Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JULY 18, 2007
JODIE VEGA, Conservator of the Estate of
JEFFREY HURLEY, a Minor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 129436
LAKELAND HOSPITALS AT NILES AND
ST. JOSEPH, INC., ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL
ASSOCIATES, P.C., and BETH VANDERAH
and MICHAEL SPEERS, Personal
Corepresentatives of the Estate of DAVID ALAN
SPEERS, M.D., Deceased,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MARKMAN, J.
We granted leave to appeal to determine whether the insanity saving
provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to medical malpractice claims. The trial
court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that the
insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does not apply to medical malpractice
claims and, thus, that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Because we conclude that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1)
does apply to medical malpractice claims, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of plaintiff’s
claim.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The alleged medical malpractice occurred on December 13, 1999, when the
claimant was 11 years old. Plaintiff, the claimant’s mother, alleges that, as a result
of the defendant physician’s misdiagnosis, the claimant sustained severe,
permanent mental impairment. Plaintiff sent a notice of intent to bring an action
to defendants on November 8, 2001. As a result, the period of limitations was
tolled for 182 days from November 8, 2001, to May 9, 2002, and the period of
limitations expired on June 12, 2002. Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 11,
2002. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition,
concluding that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does not apply to
medical malpractice claims and, thus, that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. In a
two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 267 Mich App 565; 705
NW2d 389 (2005). After initially denying plaintiff’s application for leave to
appeal, 475 Mich 854 (2006), this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, vacated its previous order denying leave to appeal, and granted
plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. 477 Mich 957 (2006).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s ruling on a summary disposition motion is a question of law
that this Court reviews de novo. Haynes v Neshewat, 477 Mich 29, 34; 729 NW2d
2
488 (2007). Questions of statutory interpretation are also questions of law that
that this Court reviews de novo. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Generally, a medical malpractice action must be commenced within two
years after the action accrued. MCL 600.5805(6). Plaintiff concedes that she did
not file a complaint within the two-year period of limitations. However, plaintiff
argues that the claimant is insane and, thus, that the insanity saving provision of §
5851(1) applies.1
MCL 600.5851(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8), if the
person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under this act
is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the
person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the
disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry
or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.[2]
MCL 600.5851(7) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (8), if, at the time
a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a person under
section 5838a the person has not reached his or her eighth birthday, a
person shall not bring an action based on the claim unless the action
is commenced on or before the person’s tenth birthday or within the
period of limitations set forth in section 5838a, whichever is later.
1
MCL 600.5851(2) defines “insane” as “a condition of mental derangement
such as to prevent the sufferer from comprehending rights he or she is otherwise
bound to know and is not dependent on whether or not the person has been
judicially declared to be insane.” Whether the claimant is “insane” is not at issue
in this appeal.
2
It is undisputed that § 5851(8), which applies to claimants who have
suffered injuries to their reproductive systems, does not apply in this case.
3
If, at the time a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a
person under section 5838a, the person has reached his or her eighth
birthday, he or she is subject to the period of limitations set forth in
section 5838a.
MCL 600.5838a(2) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an action
involving a claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced
at any time within the applicable period prescribed in section 5805
or sections 5851 to 5856 . . . .
The lower courts held that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does
not apply to medical malpractice claims. The Court of Appeals dissent, on the
other hand, concluded that “although MCL 600.5851(7) may limit a claim for
malpractice that accrued before the age of eight, its plain language does not limit
those plaintiffs whose claims accrued after the age of [eight]-- as in the present
case.” 267 Mich App at 577 (Jansen, J., dissenting).
The saving provision of § 5851(1) applies to claimants who are under 18
years of age or insane “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection[] (7),” and it
allows a claimant to file an action within one year after the disability is removed.3
The first sentence of § 5851(7) states that if the medical malpractice claimant was
3
MCL 600.5838a(2) provides, in pertinent part, “except as otherwise
provided in section 5851(7) or (8), the claim shall not be commenced later than 6
years after the date of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim.”
Therefore, even under the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1), a medical
malpractice claimant only has six years to file a complaint. The only medical
malpractice claimants who would have longer than six years to file a complaint
would be those claimants whose claims accrued at a very young age. See §
5851(7) and (8) (the longest time claimants would have under these provisions is
10 and 15 years, respectively, and they would only have that long if their claims
accrued at birth).
4
less than eight years old when the claim accrued, the claimant must file a
complaint before his tenth birthday or before the period of limitations expires,
whichever is later. The medical malpractice claimant in the instant case was 11
years old when the claim accrued, and, thus, the first sentence of § 5851(7) is not
applicable. The second sentence of § 5851(7) states that if a medical malpractice
claimant was eight years of age or older when the claim accrued, as in this case,
the period of limitations set forth in § 5838a applies. MCL 600.5851(7) does not
state anything about when an insane medical malpractice claimant must
commence an action. Therefore, § 5851(7) does not preclude application of the
insanity saving provision of § 5851(1).4
Section 5851(7) states that if the claimant was eight years old or older when
the claim accrued, “the period of limitations set forth in § 5838a” applies; contrary
to defendants’ suggestion, it does not state the corollary, i.e., that the saving
4
Defendants argue that if the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies
to medical malpractice claimants, the entire second sentence of § 5851(7) will be
rendered meaningless. We respectfully disagree. The first sentence of § 5851(7)
states that if the medical malpractice claimant was less than eight years old when
the claim accrued, the claimant must file suit before his tenth birthday. Therefore,
it is logical to include a second sentence that explains when a medical malpractice
claimant must file a suit if that claimant’s claim accrued when the claimant was
eight years old or older. The fact that the second sentence does not change the
outcome of the instant case does not make it meaningless. In addition, the second
sentence could be read to mean that the minority saving provision of § 5851(1)
does not apply to medical malpractice claimants whose claims accrued when they
were eight years old or older. We do not address this issue because plaintiff does
not argue for application of the minority saving provision of § 5851(1); plaintiff
only argues for application of the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1).
