News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

THE NEWS AND OBSERVER 
PUBLISHING COMPANY; THE DURHAM
HERALD COMPANY; THE NEW YORK
TIMES COMPANY; GANNETT
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  No. 09-1010
v.
RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT
AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellant.


THE NEWS AND OBSERVER 
PUBLISHING COMPANY; THE DURHAM
HERALD COMPANY; THE NEW YORK
TIMES COMPANY; GANNETT
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  No. 09-1231
v.
RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT
AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.
(5:04-cv-00639-BO)
2 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
Argued: October 27, 2009

Decided: March 12, 2010

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and DAVIS,
Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the
majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson concurred. Judge
Davis wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: James P. McLoughlin, Jr., MOORE & VAN
ALLEN, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Adam
Bussian, III, THE BUSSIAN LAW FIRM, PLLC, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: John A. Zaloom,
David E. Fox, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Mark J. Prak, Charles E. Coble, Eric M. David,
BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEON-
ARD, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment to newspaper publishers bringing a First
Amendment challenge to a public airport’s total ban on news-
paper racks inside its terminals. We found a similar ban
unconstitutional in Multimedia Publishing Co. of South Caro-
lina, Inc. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport District, 991 F.2d
154 (4th Cir. 1993), which guides our decision today. Because
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 3
the government interests asserted to justify the ban do not
counterbalance its significant restriction on protected expres-
sion, we affirm.1

I.

As this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we
present the facts affecting our First Amendment analysis in
the light most favorable to the appellant. See Pueschel v.
Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2009). Appellant Raleigh-
Durham Airport Authority (the "Authority") was chartered by
the North Carolina General Assembly to operate the Raleigh-
Durham International Airport (the "Airport"). See 1939 N.C.
Pub. L. ch. 168. Appellees The News and Observer Publish-
ing Company; The Durham Herald Company; The New York
Times Company; and Gannett Company, Incorporated (the
"Publishers") publish and distribute four daily newspapers:
The News & Observer, The Herald-Sun, The New York Times,
and USA TODAY.

A.

The Airport facilitates air travel for the region known as the
"Triangle area," which encompasses Raleigh, Durham, and
Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Every year millions of travelers
pass through the Airport. During the relevant time period, the
Airport consisted of two terminals, labeled A and C, that
shared one attached parking deck and eleven outer parking
1
This appeal also involves a challenge to the district court’s order
awarding attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920. The appellant contends that by awarding "those fees and expenses
the publishers incur from December 2008 through the conclusion of this
case," J.A. 1171, the court granted a "‘blanket’ award of attorney’s fees
. . . without any mechanism for evaluating the reasonableness of the pro-
spective fees," Appellant’s Br. at 62. Nothing in the court’s order, how-
ever, suggests that the publishers would ever be entitled to attorney’s fees
and costs without proving their reasonableness. Therefore, we find no
error and affirm.
4 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
lots reachable by shuttle bus. Each terminal had a non-secure
area for ticketing and baggage pickup, and a secure area or
"concourse" for loading and unloading passengers on planes.
Whereas anyone could access the non-secure areas, only tick-
eted travelers and authorized personnel could enter the secure
areas. Entering a secure area required passing through a secur-
ity checkpoint operated by the Transportation Security
Administration ("TSA").2

The Airport was intended not only to facilitate air travel but
also to generate revenue. Federal law requires making the
facility as financially self-sustaining as possible. See 49
U.S.C. § 47107(a)(13) (conditioning federal grant money
upon "the airport owner or operator . . . maintain[ing] a sched-
ule of charges for use of facilities and services at the airport
. . . that will make the airport as self-sustaining as possible").
The Authority generated revenue for the Airport in various
ways, including (1) leasing wall space for advertising, (2)
charging a fixed rent to shops and restaurants inside each ter-
minal, and (3) charging additional rent calculated as ten per-
cent of gross profits.

Inside each terminal were numerous shops and restaurants,
located mostly within the secure area where travelers waited
before departing. These concessions, which included various
eating establishments and retail stores, were selected and
arranged under "a master plan for the retail and food service
concession space" designed to "maximize customer service
and . . . revenue to the Authority."3 J.A. 265. The terminals
2
The Airport was substantially renovated after this litigation began. Ter-
minal C was demolished, a brand new terminal was constructed, and the
Airport’s terminals are now labeled 1 and 2. The Authority moved to sup-
plement the record on appeal to reflect this renovation, but we denied its
motion. See Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir County Bd. of Educ., 216 F.3d 380, 384
(4th Cir. 2000) ("From a procedural standpoint, courts hearing a case on
appeal are limited to reviewing the record that has been developed
below.").
3
In 1998, the Authority hired consultant Ann Ferraguto "to plan and
implement a master plan for the retail and food service concession space
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 5
also contained vending machines, racks displaying brochures,
information kiosks, television monitors, ATM machines,
email stations, shoe-shine stations, trash bins, bathrooms,
plants, and other features intended to serve travelers or boost
revenue.

In early 2002, the Publishers contacted the Authority about
placing coin-operated newsracks inside the terminals, where
newsracks had never been placed before. At that time, news-
papers could only be purchased from various shops. Terminal
A’s secure area had four shops selling newspapers. Three
"RDU-Press" shops were located by Gates 5, 8, and 14/16,
and an "RDU-Press Plus" shop was located by Gate 19. Ter-
minal A’s non-secure area had a "JQ Snacks" kiosk near the
baggage claim area that offered USA Today. Terminal C’s
secure area had two shops selling newspapers. These were the
"Hudson News" shop and the "Hudson News and Book" shop
located near the TSA security checkpoint. Finally, Terminal
C’s non-secure area had one shop selling newspapers located
between the baggage claim and ticketing areas. All these
shops could offer any newspaper selection they chose, but the
Authority generally expected them to carry The News &
Observer and The Herald-Sun.

Although the Airport was open to the public twenty-four
hours every day, the shops normally opened between 5:30
a.m. and 6:30 a.m., and closed between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00
p.m. They were "required to open before the first flights [left]
. . . each morning and remain open until after the last flights

within the airport terminals." J.A. 265. The Authority implemented that
plan in 2000 by reorganizing concession space inside each terminal and
entering new concession contracts. No single document comprises the
entire "master plan," but the Authority stated during oral argument that
Ingrid Hairston’s memorandum dated July 10, 2000, provides a reliable
summary. Nothing in the record suggests that anyone involved in develop-
ing the master plan ever considered placing newsracks inside the termi-
nals.
6 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
depart[ed] each evening." J.A. 296. Among the five hundred
or so flights that arrived at or departed from the Airport every
day, however, about thirty-seven were scheduled to arrive
after the shops had closed. Passengers aboard these flights or
any flights delayed beyond the normal hours were therefore
unable to purchase a newspaper.

