Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JANUARY 26, 2005
JACK BURTON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Dale Burton,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v o. 124928
N
REED CITY HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
DR. CHRISTOPHER J. JOHNSON, and
DR. JAMES JOHNSON
Defendants-Appellants.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
This case presents the question whether a complaint
alleging medical malpractice that is filed before the
expiration of the notice period provided by MCL 600.2912b
tolls the period of limitations. The Court of Appeals held
that a prematurely filed complaint invokes the tolling
provisions of MCL 600.5856(a). We disagree. MCL
600.2912b(1) unambiguously states that a person "shall not"
commence an action alleging medical malpractice until the
expiration of the statutory notice period. A complaint
filed before the expiration of the notice period violates
MCL 600.2912b and is ineffective to toll the limitations
period. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and reinstate the Osceola Circuit Court's grant of summary
disposition for the defendants.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 17, 1998, plaintiff1 went to the emergency
room of defendant Reed City Hospital complaining of
abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. Tests revealed the
presence of an ulcer. Plaintiff was hospitalized and
treated with medications until January 23, 1998. On
January 26, 1998, the individually named defendants
performed stomach and gall bladder surgery on plaintiff.
On February 10, 2000, plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice complaint, alleging that his common bile duct
and pancreatic duct were negligently transected during the
surgery and that corrective surgery had to be performed in
November 1998. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered
residual, permanent damage as a result of the individual
defendants' negligence.
1
Plaintiff, Dale Burton, died following the
proceedings in the trial court. The personal
representative of his estate, Jack Burton, was substituted
as plaintiff. For ease of reference, the term "plaintiff"
refers to the decedent.
2
The alleged malpractice occurred on January 26, 1998.
The period of limitations for a medical malpractice action
is two years. MCL 600.5805(6). Absent tolling, the
statutory period of limitations would therefore have
expired on January 26, 2000.
Plaintiff's counsel sent defendants a notice of intent
to file a claim on October 18, 1999. Under MCL
600.5856(d), if the period of limitations would expire
during the notice period, the period of limitations is
tolled for 182 days and then resumes running after the 182-
day period. In this case, the limitations period was
tolled until April 17, 2000, and then resumed running,
expiring on July 26, 2000.
Plaintiff filed a complaint and an affidavit of merit
under MCL 600.2912d on February 10, 2000, 115 days after he
provided his notice of intent. After receiving from
plaintiff’s counsel two extensions of time in which to
answer, defendants filed an answer to the complaint on May
8, 2000. Defendants’ affirmative defenses included the
following:
5. That plaintiff's claim is barred by the
applicable Statute of Limitations.
* * *
12. That plaintiff has failed to comply
with the provisions of MCLA 600.2912b and MCLA
3
600.2912d, et seq[.], and plaintiff's complaint
must, therefore, be dismissed.
A pretrial status conference was held on June 29,
2000. The summary of that conference provides that
"Counsel stated that the status of the pleadings is
satisfactory, pending discovery."
On August 24, 2000, defendants moved for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (C)(10),
alleging that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice
provisions of MCL 600.2912 et seq.2 Defendants’ motion
pointed out that plaintiff's complaint was filed only 115
days after the date the notice of intent was sent.
Defendants’ motion alleged that the prematurely filed
complaint did not toll the limitations period, which
expired on July 26, 2000.
Plaintiff acknowledged that the complaint was filed
before the expiration of the notice period, but argued that
the filing of the complaint nevertheless tolled the period
of limitations, such that the proper remedy was dismissal
without prejudice. Plaintiff also asserted that defense
counsel had engaged in misconduct by expressing
2
Defendants also challenged the sufficiency of the
affidavit of merit filed with the complaint. The trial
court held that the affidavit met the statutory
requirements. Defendants have not appealed that ruling.
4
satisfaction with the state of the pleadings at the
pretrial conference and by waiting until after the
limitations period had run to bring the motion for summary
disposition. Plaintiff argued that defense counsel’s
misconduct resulted in a waiver, or that defendants were
estopped from challenging the premature filing of the
complaint.
The trial court initially denied the motion for
summary disposition. Although the trial court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that defendants’ expression of
satisfaction with the state of the pleadings at the
pretrial conference waived the premature filing defense, it
held that defendants’ failure to bring their motion for
summary disposition before the expiration of the
limitations period resulted in a waiver. The court
therefore denied defendants’ motion for summary
disposition.
