Rule 81(a)(1) ... recognizes that all rules of civil procedure,
other than Rules 26 through 37, apply.”).
State ex rel. Veard v. Miller, 238 W. Va. 333, 338-39, 795 S.E.2d 55, 60-61 (2016).
9
Thus, we conclude that the plain language of Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the Magistrate Courts of West Virginia provides the exclusive methods of
discovery in West Virginia’s magistrate courts. Requests for admission are not a proper
form of discovery in magistrate courts. Rule 81 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure governs the de novo appeal of magistrate court bench trial decisions and such
rule expressly excludes the application of Rules 26 through 37 of the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure to such appeals. Because requests for admissions are a discovery tool
provided for in Rule 36 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, such requests are
not available to parties in circuit court appeals of magistrate court cases tried without a
jury. Accordingly, neither the magistrate court nor the circuit court had authority to deem
matters admitted in requests for admission improvidently served in magistrate court.
The Respondent appears to argue that, even excluding the evidence deemed
admitted pursuant to the requests for admission, there was sufficient evidence of record to
support the circuit court’s decision. We disagree with this position. Following the
presentation of Respondent’s case, and relying largely upon the Petitioner’s failure to
answer the requests for admissions, the circuit court granted the Respondent’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Petitioner was denied the opportunity to
present evidence before the circuit court in support of his position. The circuit court should
have denied Respondent’s motion at the conclusion of its evidence during the trial de novo
and allowed Petitioner to present his defense.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court erred in granting judgment as a
matter of law and therefore we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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