The record also reflects other issues regarding the adequacy
of newspaper circulation. For example, the Authority received
complaints that newspapers were sometimes unavailable dur-
ing the early morning hours. Furthermore, The Durham Her-
ald Company received complaints that the shops sold out of
The Herald-Sun. Notwithstanding, the Authority declined to
regulate how many newspapers were stocked, reasoning that
the shops had a financial incentive to meet demand.

B.

In January 2002, The News and Observer Publishing Com-
pany (the "Observer") inquired about the possibility of plac-
ing newsracks inside the terminals. In response, the Authority
asserted "an informal policy that newspapers would be dis-
tributed via the newsstands/gift shops in the terminals," and
explained that "there had been no complaints from customers
with respect to newspapers being available only in those
shops." J.A. 230-31. The Authority also raised concerns about
security, floor space, and losing revenue from shop sales.

The Observer and Authority did not discuss newsracks
again until about two years later. On February 17, 2004, the
Observer faxed a letter to the Authority asserting that its ban
on newsracks would unlikely survive First Amendment scru-
tiny, requesting permission to place and stock "a limited num-
ber of newsracks at locations in the terminal and on the
concourses . . . without charge," and promising that the news-
racks would be "as ‘security friendly’ as technology currently
allows." J.A. 167. The Authority refused this request. On
March 31, 2004, the Observer faxed another letter asserting
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 7
"the right to place [Observer] newsracks on the concourses"
and threatening litigation, but the Authority again refused.
J.A. 168.

On September 2, 2004, the Publishers sued the Authority in
the Eastern District of North Carolina. Their complaint
alleged that the Authority’s refusal to allow newsracks inside
the terminals violated the First Amendment and North Caro-
lina Constitution. The Publishers requested both injunctive
relief and attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Specifically, the Publishers sought a
permanent injunction letting them place 208 newsracks in 26
locations throughout the Airport terminals.4

The Authority and Publishers filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
After initially denying both motions, the district court
amended its decision and granted the Publishers’ motion for
summary judgment regarding their First Amendment claim.
See The News & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham
Airport Auth., 588 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 (E.D.N.C. 2008). The
court reasoned that banning "the installation of news racks
within the terminals ‘substantially burdens the newspaper
companies’ expressive conduct within that public place,’" id.
at 658 (quoting Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159), and that con-
cerns about security, aesthetics, preserving revenue, and pre-
venting congestion were not "sufficiently powerful interests to
justify the burden on protected expression," id. This appeal
followed.
4
Although it provides factual context, this request does not affect our
First Amendment analysis. We decide today only whether the Authority
violated the Constitution by banning any newsracks inside the terminals,
not whether 208 newsracks should be mandated. That and other remedial
issues remain for another day.
8 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
II.

On appeal, the Authority challenges the district court’s
grant of summary judgment. We "review[] a district court’s
decision to grant summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standards as the district court." Pueschel, 577 F.3d
at 563. Summary judgment should be granted "if the plead-
ings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Facts are "material"
when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a "genu-
ine issue" exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable
jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving
party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" when the
nonmoving party fails to make an adequate showing on an
essential element for which it has the burden of proof at trial.
See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804
(1999). "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all justifi-
able inferences are to be drawn in that party’s favor." Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (internal quotations
omitted). To overcome a motion for summary judgment, how-
ever, the nonmoving party "may not rely merely on allega-
tions or denials in its own pleading" but must "set out specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The Publishers’ complaint alleged that the Authority’s total
ban on newsracks inside the terminals violated the First
Amendment. Multimedia addressed a similar challenge on
appeal from a final judgment after a bench trial. The district
court there found that the Greenville-Spartanburg Airport
Commission’s (the "Commission") ban on newsracks inside
the Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport ("GSP") vio-
lated the First Amendment.

GSP had two terminals, labeled A and B, that were con-
nected by both a direct walkway and a ticketing area with
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 9
walkways leading to each terminal. Newspapers could be pur-
chased either from a newsrack located in the parking deck or
from a souvenir shop located between terminal A and the tick-
eting area. The shop was open from 6:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.
and had a sign advertising the newsrack outside, but travelers
using terminal B were unlikely to pass the shop. Likewise,
travelers not using the parking deck were unlikely to pass the
newsrack.

We held that "the First Amendment protects distribution as
well as publication" of newspapers and that "modes of distri-
bution involving permanent or semi-permanent occupation of
publicly-owned property don’t lose First Amendment protec-
tion because of that fact." Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 158. After
noting that the Commission allowed only limited means of
newspaper distribution, we upheld the district court’s decision
that concerns about aesthetics, preserving revenue, preventing
congestion, and security failed to justify the heavy restriction
on protected expression. See id. at 160-63.

Although the procedural posture here differs, Multimedia
provides the substantive legal framework for our analysis. In
deciding whether government property should be made avail-
able for protected expressive activity such as newspaper dis-
tribution, we apply different levels of protection for different
types of government property. See id. at 162; see also Perry
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
44-46 (1983). Stringent protection applies for "public
forums," i.e., "places which by long tradition or by govern-
ment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate," but less
protection applies for "nonpublic forums," i.e., "[p]ublic prop-
erty which is not by tradition or designation a forum for pub-
lic communication." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The Supreme
Court has declared that airports are nonpublic forums. See
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 679-80 (1992). Accordingly, the following protection
applies in this case: "In addition to time, place, and manner
regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended
10 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regula-
tion on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speak-
er’s view." Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159 (quoting Perry, 460
U.S. at 46).

Because no one argues that the Authority’s total ban on
newsracks inside the terminals discriminated based on view-
point, we need only consider its reasonableness. See id.
"[R]easonableness . . . must be assessed ‘in the light of the
purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances.’"
Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985)). Although the ban "need not
be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation" on
protected expression, "it isn’t enough simply to establish that
the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate governmen-
tal objective, as might be the case for a typical exercise of the
government’s police power." Id. Instead, Multimedia requires
the following analysis:

The degree and character of the impairment of pro-
tected expression involved, discounted by any miti-
gating alternatives that remain to the aggrieved
party, must be considered. . . . The validity of any
asserted justification for the impairment must then
be assessed and, if found valid, then weighed in the
balance against the impairment. . . . Because regula-
tions other than mere time, place, and manner
restrictions must be designed to reserve the forum
for its intended purposes, the overall assessment
must be undertaken with an eye to the intended pur-
poses of this particular airport terminal and of the
ways in which the regulated conduct . . . might actu-
ally interfere with the carrying out of those purposes.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Consistent with
Multimedia, but through the lens of summary judgment, we
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 11
now consider whether the Authority’s total ban on newsracks
inside the terminals was reasonable.5

A.

First we measure the Authority’s restriction on the Publish-
ers’ protected expressive activity, namely, newspaper distri-
bution. This analysis hinges not upon a projected difference
in newspaper sales but rather upon the Publishers’ access to
Airport users for speech purposes. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 684
(upholding a regulation "limiting solicitation . . . to the side-
walk areas outside . . . [airport] terminals" and reasoning that,
because "[t]his sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelm-
ing percentage of airport users, . . . the resulting access of
those who would solicit the general public is quite com-
plete"). Among other things, we consider the extent to which
people visiting the Airport could have received the Publish-
ers’ message by buying their newspapers. See Multimedia,
991 F.2d at 160 (reasoning that "the Commission’s newsrack
ban makes newspapers hard to come by for many patrons of
the Greenville-Spartanburg Airport and impossible for others,
thereby placing a heavy burden on the newspaper companies’
protected distribution activity").

Even drawing all reasonable inferences in the Authority’s
favor, we are constrained to find that its total ban on news-
racks inside the Airport’s terminals significantly restricted the
Publishers’ ability to distribute newspapers. The record
reflects that travelers had trouble buying newspapers from the
shops. There were instances of unavailability during the early
morning, and the shops would sell out of The Herald-Sun.
5
The Authority contends that we should apply a different analysis,
assessing reasonableness without weighing asserted justifications against
the restriction on protected expression, because its ban on newsracks
inside the terminals arose from a business judgment. See Appellant’s Br.
at 28-32. We disagree. Because the ban considered in Multimedia also
resulted from a business judgment, this case cannot be distinguished from
Multimedia on that basis.
12 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
Furthermore, the Authority concedes that newspapers were
unavailable once the shops closed each day around 9:00 p.m.
This means that passengers aboard the thirty-seven flights
scheduled to arrive after that time or aboard flights delayed
past that point could never purchase a newspaper upon land-
ing. The Publishers’ ability to reach these people inside the
terminals was thus nonexistent. Finally, the Airport’s tightly
contained character enhanced this burden on newspaper distri-
bution. See id. ("If a governmental entity imposed a similar
ban on newsrack placement on city streets and sidewalks,
those desiring a paper might find private vendors on nearby
private property taking advantage of a newly created market;
but the Airport’s ban offers no similar opportunity for patrons
or vendors."). For these reasons, we conclude that the Author-
ity’s total ban on newsracks inside the terminals significantly
restricted the Publishers’ protected expression.

B.

Next we determine whether the Authority asserted legiti-
mate interests that counterbalance the restriction on protected
expression. Given that the Authority may "reserve the forum
for its intended purposes," our analysis here must keep in
mind the Airport’s intended purposes of facilitating air travel
and raising revenue. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. We also note that
the Authority "need not have adduced specific factual evi-
dence that its interests were advanced by the ban or that the
expressive activity banned did interfere with the forum’s
intended use." Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 160. Instead, the
Authority generally "was entitled to advance its interests by
arguments based on appeals to common sense and logic." Id.

The Authority asserts four interests to justify totally ban-
ning newsracks inside the terminals: aesthetics, preserving
revenue, preventing congestion, and security. We recognize
the legitimacy of these interests. See id. at 161 (noting that
government interests in aesthetics and preserving revenue are
legitimate); Lee, 505 U.S. at 683-85 (deeming legitimate the
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 13
government interest in preventing congestion); Jacobsen v.
City of Rapid City, 128 F.3d 660, 662-63 (8th Cir. 1997)
(deeming legitimate the government interest in airport secur-
ity). Below we consider whether they counterbalance the sig-
nificant restriction on protected expression.

1.

First, we consider the Authority’s interest in preserving the
Airport’s aesthetics. Although arguments based solely on
logic or common sense normally are allowed, Multimedia
stated that asserting an "interest in aesthetics . . ., without
more, isn’t sufficient to . . . permit the restriction of protected
expression." Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 161. We added that aes-
thetic concerns have been found substantial enough to justify
restricting protected expression only where "the aesthetic
harm has been both substantial and widely recognized," and
noted "that the speech restricted has often been of low First
Amendment value." Id. (citations omitted).

The Authority has offered no evidence that placing news-
racks inside the Airport’s terminals would cause substantial
and widely recognizable aesthetic harm. Nor does common
sense or logic support that conclusion. We cannot see how an
appropriate number of carefully placed newsracks fashioned
to complement each terminal’s interior design would have
substantially undermined the Airport’s aesthetics. Moreover,
the Authority has proffered no justification to distinguish
newsracks from the vending machines, racks displaying bro-
chures, ATM machines, and other visual obtrusions that
existed inside the terminals. For these reasons, we conclude
that the Authority’s aesthetic interest cannot counterbalance
the significant restriction on protected expression.

2.

Second, we consider the Authority’s interest in preserving
revenue. The Authority argues that we should adopt its busi-
14 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
ness judgment under the "concession master plan," which
excludes newsracks but purports to maximize revenue. J.A.
265. The Authority also proffered expert testimony that let-
ting people buy newspapers from newsracks would affect
shops’ sales not only of newspapers but also of snacks and
other items that customers seeking newspapers might pur-
chase on impulse. Fewer sales would mean less revenue for
the Authority, which received ten percent of shops’ gross
profits.

At the very least, these arguments fail to address the signif-
icant restriction on protected expression we identified,
namely, that the Publishers cannot distribute newspapers
inside the terminals to passengers arriving when the shops are
closed, and that at times newspapers are otherwise unavail-
able. We cannot see, and indeed the Authority has offered no
evidence or rational explanation for, how allowing newsracks
in such circumstances could detract from sales or affect reve-
nue.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the Authority’s reli-
ance on the master plan for concessions. Nothing in the record
or briefs suggests that, when the master plan was being devel-
oped, its creators even considered newsracks. Accordingly,
that the plan excludes newsracks provides no basis for con-
cluding that placing some number inside the terminals would
be inconsistent with maximizing revenue.

Finally, Multimedia considered and rejected a similar argu-
ment about lost revenue on the ground that the Commission
"could have exacted a concession for papers sold from news-
racks equal to that assessed against the shop." Multimedia,
991 F.2d at 161. We do not foreclose that possibility here.6
6
Once again, we stress the limited nature of our inquiry. We consider
only whether banning all newsracks inside the terminals violated the First
Amendment. Such issues as number, placement, and cost are beyond the
scope of our analysis.
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 15
For these reasons, we conclude that the Authority’s interest in
preserving revenue cannot counterbalance the significant
restriction on protected expression.

3.