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. On
reconsideration, the trial court reversed its prior
decision and granted summary disposition to defendants.
The trial court concluded that the affirmative defenses
were sufficiently pleaded to place plaintiff on notice of a
problem before the expiration of the limitations period.
5
Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed in a published opinion.
259 Mich App 74; 673 NW2d 135 (2003). While acknowledging
that dismissal is an appropriate remedy for noncompliance
with the provisions of MCL 600.2912b and that when a case
is dismissed the plaintiff must still comply with the
applicable statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless concluded that MCL 600.5856(a) operated to
toll the period of limitations. Burton, supra at 85.
The Court of Appeals distinguished the present case
from Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547; 607 NW2d 711 (2000),
in which the plaintiff filed the complaint without also
filing the affidavit of merit. The Court of Appeals
determined that because the affidavit of merit was filed
with the complaint in this case, the filing tolled the
period of limitations. Burton, supra at 85–86. Finally,
the Court of Appeals concluded that tolling is permissible
where a complaint is filed prematurely because it does not
result in unfair prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 87–89.
It thus reversed the trial court’s order granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Defendants filed an application for leave to appeal to
this Court.
6
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s grant of summary
disposition de novo. Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466
Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) (Roberts I). This case
involves questions of statutory interpretation, which are
also reviewed de novo. Id. The cardinal principle of
statutory construction is that courts must give effect to
legislative intent. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After
Remand), 469 Mich 487, 490; 672 NW2d 849 (2003). When
reviewing a statute, courts necessarily must first examine
the text of the statute. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich
557, 562; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). If the Legislature's intent
is clearly expressed by the language of the statute, no
further construction is permitted. Helder v Sruba, 462
Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000).
III. ANALYSIS
A. RELEVANT STATUTES
MCL 600.2912b(1) precludes a medical malpractice
claimant from commencing suit against a health professional
or health facility unless written notice is provided to
that professional or facility before the action is
commenced. Section 2912b(1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this
section, a person shall not commence an action
alleging medical malpractice against a health
7
professional or health facility unless the person
has given the health professional or health
facility written notice under this section not
less than 182 days before the action is
commenced. [Emphasis supplied.]
After providing the written notice, the claimant is
required to wait for the applicable notice period to pass
before filing suit. The claimant generally must wait 182
days after providing the notice of intent before commencing
an action alleging medical malpractice. MCL 600.2912b(1).
A claimant may file an action after 154 days if no response
to the notice is received as contemplated by MCL
600.2912b(7).
MCL 600.5856(d) provides that the two-year period of
limitations for medical malpractice actions is tolled
during the notice period if notice is given in compliance
with MCL 600.2912b. Defendants do not dispute that the
notice given in this case tolled the period of limitations
during the statutory notice period, so that the limitations
period was extended through July 26, 2000.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the period of
limitations was further tolled by plaintiff’s prematurely
filed complaint. It relied on MCL 600.5856(a), which
states that the period of limitations is also tolled “[a]t
the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons
and complaint are served on the defendant.”
8
B. PLAINTIFF’S PREMATURELY FILED
COMPLAINT DID NOT TOLL THE PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS
Section 2912b(1) unequivocally provides that a person
“shall not” commence an action alleging medical malpractice
against a health professional or health facility until the
expiration of the statutory notice period. This Court has
previously construed other such imperative language in the
statutes governing medical malpractice actions. For
example, in Scarsella, we held that a complaint alleging
medical malpractice that is not accompanied by the
statutorily required affidavit of merit is not effective to
toll the limitations period because the Legislature clearly
intended that an affidavit of merit “shall” be filed with
the complaint. Id. at 549 (citing MCL 600.2912d[1]). In
adopting the Court of Appeals opinion in Scarsella, we
noted that the Legislature’s use of the word “shall”
indicates a mandatory and imperative directive (citing
Oakland Co v Michigan, 456 Mich 144, 154; 566 NW2d 616
[1997]). Scarsella, supra at 549. We concluded that the
filing of a complaint without the required affidavit of
merit was insufficient to commence the lawsuit. Id.
In Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567; 609 NW2d
177 (2000), a case involving tolling during the notice
period, we held that a plaintiff cannot file suit without
9
first giving the notice required by MCL 600.2912b.
Omelenchuk, supra at 572. We further held that the
limitations period cannot be tolled unless a plaintiff
complies with the provisions of MCL 600.2912b. Omelenchuk,
supra at 576.
