SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
AMY YOUNG, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-10-0230-PR
Plaintiff/Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 09-0188
KENNETH L. BECK and BARBARA BECK, )
husband and wife, ) Maricopa County
) Superior Court
Defendants/Appellants. ) Nos. CV2007-015269
) CV2007-015556
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Glenn M. Davis, Judge
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
224 Ariz. 408, 231 P.3d 940 (App. 2010)
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
BEALE MICHEAELS & SLACK PC Phoenix
By K. Thomas Slack
Tracy Gromer
Attorney for Amy Young
EHMANN DECIANCIO PLLC Tempe
By Joel DeCiancio
Christopher Robbins
And
DIANE M. LUCAS PC Phoenix
By Diane M. Lucas
Michael S. Ferraro
Attorneys for Kenneth L. Beck and Barbara Beck
HUMPHREY & PETERSEN PC Tucson
By Andrew J. Petersen
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association of Defense
Counsel
HARALSON MILLER PITT FELDMAN & MCANALLY PLC Tucson
By Stanley G. Feldman
And
GALLAGHER & KENNEDY P A Phoenix
By C. Lincoln Combs
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Association for Justice
and Arizona Trial Lawyers Association
________________________________________________________________
P E L A N D E R, Justice
¶1 We adopted the family purpose doctrine nearly a
century ago in Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 P. 966
(1919). In this case we address its continued validity and
application. We consider whether the Legislature has
statutorily abrogated the doctrine and, if not, whether this
Court should abolish it. Finally, we consider whether the
doctrine was properly applied in this case.
I.
¶2 The material facts are not in dispute. Kenneth and
Barbara Beck furnished a sport utility vehicle to their
seventeen-year-old son, Jason. He was the primary driver of
that vehicle and used it for travel to and from school, church,
and work. With his parents’ permission, Jason could also drive
the vehicle for social and recreational purposes. After Jason
was involved in an accident while driving the vehicle, however,
2
the Becks specifically instructed him not to “taxi” his friends
or drive their girlfriends home.
¶3 About a month later, Jason asked to use the vehicle to
drive to a friend’s house after work. Jason’s mother permitted
him to do so, with the understanding that Jason would drive to
his friend’s house, spend the night there, and then drive home
the next day. Jason did not request or receive permission to
use the vehicle for any other purpose.
¶4 After going to his friend’s house, however, Jason
drove around with several friends as they threw eggs at houses
and parked cars. Jason then drove his friend’s girlfriend home,
and while on his way to drop off another friend, collided with a
vehicle driven by Amy Young, who was seriously injured.
¶5 Young sued Jason and also named the Becks as
defendants, alleging they were liable for Jason’s negligence
under the family purpose doctrine. On cross-motions for summary
judgment regarding the doctrine’s applicability, the superior
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Young. The
parties later entered into a “high-low” settlement, under which
the Becks agreed to pay Young one of two specified damage
amounts, depending on whether the summary judgment ruling was
affirmed or reversed on appeal.
¶6 In the court of appeals, the Becks argued that the
family purpose doctrine did not apply because Jason violated
3
their restriction against “transporting of friends.” Young v.
Beck, 224 Ariz. 408, 411 ¶ 11, 231 P.3d 940, 943 (App. 2010).
Alternatively, the Becks contended that the doctrine should be
abolished. Id. at 413 ¶ 19, 231 P.3d at 945. The court of
appeals rejected those arguments and affirmed the superior
court’s ruling, holding the Becks vicariously liable for Jason’s
negligence. Id. at 412-14 ¶¶ 15, 19, 22, 231 P.3d at 944-46.
¶7 We granted review because the continued vitality of
the family purpose doctrine is of statewide importance. We have
jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona
Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-
120.24 (2003).
II.
¶8 The family purpose doctrine “subjects the owner of a
[vehicle] to vicarious liability when the owner provides an
automobile for the general use by members of the family . . .
and when the vehicle is so used by a family member.” Dan B.
Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 340, at 935 (2001); see also Young,
224 Ariz. at 410 ¶ 8, 231 P.3d at 942 (“[Under the doctrine,] a
head of household who furnishes or maintains a vehicle for the
use, pleasure, and convenience of the family is liable for the
negligence of family members who have the general authority to
drive the vehicle while it is used for family purposes.”); Brown
v. Stogsdill, 140 Ariz. 485, 487, 682 P.2d 1152, 1154 (App.
4
1984) (same).
¶9 This Court adopted the doctrine in Benton, which
upheld a judgment holding a parent vicariously liable for his
minor son’s negligent driving. Finding the doctrine supported
by “sound reason” and “the great weight of authority,” we framed
the rule as follows:
[A parent] who furnishes an automobile for the
pleasure and convenience of the members of his family
makes the use of the machine for the above purposes
his affair or business, and . . . any member of the
family driving the machine with the [parent’s]
consent, either express or implied, is the [parent’s]
agent.
Benton, 20 Ariz. at 278, 179 P. at 968.
III.
¶10 Arizona courts have applied the family purpose
doctrine in various contexts in the nine decades since Benton.
See A.R.S. § 1-201 (stating, with certain qualifications, “[t]he
common law . . . is adopted and shall be the rule of decision in
all courts of this state”). The Becks argue, however, that the
Legislature abrogated the doctrine by amending the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”), A.R.S. § 12-2506,
in 1987. See 1987 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 2 (1st Reg.
Sess.). As amended, UCATA abolishes joint and several liability
in most circumstances and establishes a system of comparative
fault, making “each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her
percentage of fault and no more.” State Farm Ins. Cos. v.
5
Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 217 Ariz. 222, 225 ¶ 12, 172
P.3d 410, 413 (2007) (quoting Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 Ariz.
505, 510, 821 P.2d 166, 171 (1991)). Section 12-2506(A)
provides as follows:
In an action for personal injury, property damage or
wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for
damages is several only and is not joint, except as
otherwise provided in this section.
¶11 Section 12-2506(D) sets forth three exceptions to
UCATA’s general rule of several-only liability:
The liability of each defendant is several only and is
not joint, except that a party is responsible for the
fault of another person, or for payment of the
proportionate share of another person, if any of the
following applies:
1. Both the party and the other person were acting in
concert.
2. The other person was acting as an agent or servant
of the party.
3. The party’s liability for the fault of another
person arises out of a duty created by the federal
employers’ liability act, 45 United States Code § 51.
¶12 Citing § 12-2506(D)(2), the Becks argue that “the
family purpose doctrine can survive under UCATA only if family
members are agents or servants of the head of the family,” and
“Jason was not the agent, employee, or servant of his parents.”
They contend that, although Benton initially based the doctrine
on an agency concept, Arizona courts have since repudiated the
doctrine’s agency foundation.
6
¶13 We generally do not find that a statute changes common
law unless “the legislature . . . clearly and plainly
manifest[s] an intent” to have the statute do so. Wyatt v.
Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991); see
also Pleak v. Entrada Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 207 Ariz. 418, 422
¶ 12, 87 P.3d 831, 835 (2004) (“Absent a clear manifestation of
legislative intent to abrogate the common law, we interpret
statutes with every intendment in favor of consistency with the
common law.”) (quotation omitted). This approach “encourages
legislators to avoid leaving something as important as the
existence or nonexistence of common-law rights to inference or
implication.” Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 274, 872
P.2d 668, 678 (1994).
¶14 Our court of appeals has often noted that the family
purpose doctrine departs from traditional agency law.1 See
Young, 224 Ariz. at 411 ¶ 12, 231 P.3d at 943 (“The doctrine has
never purported to rely on a true agency relationship.”);
1
For example, under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, “the
head of a household who permits members of the family to use his
automobile is not liable for such use except when members use it
on his affairs and as his servants.” Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 238 cmt. c (1958); cf. Reed v. Hinderland, 135 Ariz.