Third, we consider the Authority’s interest in preventing
congestion. The Authority draws support from the following
description of newsracks:

A standard newsrack projects twenty inches into a
passenger movement corridor. An object of this size
reduces the pedestrian traffic flow capacity of the
corridor by 42 people per minute. A USA TODAY
type newsrack, being used by a standing customer
with the cabinet door fully extended, reduces pedes-
trian traffic flow capacity by 110 people per minute,
without allowing for any baggage placed on the floor
while the device is in use.

Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 716 F.Supp.
140, 153 (D.N.J. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 894 F.2d 61
(3d Cir. 1990). The Authority might well posit a government
interest against spreading a large number of newsracks indis-
criminately throughout the terminals, but that is not the sce-
nario presented. The Authority has not simply prohibited a
large number of newsracks from being randomly spread
around the terminals; it has banned them all. Accordingly, we
need only consider how much congestion would result from
a "limited number" of carefully placed newsracks—the
amount requested by the Observer’s February 17, 2004, letter.
J.A. 167.

Having properly framed the question, we are ultimately
bound by Multimedia. There, we stated that "common sense"
allays fears of congestion around newsracks. Multimedia, 991
F.2d at 162. We reasoned that, because the Supreme Court
found the congestion at an airport created by "a large number
16 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
of peaceful leafletters seeking out passersby and attempting to
engage them in dialogue" insufficient to justify banning that
expressive activity, id. at 162 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 690
(O’Connor, J., concurring)), "the obviously trivial congestion-
related difficulties posed by carefully placed inanimate news-
racks cannot justify the Commission’s ban either," id.
Accordingly, we find here that a limited number of carefully
placed newsracks would create only trivial congestion.7 Cf.
Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997)
("The incremental contribution to congestion that five ped-
dlers can make in a sea of hundreds of thousands of festival-
goers is very small.").

Furthermore, the record reflects the presence of numerous
free-standing objects inside the terminals. The Authority prof-
fers no basis on which to distinguish newsracks from the
plants, vending machines, racks displaying brochures, ATM
machines, email stations, trash bins, and similar objects
already present. For these reasons, we conclude that the
Authority’s interest in preventing congestion cannot counter-
balance the significant restriction on protected expression.

4.

Finally, we consider the Authority’s interest in maintaining
security within the Airport. The Authority contends that
newsracks could become hiding places for bombs or weapons,
and that stocking them would require letting delivery persons
7
That Multimedia applied a different legal standard makes no differ-
ence. Its holding about congestion was based on common sense rather than
factual evidence, and summary judgment does not require ignoring logic
or common sense to favor the nonmoving party. See Nat’l Amusements,
Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 743 (1st Cir. 1995) ("While the
summary judgment mantra requires us to draw every reasonable inference
in favor of the nonmoving party, inferences, to qualify, must flow ratio-
nally from the underlying facts; that is, a suggested inference must ascend
to what common sense and human experience indicates is an acceptable
level of probability.").
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 17
through TSA security checkpoints. In support, the Deputy
Airport Director for Operations Mike McElvaney provided an
affidavit stating that placing newsracks throughout the Airport
would create security risks and burden security personnel,
who would need to screen delivery persons and repeatedly
check newsracks for contraband. Notably, McElvaney con-
fined his analysis to "the information provided by the Plain-
tiffs in this action identifying 26 locations where they want to
place 208 news racks at the Airport." J.A. 316.

Without in any way diminishing the importance of security
concerns, we again note the extent to which the Airport’s evi-
dence misses the mark. McElvaney premised his analysis on
the existence of 208 newsracks throughout the Airport. The
Authority, however, has banned all newsracks inside the ter-
minals. McElvaney’s analysis indicates little about the secur-
ity risk created by allowing a carefully calibrated newsrack
presence. Such risk could not be more than de minimis. We
find Multimedia particularly instructive on this point: "The
Federal Aviation Administration has no safety or security reg-
ulations addressed to newsracks, and proper design would
render them highly unsuitable for bomb placement. . . . The
incremental danger to airport security posed by newsracks is
entirely de minimis." Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 162 (internal
citation omitted).

In addition to being facially overbroad, the Authority’s evi-
dence has "fail[ed] to distinguish the security impact of news-
racks from that of other places in the terminal where a
weapon or bomb can be placed, such as, restrooms, trash cans,
various plants placed in the terminal for aesthetic purposes,
and within newsstands and kiosks." News & Observer, 588 F.
Supp. 2d at 659; see also Jacobsen, 128 F.3d at 663 (dismiss-
ing a similar concern "because the terminal has many other
places where a bomb could be hidden, such as waste contain-
ers and plant holders, and if anything, the glass door on the
front of a newsrack makes it a less suitable place to hide a
bomb."). We therefore conclude that the Authority’s security
18 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
interest cannot counterbalance the significant restriction on
protected expression.

In sum, the record contains insufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Authority’s
asserted interests justify the total ban on newsracks inside the
terminals. Nor does the record support the conclusion that
carefully placing an appropriate number of newsracks inside
the terminals would be incompatible with the Airport’s
intended purposes of facilitating air travel and raising reve-
nue. Cf. Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 163 ("Nothing in the eviden-
tiary record of this case, or in the Commission’s arguments,
suggests that a reasonably controlled placement of a limited
number of newsracks in this terminal would significantly, if
at all, interfere with either the primary or secondary intended
purposes of its operation."). For the reasons stated above, we

AFFIRM.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The issue in this case is whether the court below properly
granted summary judgment to the newspaper publishers when
it held that the Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority’s ban on
newsracks violated the publishers’ First Amendment rights
under Multimedia v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist.,
991 F.2d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1993). My colleagues find that
"the government interests asserted to justify the ban do not
counterbalance its significant restriction on protected expres-
sion[.]" Maj. Op. at 3. But that conclusion answers the wrong
inquiry. Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, the question is simply whether the evidentiary
record reflects the existence of genuine disputes of material
fact. I conclude that it does, and therefore, I would vacate the
district court’s order granting summary judgment and remand
this case for trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 19
I.

In the Fifth Circuit, district courts have been afforded sig-
nificant authority to find facts even when they are considering
motions for summary judgment if the proceeding is a nonjury
case. Cf. In re Placid Oil Co., 932 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir.
1991). But while our court has grudgingly embraced that
notion in a narrow context, see Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe
des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Estrangers a Monaco, 329
F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106 (2004),
this is not one of those instances. No party here consented to
have the district court convert the summary judgment record
into a trial record, permitting the district court to engage in
fact-finding. Rather, in this case,

the district court was not entitled to find facts and
resolve conflicting inferences at this stage of the pro-
ceedings. Nor was it allowed to draw reasonable
inferences from the facts before it as if it were a fact-
finder. Indeed, given the posture of the case, the
court was required to resolve all inferences in favor
of the non-moving party.