In Roberts I,3 another case involving tolling during
the notice period, we again emphasized that a plaintiff’s
compliance with MCL 600.2912b is mandatory before tolling
under MCL 600.5856(d) may occur. Roberts I, supra at 65,
67. We also held that MCL 600.2912b clearly places the
burden of complying with the notice of intent requirements
on the plaintiff and that this clear, unambiguous statute
requires full compliance with its provisions as written.
Roberts I, supra at 66.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly
determined that dismissal is an appropriate remedy for
noncompliance with the notice provisions of MCL 600.2912b
and that when a case is dismissed, the plaintiff must still
comply with the applicable statute of limitations. See
Gregory v Heritage Hosp, 460 Mich 26, 47-48; 594 NW2d 455
(1999); Scarsella, supra at 552. The Court of Appeals
3
The case was remanded for consideration of other
issues. Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (On Remand), 252
Mich App 664; 653 NW2d 441 (2002); (After Remand) 470 Mich
679; 684 NW2d 711(2004).
10
erred, however, by basing its decision to reverse the
decision of the trial court on the alleged lack of
prejudice to the defendants, a factor that is not contained
in the relevant statutes.
The directive in § 2912b(1) that a person “shall not”
commence a medical malpractice action until the expiration
of the notice period is similar to the directive in §
2912d(1) that a plaintiff’s attorney “shall file with the
complaint an affidavit of merit . . . .” Each statute sets
forth a prerequisite condition to the commencement of a
medical malpractice lawsuit. The filing of a complaint
before the expiration of the statutorily mandated notice
period is no more effective to commence a lawsuit than the
filing of a complaint without the required affidavit of
merit. In each instance, the failure to comply with the
statutory requirement renders the complaint insufficient to
commence the action.
The fact that defendants did not bring their motion
for summary disposition until the period of limitations had
run does not constitute a waiver of the defense.4 MCL
4
The assertion by the dissent that defendants
implicitly waived their statute of limitations defense is
not supported by the evidence. We agree that a waiver
sometimes “'may be shown by a course of acts and conduct,
and in some cases will be implied therefrom.'” Klas v
Pearce Hardware & Furniture Co, 202 Mich 334, 339; 168 NW
11
600.2912b places the burden of complying with the notice
provisions on the plaintiff. Roberts I, supra at 66. As
we explained in Roberts I, the purpose of a tolling
provision is to protect a plaintiff from a statute of
limitations defense. Here, defendants specifically raised
the statute of limitations and plaintiff’s compliance with
MCL 600.2912b in their answer and affirmative defenses.5
Such a direct assertion of these defenses by defendants can
425 (1918) (citation omitted). However, neither of the
acts cited by the dissent implies an “intentional
abandonment” of defendants’ right to assert a statute of
limitations defense. See Roberts I, supra at 64 n 4.
First, the request for additional time to answer
plaintiff's prematurely filed complaint was not, in fact,
“inconsistent with” their statute of limitations defense.
Defendants did not, as a result of the extension granted
them, file their answer after the limitations period had
expired. Had they done so, the dissent’s theory would be
more compelling. Rather, defendants filed their answer
more than two months before the expiration of the
limitations period. In addition, defendants’ express
incorporation of such a defense in their answer makes clear
that they were not intentionally abandoning that defense
when they sought the extension.
Second, defendants’ expression during a pretrial
conference that “the status of the pleadings is
satisfactory” was also not “inconsistent with” their
statute of limitations defense. This statement was offered
only after defendants had filed their answer, which
included the statute of limitations defense. There is
nothing in the record to support an implication that
defendants were willing to waive this defense on the basis
of their “satisfaction” with the status of the pleadings.
5
As noted earlier, the answer and affirmative defenses
were filed on May 8, 2000, more than two months before the
period of limitations expired.
12
by no means be considered a waiver. Roberts I, supra at 68-
70. To the contrary, it was a clear affirmation and
invocation of such defenses. Defendants’ pleadings were
more than sufficient to comply with the requirements of MCR
2.116(D)(2) (requiring the statute of limitations to be
raised in the first responsive pleading or in a motion
filed before the responsive pleading).
