[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 8, 2007
No. 06-16115 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-03362-CV-BBM-1
WAYNE BERTRAM WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
BRUCE CHATMAN, Warden,
Hancock State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(November 8, 2007)
Before BLACK, CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wayne Bertram Williams, a Georgia prisoner, appeals the district court’s
denial of both his § 2254 petition and his Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration.
Following a jury trial in state court, Williams was convicted of two counts of
murder in connection with what has been informally referred to as “the Atlanta
Child Murders,” and was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment.
After exhausting available state remedies, Williams filed a § 2254 federal habeas
petition in the Northern District of Georgia.
Following the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition in February 2006,
Williams failed to file a notice of appeal within thirty days. Instead, he moved the
district court for extensions of time and ultimately filed a motion for
reconsideration. After the district court denied Williams’ motion, he filed a notice
of appeal designating both the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition as well
as its denial of his motion for reconsideration. The district court construed the
notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of appealability and granted one with
respect to six of Williams’ claims.
In a previous order, we concluded that Williams’ notice of appeal as to the
district court’s denial of habeas relief was untimely because his motion for
reconsideration did not toll the limited period in which he had to appeal the
underlying habeas judgment. Order, No. 06-16115, Dec. 21, 2006. Thus, we have
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appellate jurisdiction to consider only the order denying Williams’ post-judgment
motion, which we construed as a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). Id.
As to the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, Williams contends that the district
court abused its discretion. Specifically, he argues that the court improperly denied
reconsideration of its ruling regarding three alleged Brady1 violations. Williams
also contends that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
newly-discovered evidence—excerpts from a documentary that include statements
made by the state’s trial expert—which Williams argues undermines the credibility
of scientific evidence presented at his trial. Furthermore, Williams challenges the
denial of his motion to reconsider the admission of other crimes evidence at trial.
Finally, Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion procedurally by
refusing to reconsider its denial of his § 2254 petition in light of his claim that he
was never afforded an adequate opportunity to brief the issues that he raised.
I.
Federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua
sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th
Cir. 2004). As a threshold matter, therefore, we must initially determine both
1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
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whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Williams’ Rule
60(b) motion and whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s
denial of his motion. We review de novo questions concerning jurisdiction.
Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides a basis, but only a limited basis,
for a party to seek relief from a final judgment in a habeas case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60. The Supreme Court explained in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 534, 125 S. Ct.
2641 (2005), that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas proceedings
to the extent that they are “not inconsistent with applicable federal statutory
provisions,” id. at 529, 125 S. Ct. at 2646 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11)
(internal marks omitted), and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
does not explicitly limit the operation of Rule 60(b). Id. The Act does,
nonetheless, foreclose application of that rule where it would be inconsistent with
the restrictions imposed on successive petitions by the AEDPA. Id. at 529–30,
125 S. Ct. at 2646.
The Supreme Court held in Gonzalez that a Rule 60(b) motion is to be
treated as a successive habeas petition if it: (1) “seeks to add a new ground of
relief;” or (2) “attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the
merits.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532, 125 S. Ct. at 2648. Where, however, a Rule
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60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim
on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,”
the motion is not a successive habeas petition. Id. A “claim,” as described by the
Court in Gonzalez, is “an asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s
judgment of conviction.” Id. at 530, 125 S. Ct. at 2647. The Supreme Court
further explained in Gonzalez that:
The term “on the merits” has multiple usages. We refer here to a
determination that there exist or do not exist a grounds entitling a petitioner
to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b). When a movant
asserts one of those grounds (or asserts that a previous ruling regarding one
of those grounds was in error) he is making a habeas corpus claim. He is not
doing so when he merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a
merits determination was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as
failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.
Id. at 532 n.4, 125 S. Ct. at 2648.
When a Rule 60(b) motion qualifies as a second or successive habeas
petition as defined in Gonzalez, it must comply with the requirements for such
petitions under the AEDPA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2244. The AEDPA imposes three
basic requirements on successive habeas petitions. First, “any claim that has
already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed.” Gonzalez, 545
U.S. at 529–30, 125 S. Ct. at 2646; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Second, any
new claim that was not already adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on “a
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new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high
probability of actual innocence.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530, 125 S. Ct. at 2646;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Finally, before a district court can accept a
successive habeas petition, “the court of appeals must determine that it presents a
claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or
actual-innocence provisions.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530, 125 S. Ct. at 2646; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).
Furthermore, subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez, we
have confirmed that “[i]t is still the law of this circuit that a ‘certificate of
appealability is required for the appeal of any denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for
relief from a judgment in a [28 U.S.C.] § 2254 or [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 proceeding.’”
Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gonzalez v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004)). Where a district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a Rule 60(b) motion, however, it also
lacks jurisdiction to grant a COA. See Boone v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d
1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (vacating a COA granted by the district
court, which lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the prisoner’s Rule 60(b)
motion).
II.
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After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ briefs, we conclude
that we cannot reach the merits of the questions raised by Williams. His first three
grounds of appeal involve the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion
relating to the alleged Brady violations, the trial court’s admission of other crimes
evidence, and allegedly newly-discovered evidence. Those are all merits related
claims that are, in substance, part of a successive petition as defined in Gonzalez.
In denying Williams’ habeas petition, the district court considered all of these
issues and after careful review, rejected each of them.
Because he was attempting to relitigate previous claims that challenge the
validity of his conviction, Williams was required to move this Court for an order
authorizing the district court to consider a successive habeas petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Without such authorization, the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the successive petition, and therefore could
not issue a COA with respect to any of these claims. See Farris v. United States,
333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, as to Williams’ first three
issues on appeal, we vacate the COA and remand to the district court with
instructions to dismiss them for a lack of jurisdiction.
Williams’ final ground of appeal, however, does not fall within the Gonzalez
Court’s definition of a successive habeas petition. By contending that the district
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court should have permitted further briefing, Williams “attacks, not the substance
of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the
integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532, 125 S. Ct.
at 2648. Because this briefing issue is confined to a nonmerits aspect of the
proceedings, Williams could properly raise it as part of his Rule 60(b) motion. See
id. at 532, 125 S. Ct. at 2648. As a result, the district court did have jurisdiction to
consider this claim and, therefore, also had the authority to issue a COA. The
problem, however, is that the district court did not grant a COA with respect to the
briefing issue. Nor would we. Because we confirmed in Jackson that it is still the
law of this circuit that a COA is required to appeal any denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion for relief from a judgment in a § 2254 proceeding, Jackson, 437 F.3d at
1294–95, we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider Williams’ briefing claim and,
therefore, dismiss his appeal to that extent.
Insofar as Williams contends that his Rule 60(b) motion should have been
granted because the district court violated his procedural rights by not allowing him
further briefing, this appeal is DISMISSED. Insofar as Williams’s other
contentions concerning the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion are concerned, the
district court’s judgment denying the motion is VACATED, and the case is
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REMANDED to the district court with instructions to dismiss the Rule 60(b)
motion for lack of jurisdiction.
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