Id. at 394 (Motz, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the facts in this
case and the inferences fairly to be drawn from them must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
here, the Authority. Pueschel, 577 F.3d at 563. Even though
this case will be tried without a jury because the parties did
not request one, there must nevertheless be a trial.

II.

Appellant Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority (the "Author-
ity") operates the Raleigh-Durham Airport (the "Airport"), a
facility that has two passenger terminals, each with its own
departure and arrival concourse, baggage claim, and ticketing
area. As of 2007, approximately ten million passengers passed
20 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
through the Airport annually, and in 2004, the Authority’s
operating budget was approximately 65 million dollars.

The vast majority of the Airport’s passengers have ample
access to newspapers. There are multiple vendors in the air-
port, many of which sell newspapers and magazines, along
with other non-newspaper items, such as food. As the major-
ity opinion indicates, these shops were "required to open
before the first flight [left] . . . each morning and remain open
until the last flight depart[ed] each evening." J.A. 296. They
normally opened between 4:30 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. and closed
between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., although the shops often
closed later when flights were delayed.

As the majority indicates, in January 2002, The News and
Observer Publishing Company ("the Observer") inquired
about the possibility of placing newsracks inside the termi-
nals. The Authority tentatively agreed to allow installation of
newsracks in the Airport’s parking areas. The Observer
declined the Authority’s offer, likely because it did not want
to pay rent and concession fees. The Publishers then filed suit,
demanding that the Authority permit them to install 208
newsracks throughout the Airport.

III.

The surprising procedural history of this case merits atten-
tion. On September 29, 2007, the district court denied cross
motions for summary judgment. The court explained that it
was required by Multimedia to undertake an intensive fact-
based inquiry, and that it could not resolve this case as a mat-
ter of law because it contained multiple material and disputed
facts.

The court identified five such facts. They were (1) the
severity of the burden faced by customers at the Airport in
buying newspapers; (2) the validity of the aesthetic justifica-
tion offered by the Authority for refusing to allow racks in the
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 21
terminals; (3) the Authority’s potential loss of revenue from
the allowance of racks in the terminals and the resulting
decline in sales the Authority’s authorized concessions would
see as a result; (4) the safety issues involved in having news-
racks in crowded terminals; and (5) the security issues
involved in having newsracks in the secure areas of the termi-
nals. J.A. 1123-27.

The district court concluded:

Both parties have answered, in various forms, their
opponents arguments with straight factual contradic-
tions—contradictions that require a weighing of the
evidence, not mere arguments on the law. Such a
multitude of disputed and highly specific factual
contradictions, enhanced by the volume of the
motions and reply, raises a cacophony of arguments
that cannot be settled in a mere summary judgment
hearing.

J.A. 1127.

The court scheduled a bench trial for November 13, 2007.
On the eve of trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel requested a continuance
to address a serious medical problem in his family, and the
court granted the continuance. Neither party filed anything
with the court between November 13, 2007, and November
24, 2008.

Over one year after the court denied the cross motions for
summary judgment, on November 24, 2008, the district court
issued an amended order, granting summary judgment to the
Plaintiffs. The court offered no explanation for the change,
and none is apparent, since the court did not receive any fil-
ings or additional briefing between its first and second rul-
ings.

In its amended order, the district court applied the same
reasonableness analysis from Multimedia that it used in its
22 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
first opinion. The only difference was that — without receiv-
ing any new factual evidence or hearing any new legal argu-
ments — it methodically reversed each of its prior
conclusions, converting genuine and material factual disputes
into legal conclusions simply by declaring them as such. J.A.
1140-42.

IV.

Clearly, the legal framework set forth in Multimedia con-
trols the outcome of this case. The question presented under
Multimedia is whether the ban is reasonable "in the light of
the purpose[s] of the forum and all the surrounding circum-
stances." 991 F.2d at 159. The Authority must establish a rea-
sonable fit between its ends and its means. Bd. of Trustees of
State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). The
fit need not be perfect, only reasonable. The Multimedia test
evaluates the severity of the burden imposed by the ban, and
then weighs that burden against the government’s interests
and asks if the ban is reasonable. See Maj. Op. at 12-13.

A.

As did the majority, I start by quantifying the burden suf-
fered by potential newspaper customers. In Multimedia, the
court’s burden analysis focused on whether newspaper dis-
tributors and potential newspaper buyers had access to news-
papers via alternative channels such as gift shops or retail
stores. Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159. This analysis hinges not
upon a projected difference in newspaper sales but rather
upon the Publishers’ access to Airport users for speech pur-
poses. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 684.

To help identify the overall burden suffered by the custom-
ers at the Airport, it is useful to contrast the situation at the
Airport with the situation at Greenville-Spartanburg Airport
("GSP"), the airport at issue in Multimedia. This comparison
makes it clear that a factfinder could reasonably find that the
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 23
Airport’s customers suffer only a minimal burden. The Air-
port boasts significantly more newspaper vendors, the vendors
are open longer hours, and the newspapers sold by these ven-
dors are more prominently displayed.

Customers at the Airport enjoy substantially broader and
easier access to newspapers than those at GSP. Prior to Multi-
media, GSP contained only one shop, and it was "a substantial
distance from the gate areas." Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159.
Moreover, the sole shop was accessible only in one of the
GSP’s two terminals. At the Airport, however, customers may
choose between multiple gift shops in both of its terminals,
both inside and outside the secure passenger area.1

The shops at the Airport are also open longer. At GSP, the
single shop was open from 6:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. Multimedia,
991 F.2d at 160. Here, the newspaper vendors are open before
the first flight leaves the Airport each morning and they
remain open until after the last flight departs each evening,
typically from as early as 4:30 a.m. to as late as 9:00 p.m. J.A.
296. Further, many shops remain open after the last flight is
scheduled to depart if extraordinary events, such as bad
weather, cause flight delays. J.A. 296, 327, 352.

The newspapers at the Airport are also more prominently
displayed than they were at GSP. The shops draw attention to
their newspapers with displays visible from outside the shops.
J.A. 327, 326-27. At GSP, the only shop that sold newspapers
did not display them visibly, and instead, the newspapers
were put in the back of the shop on a flat shelf. Multimedia,
991 F.2d at 160.
1
At the time the district court denied summary judgment, Terminal A
had five shops and two kiosks selling newspapers, with one of those shops
and one of those kiosks located outside the secure passenger area. J.A.
413-15. Terminal C had three shops selling newspapers, one located out-
side the secure passenger area and two in the secure area. J.A. 289-290.
24 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
For all of these reasons, it is clear that the burden on pas-
sengers at the Airport is considerably less onerous than the
pre-Multimedia burden imposed on GSP passengers. But the
analysis does not end with a simple comparison, because a
review of the absolute burden imposed on the Airport’s pas-
sengers by the newspaper rack ban also demonstrates the
weakness of the burden.

