[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
_____________________________U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-12621 August 11, 2006
_____________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 95-01413 CV-CSC
PHILLIP D. HALLFORD,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
GRANTT CULLIVER,
Warden of Holman State Prison,
TROY KING, The Attorney General
of the State of Alabama,
Respondents-Appellees.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________________________
(August 11, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Phillip D. Hallford appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition
challenging his conviction and death sentence. Hallford argues that he suffered
prejudice in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), that his trial
counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase, and that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating
circumstance. We now affirm Hallford’s conviction and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Hallford was convicted of the capital offense of murder committed during
the course of a robbery in violation of ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(2). Hallford’s
victim was 16-year old Charles Eddie Shannon, the boyfriend of Hallford’s
daughter, Melinda. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the facts
of the murder-robbery this way:
The state’s evidence at the guilt phase of [Hallford’s] trial
tended to show that in the early morning of April 13, 1986, [Hallford]
forced his daughter to entice her boyfriend, Charles Eddie Shannon,
to a secluded bridge. He then shot Shannon once in the roof of the
mouth. While Shannon was still alive, Hallford dragged him to the
side of the bridge and shot him two more times, once in the front of
2
the left ear and once in the forehead. [Hallford] then threw the body
over the bridge railing and into the water.
Sometime after the shooting, [Hallford] returned to the scene of
the crime to remove the blood from the bridge. The next day
[Hallford] burned the victim’s wallet and its contents. These events
were witnessed in part by [Hallford’s] daughter and his son, who
testified against him at trial. While [Hallford] was burning the
victim’s wallet he commented that the victim was a “cheapskate”
because he said he found no money in the wallet. However, the
victim’s father testified that he had given the victim money on the
afternoon of his disappearance. The victim’s badly decomposed body
was discovered in the water approximately two weeks after the
shooting.
[Hallford] maintained at trial that he did not kill the victim and
that he was nowhere near the bridge when the murder occurred.
Hallford v. State, 629 So. 2d 6, 7-8 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
The jury convicted Hallford and, by a 10-2 vote, recommended that Hallford
receive the death penalty based on two aggravating circumstances: (1) that the
murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, and (2) that it was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” The trial court sentenced him to death.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed Hallford’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Hallford v. State,
548 So. 2d 526 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), aff’d, 548 So. 2d 547 (Ala. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 354 (1989).
Hallford filed a motion for state post-conviction relief pursuant to ALA. R.
CRIM. P. 32. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Alabama Court
3
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial. Hallford v. State, 629 So. 2d 6 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1870 (1994). Hallford then filed a
petition for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district
court denied his petition, and Hallford appeals.1
A. Facts for the Brady Claim
Although the State presented several witnesses, Hallford’s daughter,
Melinda, was perhaps the most incriminating single witness. During the guilt
phase of the trial, Melinda described Hallford’s plot to lure Shannon to him and
the graphic details of the murder. Melinda was also the only witness to identify
directly the wallet Hallford burned as Shannon’s. Her further testimony during the
penalty phase -- where she was the only witness for the State -- described her
sexual relationship with Hallford that began when she was seven or eight years
old; Melinda testified that she and her father were engaged in an incestuous
relationship when she became romantically involved with Shannon.
1
By the parties’ consent, the federal post-conviction proceedings were conducted by a United
States Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Magistrate Judge entered the final judgment for the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama. To be clear, we refer to the Magistrate Judge’s findings
and decisions as those of the district court.
4
The gravamen of Hallford’s Brady claim is that Melinda testified pursuant
to a plea agreement of which Hallford’s trial counsel was never made aware and
about which the jury never learned. The prosecutor initially sought to charge
Melinda as an adult and prosecute her for intentional murder along with Hallford.
The lead investigator in the case, Walter Ford, found Melinda initially
uncooperative; before her arrest Melinda was reluctant to speak with Ford, and she
denied having sexual contact with Shannon, calling Shannon to the bridge, or
being with Shannon at the bridge where he was killed. But Melinda did cooperate
in the investigation after she struck a plea agreement in which she agreed to testify
against Hallford in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement not to prosecute her
as an adult.2 The plea agreement was never memorialized in writing.
