State v. Blinzler

No. 14631
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1979

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
BRUCE R. BLINZLER,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial ~istrict,
Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding.
i
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:

James D. Moore, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ted 0 Lympus, County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
.

Submitted on briefs: August 2, 1979

Filed: SE[ " 1973
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.

A p p e l l a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d on two c o u n t s o f p r a c t i c i n g

c h i r o p r a c t i c w i t h o u t a l i c e n s e i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 37-

12-301, MCA, f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f

t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t h e Honorable James M.

Salansky presiding. H e was s e n t e n c e d t o pay a f i n e o f $ 2 0 0

on e a c h c o u n t , and h e a p p e a l s from t h a t judgment.

Appellant i s a naturopathic physician practicing i n

a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Kenneth L. P i l l e r i n K a l i s p e l l , Montana,

h a v i n g come t h e r e from t h e S t a t e o f P e n n s y l v a n i a where he

had p r a c t i c e d a s a n a t u r o p a t h i c and c h i r o p r a c t i c p h y s i c i a n

f o r a p e r i o d o f some t e n y e a r s . I n 1977 D r . B l i n z l e r became

i n t e r e s t e d i n moving t o Montana and s u b m i t t e d a n a p p l i c a t i o n

f o r a Montana c h i r o p r a c t i c l i c e n s e . B e f o r e coming t o t h e

s t a t e he c o n t a c t e d D r . Ronald R. Hoye, p r e s i d e n t o f t h e

N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Naturopathic P h y s i c i a n s and S t a n l e y

Crowe, a B o i s e a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e n a t i o n a l a s s o c i a -

t i o n , t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e l e g a l requirements t o p r a c t i c e i n

t h e S t a t e o f Montana. H e was i n f o r m e d t h a t Montana had no

r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e l i c e n s i n g r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r a c t i c e of

naturopathy. A f t e r c o n f e r r i n g w i t h D r . Hoye and M r . Crowe

i n I d a h o , a p p e l l a n t and D r . P i l l e r moved t o K a l i s p e l l where

t h e y opened up a n a t u r o p a t h i c c l i n i c . Dr. Hoye a d v i s e d him
t h a t upon coming t o K a l i s p e l l he s h o u l d c o n t a c t D r . ~ e r l i n

Anderson, a K a l i s p e l l n a t u r o p a t h i c p h y s i c i a n who had p r a c -

t i c e d i n t h e a r e a some 2 0 y e a r s .

On December 20, 1977, i n f o r m a t i o n s w e r e f i l e d a g a i n s t

a p p e l l a n t , Bruce B l i n z l e r , and h i s a s s o c i a t e c h a r g i n g them

w i t h p r a c t i c i n g m e d i c i n e w i t h o u t a l i c e n s e and p r a c t i c i n g

c h i r o p r a c t i c w i t h o u t a l i c e n s e , b o t h ~ i s t r i c t o u r t misde-
C
meanors. Appellant herein was charged with two counts of
chiropractic and one count of medicine. He entered pleas of
not guilty to these charges. Subsequently, the information
was amended on April 4, 1978, when three counts were added
against appellant. Again, on July 21, 1978, the information
was amended and appellant ended up being charged with a
total of seven counts of either practicing medicine or
practicing chiropractic without a license. To all of these
charges, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial by jury followed. Prior to going to the jury,
one count of practicing chiropractic without a license was
dismissed. Appellant was acquitted of the four counts of
practicing medicine and was found guilty on two counts of
practicing chiropractic. From the verdict and judgment,
appellant appeals.
The issues presented for our consideration are:
1. Whether the statutes under which appellant was
prosecuted violate the due process clause and equal protec-
tion clause of the United States Constitution and the Montana
Constitution?
2. In the event the statutes are constitutional, was
the evidence sufficient to support the convictions?
3. Do the double jeopardy provisions of the United
States and Montana Constitutions bar the convictions?
The first issue before this Court is the question of
whether the charges are specific enough to satisfy due
process. We first note that the constitutional validity of
the definition of "medicine" as set forth in section 37-3-
I
102r(a), MCA, is not before the Court in this case. Much of
appellant's brief concerns the practice of medicine and the
statutes controlling the same; however, in this case, appel-
l a n t was n o t c o n v i c t e d o f u n l a w f u l l y p r a c t i c i n g m e d i c i n e

under t h e s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n . On t h o s e c h a r g e s t h e j u r y

r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t o f a c q u i t t a l , and t h e r e c a n b e no p r e j u -

d i c e shown i n t h i s case i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 37-3-
i
1 0 2 7 a ) , MCA. Appellant, therefore, l a c k s standing t o chal-

lenge its constitutionality.