213, 219, 660 P.2d 464, 470 (1983) (rejecting former rule that
“mere ownership of a vehicle raised a presumption that the
driver is the agent or servant of the owner,” and holding that
“mere presence of the owner in an automobile driven by another
does not create any presumption of a master-servant
relationship”).
7
Jacobson v. Superior Court (Steinhoff), 154 Ariz. 430, 431, 743
P.2d 410, 411 (App. 1987) (observing that the doctrine’s
“insecure[]” grounding “in agency principles . . . is the purest
of fictions”); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz. App. 476, 479, 441
P.2d 73, 76 (App. 1968) (noting “the agency for pleasure
precepts of the family purpose doctrine do not square with
established principles of agency law”) (quotation omitted).
¶15 But when we adopted the doctrine in Benton, we did so
on the premise that “any member of the family driving the
machine with the father’s consent, either express or implied, is
the father’s agent,” and we held that “the minor son was the
agent of his father in driving the [family vehicle] at the time
of the accident.” 20 Ariz. at 278-79, 179 P. at 968.
Similarly, in Mortensen v. Knight, we noted that “the family
purpose doctrine is the settled law of this jurisdiction” and
that “[a]gency, not ownership, is the test of liability.” 81
Ariz. 325, 332, 333, 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956).
¶16 In view of this history and the express exception in
§ 12-2506(D)(2) for “agent or servant” relationships, we cannot
conclude that the Legislature intended to abolish the family
purpose doctrine when it amended UCATA in 1987, abolishing joint
and several liability. Certainly nothing in UCATA manifestly
indicates such a legislative intent. Nor is it clear that § 12-
2506(D) prescribes an exclusive list of situations in which
8
vicarious liability (as contrasted with joint and several
liability) may be imposed.
¶17 In Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, we noted that “[j]oint
liability and vicarious liability are related but separate
doctrines,” and that “[t]he joint liability that was abolished
by A.R.S. § 12-2506[] was limited to that class of joint
tortfeasors whose independent negligence coalesced to form a
single injury.” 198 Ariz. 367, 371 ¶ 13, 10 P.3d 625, 629
(2000). We therefore concluded that UCATA did not abolish the
common-law, non-delegable duty doctrine, which imposes vicarious
liability on an employer in certain circumstances for an
independent contractor’s negligence. Id. at ¶ 14. Noting that
parties whose liability is only vicarious “have no fault to
allocate,” we interpreted the “agent or servant” provision in
§ 12-2506(D)(2) as simply making “express that which is
implicit—the statute does not affect the doctrine of vicarious
liability.” Id. at ¶ 13. Because the family purpose doctrine
is a form of vicarious liability, Wiggs strongly suggests that
the Legislature did not abolish the doctrine in UCATA.
¶18 Premier Manufactured Systems, on which the Becks rely,
does not alter that conclusion. Premier concluded that
defendants against whom strict product liability was alleged
could not be held jointly and severally liable after UCATA’s
1987 amendment. 217 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 1, 172 P.3d at 412. We
9
distinguished Wiggs, reasoning that in strict product liability
actions, “the various participants in the chain of distribution
are liable not for the actions of others, but rather for their
own actions in distributing the defective product.” Id. at 226
¶ 20, 172 P.3d at 414.
¶19 In contrast, the family purpose doctrine imputes
liability not because of the head of the family’s independent
fault or breach of a legal duty, but because of “the agency
relationship that is deemed to exist between the head of the
household and the driver of the family car.” Camper v. Minor,
915 S.W.2d 437, 448 (Tenn. 1996) (concluding that statute
abolishing joint and several liability did not abrogate the
family purpose doctrine); see also Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 433,
743 P.2d at 413 (noting that the “doctrine does not rest on a
classical theory of agency” but rather serves “a practical
purpose” of “provid[ing] reparation for an injured party from
the closest financially responsible party to the wrongdoing
minor”). Thus, UCATA’s 1987 amendment did not abrogate the
family purpose doctrine.