Twice before trial, Hallford’s trial counsel requested all exculpatory Brady
material. But at no time before trial did the State disclose the plea agreement.3 As
the district court wrote, “the jury heard no testimony during either the guilt or
penalty phases of Hallford’s trial that Melinda was testifying pursuant to a plea
2
Melinda pleaded guilty to juvenile delinquency based on a charge of criminally negligent
homicide and served no more than 6 weeks in a juvenile facility.
3
The State explains this discrepancy as the result of a prosecutorial staffing change. The assistant
district attorney who ratified Melinda’s plea agreement left the prosecutor’s office before the trial,
and the newly elected district attorney -- who took office shortly before trial -- was never informed
about the verbal agreement. No evidence shows that the State intentionally failed to disclose this
information.
5
agreement or that Melinda had originally been charged with the intentional murder
of Shannon.”
Despite two requests, the State also failed to disclose Melinda’s plea
agreement to Hallford’s counsel during the state post-conviction proceedings. The
State advised Hallford’s state post-conviction counsel that all information had
been disclosed. Yet nothing in counsel’s records disclosed the existence of the
plea agreement. Hallford included a general Brady claim in his petition for state
post-conviction relief, but Hallford failed to argue the claim or include it in his
appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Later, in Hallford’s federal
section 2254 proceedings, the district court concluded Hallford’s Brady claim was
procedurally defaulted. And although the district court found cause for the
procedural default, the court concluded Hallford did not suffer sufficient prejudice
to excuse the default.
B. Facts for the Ineffective Assistance Claim
During the guilt phase of the trial, Hallford testified that he disapproved of
certain of his children’s acts such as “smoking dope” and that he was a strict
disciplinarian. Because Hallford denied committing the murder, he offered this
6
“good father” explanation to suggest a motive for his children’s testimony against
him. But this “good father” testimony made it possible for the State to present,
during the penalty phase, Melinda’s testimony about her incestuous relationship
with Hallford.
At the penalty phase, Hallford presented only his mother’s testimony in
which she pleaded for Hallford’s life. Hallford’s trial counsel -- who had
previously represented Hallford on unrelated matters -- considered but decided not
to present psychological or personal background testimony.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hallford filed his section 2254 petition before the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). This case is
accordingly governed by pre-AEDPA law. See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059,
2068 (1997) (concluding that AEDPA provisions apply “only to cases filed after
[AEDPA] became effective”). Under pre-AEDPA law, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1169
(11th Cir. 2001). The state court’s findings of fact generally are accorded a
presumption of correctness. Hardwick v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1158 (11th Cir.
7
2003). But questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are not subject to
the same presumption. Id. at 1159.
III. BRADY CLAIM
Hallford claims in his section 2254 petition that he suffered prejudice when
the State failed to disclose its plea agreement with Melinda, in violation of Brady
v. Maryland, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). But Hallford abandoned this Brady claim
during the state post-conviction proceedings. The district court accordingly
concluded that Hallford’s Brady claim was procedurally defaulted.4
But Hallford’s procedural default may be excused if he can show cause for
the default and prejudice resulting from his failure to raise the claim. Johnson,
256 F.3d at 1171 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644 (1986)).5 To
4
Hallford’s Brady claim was procedurally defaulted under Alabama’s procedural rules. When
pursuing state post-conviction relief, Hallford did not present his Brady claim to the Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals. “Claims presented in a Rule 32 petition but not pursued on appeal are deemed
to be abandoned.” Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113, 1145 (Ala. Crim App. 2003). And failure to
present the claim in state court leads to the claim being procedurally defaulted in federal court. See
Collier v. Jones, 910 F.2d 770, 772 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen a petitioner has failed to present a
claim to the state courts and under state procedural rules the claim has become procedurally
defaulted, the claim will be considered procedurally defaulted in federal court.”)
5
Hallford may also circumvent the procedural bar by showing that failure to hear his claim would
result in “a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1171 (citing Murray, 106 S.Ct.
at 2649). But this exception is “exceedingly narrow in scope,” id., and inapplicable to this case.
8
prove cause, Hallford must show that “some objective factor external to the
defense impeded counsel’s efforts” to raise the Brady claim in state court.
Murray, 106 S.Ct. at 2645. To prove prejudice, Hallford “must show ‘not merely
that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to
his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions.’” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1171 (quoting United States v.
Frady, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982) (emphasis in original)).
The district court concluded that Hallford showed cause for his procedural
default but that he did not sufficiently demonstrate prejudice. Because we
conclude that Hallford cannot demonstrate prejudice, we assume without deciding
that Hallford has demonstrated sufficient cause to excuse his default.
Hallford contends he suffered prejudice from the State’s failure to disclose
Melinda’s plea agreement because -- as the only witness to give direct evidence
that the wallet Hallford burned was Shannon’s -- Melinda’s testimony was critical
to proving the robbery element of the crime. Conviction for capital murder-
robbery under Alabama law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that “the
murder was committed ‘in the course of or in connection with the commission of,
or in the immediate flight from the commission of’ the robbery.” Connolly v.
State, 500 So. 2d 57, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff’d 500 So. 2d 68 (Ala. 1986)
9
(quoting ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39(2)). Hallford argues that disclosing Melinda’s
plea agreement would have impeached Melinda’s credibility and undermined the
State’s case. Failure to disclose the agreement, Hallford argues, inflicted
unconstitutional error upon the case. We disagree.
The prejudice inquiry used to resolve questions of procedural default is
similar to the inquiry used to determine materiality for Brady purposes. Strickler
v. Greene, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948-49 (1999); Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288,
1327 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t seems that in practice the inquiries are the same. At
the very least, . . . ‘prejudice’ cannot be established where the Brady materiality
standard is not satisfied.”). To prove prejudice, Hallford must show a “‘reasonable
probability’ that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed
documents had been disclosed to the defense.” Strickler, 119 S.Ct. at 1952. “The
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v.
Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995). See also Strickler, 119 S.Ct. at 1952
(“[T]he question is whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to
put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.”) (quotation omitted).
10
We agree with the district court that “[t]he evidence that Hallford shot and
killed Eddie Shannon is overwhelming.” The issue here, however, is whether the
murder occurred in connection with a robbery. Melinda was the only witness to
identify directly the wallet that Hallford burned as Shannon’s. That a testifying
witness had entered a plea agreement with the prosecution is something that can
be material to an accused’s defense. See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381,
1397 (11th Cir. 1997). But we do not believe that disclosing Melinda’s plea
agreement would have created a reasonable probability that Hallford’s trial would
have come out differently.
In addition to Melinda’s testimony, the jury heard testimony from Hallford’s
stepson, Sammy, that matched Melinda’s in providing critical details tying
Hallford to Shannon’s murder and the robbery. Sammy -- as well as Melinda --
testified that he witnessed Hallford attack Shannon with a pistol and described
how Sammy helped Hallford destroy evidence that could have tied Hallford to the
crime. Sammy testified that on the morning after the murder -- after Hallford had
Sammy return to the crime scene with him to wash blood from the bridge and
make sure Shannon’s body was undetectable -- Hallford told Sammy to build a fire
in a drum outside the trailer. According to Sammy, after the fire was lit, Hallford
brought out a wallet and burned its contents. Sammy testified that he saw Hallford
11
burn an orange and white military identification card. Sammy did not read the
name on the card, and Hallford’s thumb obscured the card’s picture. Sammy
testified that Melinda was present when Hallford burned the wallet.
The victim’s step-brother, David Ferguson, testified that Shannon carried a
wallet in which he kept an identification card. The victim’s father, Olen Johns,
who similarly described Shannon’s wallet and stated that Shannon’s wallet carried
his military identification card, testified that he never saw Shannon’s wallet after
the murder.
Melinda’s testimony that Hallford burned Shannon’s wallet on the morning
after the murder was more specific than the other wallet-related testimony.6 But --
apart from Melinda’s testimony -- the testimony from Sammy, Ferguson, and
Johns indirectly identifying Shannon’s wallet, when coupled with the other
evidence presented at trial, was easily sufficient for a jury to conclude that
Hallford had taken (and had then burned) Shannon’s wallet. Alabama law
provides that a defendant’s guilt may be established by circumstantial evidence.
McMillian v. State, 594 So. 2d 1253, 1263 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (“In reviewing
a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, ‘[t]he test to be applied is whether
6
Melinda identified the wallet Hallford burned as Shannon’s. Melinda further testified that
Hallford, as he was emptying the wallet’s contents, referred to Shannon as a “cheapskate” because
he had no money in his wallet and showed Melinda a picture from Shannon’s wallet.
12
the jury might reasonably find that the evidence excluded every reasonable
hypothesis except that of guilt. . . .’”). Perhaps the most incriminating
circumstantial evidence is the timing of Hallford’s acts: Hallford burned a wallet
containing a military identification card like Shannon’s less than twelve hours
after the murder occurred and after spending most of the same morning
undertaking efforts to conceal the crime. Shannon’s wallet was not recovered with
his body.
When determining whether Hallford suffered the kind of prejudice required
to excuse his procedural default, we consider disclosure of Melinda’s plea
agreement against the backdrop of other evidence presented at trial. Crawford,
311 F.3d at 1330-31 (considering suppressed GBI report and concluding that
defendant could not demonstrate prejudice to excuse procedural default “given the
strong evidence of [defendant’s] guilt”). Even if Melinda’s plea agreement had
been disclosed and her testimony successfully discredited, we conclude that the
jury could have reasonably found that the circumstantial evidence of the robbery
excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Disclosure of the plea
13
agreement could not reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.7
Hallford further contends he suffered prejudice from the alleged Brady
violation because Melinda was the only witness to testify for the State during the
penalty phase. During her penalty phase testimony, Melinda described her
incestuous relationship with Hallford and Hallford’s jealousy of Shannon.
Melinda’s testimony was offered to rebut Hallford’s testimony during the guilt
phase that he was a good father. Hallford contends he suffered prejudice because
he was unable to use the plea agreement to impeach Melinda’s penalty phase
testimony. We disagree.
We accept that the incest evidence may have been shocking. But the trial
court properly instructed the jury on how to weigh the evidence and the two
aggravating circumstances in recommending Hallford’s sentence.8 Even if
7
Our conclusion is strengthened some by the fact that Hallford did place Melinda’s credibility in
issue at trial. Hallford suggested during his testimony that Officer Ford improperly influenced the
testimony of Melinda and Hallford’s other children. Hallford specifically addressed Melinda’s
changing story, saying: “If [Melinda] thought [changing her story]was the only way she was going
to be released, I imagine anyone on the jury if they were locked up and were expecting to be tried
on a murder charge would say anything Mr. Walter Ford would want. You have to be in that
predicament to really know.”
8
After instructing the jury on how to balance aggravating and mitigating factors to determine
Hallford’s sentence, the trial court told the jury that it may consider only two aggravating factors:
that the “capital offense was committed while the Defendant was engaged in or attempting to commit
a flight after committing, or attempting to commit a robbery” and that “the capital offense was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses.”
14
Hallford had been able to discredit Melinda’s testimony by introducing her plea
agreement, we do not believe a reasonable probability arises that the result of the
trial would have been different. Ample evidence from the trial -- without
Melinda’s penalty-phase testimony -- allowed the jury to find the two aggravating
circumstances and to find that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances. Hallford cannot, therefore, show prejudice to excuse his
procedural default.
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM
Hallford also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective during the
penalty phase by mishandling the incest evidence and by failing to investigate or
present certain mitigation evidence. “To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance, [Hallford] must show both incompetence and prejudice.” Chandler v.
United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To make this
showing, Hallford must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 1312-13 (quoting Darden v.
15
Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2473 (1986) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 2068 (1984)) (internal marks omitted).
We review trial counsel’s performance for “reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at
2065). And our scrutiny of counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential.”
Strickland, 104. S.Ct. at 2065. See also Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 (“Given the
strong presumption in favor of competence, the petitioner’s burden of persuasion -
- though the presumption is not insurmountable -- is a heavy one.” (citing
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 (1986))). “No absolute rules
dictate what is reasonable performance for lawyers.” Id. at 1317. See also
Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (“There are countless ways to provide effective
assistance in any given case.”). We review those acts or omissions by counsel that
Hallford alleges are unreasonable “and ask whether some reasonable lawyer could
have conducted the trial in that manner.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316 n.16. Upon
review, we conclude that the acts of Hallford’s trial counsel -- although
unsuccessful -- were not unreasonable. See id. at 1314. (“Nor does the fact that a
particular defense ultimately proved to be unsuccessful demonstrate
ineffectiveness.”).