A s t h i s Court noted i n S t a t e e x rel. Hauswirth v .

Beadle, e t a l . ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 90 Mont. 24, 27, 300 P . 1 9 7 , t h i s

C o u r t w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r moot p o i n t s . There, t h e Court

noted :

"The q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d i s moot. (See S t a t e
e x r e l . Rankin v . M a r t i n , 65 Mont. 323, 211 P .
210; H o n s t a i n v. Board o f County Commissioners,
52 Mont. 391, 158 P . 476; Chesapeake Western
Railway v . J a r d i n e , 56 App.D.C. 33, 8 F.2d 794.)
T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t p a s s on moot q u e s t i o n s .
( S t a t e e x r e l . OIGrady v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 58
Mont. 695, 198 P . 1117; S t a t e e x r e l . Rankin v .
M a r t i n , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . K n i l a n s , 69 Mont. 8 ,
220 P . 91; S t a t e e x r e l . S t . George v . J u s t i c e
C o u r t , 84 Mont. 1 7 3 , 274 P . 4 9 5 . ) "

T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f s e c t i o n 37-3-

1 0 2 ( a ) , MCA, was r e n d e r e d a moot q u e s t i o n by t h e j u r y ' s

v e r d i c t o f a c q u i t t a l o n t h e c o u n t s c h a r g e d u n d e r t h a t sec-

tion. A p p e l l a n t was c o n v i c t e d o n l y o f t h e u n l a w f u l p r a c -

t i c i n g o f c h i r o p r a c t i c , and t h e r e f o r e o n l y t h e c o n s t i t u -

t i o n a l i t y of t h a t s t a t u t e i s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e Court,

viz. , s e c t i o n 37-12-101 ( 2 ) , MCA, d e f i n i n g t h e p r a c t i c e o f

chiropractic.

W e a r e f a c e d , t h e r e f o r e , w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether

s e c t i o n 37-12-101(2), MCA, i s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c and

d e t a i l e d t o s a t i s f y t h e requirements of due process. Sub-

s e c t i o n (2) of t h i s s t a t u t e reads:

" ' C h i r o p r a c t i c ' i s a system of s p e c i f i c a d j u s t -
ment o r m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n s and
t i s s u e s o f t h e body, p a r t i c u l a r l y o f t h e s p i n a l
column, f o r c o r r e c t i o n o f n e r v e i n t e r f e r e n c e
and i n c l u d e s t h e u s e o f r e c o g n i z e d d i a g n o s t i c
and t r e a t m e n t methods a s t a u g h t i n c h i r o p r a c t i c
colleges b u t does n o t include surgery o r t h e
p r e s c r i p t i o n o r u s e of drugs."
 To summarize t h e argument o f a p p e l l a n t , h e c o n t e n d s

t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e p r a c t i c e of c h i r o p r a c t i c

contains an i n d e f i n i t e term--"specific a d j u s t m e n t o r mani-

pulation"--which is susceptible t o differing interpretation

by e x p e r t s i n t h e f i e l d o f c h i r o p r a c t i c . H e further argues

t h a t t h e p u b l i c cannot be expected t o p r o v i d e t h e c o n t e n t

f o r t h i s t e r m when e x p e r t s a r e u n a b l e t o a g r e e a s t o i t s

meaning, and t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i s t h e r e f o r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

vague.

Noting t h e d e f i n i t i o n of c h i r o p r a c t i c , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s

t h a t nowhere a r e t h e t e r m s " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t m e n t " o r " a r t i c u -

l a t i o n s and t i s s u e s " d e f i n e d . Therefore, he says, t h e

s t a t u t e h a s a n i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s t a n d a r d t o t h e members o f

t h e p u b l i c and p l a c e s a heavy burden upon a d e f e n d a n t . With

r e g a r d t o t h e heavy b u r d e n p l a c e d on a d e f e n d a n t , a p p e l l a n t

a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s no a s c e r t a i n a b l e s t a n d a r d

o f c o n d u c t a g a i n s t which h e m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y have measured

h i s conduct a s a naturopath, noting:

". . . There must be a s c e r t a i n a b l e s t a n d a r d s of
g u i l t . Men o f common i n t e l l i g e n c e c a n n o t b e
r e q u i r e d t o g u e s s a t t h e meaning o f t h e e n a c t -
ment. The v a g u e n e s s may b e from u n c e r t a i n t y i n
regard t o persons within t h e scope of t h e a c t ,
L a n z e t t a v . N e w J e r s e y , 306 U.S. 451, o r i n re-
g a r d t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e tests t o a s c e r t a i n g u i l t . "
W i n t e r s v . N e w York ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 333 U.S. 507, 515-
516, 68 S . C t . 665, 92 L.Ed. 840.