The dissent contends that defendants’ failure to
comply with the pleading requirements of MCL 600.2912e(1)
and MCR 2.108(A)(1) acts as a forfeiture of the statute of
limitations defense. In Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466
Mich 57, 69; 642 NW2d 663 (2002), we stated that “a
forfeiture necessarily requires that there be a specific
point at which the right must be asserted or be considered
forfeited.” Id. (emphasis omitted). In this case, that
specific point must have either occurred at defendants’
first responsive pleading or at a motion filed before that
pleading. MCR 2.116(D)(2). Here, defendants asserted the
statute of limitations argument in their May 8, 2000,
answer to plaintiff’s complaint.
The dissent concludes, however, that defendants’
failure to either answer or provide an affidavit of
meritorious defense within the statutory time frame
requires forfeiture. While the medical malpractice statute
13
is silent on the remedy for a violation of the pleading
requirements, generally, the remedy against a party who
“fail[s] to plead or otherwise defend” in an action is
default. MCR 2.603(A)(1). But this remedy was unavailable
to plaintiff, because he afforded defendants two extensions
of time in which to answer and also agreed to extend the
time for service of the affidavit of meritorious defense
through May 28, 2000. In sum, a party that stipulates an
extension of the time permitted for a filing may not be
heard to complain that the filing, when submitted within
that extended period, is untimely.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff did not fulfill his obligation under §
2912b. Accordingly, the limitations period was not tolled
by the prematurely filed complaint. We therefore reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the
judgment of the trial court granting summary disposition to
defendants.
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
14
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
JACK BURTON, personal
representative of the estate
of Dale Burton,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 124928
REED CITY HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
DR. CHIRSTOPHER J. JOHNSON, and
DR. JAMES JOHNSON,
Defendants-Appellants.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Defendants negotiated with plaintiff for extensions of the
time in which to file their answer. They failed to obtain
approval of any extension from the trial court. Moreover,
they failed to file their affidavit of meritorious defense
in conformance with the mandatory requirements for medical
malpractice actions.
I would hold that a party who requests a late answer
and expresses no objection to the pleadings cannot
challenge an early complaint. Defendants implicitly waived
their statute of limitations defense predicated on the
timing of plaintiff’s complaint.
Moreover, under the Court’s interpretation of the
statutes governing medical malpractice actions, defendants’
failure to conform to the mandatory pleading requirements
should have rendered their answer a nullity. Accordingly,
the statute of limitations defense should be deemed
forfeited.
Plaintiff's complaint, which was filed before the end
of the statutory waiting period for medical malpractice
claims, was timely in all other respects. I agree with the
Court of Appeals that the trial court’s dismissal with
prejudice was an unjust remedy in light of defendants’
conduct.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When presented with a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the court considers the pleadings,
affidavits, and other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G).
In this case, the facts needed to review defendants' motion
for summary disposition are not in dispute.
This case involves an issue of statutory construction.
We review it de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v
Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467
NW2d 21 (1991). The primary goal of statutory
interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396,
2
411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). The provisions of a statute must
be read in the context of the entire statute in the
interest of producing an harmonious whole. Macomb Co
Prosecutor v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 159; 627 NW2d 247
(2001).
II. BACKGROUND
On January 25, 1998, the defendant doctors at the
defendant hospital performed exploratory surgery on
plaintiff.1 Plaintiff has alleged that, during the surgery,
they committed malpractice by negligently cutting his
common bile and pancreatic ducts.
In order to file a complaint for this malpractice, a
Michigan statute required plaintiff to serve defendants
with a notice of intent to sue. MCL 600.2912b. Plaintiff
served this notice on October 18, 1999, well within the
two-year statutory period of limitations for medical
malpractice actions.2 MCL 600.5805(6). Defendants did not
respond. Plaintiff’s counsel filed the complaint and
affidavit of merit on February 10, 2000. Plaintiff’s
1
Plaintiff, Dale Burton, died following the
proceedings in the trial court. The personal
representative of his estate, Jack Burton, was substituted
as plaintiff. For ease of reference, the term “plaintiff”
refers to the decedent.
2
This tolled the running of the limitations period.
MCL 600.5856(d).
3
counsel asserted that 154 days had elapsed since he filed
the notice and that, since defendants had not responded, he
believed that he was entitled to file the complaint early.
MCL 600.2912b(8). In fact, defendants’ failure to respond
did not entitle plaintiff to file his complaint until March
20, 2000.
