ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Mark Small
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Scott P. Sullivan
Kokomo, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
ROSE FOBAR (VONDERAHE), )
)
Appellant (Respondent Below), ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 34S05-0204-CV-228
v. )
) Indiana Court of Appeals
ANTHONY M. VONDERAHE, ) Cause No. 34A05-0101-CV-2
)
Appellee (Petitioner Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Stephen M. Jessup, Special Judge
Cause No. 34D01-9904-DR-154
__________________________________________________________________
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
__________________________________________________________________
July 1, 2002
BOEHM, Justice.
In this marriage dissolution case, the Court of Appeals found the
trial court abused its discretion and instructed the trial court to deviate
from a 50-50 property division to the extent necessary to reflect the value
of one spouse’s inherited and non-commingled interest in property. Fobar
v. Vonderahe, 756 N.E.2d 512, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We hold that a
trial court’s discretion in dividing property in a dissolution is to be
reviewed by considering the division as a whole, not item by item. So
viewed, the trial court’s 50-50 division was within its discretion.
Factual and Procedural Background
Rose Fobar Vonderahe and Anthony Vonderahe were married in 1983, and
Anthony filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in 1999. The couple
jointly owned their marital residence, and Rose and Anthony each
individually owned rental real estate acquired before the marriage. In
addition, Rose owned a one-half interest in real estate in Buffalo, Indiana
that was inherited from her first husband after a fatal automobile
accident. Rose’s only daughter, Robin, inherited the other half of the
Buffalo property.
The trial court included Rose’s one-half interest in the Buffalo real
estate as marital property. After a three-day hearing, at Rose’s request,
the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court
divided the marital estate nearly equally, 50.7% to Anthony, 49.3% to Rose.
Rose appealed, claiming that the trial court was required to set
aside her interest in the Buffalo property to her. The Court of Appeals
agreed and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to “enter
a property division decree that deviates from a 50/50 division of property
in favor of [Rose] to the extent necessary to reflect the value of her
interest in the Buffalo property.”[1] 756 N.E.2d at 523. Anthony sought
transfer, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper
standard of review. This Court granted transfer in a previous order dated
April 5, 2002.
Standard of Review of a Property Division
Property owned by either spouse before the marriage is included in the
marital estate and subject to division and distribution. Ind. Code § 31-15-
7-4 (1998). Indiana law requires that marital property be divided in a
“just and reasonable manner,” id., and provides for the statutory
presumption that “an equal division of the marital property between the
parties is just and reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5. This presumption may
be rebutted, however, by evidence of each spouse’s contribution to the
acquisition of the property, the extent to which the property was acquired
before the marriage or by inheritance, the economic circumstances of each
spouse, the conduct of the parties relating to the disposition or
dissipation of assets, and each spouse’s earning ability. Id.
At Rose’s request, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Conclusions of law, however,
are reviewed de novo. Finally,
A “clearly erroneous” judgment can result from application of the
wrong legal standard to properly-found facts, and in that situation we
do not defer to the trial court. We are not bound by the trial
court’s characterization of its results as “findings of fact” or
“conclusions of law.” Rather, we look past these labels to the
substance of the judgment and will review a legal conclusion as such
even if the judgment wrongly classifies it as a finding of fact.
Beam v. Wausau Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. 2002). This case turns
on whether the trial court’s division of the marital property was just and
reasonable. Although this is in some sense an issue of law, it is highly
fact sensitive and is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Taylor
v. Taylor, 436 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. 1982); Elkins v. Elkins, 763 N.E.2d 482,
484-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Pitman v. Pitman, 721 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; Berger v. Berger, 648 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995); Truman v. Truman, 642 N.E.2d 230, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
A reviewing court will not weigh evidence, but will consider the evidence
in a light most favorable to the judgment. Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d
98, 102 (Ind. 1996); Pitman, 721 N.E.2d at 264.
The Court of Appeals found that Rose made a clear showing that she
obtained the Buffalo property both by inheritance and before the marriage,
and that Anthony never used the property, did not contribute to its
improvements, and participated in no decisions concerning the property.
Fobar, 756 N.E.2d at 522-23. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
consider the Buffalo property as an additional value to be allocated to
Rose. Id. at 521-23. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
relied principally on Castaneda v. Castaneda, 615 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993). Castaneda held that all property of the parties must be included in
the marital estate regardless of its source, but “the trial court may
deviate” from the 50-50 statutory presumption if property was brought
separately into the marriage, was never commingled with other marital
assets, and was never treated as marital assets. 615 N.E.2d at 470
(emphasis added). Anthony correctly responds that Castaneda does not stand
for the proposition that a trial court is required to reach an unequal
division of property because one spouse brought some items separately to
the marriage. Rather Castaneda permits the trial court, in its discretion,
to choose to distribute the marital property unequally in favor of one
spouse based on statutorily identified considerations, one of which is
inherited property. Whether to do so is a matter of trial court discretion
in light of all other relevant factors.