I n W i n t e r s t h e Supreme C o u r t went on t o n o t e :

"'Where t h e s t a t u t e u s e s words o f no d e t e r m i n a -
t i v e meaning, o r t h e l a n g u a g e i s s o g e n e r a l and
i n d e f i n i t e as t o embrace n o t o n l y a c t s commonly
recognized a s reprehensible, b u t a l s o o t h e r s
which i t i s u n r e a s o n a b l e t o presume w e r e i n t e n d e d
t o b e made c r i m i n a l , i t w i l l be d e c l a r e d v o i d
f o r uncertainty.'" 333 U.S. a t 516, q u o t i n g
S t a t e v . Diamond ( 1 9 2 1 ) , 27 N.M. 477, 485, 202
P . 988, 991.

A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t , b a s e d o n W i n t e r s , when a s t a t u t e

i s s o vague a s t o make c r i m i n a l a n i n n o c e n t a c t t h e c o n v i c -
 ; .. 1

t i o n cannot be s u s t a i n e d . H. &.
i C l a c k Co. v . P u b l i c S e r v i c e

Commission ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 94 Mont. 488, 22 P.2d 1056. At trial,

w i t n e s s e s Bekkedahl, Vernon, G o r d e r , and S t r u n k t e s t i f i e d a s

t o t h e n a t u r e and t h e e x t e n t o f a p p e l l a n t ' s t r e a t m e n t o f

t h e i r respective conditions. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e S t a t e pro-

duced t h e e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y o f D r . Loren W e i s and D r . W a l t e r

Kaye, b o t h l i c e n s e d c h i r o p r a c t o r s i n t h e S t a t e o f Montana,

who i d e n t i f i e d t h e movements p r a c t i c e d o n Vernon and Gorder

a s s p e c i f i c adjustments. Dr. Weis i n a d d i t i o n d e s c r i b e d t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between s p e c i f i c c h i r o p r a c t i c a d j u s t m e n t s and

nerve interference.

The e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d by a p p e l l a n t c o n f l i c t e d w i t h

t h e S t a t e ' s evidence on t h e i s s u e of s p e c i f i c i t y . Dr. Hoye,

a n a t u r o p a t h , t e s t i f i e d t h a t m a n i p u l a t i o n s done by a n a t u r o -

p a t h i n h i s p r a c t i c e d i f f e r from c h i r o p r a c t i c a d j u s t m e n t s i n

t h a t naturopathic manipulations lack s p e c i f i c i t y . Appellant

t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n s done on Vernon and Gorder

w e r e general r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c . On t h e b a s i s o f t h e

c o n f l i c t i n g evidence presented t o t h e jury, t h e j u r y found

appellant g u i l t y of practicing chiropractic without a license.

The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n C o n n a l l y v . G e n e r a l

C o n s t r u c t i o n Company ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 269 U.S. 385, 391-92, 46 S . C t .

1 2 6 , 7 0 L.Ed. 322, n o t e d :

"The q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r g i v e n l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t -
ments have been t h u s w a n t i n g i n c e r t a i n t y h a s
f r e q u e n t l y been b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t . I n some o f
t h e c a s e s t h e s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d were u p h e l d ; i n
others, declared invalid. The p r e c i s e p o i n t o f
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n some i n s t a n c e s i s n o t e a s y o f
statement. B u t i t w i l l be enough f o r t h e p r e s e n t
purposes t o say g e n e r a l l y t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n s of
t h e c o u r t upholding t h e s t a t u t e a s s u f f i c i e n t l y
c e r t a i n , r e s t e d upon t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e y
employed words o r p h r a s e s h a v i n g a t e c h n i c a l o r
o t h e r s p e c i a l meaning, w e l l enough known t o en-
a b l e those within t h e i r reach t o correctly apply
them, Hygrade P r o v i s i o n Co. v . Sherman, 266 U.S.
497, 502; Omaechevarria v . I d a h o , 246 U.S. 343,
 348, o r a w e l l - s e t t l e d common law meaning, n o t -
withstanding an element of degree i n t h e d e f i n i -
t i o n a s t o which e s t i m a t e s m i g h t d i f f e r , Nash v .
U n i t e d S t a t e s , 299 U.S. 373, 376; I n t e r n a t i o n a l
H a r v e s t e r Co. v . Kentucky, s u p r a , a t 223, o r , a s
b r o a d l y s t a t e d by M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e White i n
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,
92, ' t h a t , f o r r e a s o n s found t o r e s u l t e i t h e r from
t h e t e x t of t h e s t a t u t e s involved o r t h e s u b j e c t s
w i t h which t h e y d e a l t , a s t a n d a r d o f some s o r t was
afforded.' . . ."
W e find t h a t t h i s case f a l l s within the f i r s t c l a s s