5
provision of § 5851(1) does not apply. See Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642, 650; 677
NW2d 813 (2004) (a saving provision is not a period of limitations). As the Court
of Appeals dissent explained:
Clearly, the first part of MCL 600.5851(7) sets out a specific
time that a person under the age of eight must file his or her claim,
i.e., before the tenth birthday if the claim accrued before the age of
eight. MCL 600.5851(7). But the second sentence, which is
applicable here because plaintiff was over the age of eight at the
time of claim accrual, contains no language limiting the application
of the saving provision for insanity. MCL 600.5851(7). The second
sentence of MCL 600.5851(7) only states what the limitations period
will be for those plaintiffs whose claim accrues past the age of eight.
In other words, although the standard two-year limitations period
applies for those plaintiffs past age eight, it does not simultaneously
limit the saving provision of subsection 1, which provides that the
period of limitations for an insane plaintiff does not begin to run
until, “1 year after the disability is removed . . . although the period
of limitations has run.” MCL 600.5851(1) (emphasis added).[5]
* * *
Therefore, I would find that, although MCL 600.5851(7) may
limit a claim for malpractice that accrued before the age of eight, its
plain language does not limit those plaintiffs whose claims accrued
after the age of [eight]--as in the present case.[6] The only direction
the statute gives is to the “period of limitations set forth in section
5838a . . . .” MCL 600.5851(7). This plain language does not
5
This last sentence is not altogether correct, in our judgment, because the
period of limitations begins to run when the claim accrues, but § 5851(1) allows
minors and insane persons to bring their claims within one year after the disability
is removed “although the period of limitations has run.”
6
To the extent that the Court of Appeals dissent can be read to mean that if
a medical malpractice claimant was under the age of eight when the claim accrued,
he cannot rely on the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1), we respectfully
disagree because, as discussed throughout this opinion, we believe that the
insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies to all insane claimants.
6
simultaneously limit the application of MCL 600.5851(1). [267
Mich App at 576-578 (Jansen, J., dissenting).]
The insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) applies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided
in subsection[] (7) . . . .” MCL 600.5851(7) states that if a medical malpractice
claimant is less than eight years old when the claim accrued, the claimant must file
suit before he is ten years old or before the period of limitations expires,
whichever is later; but, if the medical malpractice claimant is eight years old or
older when the claim accrued, the claimant must file suit before the period of
limitations expires. MCL 600.5851(7) states nothing about an insane medical
malpractice claimant. That is, nothing in § 5851(7) prohibits an insane medical
malpractice claimant from taking advantage of the insanity saving provision of §
5851(1).7
Defendants argue that the first phrase of § 5851(1) conditions the
application of all remaining clauses in that subsection on the inapplicability of §
5851(7). That is, they argue that if § 5851(7) is applicable, i.e., if the plaintiff is
7
This position is consistent with this Court’s order in Dantzler v Hughett,
456 Mich 922 (1998). In Dantzler, the Court of Appeals had held that the medical
malpractice claimant was not insane for purposes of § 5851(1). This Court
reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court because
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the medical
malpractice claimant was insane for purposes of § 5851(1). There would have
been no need to remand the case to the trial court for a determination whether the
medical malpractice claimant was insane if the insanity saving provision of §
5851(1) does not apply to medical malpractice claimants.
7
bringing a medical malpractice claim, § 5851(1) is not applicable. We respectfully
disagree.
MCL 600.5851(1) begins, “Except as otherwise provided in subsection[]
(7) . . . .” Contrary to defendants’ contention, this language does not mean that if
§ 5851(7) is applicable, § 5851(1) is not applicable. Instead, it simply means that
if § 5851(1) is inconsistent with § 5851(7), § 5851(7) is controlling. For example,
if the claimant was four years old when his medical malpractice claim accrued,
under § 5851(1), the claimant would have until he was 19 years old to file a
complaint. However, under § 5851(7), the claimant would only have until he was
ten years old to file a complaint. Because § 5851(1) states “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in subsection[] (7),” § 5851(7) would be controlling under those
circumstances. On the other hand, if the claimant was four years old when the
medical malpractice claim accrued and was insane, the insanity saving provision
of § 5851(1) would apply because nothing in § 5851(7) prohibits application of the
insanity saving provision of § 5851(1). That is, § 5851(7) does not “otherwise
provide[]” anything with regard to the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1).
Therefore, § 5851(7) does not prohibit application of the insanity saving provision
of § 5851(1) to medical malpractice claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does
apply to medical malpractice claims, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
8
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of plaintiff’s
claim.
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
9
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
JODIE VEGA, Conservator of the Estate of
JEFFREY HURLEY, a Minor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 129436
LAKELAND HOSPITALS AT NILES AND
ST. JOSEPH, INC., ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL
ASSOCIATES, P.C., and BETH VANDERAH
and MICHAEL SPEERS, Personal
Corepresentatives of the Estate of DAVID ALAN
SPEERS, M.D., Deceased,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
Under the plain language of the statutes involved, Jeffrey Hurley or a
person suing on his behalf has until one year after Jeffrey’s disability is removed
through death or otherwise to bring his claim. Accordingly, I concur with the
majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s
claim as untimely, and the Court of Appeals erred by affirming that result.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly