Matter of Estate of Hartman

No. 13391

I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
H F F O T N

1977

I N THE MATTER O THE ESTATE
F
O W L A E J . HARTMAN, SR.,
F AL C
Deceased.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
H o n o r a b l e Gordon R . B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

G r a y b i l l , O s t r e m , Warner and C r o t t y , G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana
George R. C r o t t y , J r . a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana

F o r Respondent :

Rapkoch and Knopp, Lewistown, Montana
P e t e r L. Rapkoch a r g u e d , Lewistown, Montana

Submitted: January 21, 1977

Decided: WPR 2 8 19fl
Filed: Fg>a21!
1977
Mr. Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court,
Lewis and Clark County, admitting to probate a carbon copy of
the will of Wallace J. Hartman, Sr., hereinafter referred to
as decedent.
Decedent was a resident of Lewis and Clark County at
the time of his death on January 29, 1976. He was survived by
three children: Wallace J. Hartman, Jr., Shirley Hartman,
respondent here, and Delores Puckett, appellant here. It is
undisputed that decedent had properly executed a will on March
22, 1974, in the office of Charles M. Joslyn, an attorney in
Choteau, Montana. The original will was given to decedent and
a carbon copy retained by the attorney. This will provided that
Delores Puckett receive $10.00, Wallace J. Hartman, Jr. receive
$1,000 and some personal property, and Shirley Hartman receive
the remainder of the estate. Evidence presented indicated the
estate exceeds $1,000,000.
On the date of decedent's death, Wallace J. Hartman,
Jr., his wife, Janny, Shirley Hartman, and her fiance searched
decedent's automobile and residence in Lincoln, Montana. Decedent's
personal property and papers were taken to the house of Wallace
J. Hartman, Jr. in Great Falls, Montana. A subsequent examin-
ation of these papers did not reveal a will. Wallace J. Hartman,
Jr. was appointed personal representative of the estate. There-
after, Shirley Hartman presented a carbon copy of the March 22,
1974 will for probate. The district court entered its order
admitting the carbon copy to probate.
The primary conflict concerns the procedure and the proof
required to probate a lost will under Montana's Uniform Probate
Code, Section 91A-1-101, et seq., R.C.M. 1947.
Prior to enactment of Montana's Uniform Probate Code,
sections 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947, imposed special require-
ments of proof in formal testacy proceedings seeking the probate
of lost or destroyed wills. Section 91-1201, R.C.M. 1947,
provided :
"Whenever any will is lost or destroyed, the
district court must take proof of the execution
and validity thereof, and establish the same;
notice to all persons interested being first given,
as prescribed in regard to proofs of wills as in
other cases. All the testimony given must be
reduced to writing, and signed by the witnesses."

Section 91-1202, R.C.M. 1947, provided:
"No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed
will, unless the same is proved to have been in
existence at the time of the death of the testator,
or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed
in the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its
provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by
at least two credible witnesses."
To establish a prima facie case under these statutes, it
was incumbent upon the proponent of a lost or destroyed will to
show affirmatively either that the will he proposed was in exis-
tence at the time of the death of testator or that it was fraud-
ulently destroyed during his lifetime, in addition to the execution,
validity and provisions of the will. In re Colbert's Estate, 31
Mont. 461, 468, 78 P. 971; In re Estate of Una M. Newman, 164
Mont. 15, 19, 20, 22, 518 P.2d 800. Colbert and Newman also
stated that a will, last seen in the possession of a testator,
which cannot be found after a careful and exhaustive search follow-
ing death, is presumed to have been destroyed by the testator
with the intent of revoking it, and that this presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Montana's Uniform Probate Code contains no special stat-
utory requirements of proof when seeking probate of a lost or
destroyed will. The official comment to section 91A-3-303, R.C.M.
1947, states:
 " * * * L o s t o r d e s t r o y e d w i l l s must b e e s t a b l i s h e d
i n formal proceedings. See S e c t i o n [91A-3-4023. * * *"
S e c t i o n 91A-3-402, R.C.M. 1947, which g o v e r n s t h e c o n t e n t s o f

p e t i t i o n s i n formal proceedings, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :

" I f t h e o r i g i n a l w i l l i s n e i t h e r i n t h e posses-
s i o n of t h e c o u r t n o r accompanies t h e p e t i t i o n
and no a u t h e n t i c a t e d copy of a w i l l p r o b a t e d i n
a n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n accompanies t h e p e t i t i o n ,
t h e p e t i t i o n a l s o must s t a t e t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e
w i l l , and i n d i c a t e t h a t it i s l o s t , d e s t r o y e d ,
o r otherwise unavailable."

F u r t h e r m o r e , S e c 1 5 , Chap. 263, Laws 1975 e x p r e s s l y r e p e a l e d

s e c t i o n s 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947.

The i n s t a n t c a s e i n v o l v e s no d i s p u t e a s t o t h e e x e c u t i o n

of t h e w i l l , n o r i t s p r o v i s i o n s . What r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s i s

t h a t t h e presumption f a v o r i n g r e v o c a t i o n under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e

o f t h i s c a s e was a b o l i s h e d when t h e s p e c i a l s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e -

ments o f proof under s e c t i o n s 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947 were

repealed. T h e r e f o r e s i n c e s e c t i o n 91A-3-407, R.C.M. 1947 p l a c e s

t h e burden o f proof o f r e v o c a t i o n upon t h e c o n t e s t a n t , he must

s o do w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t of t h e presumption of r e v o c a t i o n . Appel-

l a n t , on t h e o t h e r hand, c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e presumption d i s c u s s e d

i n C o l b e r t and Newman s t i l l e x i s t s , and proponent must r e b u t t h e

presumption when it a r i s e s by showing t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e w i l l

a t t h e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s d e a t h . Neither of t h e s e conten-

tions is entirely correct.

A s found from a r e a d i n g o f C o l b e r t and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e -

i n , t h e presumption f a v o r i n g r e v o c a t i o n which a r i s e s when a w i l l

known t o be i n t h e t e s t a t o r ' s p o s s e s s i o n c a n n o t be found a f t e r

h i s d e a t h , o r i g i n a t e d from t h e common l a w o f England, where t h e

c o u r t s a r e n o t c o n t r o l l e d by any p o s i t i v e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s .

Loxley v. J a c k s o n , 3 P h i l l - E c c . 1 2 6 , 1 6 1 Eng. R e p r i n t 1277 ( 1 8 1 9 ) ;

C o l v i n v. F r a s e r , 2 Hagg.Ecc. 266, 162 Eng. R e p r i n t 856, 874,

( 1 8 2 9 ) ; L i l l i e v. L i l l i e , 3 Hagg.Ecc. 1 8 4 , 162 Eng. R e p r i n t 1124

(1829). C o l v i n e x p l a i n s t h e r e a s o n i n g behind t h i s presumption:
 " A l l t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s , i f t h e y come t o be
a n a l y s e d , may be r e s o l v e d i n t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e
p r o b a b i l i t y o f f a c t , deduced from t h e o r d i n a r y
p r a c t i c e of mankind and from sound r e a s o n .
P e r s o n s i n g e n e r a l keep t h e i r w i l l s i n p l a c e s
of s a f e t y , o r , a s we here t e c h n i c a l l y express it,
'among t h e i r p a p e r s o f moment and c o n c e r n . ' They
a r e instruments i n t h e i r n a t u r e revocable: testa-
mentary i n t e n t i o n i s ambulatory till d e a t h ; and i f
t h e i n s t r u m e n t be n o t found i n t h e r e p o s i t o r i e s o f
t h e t e s t a t o r , where he had p l a c e d i t , t h e common
s e n s e of t h e m a t t e r , prima f a c i e , i s t h a t he h i m s e l f
d e s t r o y e d i t , meaning t o r e v o k e it * * *."

A s t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n C o l b e r t c i t i n g I n r e Kennedy's

Will, 30 M i s c . Rep. 1, 62 N . Y S . 1 0 1 1 :

" ' " L e g a l p r e s u m p t i o n s a r e founded upon t h e e x p e r -
i e n c e and o b s e r v a t i o n of d i s t i n g u i s h e d j u r i s t s a s
t o what i s u s u a l l y found t o be t h e f a c t r e s u l t i n g
from any g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; and, t h e r e s u l t b e i n g
t h u s a s c e r t a i n e d , whenever s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s o c c u r ,
t h e y a r e prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e o f t h e f a c t presumed."'"

The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e i s whether t h e p r e -

sumption f a v o r i n g r e v o c a t i o n and t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s o f

proof i n s e c t i o n s 91-1202 a r e one and t h e s a m e . A t h o r o u g h re-

s e a r c h o f t h e law on t h i s p o i n t i n d i c a t e s t h e y a r e n o t .

A c a r e f u l r e a d i n g o f C o l b e r t and Newman show t h i s C o u r t

was s p e a k i n g o f two s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t r u l e s of law when t h e y

c o n s i d e r e d t h e s t a t u t e , on o n e hand, and t h e presumption on t h e

other. I n Newman, it i s s t a t e d :

"Not o n l y do t h e p r o p o n e n t s o f t h e proposed w i l l
have t h e burden o f proof t o e s t a b l i s h i t s
e x i s t e n c e when it is --
a l o s t w i l l , but also
where no t e s t a m e n t a r y p a p e r s have been found
a f t e r a c a r e f u l and e x h a u s t i v e s e a r c h , a s i n
t h i s c a s e , a presumption a r i s e s t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d
d e s t r o y e d t h e w i l l animo r e v o c a n d i ( w i t h i n t e n t i o n
t o revoke). * * *

"For t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t s d i d n o t
m e e t t h e i r burden of proof t h a t t h e w i l l was
a c t u a l l y i n e x i s t e n c e o r i n e x i s t e n c e i n contem-
p l a t i o n of law a t t h e t i m e o f d e c e a s e d ' s d e a t h ,
and f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e presumption of
d e s t r u c t i o n i s n o t overcome by t h e t e s t i m o n y
adduced a t t h e h e a r i n g , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d
i n admitting t h e w i l l t o probate." (Emphasis
supplied. )

Likewise, t h e c o u r t s o f N e w York have made t h e d i s t i n c -

t i o n t h a t s t a t u t e s i n t h e n a t u r e of s e c t i o n 91-1202, R.C.M. 1947,
d i d n o t r e p l a c e t h e common law presumption o f r e v o c a t i o n , b u t

added t o it. The c o u r t , i n Knapp v . Knapp,Selden 6 , 1 0 N.Y.

276, 278 (1851) s t a t e d :

" I t was w e l l s e t t l e d a t common law by a l o n g
series of a d j u d i c a t i o n s i n t h e c o u r t s i n England,
and which have been f o l l o w e d by t h e c o u r t s o f
t h i s s t a t e , t h a t t h e presumption o f law i s , t h a t
a w i l l proved t o have had e x i s t e n c e , and n o t
found a t t h e d e a t h of t e s t a t o r , was d e s t r o y e d
animo r e v o c a n d i . ( B e t t s v . J a c k s o n , 6 Wend., 173;
I d l e y v . Bowen, 1 Wend., 227.)
1 And o u r s t a t u t e
h a s p l a c e d t h i s m a t t e r beyond a l l c a v i l and
doubt. I t i s a s follows: 'No w i l l o f any t e s t a t o r ,
who s h a l l d i e a f t e r t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l t a k e e f f e c t
a s a law, s h a l l be a l l o w e d t o be proved as a l o s t
o r d e s t r o y e d w i l l , u n l e s s t h e s a m e s h a l l be proved
t o have been i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e d e a t h o f t h e
t e s t a t o r o r be shown t o have been f r a u d u l e n t l y
destroyed i n t h e l i f e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r ; nor
u n l e s s i t s p r o v i s i o n s s h a l l be c l e a r l y and d i s -
t i n c t l y proved by a t l e a s t two c r e d i b l e w i t n e s s e s ,
a c o r r e c t copy o r d r a f t b e i n g deemed e q u i v a l e n t
t o one witness. ' ( 2 R.S., 6 8 , B 67. ) T h i s
s t a t u t e r e c o g n i z e s t h e former common law r u l e , by
r e q u i r i n g proof e i t h e r t h a t t h e w i l l w a s i n e x i s -
t e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d e a t h of t h e t e s t a t o r ,
o r t h a t t h e l e g a l presumption t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r
d e s t r o y e d it animo r e v o c a n d i be overcome by s a t -
i s f a c t o r y proof t h a t it w a s f r a u d u l e n t l y d e s t r o y e d
i n t h e l i f e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r . "

The t r u e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e presumption of r e v o c a t i o n

and s u c h s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s of proof i s t h a t t h e former i s a

r u l e o f s u b s t a n t i v e law g o v e r n i n g r e v o c a t i o n , whereas t h e l a t t e r

i s a p r o c e d u r a l l a w g o v e r n i n g t h e p r o b a t e of l o s t o r d e s t r o y e d

wills. This d i s t i n c t i o n i s f u r t h e r explained i n J u s t i c e Traynor's

d i s s e n t i n I n r e B r i s t o l ' s E s t a t e , 23 Cal.2d 221, 143 P.2d 689,

"While t h e o v e r r u l i n g of I n r e E s t a t e o f
Sweetman d i d much t o d i s p e l t h e c o n f u s i o n engendered
by t h a t c a s e , t h e r e l a t i o n of P r o b a t e Code, s e c t i o n
350, t o t h e presumption of r e v o c a t i o n t h a t i s s a i d
t o arise i n t h e s e c a s e s s t i l l r e q u i r e s c l a r i f i c a -
tion. I f s e c t i o n 350 p r o v i d e d s i m p l y t h a t a p r e -
sumption o f r e v o c a t i o n a r i s e s i n t h e c a s e o f a l o s t
w i l l , it would be n e c e s s a r y o n l y t o r e b u t t h e p r e -
sumption t o p r o v e t h a t t h e w i l l was i n e x i s t e n c e
a t t h e t i m e o f t h e t e s t a t o r ' s d e a t h . A presumption
of r e v o c a t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t o f s e c t i o n 350 becomes s u p e r -
f l u o u s , however, i f t h e v e r y e x i s t e n c e of t h e w i l l
a t t h e t i m e of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s d e a t h must be proved.
While proof o f t h a t e x i s t e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h e f a c t o f
 nonrevocation, t h e converse does not follow
t h a t a w i l l e x i s t s b e c a u s e t h e r e i s no revo-
cation thereof. I t would t h e r e f o r e be i d l e t o
r e b u t t h e presumption of r e v o c a t i o n i f t h e r e
w e r e no proof t h a t a w i l l e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e
of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s d e a t h .

" S e c t i o n 350 c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y be c o n s t r u e d a s
c r e a t i n g a presumption of r e v o c a t i o n . It i s
c o n c e r n e d , n o t w i t h t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g revo-
c a t i o n , which a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t f o r t h i n
s e c t i o n 7 4 o f t h e P r o b a t e Code, b u t w i t h t h e
procedure f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a l o s t o r destroyed
w i l l . * * * C o m ~ l i a n c ew i t h t h e s u b s t a n t i v e D r c
v i s i o n s t h a t deiermine t h e s t a t u s of t h e w i l i a s
a n e x e c u t e d i n s t r u m e n t i s n o t enough t o r e n d e r
t h e w i l l o p e r a t i v e a s a conveyance. A w i l l
c a n n o t be g i v e n i n e v i d e n c e a s t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f
a r i g h t o r t i t l e u n l e s s it h a s been d u l y p r o b a t e d
* * * and s e c t i o n 350 p r e s c r i b e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
t h a t must be s a t i s f i e d b e f o r e a l o s t w i l l c a n be
probated. It i s therefore not controlling t h a t
under t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e law, t h e
w i l l h a s been d u l y e x e c u t e d and h a s n o t been
revoked, f o r it c a n n o t be p r o b a t e d i f t h e r e q u i r e -
ments p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e Code f o r t h e p r o b a t e o f
w i l l s c a n n o t be met. The r e q u i r e m e n t of proof
t h a t t h e w i l l e x i s t e d a t t h e time of t h e t e s t a t o r ' s
d e a t h c a n n o t be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a r e q u i r e m e n t o f
proof of n o n r e v o c a t i o n . " (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )

Other a u t h o r i t i e s a l s o p o i n t o u t t h i s presumption i s a

s u b s t a n t i v e r u l e o f law r e l a t e d t o r e v o c a t i o n by a p h y s i c a l a c t ,

r a t h e r t h a n a procedural r u l e governing l o s t o r destroyed w i l l s .
on
9 Wigmore/Evidence 3d Ed, B 2523, s t a t e s :

"The r e v o c a t i o n of a w i l l by d e s t r u c t i o n
may be i n f e r r e d , on a p r i n c i p l e o f Relevancy
a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d * * * from t h e f a c t t h a t it
once e x i s t e d b u t c a n n o t be found a t t h e t e s t a -
t o r ' s death." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )

A t k i n s o n W i l l s 2nd Ed, S 1 0 1 , p. 5 5 3 , s t a t e s

"The m a t t e r o f r e v o c a t i o n by p h y s i c a l a c t i s compli-
c a t e d by t h e o p e r a t i o n o f p r e s u m p t i o n s under c e r t a i n
circumstances. Thus, i t i s o f t e n h e l d t h a t where t h e
w i l l was i n t e s t a t o r ' s p o s s e s s i o n and c a n n o t be found
a t t h e t i m e o f h i s d e a t h , i t w i l l be presumed t h a t t h e
t e s t a t o r d e s t r o y e d it w i t h i n t e n t t o r e v o k e , and t h e
same h a s been h e l d where a d u p l i c a t e w i l l i n t e s t a t o r ' s
p o s s e s s i o n c a n n o t be found. Indeed it i s o f t e n s a i d
t h a t t h e burden o f proof i s on t h e proponent under
t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . * * *" (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )

Furthermore, t h i s presumption i s c o n t r o l l i n g i n j u r i s d i c -

t i o n s which do n o t have and n e v e r have had s t a t u t e s imposing

s p e c i f i c r e q u i r e m e n t s o f proof f o r p r o b a t i n g l o s t o r d e s t r o y e d
wills. This statement is found at Anno. 3 ALR2d 949, 986:
"It has been provided by statute in some instances
that no will shall be proved as a lost will unless
it is shown to have been in existence at the time
of the death of the testator, or is shown to have
been destroyed either without his consent or
fraudulently during his lifetime. Among the juris-
dictions which, as shown by the adjudications
falling within the scope of this annotation, have
had statutes which in effect so provide, are
Arkansas, California, Indiana, Montana, New York,
Ohio, and Washington."
Nevertheless, the annotation lists another 32 jurisdictions
which adhere to this presumption and have done so for a long
time, as evidenced by these few cases: Throckmorton v. Holt,
180 U.S. 552, 21 S.Ct. 474, 45 L ed 663 (1901); McBeth v. Mc-
Beth, 11 Ala. 596 (1847); Weeks v. McBeth, 14 Ala. 474 (1848);
Allen v. Scruggs, 190 Ala. 654, 67 So 301 (1914); Valentine's
will, 93 is. 45, 67 N.W. 12 (1896); Scoggins v. Turner, 98 N.C.
135, 3 S.E. 719 (1887); Shacklett v. Roller, 97 Va. 639, 34 S.E.

Thus the repeal of sections 91-1201, 1202, R.C.M. 1947
did not abolish the rebuttable presumption of revocation, which
arises when a duly executed will, last seen in the testator's
possession, cannot be found at his death. Section 91A-3-407,
R.C.M. 1947, provides in part:
"In contested cases, petitioners who seek to
establish intestacy have the burden of establish-
ing prima facie proof of death, venue, and heir-
ship. Proponents of a will have the burden of
establishing prima facie proof of due execution
in all cases, and, if they are also petitioners,
prima facie proof of death and venue. Contestants
of a will have the burden of establishing lack of
testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence,
fraud, duress, mistake or revocation. Parties have
the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters
with respect to which they have the initial burden
of proof. * * * "
As the official comment states, this is a fairly general approach
to questions concerning burdens of going forward with the
evidence. I n e s s e n c e , t h e p r o c e d u r e i s t h e same a s t h a t under

t h e o l d law. A s s t a t e d i n I n r e C o l b e r t l s E s t a t e , 31 Mont. 461,

" I n o r d e r t o s i m p l i f y t h e d i s c u s s i o n , it w i l l
be w e l l t o a s c e r t a i n f i r s t what a r e t h e e s s e n -
t i a l s i n proving a l o s t w i l l . I n e v e r y c a s e under
our s t a t u t e t h e r u l e of procedure i s t h a t t h e
proponent o f t h e w i l l must f i r s t make o u t a prima
f a c i e c a s e ; t h a t i s t o s a y , must make such p r o o f
a s would e n t i t l e t h e w i l l t o p r o b a t e i n t h e a b s e n c e
of a c o n t e s t . Then t h e c o n t e s t a n t a t t a c k s t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e w i l l , t h e p r o p o n e n t d e f e n d s t h e
same, and t h e c o n t e s t a n t r e b u t s t h e t e s t i m o n y o f
t h e proponent."

What w e have h e l d i s t h a t t h e c o n t e s t a n t may u t i l i z e t h i s r e b u t -

t a b l e presumption i n m e e t i n g h i s burden of p r o v i n g r e v o c a t i o n .

The p r o p o n e n t t h e n h a s t h e burden of g o i n g forward w i t h s u f f i c i e n t

e v i d e n c e t o r e b u t t h i s presumption.

However, a p p e l l a n t i s m i s t a k e n i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e

p r o p o n e n t c a n o n l y r e b u t t h e presumption by p r o v i n g e x i s t e n c e o f

t h e w i l l subsequent t o t h e t e s t a t o r ' s death. In addition t o

s u c h e v i d e n c e , t h e p r o p o n e n t may a l s o show (1) t h a t one o t h e r

t h a n t h e t e s t a t o r had p o s s e s s i o n of t h e w i l l ; (2) that the testa-

t o r was on f r i e n d l y o r u n f r i e n d l y t e r m s w i t h c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t e d

persons; ( 3 ) t h a t t h e t e s t a t o r was p h y s i c a l l y o r m e n t a l l y i n -

c a p a b l e of d e s t r o y i n g t h e w i l l w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o r e v o k e ; o r ( 4 )

t h a t a n o t h e r had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o d i s p o s e o f t h e w i l l and

b e n e f i t t h e r e b y . See3ALR2d 949. T h i s l i s t h a s n o t been e x h a u s t e d ;

c e r t a i n l y t h e r e may be o t h e r f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e . In

any e v e n t , t h e proof r e q u i r e d must be c l e a r , s a t i s f a c t o r y and

convincing. I n re C o l b e r t l s E s t a t e , supra.

The second i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t i s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t e r r e d i n d i s a l l o w i n g c e r t a i n d e c l a r a t i o n s of d e c e d e n t i n

which h e a l l e g e d l y s t a t e d t o h i s son t h a t he had d e s t r o y e d h i s

w i l l and t h e r e a s o n f o r d o i n g s o . This i s s u e i s well s e t t l e d

i n Montana by C o l b e r t . Such d e c l a r a t i o n s a r e n o t a d m i s s i b l e ,
u n l e s s t h e y a r e a p a r t of t h e r e s g e s t a e , and a r e used t o s i m p l y

show t h e m e n t a l s t a t e of t h e t e s t a t o r when he e i t h e r e x e c u t e d

t h e w i l l o r when he d e s t r o y e d i t . An e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n of

t h e r e a s o n i n g f o r t h i s r u l e of law i s p r o v i d e d i n C o l b e r t . The

d e c l a r a t i o n s s o u g h t by a p p e l l a n t w e r e n o t a d m i s s i b l e , s i n c e no

a c t of d e s t r o y i n g t h e w i l l was e v e r proven. What a p p e l l a n t was

t r y i n g t o p r o v e by t h e s e d e c l a r a t i o n s was t h e a c t of d e s t r o y i n g

t h e w i l l , n o t t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e c e d e n t w h i l e t h e a l l e g e d

d e s t r u c t i o n was t a k i n g p l a c e . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t w a s c o r r e c t

i n i t s e x c l u s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e .

T h i s c a s e i s remanded f o r h e a r i n g c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s

opinion.

Chief J u s t i c e
D