¶20 We also reject the Becks’ contention that the
Legislature preempted the family purpose doctrine in the
Financial Responsibility Act, which requires all vehicle owners
to carry liability insurance and all policies to provide
liability coverage for not only the owner but also all
10
permissive drivers. See A.R.S. §§ 28-4009, -4135. As the court
of appeals correctly observed, that Act contains no “language
indicating legislative intent to abrogate, replace, preempt, or
limit the family purpose doctrine.” Young, 224 Ariz. at 414
¶ 20, 231 P.3d at 946. Requiring all Arizona vehicle owners to
carry liability insurance coverage with minimum limits is not
inconsistent with imposing vicarious liability under the family
purpose doctrine. Cf. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartley, 204
Ariz. 596, 597 ¶¶ 1, 5, 65 P.3d 977, 978 (App. 2003) (holding
that A.R.S. § 28-3160, which imputes certain driving misconduct
of a minor to the person who signs the minor’s driving
application, did not abrogate or limit liability arising under
family purpose doctrine).
IV.
¶21 We next consider the Becks’ argument that this Court
should abandon the family purpose doctrine. The Becks contend
the doctrine lacks a viable legal basis or public policy
justification, is “grossly unfair to any parent [of] a young
driver,” and functions as “solely a penalty against wealthy
parents.”
¶22 “Just as the common law is court-made law based on the
circumstances and conditions of the time, so can the common law
be changed by the court when conditions and circumstances
change.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 17
11
n.21, 730 P.2d 186, 194 n.21 (1986) (quoting Fernandez v. Romo,
132 Ariz. 447, 449, 646 P.2d 878, 880 (1982)); see also Estate
of DeSela v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, CV-10-0172-PR,
2011 WL 134917, at *4 ¶ 15 (Ariz. Jan. 18, 2011) (noting that
“the common law should adapt when circumstances make it no
longer just or consistent with sound policy”). But stare
decisis commands that “precedents of the court should not
lightly be overruled,” and mere disagreement with those who
preceded us is not enough. State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399,
416, 844 P.2d 566, 583 (1992) (quoting State v. Crowder, 155
Ariz. 477, 483, 747 P.2d 1176, 1182 (1987) (Moeller, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Rather, “[w]e will
overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason.”
State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 159 ¶ 52, 140 P.3d 930, 942
(2006); see also White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113, 358 P.2d
712, 714 (1961) (noting our prior case law “should be adhered to
unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist
or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly
wrong”).
¶23 Whatever the original soundness of the family purpose
doctrine’s use of agency principles, “it is now usually
recognized that the doctrine represents a social policy
generated in response to the problem presented by massive use of
the automobile.” Dobbs, § 340, at 935. The doctrine’s primary
12
justification is to provide “for an injured party’s recovery
from the financially responsible person—the family head—deemed
most able to control to whom the car is made available.”
Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 431, 743 P.2d at 411; see also Young, 224
Ariz. at 410 ¶ 8, 231 P.3d at 942 (same). As Benton explained,
when a vehicle “is placed in the hands of his family by a
[parent], for the family’s pleasure, comfort, and entertainment,
. . . justice should require that the owner should be
responsible for its negligent operation.” 20 Ariz. at 278, 179
P. at 968 (quotations omitted).
¶24 The Becks contend that the doctrine’s compensatory
purpose was rendered moot by the Financial Responsibility Act.
See A.R.S. §§ 28-4009, -4135. Just as we are not persuaded that
those statutes abrogated the family purpose doctrine, see supra
¶ 20, we also are not convinced that a law requiring minimum
liability coverage of only $15,000 per person and $30,000 per
occurrence guarantees that victims of serious accidents caused
by young, inexperienced, and financially insecure drivers will
be fully compensated.2 Nor is it clear that the doctrine’s
2
The Becks also point out that motorists may now protect
themselves by purchasing uninsured (UM) and underinsured (UIM)
coverage in their automobile insurance policies. See A.R.S.
§ 20-259.01. In originally enacting and repeatedly amending the
UM/UIM statute, however, the Legislature never mentioned, let
alone expressed a clear intent to abrogate, the family purpose
doctrine.