16
A. Incest Evidence
Hallford contends his trial counsel was ineffective by opening the door for
presentation of the incest evidence and by failing to request a limiting instruction.9
In his testimony during the guilt phase, Hallford suggested that his efforts to
discipline his children strictly -- the same children who provided the most
incriminating testimony against Hallford -- provided them with motive to testify
against him. The State answered Hallford’s “good father” testimony during the
penalty phase with evidence that Hallford sexually abused Melinda and had an
incestuous relationship with her in the months leading up to Shannon’s murder.10
Hallford’s trial counsel testified at the state post-conviction evidentiary
hearing that he intended to show through his client’s testimony that “perhaps the
children had some sort of reason for their testimony and turning on him” and that
this testimony might generate sympathy for Hallford. The issue of guilt was hotly
9
For discussion’s sake, we accept Hallford’s contention that the incest evidence was otherwise
inadmissible at trial without Hallford’s testimony opening the door to its presentation. We do not
actually decide whether or not the incest testimony may have been properly admitted at trial had
Hallford not so testified.
10
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals deemed the incest evidence “admissible for the
purpose of negating [Hallford’s] testimony, which obviously had been offered in an effort to portray
himself as a good father and, therefore, a person of good character.” Hallford, 548 So. 2d 526, 544
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
17
contested in this case. The children’s testimony hurt Hallford’s chances for
acquittal. In combating the children’s testimony -- particularly the detailed
eyewitness accounts from Melinda and Sammy -- an objectively reasonable
counsel could reasonably seek to discredit them as Hallford’s counsel did at the
guilt phase. That this testimony at the guilt phase prompted later presentation at
the penalty phase of the incest evidence -- after Hallford was adjudged guilty --
was a byproduct of an otherwise reasonable act by a defense counsel trying to
avoid a conviction. And if Hallford had been found not guilty, no penalty phase
would have occurred.
We agree with the district court that “[f]acts seldom occur in isolation of
other facts.” We have written that “for a petitioner to show that [his counsel’s]
conduct was unreasonable, a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel
would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Marquard v. Sec’y for
Dept. of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chandler, 218 F.3d
at 1315). Presenting evidence at the guilt phase that key witnesses may have had
ulterior motives to testify against Hallford was not unreasonable in a case in which
guilt was contested.
Hallford also contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
limiting instruction that the jury should not consider the incest evidence in
18
determining the existence of the aggravating factors. Hallford asserts that, without
a limiting instruction, the jury may have concluded that the incest evidence could
be considered as evidence for finding the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravating circumstance. We disagree.
In describing the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance, the
trial court told the jury that the acts it might consider were those attendant to the
capital offense itself and those which were “unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.”11 (Emphasis added.) And the trial court instructed the jury that they could
consider only the two aggravating circumstances charged. “Jurors are presumed to
follow the law as they are instructed.” Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869,
876 (11th Cir. 1985). We think the instructions plainly and correctly conveyed to
the jury that in meting their recommended sentence they could consider only those
heinous, atrocious, or cruel acts that befell the murder victim, Shannon. Failure to
request a limiting instruction, under the circumstances, was not ineffective.
By the way, even if counsel acted unreasonably in handling the incest
evidence, we cannot say -- in the light of the overwhelming evidence of Hallford’s
11
We find no evidence in the record that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that
there was more than one victim -- Charles Eddie Shannon -- in this case. The indictment charges
a single-victim crime -- the murder and robbery of Shannon. And the court’s charge after the guilt
phase of the trial -- to which the court later referred the jury in its penalty-phase charge -- uses the
term “victim” interchangeably with “Charles Eddie Shannon.” We are confident that the jury, at the
penalty phase, understood that “victim” referred exclusively to Shannon.
19
guilt and the nature of the killing -- that the result of the trial would have been
different.
B. Mitigation Evidence
Hallford’s penalty-phase presentation consisted only of his mother’s
testimony. Hallford contends his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel
failed to conduct a background investigation and to present evidence of other
mitigating circumstances. Hallford’s counsel explained that he did not present
psychological or personal background testimony because he “just didn’t have the
benefit of a client that had a good background.” In preparing his penalty phase
presentation, Hallford’s counsel interviewed only Hallford and his mother. We
must determine whether counsel acted reasonably in not investigating or
presenting more evidence, while according counsel’s decision the high degree of
deference it is due. Marquard, 429 F.3d at 1304.
