Attorney for Appellant
Aaron E. Haith
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Arthur Thaddeus Perry
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
JAMEIL COTTON,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 49S00-0005-CR-326
)
)
)
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Cale J. Bradford, Judge
Cause No. 49G03-9811-CF-177029
ON DIRECT APPEAL
August 20, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Jamiel Cotton was convicted of murder for shooting a woman
to death after breaking into her apartment. Although the trial court held
a pre-trial competency hearing, Defendant requested a new competency
hearing following his conviction. Based on the results of the initial
hearing and Defendant’s conduct at trial, we find no abuse of the trial
court’s discretion in denying the request.
Background
The facts most favorable to the judgment indicate that on October 17,
1998, Defendant Jameil Cotton broke into the apartment of Charese Cook. He
shot her seven times in the head, chest, and shoulder, killing her. He was
convicted of Murder,[1] and Burglary,[2] a Class A Felony. He was
sentenced to 65 years for the murder, and twenty years for the burglary.
The sentences were imposed consecutively.
Discussion
Defendant contends that that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to correct errors in which he challenged the competence finding made
by the trial court. Appellant’s Br. at 13.
During the pre-trial proceedings, Defendant was confined at Logansport
State Hospital. While at the hospital, he was administered two
psychotropic medications, Depakote and Haldol. Upon Defendant’s return to
the Marion County Jail, the trial court appointed two experts, Dr. Schuster
and Dr. Masbaum, to evaluate Defendant’s competency to stand trial. At the
time of his evaluation, the examiners believed that Defendant was still
taking medication. In fact, Defendant was not receiving any psychotropic
medications because his medical orders had inadvertently been misfiled.
Dr. Schuster’s findings were predicated on the continued use of the
drugs. Dr. Schuster concluded the following:
As a result of my examination it is my opinion with reasonable medical
certainty that [Defendant] is competent to stand trial in that he
understands he is charged with a crime, that he understands the legal
procedures thereon and he is able to assist his attorney in his own
defense.
(R. at 64.)
Dr. Masbaum’s evaluation was not predicated on Defendant’s use of
medication. He concluded, “It is my opinion, based on reasonable medical
certainty, that this individual, in spite of his various diagnoses does
have comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the proceedings.
He is able to aid his attorney in his defense.…” (R. at 67.)
Defendant’s pre-sentence report showed that Defendant had not
received his medication after being transferred to the jail. Defendant
thereupon filed a motion to correct errors seeking a new trial. Citing the
incorrect information given to Drs. Schuster and Masbaum, he argued that he
had not in fact been competent to stand trial.
The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, stating:
The Court considers both the reports; that is, the reports that were
filed in connection with this case by Dr. Schuster and Dr. Masbaum.
The Court also considers the evidence introduced during the trial of
this matter and the Court’s observation of Mr. Cotton throughout the
trial of this case. And, it appeared that he was able to confer with
counsel. And the Court, in its observations, saw nothing that would
indicate to the Court that the defendant was not competent to stand
trial.
(R. at 591.)
Defendant now argues that “The trial court should have suspended the
sentencing until such time as a determination of [Defendant’s] competence
to understand the proceeding and to assist his counsel, without the benefit
medication, was made.” Appellant’s Br. at 15.
Indiana Code § 35-36-3-1 provides:
If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to the
court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds
for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the
proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense, the court
shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the
defendant has that ability.
Whether reasonable grounds exist to order an evaluation of competency is a
decision assigned to the sound discretion of the trial court and is
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See Haviland v. State, 677
N.E.2d 509, 516 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. The court’s observations of a
defendant in court can be an adequate basis for finding that a competency
hearing is not necessary. See Manuel v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ind.
1989); Culpepper v. State, 662 N.E.2d 670, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996),
transfer denied.
We find that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant a competency hearing. Prior to the trial, the trial court found
a competency hearing necessary. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to
Defendant’s competency, although, Drs. Schuster and Masbaum were not aware
that Defendant was not receiving medication. At the time of Defendant’s
motion to correct errors, the trial court again considered whether or not
to conduct a new competency hearing. This time, however, the trial court
concluded that a hearing was not necessary. This decision was based on the
pre-trial reports and Defendant’s conduct at trial. We believe that the
report and conduct provided the trial court with sufficient information to
determine whether further inquiry into Defendant’s competence was
necessary.
Defendant cites Smith v. State, in which we ruled that a precursor to
Indiana Code § 35-36-3-1 requires that a determination of competency must
be made by disinterested psychologists or physicians. 443 N.E.2d 1187,
1190 (Ind. 1983). Smith, however, involved the requisite procedure to
determine competence; the procedures are only required under Indiana Code §
35-36-3-1 if “the court has reasonable grounds for believing that the
defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the
preparation of his defense.” Here, the trial court, after observing
Defendant throughout trial, found there were no grounds to believe that
Defendant lacked the ability to understand the proceedings. We see no
basis for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in finding
that Defendant was competent.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1998).
[2] Id. 35-43-2-1.