i d e n t i f i e d i n Connally, supra. The t e r m " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t -

ment o r m a n i p u l a t i o n " i s a s c i e n t i f i c t e r m h a v i n g a r e a d i l y

a s c e r t a i n a b l e d e f i n i t i o n w i t h i n t h e c h i r o p r a c t i c community,

and a p p e l l a n t h e r e i n , a s a c h i r o p r a c t o r l i c e n s e d i n two

s t a t e s , c a n n o t a s s e r t a l a c k o f n o t i c e o f t h e meaning o f t h e

terms.

Viewing t h e s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n , i n l i g h t o f t h e con-

d u c t o f which a p p e l l a n t was c o n v i c t e d , most c e r t a i n l y

a p p e l l a n t was g i v e n a d e q u a t e n o t i c e o f t h e k i n d of c o n d u c t

t h a t the s t a t u t e proscribes. Although no p a r t i c u l a r m e n t a l

s t a t e i s i d e n t i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 37-12-301, MCA, t h e Montana

C r i m i n a l Code c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e o f c h i r o -

p r a c t i c b e done knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y t o c o n s t i t u t e a n

offense. S e c t i o n 45-2-103(1), MCA. The t r i a l c o u r t i n -

s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n t h e t e r m s i m i l a r t o t h e Idaho s t a t u t e

r e l i e d upon i n Omaechevarria v . I d a h o ( 1 9 1 8 ) , 246 U.S. 343,
.3
38 S.Ct. 322, 62 L.Ed. 763, t h a t t h e a c t and i n t e n t must

b o t h b e p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t o s a t i s f y a c o n v i c -

tion. Here, t h e t e s t i m o n y o f two S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s , D r .

W e i s and D r . Kaye, g a v e a d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e t e r m " s p e c i f i c

a d j u s t m e n t " upon which t h e j u r y c o u l d make a p r o p e r d e c i s i o n

o f what " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t m e n t " was, which was "when a p e r s o n

i s p r e s e n t e d w i t h a l o c a l i z e d c o n d i t i o n i n v o l v i n g o n e o r two

o r t h r e e v e r t e b r a e a n d i n t e n t i o n a l l y b r i n g s a b o u t a movement
of these vertebrae to relieve that condition, he or she has
performed a specific adjustment."
The key to the query here is whether the statute in
question provides a standard with meaningful differentiation
between culpable and innocent conduct. Under section 37-12-
301, MCA, such a standard exists: there can be no statutory
violation unless the adjustment in question is shown to be
specific and intentional. It is manifest in this case that
"specificity" provides a meaningful standard. In fact, a
lack of specificity resulted in the dismissal of one count
in this case.
The United States Supreme Court in Roth v. united
States (19571, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d
1498, where they quoted from United States v. Petrillo
(1947), 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877, had
this to say:
". .
. lack of precision is not itself offen-
sive to the requirements of due process. ' ...
[Tlhe Constitution does not require impossible
standards'; all that is required is that the
language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning
as to the prescribed conduct when measured by
the common understanding and practices. ..'
.. .'That there may be marginal cases in which
it is difficult to determine the side of the
line on which the particular fact situation
falls is no sufficient reason to hold the lan-
guage too ambiguous to define a criminal of-
fense . . . f 11
Here appellant was a chiropractor by profession and
training. Since he was unlicensed in Montana, and during
the time the offense was committed had an application in to
be licensed in Montana as a chiropractor, the law placed the
responsibility on him to assure that his practice of naturo-
pathy be performed with no chiropractic movements. The fact