Rather than comment on the premature filing,
defendants told plaintiff that they intended to file an
answer and received two extensions from him. On March 7,
2000, defendants obtained from plaintiff an extension of
the time in which to answer. On the date that extension
expired, defendants obtained another extension through May
4, 2000. They told plaintiff that they “looked forward to
working with” him and “appreciate[d plaintiff’s] continued
cooperation.”
When ultimately defendants filed their answer on
May 8, 2000, it was not timely under either the statutory
pleading rules for medical malpractice claims or the court
rules.3 See MCL 600.2912e(1) and MCR 2.108(A)(1). It
lacked supporting facts, as required by the Michigan court
rules. MCR 2.111(F). Moreover, it lacked the requisite
affidavit of meritorious defense, as required by statute.
3
It was also after the expiration of the second
extension granted by plaintiff.
4
MCL 600.2912e. This affidavit was not filed until May 15,
2000, four days after the mandatory ninety-one-day deadline
expired. MCL 600.2912e(1).
Defendants’ answer included a statute of limitations
defense. However, it did not indicate the basis for
defendants’ assertion of the defense. On the date the
answer was filed, the limitations period had not yet run.
The defense was not yet viable and appeared to have been
included in the answer as boilerplate. Plaintiff denied
that the defense was applicable.
At a pretrial conference on June 29, 2000, defendants
expressed satisfaction with the pleadings. Then, on August
24, 2000, defendants brought a motion to dismiss the claim
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (C)(10), asserting that plaintiff
had not complied with the timing provisions of MCL
600.2912b and MCL 600.2912d. Plaintiff challenged
defendants’ motion on several grounds. Among the reasons
was that defendants’ conduct had waived the statute of
limitations defense.
The trial court granted the motion. It held that the
statute of limitations defense in defendants’ answer had
placed plaintiff on notice of a problem with his pleadings
before the expiration of the period of limitations.
5
The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary
disposition. It opined that the statutory period of
limitations had not elapsed, because plaintiff's
prematurely filed complaint and affidavit had tolled the
period of limitations. Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp, 259
Mich App 74; 673 NW2d 135 (2003). Tolling should be found
to have occurred, it reasoned, because defendants had not
been prejudiced and because summary disposition with
prejudice was an unnecessarily harsh remedy.
III. ANALYSIS
A. DEFENDANTS WAIVED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
In the trial court, plaintiff argued that the
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations had been
waived. I agree. “'[W]aiver is the “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”’” People
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999),
quoting United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 733; 113 S Ct
1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). It is an equitable doctrine
applied judicially to avoid injustice. Roberts v Mecosta
Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 76 n 9; 642 NW2d 663 (2002)
(KELLY, J., dissenting).
Waiver may be implied by conduct inconsistent with the
intent to assert the right. 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and
Waiver, § 209, pp 612-613. The party waiving the right
6
must have actual or constructive knowledge of facts that
would create the right. Id., § 202, pp 607-608.
Here, defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s notice
of intent to sue. Defendants contacted plaintiff only
after receiving his complaint. Defendants requested two
extensions of the time in which to file their answer. They
reserved no rights or defenses.
Defendants’ answer raised the affirmative defense of
the statute of limitations at a time when it was not
viable. Plaintiff denied that the defense was applicable.
At a pretrial conference, defendants expressed satisfaction
with the pleadings.
Defendants knew that the notice period had not
elapsed. They also knew that plaintiff’s complaint was
subject to a statute of limitations. Yet they made no
mention that the complaint had been filed prematurely.
They did not then assert, and have not yet asserted, any
prejudice from receiving plaintiff’s complaint before the
full notice period had elapsed.
Defendants induced plaintiff to believe that they had
no objection to the timing of his complaint. Defendants,
who asked twice to file a late answer, cannot equitably
7
harbor a challenge to plaintiff’s early complaint.4
Plaintiff’s claim should not be subject to dismissal, with
prejudice or otherwise. I would hold that defendants’
actions implied a knowing waiver of any affirmative defense
that is based on the premature filing of plaintiff’s
complaint.
B. UNDER THE MAJORITY’S JURISPRUDENCE, DEFENDANTS FORFEITED
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
This Court has held that, in medical malpractice
cases, pleading requirements must be strictly followed.
For instance, an affidavit of merit “shall” accompany the
complaint,5 unless the plaintiff obtains an extension from
the trial court pursuant to MCL 600.2912d(2).
