Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chie f Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 8, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 121668
CHARLES DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
This case presents the question whether defendant may be
convicted twice of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, one conviction
being based on the theft from the driver of the vehicle and
the other conviction being based on the theft of the same
vehicle from the passenger. We hold that defendant committed
only one carjacking offense. Accordingly, we reverse in part
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate one of
defendant’s two carjacking convictions.
I
On the afternoon of August 24, 1999, Coy Anderson drove
his automobile to his sister’s house. Tiara Hughes was a
passenger in the automobile. Anderson parked his car in the
street and walked to his sister’s house, while Hughes remained
in the car. Anderson left the keys in the ignition and the
motor running. As Anderson returned to his car, defendant
approached Anderson’s car, pointed a gun at Anderson and
warned him to get back, then pointed the gun at Hughes and
told her to leave the car. Anderson and Hughes complied.
Defendant entered Anderson’s car and drove away. Anderson
estimated that he was never closer than twelve to fifteen feet
from defendant.
A jury convicted defendant on two counts of carjacking,
MCL 750.529a, and one count of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was
sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 120 to 240 months
for the carjacking convictions and to the mandatory two-year
consecutive term for the felony-firearm conviction. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. 250 Mich App 589; 649 NW2d 118 (2002).
II
This case requires us to consider the meaning of MCL
750.529a. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that
we review de novo. Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich
57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002); Crowe v Detroit, 465 Mich 1, 6;
631 NW2d 293 (2001).
III
The goal of judicial interpretation of a statute is to
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ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275 (2002). To
accomplish this objective, we begin by examining the language
of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, “no
further construction is necessary or allowed to expand what
the Legislature clearly intended to cover.” Id. Stated
another way, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous
statute that is not within the manifest intent of the
Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.”
Roberts, supra at 63.1
Michigan’s carjacking statute, MCL 750.529a, provides:
(1) A person who by force or violence, or by
threat of force or violence, or by putting in fear
robs, steals, or takes a motor vehicle as defined
in section 412 from another person, in the presence
of that person or the presence of a passenger or in
the presence of any other person in lawful
possession of the motor vehicle, is guilty of
carjacking, a felony punishable by imprisonment for
life or for any term of years.
(2) A sentence imposed for a violation of
this section may be imposed to run consecutively to
any other sentence imposed for a conviction that
arises out of the same transaction.
A straightforward reading of this language shows that the
conduct to which the statute applies is the taking of a motor
vehicle under certain circumstances. Those circumstances
1
The analysis of the Court of Appeals relies in part on
a Senate legislative analysis. Such a legislative analysis is
generally not a persuasive tool of statutory interpretation.
See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578,
587 n 7; 624 NW2d 180 (2001).
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include the nature of the taking and from whom the motor
vehicle is taken.2 The core and focus of the offense,
however, are the taking of a motor vehicle. Because defendant
took one motor vehicle, the language of the carjacking statute
allows only one carjacking conviction.
It is clear that defendant committed the offense of
carjacking when, in order to steal Anderson’s car, he forced
Hughes at gunpoint to get out of the car. Defendant used a
threat of force or violence directed at Hughes, who was a
passenger in the car, to steal the car. While the elements of
the carjacking offense might also be based on the threat
defendant directed at Anderson, it is unnecessary to decide
whether the facts regarding Anderson also establish a
carjacking, because only one motor vehicle was taken.
In concluding that defendant committed two carjacking
offenses, the Court of Appeals reasoned in part that both
Anderson and Hughes suffered a loss of transportation. While
that is true, the language of the carjacking statute does not
identify “loss of transportation” as an element of the
offense. In effect, the Court of Appeals expanded the
language of the statute. Our Legislature could have made it
2
Carjacking must be (1) “by force or violence, or by
threat of force or violence, or by putting in fear” and (2)
must be “from another person, in the presence of that person
or the presence of a passenger or in the presence of any other
person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle . . . .” MCL
750.529a.
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a crime to deprive a person of transportation, but it did not.
Similarly, the fact that both Anderson and Hughes were
threatened does not mean that there were two carjackings.3
IV
The carjacking statute is structured in a manner similar
to the armed robbery statute, MCL 750.529,4 but the focus of
the armed robbery statute is significantly different. The
focus of the armed robbery statute is on the person assaulted.
The nature of the assault and the conduct accompanying the
assault are then further defined by the statute. This
perspective explains the decision in People v Wakeford, 418
Mich 95; 341 NW2d 68 (1983), in which the defendant, who took
property from two employees of a grocery store, was properly
3
The Court of Appeals noted that a similar California
carjacking statute was found to support multiple convictions
where only one vehicle was stolen. People v Hamilton, 40 Cal
App 4th 1137; 47 Cal Rptr 2d 343 (1995). While it is
unnecessary to distinguish the California decision because we
are interpreting the language of the Michigan carjacking
statute, we note that the California decision, like the Court
of Appeals decision, recognized that all occupants of a
carjacked vehicle suffer a loss of transportation.
4
MCL 750.529 provides in relevant part:
Any person who shall assault another, and
shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his
person, or in his presence, any money or other
property, which may be the subject of larceny, such
robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any
article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the
person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be
a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for
life or for any term of years.
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convicted of two counts of armed robbery.
In contrast, the carjacking statute focuses on the taking
of a particular type of property, a motor vehicle, rather than
on the person from whom the property is taken. In terms of
the language used in Wakeford, for armed robbery the
appropriate focus is the person assaulted and robbed, while
the appropriate focus for carjacking is the stolen vehicle.
V
Defendant’s presentation raises four other issues, the
first of which is a double jeopardy5 challenge to his multiple
convictions for carjacking. Given that we have determined
that the carjacking statute does not permit multiple charges
arising from a single carjacking, it is unnecessary to reach
defendant’s double jeopardy argument.
In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
defendant’s claim that improper prosecutorial comments denied
him a fair trial is meritless. Further, because we have
vacated one of defendant’s carjacking convictions, and
defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct lacks merit,
defendant is not entitled to relief on the basis of his
particular claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Defendant further contends that he is entitled to be
resentenced if one of his carjacking convictions is vacated.
5
US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.
6
We find no reason to remand for resentencing. Rescoring of
the guidelines to reflect only one carjacking conviction would
result in the same recommendation under the guidelines.
Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the
sentencing judge, who imposed identical concurrent sentences,
viewed defendant’s criminal episode as a single event, and
sentenced defendant accordingly. No reason exists to believe
that defendant’s convictions on two counts of carjacking
rather than one affected either sentence.
VI
Accordingly, we vacate one of defendant’s convictions and
the related sentence. In all other respects we affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
KELLY, J.
I concur in the result only.
Marilyn Kelly
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