that the law required appellant to make a choice, and ex-
tracted a penalty when his judgment proved incorrect, does
not invalidate the statute. As noted in the United States
Supreme Court case of Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman
(1925), 266 U.S. 497, 502, 45 S.Ct. 141, 69 L.Ed. 402: "If
exceptional cases may sometimes arise where opinions might
differ, that is no more than is likely to occur, and does
occur, in respect to many criminal statutes either upheld
against attack or never assailed as indefinite." Here,
appellant chose to perform a manipulation which the jury
found to be specific and therefore prohibited to all except
licensed chiropractors.
The next issue raised is whether the record reflects
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Appel-
lant argues that there is no evidence establishing that the
treatment of Vernon and Gorder involved specific adjustment
or that the treatments were for the purpose of relieving
nerve interference. A review of the record discloses that

this contention is without merit.
A brief review of the facts show that Vernon testified
that she went to appellant's office complaining of a "rib
out." She stated that appellant told her he could put it in
place. According to her testimony, appellant then placed
his knee on the place indicated by her and pulled her arms
back, causing pain.
Gorder testified to a treatment of his lower back. He
testified that he told appellant he had lower back problems.
He was placed lying on his stomach, and appellant told him
one of his vertebrae was lower than the other in the lower
back. Appellant then pushed down on his back and it sounded
like "bones moving."
While appellant argues that there is no expert testimony

to establish that these were specific adjustments, Dr. weis
t e s t i f i e d t h a t p l a c i n g a knee and p u l l i n g back on t h e s h o u l d e r s

was " p r e t t y s p e c i f i c . " "When you have y o u r k n e e i n o n e

p a r t i c u l a r s p o t , l i k e a g a i n s t a r i b , o r where t h e r i b j o i n s

t h e v e r t e b r a , you have a p a r t i c u l a r s p o t . "

This Court has o f t e n s t a t e d t h a t a jury v e r d i c t based

on s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e w i l l be s u s t a i n e d on a p p e a l . See,

S t a t e v . Pankow ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 134 Mont. 519, 522, 333 P.2d 1017.

S u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d h e r e from which t h e j u r y

c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r e a t m e n t o f Vernon a n d Gorder

involved s p e c i f i c adjustments f o r r e l i e f of nerve i n t e r -

ference. T h e r e f o r e , t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and judgment w i l l n o t

be d i s t u r b e d .

A p p e l l a n t n e x t a l l e g e s t h a t he was s u b j e c t e d t o d o u b l e

j e o p a r d y by t h e c h a r g e s o f t h e S t a t e . H e argues t h a t the

f a i l u r e o f t h e S t a t e t o e l e c t between C o u n t s I and 11, which

c h a r g e d p r a c t i c e o f c h i r o p r a c t i c on Bekkedahl, J u l i a Vernon,

and L e e G o r d e r , and C o u n t s I V t h r o u g h V I , c h a r g i n g t h e

p r a c t i c e o f m e d i c i n e o n t h e same p a t i e n t s f o r t h e same

c o n d u c t , s u b j e c t e d him t o d o u b l e j e o p a r d y . H e argues t h a t

u n d e r t h e r e c e n t case o f S t a t e e x r e l . McKenzie v . D i s t r i c t

C o u r t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 54, 525 P.2d 1211, t h i s C o u r t a d o p t e d

a s o - c a l l e d "same t r a n s a c t i o n " t e s t and abandoned t h e t r a d i -

t i o n a l "same f a c t s " r u l e . Since t h e counts c l e a r l y arose

from t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n , i t i s a r g u e d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e by

t h e S t a t e t o e l e c t between p r a c t i c i n g m e d i c i n e and p r a c t i c i n g

c h i r o p r a t i c subjected a p p e l l a n t t o double jeopardy. We find

no m e r i t t o t h i s argument.

The F i f t h Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n

p r o v i d e s t h a t no p e r s o n " s h a l l b e s u b j e c t f o r t h e same
o f f e n s e t o be t w i c e p u t i n jeopardy of l i f e o r limb." his

p r o h i b i t i o n i s a p p l i c a b l e t o s t a t e a c t i o n s u n d e r t h e "due
p r o c e s s " c l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d

States Constitution.
*.- '
N o r t h C a r o l i n a v . P k r c e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395

U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656. It protects of-

f e n d e r s from m u l t i p l e punishment f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . Ex

P a r t e Lange ( 1 8 7 3 ) , 85 U.S. (18 W a l l ) 1 6 3 , 2 1 L.Ed. 872, and

Kohlfus-2v. Warden ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 9 Conn. 692, 1 8 3 A.2d 626.