In Scarsella v Pollak,6 this Court considered MCL
600.2912d(1). There, the plaintiff failed to include an
affidavit of merit with his complaint and neglected to
obtain an extension. The statutory period of limitations
had expired before the plaintiff filed the affidavit. The
4
The majority contends that plaintiff is not entitled
to pursue his claim because “a party that stipulates [to]
an extension of the time permitted for a filing may not be
heard to complain that the filing, when submitted within
that extended period, is untimely.” Ante at 14. However,
plaintiff is not claiming that defendants’ answer was
untimely.
5
MCL 600.2912d(1).
6
461 Mich 547, 553; 607 NW2d 711 (2000).
8
Court held that, because the plaintiff failed to comply
with the mandatory requirement, he failed to commence the
action. Thus, the filing of the complaint “‘was a
nullity’” and did not toll the period of limitations.
Scarsella, supra at 549 (citation omitted). This
interpretation, it concluded, was necessary to effectuate
“the Legislature’s clear statement that an affidavit of
merit ‘shall’ be filed with the complaint. MCL
600.2912d(1).” Id. at 552.
Similarly, this Court has held that “a plaintiff
cannot file suit without giving the notice required by [MCL
600.2912b(1)].” Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567,
572; 609 NW2d 177 (2000), overruled in part on other
grounds Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642, 655; 677 NW2d 813
(2004). The failure to file a notice precludes the filing
of a valid complaint. By contrast, defendants “must file
an affidavit as provided in . . . [MCL] 600.2912e . . . .”
MCR 2.112(L). The Legislature has mandated that medical
malpractice defendants promptly respond to complaints with
an affidavit of meritorious defense. Unlike plaintiffs,
defendants may not obtain “an additional 28 days in which
to file the affidavit required . . . .” See MCL
600.2912d(2) and MCL 600.2912e. The fact that, in this
case, the parties had agreed to extend the time in which to
9
answer is of no moment. The parties may not rewrite
statutes by extrajudicial agreement. See Harvey v Harvey,
470 Mich 186, 193-194; 680 NW2d 835 (2004).
Defendants’ answer and affidavit of meritorious
defense failed to conform to the pleading requirements.
Therefore, the trial court could have concluded, following
the reasoning in Scarsella and Omelenchuk, that the answer
was deficient. On motion by plaintiff or at the court’s
own initiative, defendants’ nonconforming answer could then
have been stricken. MCR 2.115(B). If this had occurred,
plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment by default.
MCR 2.603(A)(1). See Kowalski v Fiutowski, 247 Mich App
156; 635 NW2d 502 (2001).
However, plaintiff did not move to strike defendants’
answer or for a default judgment. Nevertheless, the court
rules require that a statute of limitations defense be
asserted in the first responsive pleading, or it is
forfeited. MCR 2.116(D)(2). Forfeiture is the failure to
timely assert a known right. Quality Products & Concepts
Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 379; 666 NW2d 251
(2003).
If the reasoning of Scarsella were consistently
applied to MCL 600.2912e(1) as it was to MCL 600.2912d(2),
defendants’ answer would be deemed a nullity because
10
defendants failed to satisfy the mandatory statutory
requirements. Thus, even assuming that the statute of
limitations defense was a viable affirmative defense at the
time it was raised, the defense would be deemed forfeited.
This holding would effectuate “the Legislature’s clear
statement”7 that without exception, after the plaintiff has
filed a complaint and the requisite affidavit of merit, an
answer shall be filed “within 21 days.” In addition, an
affidavit of meritorious defense shall be filed within “91
days.” MCL 600.2912e(1). Here, defendants did neither.
Their statute of limitations defense should be deemed
forfeited.
C. DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE UNDERMINES
THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE
The notice provision for medical malpractice suits
requires a plaintiff to provide a sound basis for his
claim. MCL 600.2912b(4).8 The Legislature enacted these
7
Scarsella, supra at 552.
8
The notice given to a health professional or
health facility under this section shall contain
a statement of at least all of the following:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or
care alleged by the claimant.
11
requirements to discourage frivolous lawsuits and allow
only meritorious claims to proceed.
The Legislature also imposed a presuit requirement on
defendants accused of medical malpractice. Defendants must
provide the basis for their defense to the alleged
malpractice. MCL 600.2912b(7).9
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that
the applicable standard of practice or care was
breached by the health professional or health
facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been
taken to achieve compliance with the alleged
standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the
breach of the standard of practice or care was
the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the
notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals
and health facilities the claimant is notifying
under this section in relation to the claim.