The trial court’s disposition is to be considered as a whole, not item
by item. Simpson v. Simpson, 650 N.E.2d 333, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995);
Livingston v. Livingston, 583 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992),
trans. denied; Hoyle v. Hoyle, 473 N.E.2d 653, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
In crafting a just and reasonable property distribution, a trial court is
required to balance a number of different considerations in arriving at an
ultimate disposition. The court may allocate some items of property or
debt to one spouse because of its disposition of other items. Similarly,
the factors identified by the statute as permitting an unequal division in
favor of one party or the other may cut in different directions. As a
result, if the appellate court views any one of these in isolation and
apart from the total mix, it may upset the balance ultimately struck by the
trial court.
Here, there is ample basis justifying the trial court’s inclusion of
Rose’s interest in the Buffalo property and the equal division of the
entire marital pot. Anthony has an annual income of $32,800, and Rose
earns approximately $40,500. Rose was awarded Anthony’s rental property
that he acquired prior to the marriage. The trial court found that Rose’s
earning ability was “substantially more” than Anthony’s and would be
increased by her greater rental income after the Decree takes effect. Thus
the trial court was well within its discretion in offsetting Rose’s higher
earning capacity and resources by including the Buffalo property in the
overall 50-50 split, rather than setting it off to Rose as a separate item.
Neither party has cited any case where an equal division was reversed
on the account of inherited property. Indeed, Indiana law presumes that
“an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and
reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5. In many circumstances, it may be
appropriate to award a greater share of the marital property to one spouse
by reason of inheritance. But Indiana statute requires all property to be
considered in the marital estate. I.C. § 31-15-7-4. Even if some items
meet the statutory criteria that may support an unequal division of the
overall pot, the law does not require an unequal division if overall
considerations render the total resolution just and equitable. The trial
court considered seventy-two exhibits and the testimony of four witnesses,
which were presented over the course of three days.[2] Although several of
the couple’s assets were brought to the marriage, there was no requirement
that any be set off for one spouse, and no requirement that the overall pot
be unequally divided. Rather, we conclude that the trial court was within
its discretion in dividing the property 50-50, and was not required to
alter its virtually equal division of the marital property to reflect
Rose’s interest in the inherited Buffalo property.
Conclusion
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A)(2), we summarily affirm all
other issues. We affirm the trial court in all respects except the
attorney fee issue. This case is remanded for resolution of that issue for
the reasons given by the Court of Appeals.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] On appeal, Rose raised several other issues. She contended: (1) the
divorce decree was void due to a jurisdictional defect caused by the trial
court’s failure to strictly comply with Howard Local Rule 16(B), which
requires the filing of financial disclosure forms by the parties to a
dissolution proceeding; (2) the findings of fact and conclusions of law do
not support the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Anthony; and (3)
the trial court erred in including horses and automobiles Rose claimed were
owned by her daughter. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) any error
relating to the trial court’s failure to abide by Howard Local Rule 16(B)
was waived by Rose’s failure to object timely; (2) the trial court’s sole
reference to Rose’s “conduct” during the course of litigation was not
sufficiently complete to support the attorney’s fees award; (3) the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing competing interests and
concluding that Anthony should have possession of the marital residence;
(4) in light of the conflicting evidence regarding the horses’ true
owner(s), the trial court did not clearly err by including them in the
marital estate; (5) a Pontiac Sunfire was properly included in the marital
estate; (6) it was harmless error for the trial court to include a
Volkswagen Jetta in the marital estate; (7) the trial court’s inclusion of
Rose’s one-half interest in the Buffalo property in the marital estate was
proper; and (8) except for failing to set aside the Buffalo property to
Rose, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the property
almost nearly equally between the parties despite Rose’s claim that she
brought more assets to the marriage than Anthony and earned more income
during the course of the marriage, and despite Rose’s claim that her
daughter’s social security benefits contributed to the operation and
maintenance of the household. Fobar, 756 N.E.2d at 512. Except as issue
(8) relates to the Buffalo property, we summarily affirm these issues.
Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
[2] The trial court stated:
There was considerable dispute as to a lot located and referred to as
the Buffalo Real Estate. The property had originally come from the
lineage of the Respondent’s first husband (husband’s mother) which is
shown by Respondent’s Exhibit W, deeded to Robert L. Fobar, the
Respondent’s first husband. This was subject to a life estate in his
mother, who is now deceased. That in accordance therewith, the
property would be owned ½ half by the Respondent and ½ by Robin, the
daughter of Robert Fobar by right of inheritance from Respondent’s
first husband. That as a result thereof, the Court is justified in
giving consideration to the source of said property, and dividing the
marital assets of the parties. The Court finds that a fair evaluation
for said property is in the sum of $45,000 and that Robin Fobar is the
owner of ½ of said Real Estate, the value therefore for inclusion of
marital assets is $22,500.