13
policy goals of providing compensation to such accident victims
and encouraging parents to ensure that their children operate
motor vehicles safely and obediently are any less important
today than ninety-two years ago. See, e.g., People v. Badke,
865 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (Suffolk County Ct. 2008) (“The loss of
life resulting from inexperienced teen drivers is a national
problem of epidemic proportions.”).
¶25 The Becks also describe the doctrine as an
“anachronism” that a “great majority” of jurisdictions have
rejected. A number of courts (but none recently) have declined
to adopt the family purpose doctrine.3 But many states continue
to apply the doctrine either as a matter of common law4 or
3
See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 176 P. 131, 131 (Kan. 1918)
(punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not
justified because a car is “not a dangerous instrumentality
which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v.
Knapp, 156 A. 399, 401 (Vt. 1931) (refusing to apply doctrine
because such liability must depend on “settled common-law
principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare
v. Stetz, 214 P.2d 486, 494 (Wyo. 1950) (declining to adopt
doctrine because of its divergence from “clearly established”
agency rules and noting that policy was better left to the
legislature).
4
Fourteen states, including Arizona, currently recognize a
common-law family purpose doctrine. See Hasegawa v. Day, 684
P.2d 936, 939 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds,
Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992); Cogan v. Chase
Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp., 882 A.2d 597, 602 (Conn. 2005); Cox
v. Rewis, 429 S.E.2d 314, 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Keeney v.
Smith, 521 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Ky. 1975); Leonard v. Wilson, 468
N.W.2d 604, 606 (Neb. 1991); Madrid v. Shryock, 745 P.2d 375,
377 (N.M. 1987); Loy v. Martin, 577 S.E.2d 407, 410 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2003); Malchose v. Kalfell, 664 N.W.2d 508, 513 (N.D.
14
through statutes holding parents liable for the negligent
driving of their children.5 Thus, contrary to the Becks’
assertion, Arizona is neither alone nor clinging to an
antiquated doctrine.
¶26 We are not here “writing on a clean slate,” but rather
on an established common law backdrop. See State v. Lara, 171
Ariz. 282, 285, 830 P.2d 803, 806 (1992). Nor has the family
purpose doctrine “been eroded by the development of Arizona’s
common law.” Estate of DeSela, 2011 WL 134917, at *3 ¶ 11. If
2003); Barber v. George, 927 P.2d 140, 141 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Thompson v. Michael, 433 S.E.2d 853, 855 (S.C. 1993); Camper,
915 S.W.2d at 447-48; Kaynor v. Farline, 72 P.3d 262, 270 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2003); Ward v. Baker, 425 S.E.2d 245, 249-50 (W.Va.
1993). In Florida, an automobile owner is vicariously liable
for damages caused by any permissive user. See Hertz Corp. v.
Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1992).
5
At least nine jurisdictions have a statutory version of the
doctrine or a broader law that imposes vicarious liability on
vehicle owners for the negligence of all permissive users. See
Cal. Veh. Code § 17708 (West 2010) (holding parents or guardians
jointly and severally liable for negligence of minor drivers);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6105 (West 2010) (holding owner of
vehicle liable for damages caused by permissive driver who is a
minor); D.C. Code § 50-1301.08 (2010) (holding owner of vehicle
liable for negligence of any permissive user); Iowa Code
§ 321.493(2)(a) (2010) (same); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.590(3)
(West 2010) (holding owner liable for negligence of any
permissive user who is a minor); Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.401(1)
(West 2010) (holding owner liable for negligence of any
permissive user and family members are presumed to be permissive
users); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.09(5a) (West 2010) (holding owner
liable for negligence of all permissive users); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 41.440 (2010) (holding owner of vehicle jointly liable for
negligence of any family member using car with permission); N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law § 388(1) (McKinney 2005) (holding owner liable
for negligence of any permissive user).
15
the Legislature wants to abrogate the doctrine, it may do so
explicitly. Cf. Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 257
¶ 19, 69 P.3d 23, 28 (2003) (recognizing that Legislature can
amend statutes and is an “appropriate forum to argue that public
policy considerations favor abandoning the rule announced” in
prior court decisions).