9
Within 154 days after receipt of notice
under this section, the health professional or
health facility against whom the claim is made
shall furnish to the claimant or his or her
authorized representative a written response that
contains a statement of each of the following:
(a) The factual basis for the defense to the
claim.
(b) The standard of practice or care that
the health professional or health facility claims
to be applicable to the action and that the
health professional or health facility complied
with that standard.
12
When these subsections of § 2912b are read together it
is apparent that the notice requirements were imposed also
to facilitate settlement. They provide the parties with a
mandatory period in which to investigate a pending claim
and negotiate a settlement before suit is filed. See
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679,
707; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (KELLY, J., dissenting). If the
defendant fails to respond to the notice of intent,
indicating he does not wish to settle the case, the
plaintiff is excused from the 182-day requirement. The
plaintiff may file suit after 154 days. MCL 600.2912b(8).
In this case, defendants did not take advantage of the
statutory notice period. They did not attempt to negotiate
a settlement. In fact, they did not respond to plaintiff's
notice at all. Plaintiff was thus entitled to file his
complaint after 154 days. However, he erroneously filed
his complaint and affidavit of merit after 115 days.
(c) The manner in which it is claimed by the
health professional or health facility that there
was compliance with the applicable standard of
practice or care.
(d) The manner in which the health
professional or health facility contends that the
alleged negligence of the health professional or
health facility was not the proximate cause of
the claimant's alleged injury or alleged damage.
13
Defendants continued to violate the procedural rules.
They did not timely file their answer. MCR 2.108(A)(1).
Rather, they obtained two extensions from plaintiff. They
asserted that they had difficulty obtaining the relevant
records from each other and needed more time to prepare
their answer. They did not seek an extension from the
trial court as the court rules allow. MCR 2.108(E).
Defendants also failed to timely file their mandatory
affidavit of meritorious defense. MCL 600.2912e. When
defendants ultimately answered, they included a statute of
limitations defense.
As the Court of Appeals noted:
“Statutes of limitation are procedural
devices intended to promote judicial economy and
the rights of defendants. For instance, they
protect defendants and the courts from having to
deal with cases in which the search for truth may
be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence.
They also prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on
their rights; a plaintiff who delays bringing an
action profits over an unsuspecting defendant who
must prepare a defense long after the event from
which the action arose.” [Burton, supra at 83,
quoting Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich 531, 534; 536
NW2d 755 (1995).]
Defendants asserted the statute of limitations defense
after inducing plaintiff to believe that they had no
quarrel with the timing of his complaint. Defendants
themselves failed to comply with procedural requirements.
Allowing defendants to prevail here frustrates the purposes
14
of the requirements, does nothing to deter stale claims,
and does not discourage frivolous litigation. Rather, it
precludes valid suits from proceeding on their merits,
encourages trial by ambush, and discourages cooperation
between the parties.10 It unjustly penalizes the innocent
injured and allows negligent tortfeasors to avoid
responsibility for their actions through gamesmanship.11
Although, pursuant to MCL 600.2912b(1), plaintiff
should not have been allowed to commence his suit,
defendants are not entitled to summary disposition. Given
that defendants' conduct constitutes waiver of the statute
of limitations defense, dismissal of the complaint is
contrary to the Legislature’s intent and the goals of the
relevant court rules.
10
Under the reasoning of today’s decision, any
deviation from a mandatory statutory deadline risks summary
disposition. Parties may now be required to object to any
requested accommodation. This is likely to diminish the
frequency of settlement. In the future, cooperation like
that by plaintiff’s counsel may even constitute legal
malpractice if it voids an otherwise valid claim or
defense.
11
Indeed, defendants could not, after two extensions,
timely file an affidavit of meritorious defense. Despite
the misfeasance of defendants, the majority has chosen to
selectively apply the statute in lieu of invoking equitable
doctrines that ensure justice and fair play.
15
IV. CONCLUSION
I disagree that defendants who have slept on their
rights as in this case are entitled to raise the
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. I would
hold that the defendants here waived and then forfeited the
defense.
To hold that plaintiff’s complaint does not toll the
period of limitations undermines the intent of the
Legislature. It does not promote resolution of meritorious
claims. It does not discourage frivolous claims. It
encourages gamesmanship.
The Court of Appeals properly reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants. I
would reinstate plaintiff’s claim and remand the case for
trial on the merits.
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
16