Montana's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r

p r o v i d i n g t h a t "no person s h a l l be a g a i n p u t i n jeopardy f o r

t h e same o f f e n s e .. .I' 1972 Ilont. C o n s t . , A r t . 11, S25.

I n a r e c e n t c a s e , S t a t e v . Davis (1978), Mont.

, 577 P.2d 375, 377, 35 St.Rep. 381, t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d

t h e i s s u e r a i s e d h e r e and h e l d :

"This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y quoted with approval
t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l d i n g from t h e M a s s a c h u s e t t s c a s e
o f Morey v . Commonwealth ( 1 8 7 1 ) , 108 Mass. 433,
434:
I' 1
... A s i n g l e a c t may be a n o f f e n s e a g a i n s t
two s t a t u t e s ; and i f e a c h s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s p r o o f
o f a n a d d i t i o n a l f a c t which t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t ,
a n a c q u i t t a l o r c o n v i c t i o n under e i t h e r s t a t u t e
d o e s n o t exempt t h e d e f e n d a n t from p r o s e c u t i o n
and punishment u n d e r t h e o t h e r . '

" S t a t e v . Marchindo ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 65 Mont. 431, 446,
211 P. 1093; S t a t e v. L a g e r q u i s t ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152
Mont. 21, 30, 445 P.2d 910; S t a t e v . McDonald
( 1 9 7 1 ) , 158 Mont. 307, 310, 491 P.2d 711. See
a l s o B l o c k b u r g e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284
U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 1 8 0 , 76 L.Ed. 306; Gore v .
U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 386, 78 S.Ct.
1 2 8 0 , 2 L e d 2d 1405."

Here, t h e s t a t u t e s s e t f o r t h s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t

criminal o f f e n s e s t h a t a r e designed f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of

completely d i f f e r e n t offenses. Therefore, a p p e l l a n t suf-

f e r e d no v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t s u n d e r e i t h e r t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n o r t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

The p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t d o u b l e j e o p a r d y i s a l s o s t a t u -

t o r y i n Montana. S e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, provides:

"When t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e com-
m i s s i o n o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e , a p e r s o n c h a r g e d
w i t h s u c h c o n d u c t may b e p r o s e c u t e d f o r e a c h s u c h
o f f e n s e . H e may n o t , however, b e c o n v i c t e d o f
more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e i f :

" (1) o n e o f f e n s e i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e o t h e r ; "
 Under this statute appellant suffered no violation
unless he was convicted of two offenses, one of which is

included in the other. The mere charging of included of-
fenses involves no violation of appellant's rights, nor are
his rights infringed upon if the State fails to elect or
charge in the alternative as long as a defendant is not
convicted of both offenses. Here, appellant was convicted
of two counts of practicing chiropractic without a license
involving the treatment of two different patients on dif-
ferent occasions. These convictions are not subject to, nor
do they violate, the double jeopardy provision.
We note in closing that appellant argues that the State
no longer follows "the same facts" rule but has now adopted
the so-called "same transaction" test. We find this argu-
ment erroneous. In the recent case of State v. Perry (1979),
..

- Mont. , 590 P.2d 1199, 36 St.Rep. 291, this Court
applied Montana's statutory same facts rule, section 46-11-
501(2)(a), MCA. Perry involved an issue similar to the one
raised in State ex rel. McKenzie v. District Court, supra,
which is fully consistent with the holding in Perry. We
noted in McKenzie: "The joinder provisions of section 95-
1504, R.C.M. 1947 [now section 46-11-404, MCA], are highly
flexible. Part (a) therefore permits an information to
charge two or more different offenses, connected together in
their commission. . ." McKenzie, 165 Mont. at 62.
Appellant argues that the offenses arising from the
same transaction generally must be prosecuted together to
avoid double jeopardy. However, where, as here, the State
prosecutes "the same transaction" offenses together, double
jeopardy is implicated under section 46-11-502, MCA, only if

a defendant is convicted of two offenses, one of which is
included in the other. Here, appellant suffered no such
dual convictions, and his double jeopardy claim is therefore

without merit.
Finding no prejudicial error, the convictions are

affirmed.

We concur:

2L-Q % J.
Chief Justice
a d 4

%&,&/
Justices