The overall burden is weak because the vast majority of
passengers flow through the Airport when shops selling news-
papers are open, and it is undisputed that these passengers
have access to newspapers. More specifically, approximately
500 passenger flights arrive and depart from the Airport daily.
J.A. 418. Of these 500 flights, all departing passengers and
90% of arriving passengers have full access to open shops. Id.
The small percentage of passengers who lack access to the
shops are those who arrive in the late evening, after 9:00 p.m.
As the Authority demonstrates, these late arrivals are
extremely unlikely to buy anything because they are deplan-
ing passengers, and deplaning passengers account for only
10% of all airport purchases. Id. (explaining that enplaning
(i.e., departing) passengers make 90% of all airport pur-
chases). Further, as a matter of common sense and logic, see
Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 160, passengers who arrive at an air-
port in the late evening are unlikely to buy newspapers. By
9:00 p.m., the day is over; the newspaper that was published
earlier that morning contains outdated news, soon to be
replaced by the next day’s newspaper. For all of these rea-
sons, very few people are practically affected by this ban.2

Although the majority purports to draw all reasonable infer-
2
The majority notes that the Airport’s "tightly contained character
enhanced" the burden imposed by the newspaper rack. But the Authority
offered to permit the Observer to install newspaper racks in its garages.
J.A. 230. If the Observer had installed such newspaper racks, deplaning
passengers who arrived late in the evening — assuming that they wanted
newspapers — would have had access to purchase them.
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 25
ences in favor of the Authority as the non-movant, its burden
analysis suggests otherwise. The majority finds that passen-
gers suffer a heavy burden when they attempt to purchase
newspapers because (1) travelers had "trouble buying newspa-
pers from the shops[,]" (2) "[t]here were instances of
unavailability during the early morning," and (3) "the shops
would sell out of The Herald-Sun." Maj. Op. at 11. These
assertions are removed from their factual context and fail to
accord the Authority the proper favorable inferences to which
it is entitled under our precedents.

As to the first issue, the overwhelming evidence is that
travelers did not have trouble buying newspapers at the shops.3
Travelers could patronize any one of multiple stores open for
their convenience, all of which sold newspapers and displayed
them prominently. At the time the district court denied sum-
mary judgment (before it granted summary judgment on the
same evidentiary record), Terminal A had five shops and two
kiosks selling newspapers, with one of those shops and one of
those kiosks located outside the secure passenger area. Termi-
nal C had three shops selling newspapers, one located outside
the secure passenger area and two in the secure area. Further,
3
The majority may be referring to the occasional complaint received by
the Authority. The evidence shows that the Authority received very few
complaints about newspapers, J.A. 296, 424, and that most complaints
referred to the lack of newspapers early in the morning. J.A. 313. Between
November 2004 and August 17, 2007, less than 0.7% of the total feedback
(or 9 of 1283 complaints) to the airport expressed any concern about
access to newspapers. J.A. 417; see also J.A. 1068 (statistics from April
of 2003); J.A. 313 (airport has received less than 5 complaints about news-
papers since moving its complaint system online); J.A. 424 (airport
received one request in 2007 to keep newsstands open later on non-secure
side of airport). The Airport concedes that it received some complaints
directly after September 11, 2001, but that those complaints probably
resulted from the then-new rules that forbid non-ticketed passengers
access to the terminals. J.A. 295. The sum of these complaints is minor,
especially considering that the airport was undergoing construction and
rule changes regarding airport security throughout part of this period, two
issues that gave rise to temporary problems that were quickly resolved.
26 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
if newspaper purchasers did not want to wait in line, they
could use the "honor boxes" posted in some stores. J.A. 327.

The majority also claims that the facts demonstrate that
newspapers are sometimes unavailable in the morning, but it
omits mentioning the reason that newspapers are unavailable
in the morning. The reason that newspapers are sometimes not
available in the morning is not because of the newspaper rack
ban. Instead, it is because the Publishers deliver the newspa-
pers late. J.A. 352-53. The Airport’s stores open before the
first flight departs, and the shops’ employees attempt to pick
up the newspapers before they open or immediately upon open-
ing.4 J.A. 328, 352-53, 430-31. But, the papers are often deliv-
ered late to the Airport by the Publishers. The shops cannot
sell the papers until the Publishers deliver them.

The majority’s last assertion, that on rare occasions, some
shops sold out of The Herald Sun, also overlooks or ignores
some key evidence in the record. The record shows that the
shops rarely run out of papers, and that when they do, the
shop employees simply ask the Publishers to deliver more.
J.A. 330. This presents the Publishers with the same choice
that they would face with an empty newspaper rack, and in
either case, the Publishers would be free to decide whether to
deliver additional papers, or not. For all of these reasons, it is
clear that a factfinder could reasonably find that the newspa-
per rack ban imposes only a modest burden.
4
The Paradies stores (CNBC New, Press, and two Press Plus locations),
J.A. 326, attempt to pick up newspapers no later than 5:20 a.m., but often,
the papers are not available until 6:00 a.m. J.A. 327-28, 430-31. The three
Hudson stores open between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., and check the load-
ing dock for newspapers every fifteen minutes. J.A. 352-53. These stores
report that the USA Today and The News & Observer are typically deliv-
ered around 5:30 or 6:00 a.m., and that the New York Times and Durham
Herald Sun often do not arrive until 6:00 a.m. or later. Id. Thus, due to no
fault of their own, the stores sometimes open without newspapers.
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 27
B.

As does the majority, I turn next to determine whether the
Authority asserted legitimate interests that, when considered
together, present a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the ban is reasonable in light of the burden that it
imposes. See Maj. Op. at 11. As a threshold matter, I noted
that the facts of this case differ from those of Multimedia in
one very critical way.5 In Multimedia, the district court con-
cluded that the governmental interests asserted as justification
for the ban were post hoc, pretextual creations. Multimedia,
991 F.2d at 162. We affirmed. Thus, in Multimedia, the court
found the "government interest" side of the balancing test to
entirely lack credibility. Id. Manifestly, the same is not true
here. In fact, the Airport’s four justifications create genuine
issues of historical as well as ultimate fact regarding the rea-
sonableness of the ban "in the light of the purpose of the
forum and all the surrounding circumstances." Multimedia,
991 F.2d at 159. Thus, this case should be resolved at trial and
not decided as a matter of law. The Authority offers four justi-
fications for its ban on newspaper racks: revenue and eco-
nomics, security, passenger flow, and aesthetics.6 I review
each in turn.
5
There are also important procedural differences here as the Multimedia
decision followed a trial, not a grant of summary judgment.
6
Here, the Authority presented substantial economic arguments that
were based on a master concession plan created in collaboration with neu-
tral paid consultants. This plan was comprehensive and thoughtful, and it
also increased the Authority’s revenue.
The majority argues that the Authority’s master concession plan is not
probative evidence because it did not explicitly consider newspaper racks.
But this assertion seems illogical — obviously there are at least two ways
to sell newspapers, via stores and via newsracks. When the Authority cre-
ated its master plan, it hired two outside consulting firms and performed
customer surveys. It was surely aware of the possibility of using newspa-
per racks, but decided against it, and ultimately selected a plan that sold
newspapers through retail shops in order to maximize its revenues. J.A.
285. And the plan worked — it boosted retail sales 68% and increased
rental revenue from those sales by 17%. J.A. 298.
28 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
1.