¶27 In sum, although policy arguments can be made for and
against the doctrine, it is firmly entrenched in our common law
and has been repeatedly applied by Arizona courts. Given the
doctrine’s long history, social utility in compensating injured
victims, and conflicting policy considerations, we find no
compelling reason to abrogate the doctrine. Nothing indicates
that the rule has overburdened our courts or produced manifestly
unjust results.
V.
¶28 Finally, we consider the Becks’ argument that the
superior court misapplied the doctrine because, on the
undisputed facts, summary judgment should have been entered for
them instead of Young. Liability under the doctrine arises
(1) when there is a head of the family, (2) who maintains or
furnishes a vehicle for the general use, pleasure, and
convenience of the family, and (3) a family member uses the
vehicle with the family head’s express or implied permission for
a family purpose. Brown, 140 Ariz. at 487, 682 P.2d at 1154;
16
Pesqueira, 7 Ariz. App. at 480, 441 P.2d at 77.
¶29 The first two requirements are not at issue here. The
Becks contend, however, that Jason’s use of the vehicle when the
accident occurred was neither “for a family purpose” nor with
their “express or implied permission.” The Becks argue that,
“[i]f the individual ‘pleasure and convenience’ of the driver is
a ‘family purpose,’ then the element of ‘family purpose’ is
rendered meaningless.” According to the Becks, the doctrine
does not apply as a matter of law because Jason was driving the
vehicle for his own pleasure and convenience and in violation of
their specific restrictions on its use. We disagree.
¶30 In Benton, we held that the doctrine applied because,
when the accident occurred, the defendant’s son was driving the
family vehicle “in the very business for which the [parent] kept
and maintained the vehicle, viz., the pleasure and convenience
of the members of [the] family.” 20 Ariz. at 278, 179 P. at
968. The doctrine does not require that the vehicle be
furnished for a parental or communal errand. See Brown, 140
Ariz. at 489, 682 P.2d at 1156 (“[T]he fact that the
[driver/son] was using the vehicle solely for his own purpose
and pleasure at the time of the accident would not automatically
rule out the application of the family purpose doctrine.”);
Pesqueira, 7 Ariz. App. at 481, 441 P.2d at 78 (holding that
daughter who was involved in accident while traveling to and
17
from work was serving a family purpose). Rather, when a car is
driven for the pleasure and convenience of a family member, a
family purpose generally is served. See, e.g., Cohen v.
Whiteman, 43 S.E.2d 184, 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947) (concluding
doctrine could apply when son was using family car for his own
“pleasure and comfort”); Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925, 927-28
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (same); William L. Prosser, The Law of
Torts 484-85 (4th ed. 1971) (noting “family purpose” includes
“mere driving for the pleasure of an individual” family member).
¶31 Moreover, the doctrine does not require that a parent
give permission for every possible route taken or deviation made
by a family member while operating the vehicle. See, e.g.,
Driver v. Smith, 339 S.W.2d 135, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959)
(holding doctrine could apply when daughter, at time of
accident, disobeyed parents’ instruction not to drive outside
city limits); Jennings v. Campbell, 6 N.W.2d 376, 379-80 (Neb.
1942) (holding doctrine does not require plaintiff to prove that
driver of family car had owner’s authority to drive at exact
time and place of accident). Therefore, a deviation from the
terms of consent will not necessarily relieve a head of the
family from liability. See Evans v. Caldwell, 190 S.E. 582, 583
(Ga. 1937) (noting that when the general purpose for which
family vehicle is furnished is for family member’s convenience
and enjoyment, with parent’s express or implied permission,
18
parent’s limitation on vehicle’s use “to a particular
destination and return . . . is not a limitation on the purpose
for which the car is being used”).