We have written that “no absolute duty exists to investigate particular facts
or a certain line of defense.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1317. A reasonable defense
does not require full investigation of all alternatives. “Sometimes, a lawyer can
make a reasonable decision that no matter what an investigation might produce, he
20
wants to steer clear of a certain course.” Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 387 (11th
Cir. 1994). Here, Hallford’s trial counsel decided that a “personal and emotional
persuasive argument” in which he would attempt to “reach into and touch that spot
of compassion that one human being would feel for another human being” was the
most effective means of arguing for a merciful sentence. Under the circumstances
as they existed at trial, we believe an objectively reasonable lawyer could try the
case that way.
During the state and federal post-conviction proceedings, collateral counsel
demonstrated that had trial counsel conducted an investigation he may have
discovered some evidence that (1) Hallford’s father suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia; (2) Hallford had a turbulent childhood, dominated by his father’s
abusive behavior and alcohol abuse; (3) Hallford was sexually abused as a child;
and (4) Hallford often found his father having sex with Hallford’s cousins. A
psychologist also testified during the federal post-conviction proceeding that
Hallford exhibited “paranoid characteristics” and had emotional, sexual, and anger
issues rooted in his childhood experiences.
“[E]ven when trial counsel’s investigation is less complete than collateral
counsel’s, trial counsel has not performed deficiently when a reasonable lawyer
could have decided, in the circumstances, not to investigate.” Housel v. Head, 238
21
F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001). If Hallford’s counsel had introduced some of
the mitigating evidence presented in the post-conviction proceedings, the State
could have countered with evidence that Hallford sexually abused each of his
children and even raped one of his children. The State could also have introduced
damaging testimony from a mental health expert -- who testified during the federal
post-conviction proceeding -- that Hallford was “self-centered” and did not care
about the consequences of his acts.
It is reasonable -- and not ineffective -- for trial counsel to eliminate certain
lines of presentation if he has “[m]isgivings about hurtful cross-examination and
rebuttal witnesses.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1321. “[T]he range of what might be a
reasonable approach at trial must be broad.” Id. at 1313. Hallford’s trial counsel
had represented Hallford in prior legal proceedings. Counsel’s statement that
Hallford did not have a good background -- knowledge counsel could have started
accumulating as Hallford’s lawyer before the present case -- indicates his concern
about injecting other aspects of Hallford’s life into the trial. See Dobbs v. Turpin,
142 F.3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that failure to investigate may be
reasonable when defendant has given counsel reason to believe it would be
fruitless). It was also reasonable not to present evidence from Hallford’s
22
childhood because Hallford was 39 years old when he murdered Shannon.12 See
Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that
evidence of childhood abuse may be of minimal value when defendant is adult).
But see Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that, under certain circumstances, failure to present mitigating evidence derived
from defendant’s childhood may be unreasonable even when defendant was 33
years old). Under the circumstances, we conclude that not presenting more
mitigation evidence was not unreasonable.13
V. HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, OR CRUEL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
Hallford contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. The relevant
question in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
12
Explaining his decision not to present evidence from Hallford’s childhood, trial counsel stated:
“But [Hallford] was an adult and he had been in prison before and I just didn’t feel that I would be
effective in front of a jury talking about how unfortunate things were when he was a child.” An
objectively reasonable lawyer could so conclude.
13
Hallford also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to information
considered in the pre-sentence report and for failing to challenge Hallford’s sentence as being
arbitrary, capricious, and disproportionate. After review, we find no merit in these claims.
23
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct 2781, 2789
(1979). Alabama courts have limited “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”
crimes to those “conscienceless or pitiless homicides which are unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.” Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So. 2d 330, 334 (Ala. 1981). In this
case:
The trial court found that [Hallford], after luring the 16-year old boy
to the isolated area near the river, shot him in the mouth, rendering
him defenseless. The trial court further found that [Hallford] then
dragged and marched the helpless and pleading victim to the river,
where he shot him in the head twice more and shoved him in the river
after taking his wallet.
Hallford, 548 So. 2d at 538.
These facts were supported at trial chiefly by testimony from Sammy and
Melinda. Sammy and Melinda further testified that five minutes elapsed between
the first shot to Shannon’s face and the final two shots to Shannon’s head. During
this time Hallford dragged Shannon by his feet and pulled him by his hair toward
the river. The state trial court, therefore, did not clearly err in finding Shannon’s
murder to be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly denied Hallford’s 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
AFFIRMED.
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