Under federal law, the Authority must be financially self-
sustaining and the revenues generated at the Airport should be
expended only for its capital and operating costs. 49 U.S.C.
§ 47107(a)(13) & (b)(1). Thus, the strongest justification for
the ban of newsracks is that it increases the Authority’s reve-
nue. Selling newspapers in stores increases revenue in three
ways: it increases store rents, it increases retails sales, and it
increases advertising revenues. Increased sales drive up the
store rents because stores pay additional rent based on their
retails sales, generally 10% of gross receipts. J.A. 1027-28.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Authority,
selling newspapers in stores dramatically increases retail sales
and therefore, Authority income. J.A. 283-88, see J.A. 266-
68, 271-2 (explaining the "node approach" to retail shopping
where retail and food stores are clustered together to encour-
age impulse buying). Store-selling generates two streams of
revenue. First, the stores generate significant income from
selling the physical newspaper. J.A. 266, 285. An Airport
Retail Store Executive with several stores at the Airport
explained that the New York Times and USA Today are both
in the top 20 of items sold in his stores, and that USA Today
is among its highest gross profit items. J.A. 267. Experts esti-
mated that in 2004, the loss of newspaper sales alone would
total $25,200. J.A. 273.

The second revenue stream, income produced by the
impulse buys of newspaper purchasers, is even more substan-
tial.7 Newspaper sales spark the sale of items like bottled
water or chewing gum, and these small purchases generate
7
The majority suggests that the Airport could re-coup the lost revenue
by "exact[ing] a concession for papers sold from newsracks equal to that
assessed against the shop." Maj. Op. at 14 (citing Multimedia, 991 F.2d
at 161). But this argument only applies to lost revenue from the sales of
the actual newspapers, not lost sales from impulse buying.
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 29
not-so-small profits. One Airport retail executive explained
that newspapers help his profits because

newspapers (like bottled water) are in my view the
equivalent of bread and milk at grocery stores. . . we
have observed the people come into our shops to buy
newspapers, but once they are there, they buy other
items. If newspaper racks were put inside the airport,
it would impact sales.

J.A. 226. Other sales managers at the Airport agree. J.A. 327,
352. Thus, taking the majority’s suggestion at face value,
even if the Authority could charge the Publishers a premium
to allow installation of newsracks, "a reduction in total reve-
nue would still exist because of the lost sales on related goods
and services also available at the newsstands." See Gannett,
716 F. Supp. at 152; Jacobsen, 128 F.3d at 664 (noting that
installing newsracks would cause concessionaires to "lose
revenues, making its exclusive contract less valuable, . . .
[which] in turn will reduce the City’s leverage in bargaining
for terms such as minimum annual concession fees and pro
rata utility charges."). Each of these income streams increases
the funds that accrue to the Authority.

Installing newspaper racks would also likely decrease
advertising revenue at the Airport. The Authority sells adver-
tising space on the Airport’s walls and in floor display cases;
the vast majority of such space, about 95%, comprise wall
displays. J.A. 272. These ads produce an average of
$1,750,000 in sales annually, which translates into approxi-
mately $875,000 in annual revenue to the Authority. J.A. 292.
Since all newspaper racks must be placed on the floor,8
8
The record is clear that newspaper racks cannot be installed in walls.
The Authority provided ample evidence to show that it has little or no
interstitial wall space that could support recessed newsracks. J.A. 320,
324, 1017-18. Any existing space is already occupied with ATM
machines, telephones, or fire extinguishers. J.A. 320. Thus, the only way
to incorporate the boxes would be to install them on the floor either
adjoining or adjacent to the walls. J.A. 1018.
30 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
installing newspaper racks would eliminate floor space avail-
able for advertising displays and cover some wall ads. J.A.
250, 272, 292. Thus, newspaper racks will likely decrease the
Authority’s ability to generate advertising revenue, and
decrease it substantially.9 If, for example, twenty-five percent
of wall space was displaced by newspaper racks, the Author-
ity would lose between $182,000 and $214,000 in annual rev-
enues. J.A. 274.

The Authority’s losses from rents, retail sales, and advertis-
ing revenue sum to hundreds of thousands of dollars. It has a
substantial interest in keeping this money, and perhaps an
interest that might make reasonable the modest inconvenience
that the newspaper ban imposes on a few late-night passen-
gers. Again, the issue here is merely whether a factfinder
could find that this ban is reasonable after considering the
severity of the burden imposed by the ban, here, a very mod-
est burden, in light of all of the Authority’s interests, includ-
ing but not limited to the Authority’s interest in generating
revenue.

Tellingly, the majority finds that the "Authority’s interest
in preserving revenue cannot counterbalance the significant
restriction on protected expression." Maj. Op. at 15. But as an
appellate court, we are not in the position of a factfinder.
Moreover, all of the Authority’s interests must be considered
jointly, not individually. And finally, this statement is striking
because the issue is not whether the Authority should win at
trial — it is merely whether the Authority successfully dem-
onstrated a genuine issue of material fact and therefore
deserves an opportunity to go to trial.
9
Adding newsracks would also not increase the Publishers’ sales. Evi-
dence from other North Carolina airports shows that when airports have
newsracks and retail stores, the vast majority of buyers flock to the stores.
For example, sales of USA Today from newsracks at Charlotte, Greens-
boro, and Wilmington airports total .91%, 3.49%, and 3.14% of total sales
at these airports—very small numbers indeed. J.A. 379. At best, news-
racks re-direct a few sales.
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 31
It is worth noting that economics and revenue arguments
can be sufficiently strong on their own to make the newspaper
rack ban reasonable. See Gannett, 745 F.2d at 775 ("When a
government agency is engaged in a commercial enterprise, the
raising of revenue is a significant interest."). But the Author-
ity provided additional justifications, e.g., security, passenger
flow, and aesthetics, to which I will now turn.

2.