¶32 To hold otherwise would enable parents to immunize
themselves from liability by imposing general, unrealistic, or
unenforced limitations on their child’s use of the vehicle. See
Driver, 339 S.W.2d at 143 (“[I]f at the time of the accident it
should be assumed that [the daughter/driver] was exceeding her
authorized speed limit certainly it could not be contended that
such disobedience relieved the father of liability.”). “As
between the owner of the vehicle and the person injured by the
negligent operation thereof, it is the duty of the owner to see
that his private limitations on its use are followed.” Phillips
v. Dixon, 223 S.E.2d 678, 682 (Ga. 1976).
¶33 Here, it is undisputed that the Becks maintained and
furnished the vehicle for Jason’s general use and that, on the
night of the accident, Jason’s mother permitted him to use the
vehicle for certain purposes. Although the permission did not
extend to transporting friends, the courts below correctly
concluded that Jason’s deviation from his parents’ limitation on
his use of the vehicle did not entitle the Becks to summary
judgment on Young’s family purpose doctrine claim. See
Richardson v. True, 259 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Ky. 1953) (noting that,
once having consented to use of vehicle for family purpose,
19
parent is not relieved from liability merely because family
member was using vehicle for unauthorized purpose or in a
forbidden manner at time of accident); Heenan v. Perkins, 564
P.2d 1354, 1356 (Or. 1977) (same); Crowder v. Carroll, 161
S.E.2d 235, 237-38 (S.C. 1968) (rejecting parent’s contention
that doctrine did not apply as a matter of law because at time
of accident son was driving family vehicle contrary to parent’s
express instructions); Gray, 869 S.W.2d at 927-28 (same); Kaynor
v. Farline, 72 P.3d 262, 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (same).
¶34 Based on the undisputed facts of this case,6 we agree
with the trial court and court of appeals that the doctrine
applies and that Young was entitled to summary judgment on that
issue. See First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d
225, 230 (Ky. 1958) (noting that when “the essential facts are
not in dispute, the question really becomes one of the scope and
extent of the family purpose doctrine as a rule of law, and
therefore is a question of law for the court”). The Becks
allowed Jason to drive the vehicle on the night in question (and
thus he had the vehicle with their express permission), and he
was transporting himself (which, under Benton, constituted a
6
The Becks stipulated in their “high/low” settlement
agreement that the relevant facts “are not materially disputed”
and that “[t]he issue to be determined on appeal is a purely
legal issue regarding application of the family purpose doctrine
to the facts of this case.”
20
family purpose). Accordingly, we reject the Becks’ assertion
that the family purpose doctrine is inapplicable as a matter of
law in this case.7
VI.
¶35 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the court of
appeals’ opinion and the superior court’s partial summary
judgment in favor of Young on the family purpose doctrine’s
applicability.
_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice
7
We agree with the court of appeals that the doctrine is not
“without limits.” Young, 224 Ariz. at 413 ¶ 18, 231 P.3d at
945. We thus do not adopt a “Hell or High Water Rule,” which
“conclusively presume[s] that if the vehicle was originally
placed in the possession of [a] bailee by another having proper
authority, then, despite hell or high water, the operation of
the vehicle is considered to be within the scope of the
permission granted, regardless of how grossly the terms of the
original bailment may have been violated.” Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 108
Ariz. 113, 115, 493 P.2d 495, 497 (1972). Given the posture of
this case and the arguments made, however, we do not have
occasion here to consider whether the doctrine should be
prospectively limited (e.g., by adopting the approach espoused
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 238) or whether
different circumstances (e.g., a dispute over whether the child
had the parent’s permission to use the vehicle) would present
triable issues of fact. See, e.g., Leonard, 468 N.W.2d at 606
(finding a triable question of fact for the jury regarding
whether a child was driving an automobile with her parent’s
express or implied permission at the time of the accident). Nor
have the Becks ever suggested that application of the doctrine
to the undisputed facts could or should not be determined as a
matter of law in this case.
21
CONCURRING:
_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice
_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
_____________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice (Retired)
22
Young v. Beck
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Date filed: 2011-04-05
Citations: 251 P.3d 380, 227 Ariz. 1
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