The Authority asserts the reduction of security risks as a
government interest.10 As a matter of common sense and
logic, security is of paramount importance at airports in our
post-9/11 world. First and foremost, officials worry that the
newsracks could be used to hide explosive devices or weap-
ons. J.A. 244-45. Airport security would need to check these
potential hiding places several times each day. J.A. 317.
Although the TSA does not have any regulation that bans
newsracks, a TSA Director opined that "based on my 20+
years of physical security experience, I would discourage this
in the strongest possible terms. This is an invitation for trou-
ble." J.A. 247-48. In light of this advice, since 9/11, the
Authority has removed all vending machines except ATM
machines from the secure side of the terminal. J.A. 232, 291.11

The majority, instead of considering the record, relies on a
10
The majority dismisses these concerns because it does not distinguish
the impact of newsracks from plants, vending machines, racks displaying
brochures, ATM machines, email stations, trash bins, and similar objects
already present. Maj. Op. at 16. As the factual record makes clear, how-
ever, after the increased security following 9/11, the Airport removed all
such items (except ATM machines) from the secure part of the terminal.
There is no evidence that the Publishers merely want to put newspaper
racks on the unsecure side of the terminals, so the court must consider the
security concerns for the secure side of the terminal.
11
The non-secure side of the terminal has a few vending machines such
as a luggage cart machine, public telephones, a phone card dispenser, a
flower machine, and a flight insurance kiosk. J.A. 232, 291.
32 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
citation from Multimedia that the risk posed by newsracks is
"de minimis." Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 162. But this quote
loses it persuasiveness once it is placed in its proper context:
it predates September 11, 2001. The imperative of airport
security has changed dramatically, and governmental efforts
in these regards certainly have grown more vigorous. For
example, only ticketed passengers and badged support person-
nel who have undergone background security checks are per-
mitted to pass into the secure areas of passenger terminals
now. J.A. 911-912, 971-72. Similarly, TSA now requires that
all newspapers go through security checkpoints. In contrast,
Multimedia was decided in 1993, significantly before these
security changes were deemed necessary.

The majority also improperly discounts the testimony of the
Deputy Airport Director for Operations Mike McElvaney.
McElvaney provided an affidavit stating that placing news-
racks throughout the terminal would create security risks and
burden security personnel, who would need to screen delivery
persons and repeatedly check the racks for contraband. J.A.
316. The majority completely undercuts his testimony simply
on the basis that he responded to the Publishers’ demand to
install 208 newspaper racks. The majority does not cite any
evidence that actually discredits McElvaney, nor does the
majority indicate any reason to believe that installing fewer
than 208 newsracks would completely eliminate potential
security problems. Instead, without any support from the evi-
dentiary record, the majority assumes that "a carefully cali-
brated newsrack presence" would not create more than a "de
minimis" risk. Maj. Op. at 17. I would not discount McEl-
vaney’s testimony, and would instead permit a factfinder to
apply it to the government’s case for establishing reasonable-
ness. In sum, security risks are a legitimate factor to be con-
sidered in the reasonableness analysis.
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 33
3.

The arguments for passenger flow and aesthetics are the
Authority’s secondary arguments, but the majority gives short
shrift even to those. I disagree particularly with the majority’s
disregard for the Authority’s passenger flow argument.12 The
majority acknowledges the Authority’s argument that each
newsrack "reduces pedestrian traffic flow capacity by 110
people per minute, without allowing for any baggage placed
on the floor while the device is in use." Maj. Op. at 15 (citing
Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 716 F. Supp.
140, 153 (D.N.J. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 894 F.2d 61
(3d Cir. 1990)). But instead of crediting this demonstrated
pedestrian hindrance, the majority, without justification,
wholly discounts it.

More specifically, the majority opinion sets up a straw-man
when it considers only "how much congestion would result
from a ‘limited number’ of carefully placed newsracks," Maj.
Op. at 15, and then leaps to the conclusion that the congestion
caused by these newsracks would be "trivial" and "cannot jus-
tify the Commission’s ban." Id. But this conclusion misses the
mark for three reasons. First, the majority should not work
from the assumption of a "limited number" of newsracks.
Granting all favorable inferences to the Authority, it is clear
that the Publishers want 208 newsracks distributed throughout
the Airport, not a limited number. This court is asked to
review a summary judgment order, not to give instructions on
how to run an airport.

Second, regardless of the number of newsracks, the major-
ity should not ignore the very real hindrance that these racks
12
A factfinder understandably might be less concerned about aesthetics.
The Authority relies principally on concerns about visual clutter. J.A. 250.
Although this concern is valid to the extent that increased clutter translates
into decreased advertising revenues, id., the pure aesthetics argument does
little to help the Authority’s cause.
34 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH.
impose on passenger flow. If each newsrack impedes pedes-
trian traffic flow by 110 people per minute, 208 newsracks
impedes 200,000 people per minute, and a quarter of that
number of newsracks impedes almost 6,000 people per min-
ute. This slow-down could cause real trouble, particularly dur-
ing peak hours or during the holiday season. At the very least,
it is a valid government objective deserving of consideration
at trial.

Lastly, the majority again forgets to consider all of the
Authority’s interests in tandem and holistically, instead deter-
mining that "the Authority’s interest in preventing congestion
cannot counterbalance the significant restriction on protected
expression." Maj. Op. at 16. The majority should balance all
of the government’s proposed interests against the burden
imposed by the ban, not weigh each argument individually
and atomistically. Thus, whether or not the passenger flow
argument is dispositive as a stand-alone argument is entirely
inconsequential. It is simply one evidentiary peg giving rise
to a discrete argument, which is to be weighed with others
against the burden imposed by the ban to determine if the ban
is reasonable.

C.

The ultimate issue before the trial court is whether the
Authority’s ban is found reasonable when the Authority’s
interests are weighed against the burden imposed by the ban.
Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159. Here, the evidence shows that
the government has significant interests in generating revenue
and in airport security, along with a modest interest in ensur-
ing smooth passenger movement. Further, the evidence amply
supports a finding that the burden imposed on the Publishers
and on readers by this ban on newspaper racks is, if not de
minimis, negligible. It affects a very small number of airport
passengers, all of whom are statistically unlikely to purchase
newspaper. Despite these factors, the majority finds the
 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTH. 35
Authority’s ban on newspaper racks unreasonable as a matter
of law.

With respect, although the majority describes this conclu-
sion as a legal conclusion, the evidence in the summary judg-
ment record exposes it as the factual conclusion that it truly
is. There simply is no doubt that reasonable minds might rea-
sonably disagree over how best to strike the balance in this
case. Accordingly, I conclude that the district court’s work is
not finished and that this court cannot and should not do that
work for the district court. I would therefore vacate the order
of the district court and remand this case for a trial on the
merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and the Authority’s affirmative
defenses.

V.

For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.