Duran v. Buttrey Food, Inc.

No. 14660
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979

KAREN C. DURAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

BUTTREY FOOD, INC., an Illinois
corporation; OSCO DRUG, INC., an
Illinois corporation, and BRUCE McKAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Joseph P. Hennessey argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Anderson, Symmes, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull and Jones,
Billings, Montana
Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana
Quinn, Raucci & Lynch, Great Falls, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana

- -

Submitted: December 10, 1979
Decided:
Filed: c c :
U-.
2.

Clerk
Mr. ~usticeGene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
his i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f

a f t e r a j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, i n a s u i t f o r damages
for false arrest. P l a i n t i f f a l s o a p p e a l s from t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of h e r c l a i m f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n .

On March 1 6 , 1976, p l a i n t i f f Karen C. Duran went t o t h e

B u t t r e y Food-Osco Drug s t o r e on C e n t r a l Avenue i n B i l l i n g s ,

Montana, w i t h h e r f r i e n d Yvonne Saunders. They parked n e a r

t h e e n t r a n c e and e n t e r e d t h e s t o r e . Beyond t h a t p o i n t , the

f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e are i n d i s p u t e . According t o a p p e l l a n t ,

s h e and Yvonne S a u n d e r s s t o p p e d a t t h e c o s m e t i c s a i s l e where

s h e looked a t some l i p s t i c k .

The two women t h e n proceeded t o a n o t h e r p a r t of t h e

s t o r e where a p p e l l a n t t r i e d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t o f i n d a n e l e c -

t r i c a l c o n n e c t o r which h e r husband had r e q u e s t e d h e r t o p i c k

up, n o t b e i n g s u r e of t h e c o r r e c t s i z e . From t h e r e a p p e l -

l a n t and S a u n d e r s walked t o t h e f r o n t of t h e s t o r e where

t h e y looked a t some macrame p l a n t h a n g e r s . A t that point,

a p p e l l a n t went t o t h e c o u r t e s y c o u n t e r and purchased two

packages of c i g a r e t t e s w h i l e Saunders went back i n t o t h e

s t o r e , s a y i n g t h a t s h e had something e l s e s h e wanted t o

check on and t h a t s h e would meet a p p e l l a n t o u t s i d e i n t h e

car. A s Duran w a s e x i t i n g t h e s t o r e , s h e was s t o p p e d by a

c l e r k who a s k e d t o examine h e r p u r s e . She showed him t h e

p u r s e , and f i n d i n g n o t h i n g h e a l l o w e d h e r t o l e a v e t h e

s t o r e , which s h e d i d . A p p e l l a n t t h e n r e t u r n e d t o Yvonne

S a u n d e r s ' c a r and w a i t e d .

About t e n m i n u t e s l a t e r a s S a u n d e r s was l e a v i n g t h e

s t o r e , f o u r employees of B u t t r e y and Osco f o l l o w e d h e r o u t

and a c c u s e d h e r of s h o p l i f t i n g and demanded s h e r e t u r n t o
the store. ~ f t e a s c u f f l e , Saunders r e t u r n e d with t h r e e of
r

t h e employees. Bruce McKay, one of t h e employees, approached

a p p e l l a n t , who was s i t t i n g i.1 t h e car, a c c u s e d h e r of shop-

l i f t i n g and grabbed h e r p u r s e . Finding nothing, he threw

t h e p u r s e back a t Duran and l e f t a f o u r t h employee t o g u a r d

her u n t i l the police arrived. Following t h e a r r i v a l of t h e

p o l i c e , Duran w a s t a k e n u p s t a i r s i n t h e s t o r e where s h e was

arrested. She was t h e n t a k e n t o t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t ,

booked f o r t h e f t and t a k e n t o t h e c o u n t y c o u r t h o u s e t o a w a i t

bonding.

B u t t r e y c o n t e n d s t h a t s h o r t l y a f t e r Duran and S a u n d e r s

e n t e r e d t h e s t o r e , Yvonne Saunders w a s r e c o g n i z e d a s a known

s h o p l i f t e r by Diane E l d r i d g e , a n Osco employee, who communi-

c a t e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t o O s c o ' s a s s i s t a n t manager, Bruce

McKay. A f t e r o b s e r v i n g Karen Duran p i c k up two packages of

l i p s t i c k , M s . E l d r i d g e proceeded t o t h e s t o r e o f f i c e s a t t h e

r e a r of t h e b u i l d i n g , one-half f l i g h t upstairs. From t h e r e

and from c a t w a l k s a l o n g t h e e n t i r e r e a r l e n g t h of t h e b u i l d -

i n g , s h e and McKay o b s e r v e d a p p e l l a n t and S a u n d e r s t h r o u g h

one-way m i r r o r s . They m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e y saw Karen Duran

p a s s t h e two packages of l i p s t i c k t o Yvonne Saunders who was

s t a n d i n g behind h e r and who p u t them i n h e r p u r s e . Both

McKay and E l d r i d g e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y watched

S a u n d e r s p i c k up a jigsaw from a d i s p l a y and p l a c e i t i n h e r

p u r s e and t a k e a sawblade and p l a c e i t down t h e w a i s t b a n d of

her pants. While t h i s w a s b e i n g done, Karen Duran w a s
immediately a d j a c e n t t o h e r and i n a p o s i t i o n where s h e

c o u l d see a l l t h a t went on. A t h i r d s t o r e employee who had

been a l e r t e d t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw one of t h e women open h e r

p u r s e w h i l e t h e o t h e r woman p l a c e d a package of c h e e s e

p r o d u c t s i n it.
 The Buttrey-Osco employees m a i n t a i n t h a t Karen Duran

and Yvonne S a u n d e r s w e r e t o g e t h e r t h e e n t i r e t i m e t h e y w e r e
i n t h e s t o r e and t h a t t h e y e x i t e d t h e s t o r e a t t h e same

t i m e , c o n t r a r y t o a p p e l l a n t ' s testimony. The employees

c o n t e n d t h a t t h e y f o l l o w e d t h e two women o u t of t h e s t o r e

and apprehended them a t t h e c a r , b r i n g i n g Yvonne S a u n d e r s

back t o t h e s t o r e t o w a i t f o r t h e p o l i c e t o a r r i v e . Karen

Duran w a i t e d i n t h e c a r a f t e r one o f t h e s t o r e employees

asked t o see h e r p u r s e , examined i t , and found none of t h e

s t o l e n merchandise. The employee remained w i t h a p p e l l a n t

u n t i l t h e p o l i c e a r r i v e d , a b o u t twenty m i n u t e s l a t e r , a t

which t i m e s h e was t a k e n i n t o t h e s t o r e and a r r e s t e d . A

s e a r c h o f Yvonne S a u n d e r s a t t h e p r e m i s e s t u r n e d up t h e

j i g s a w and o t h e r merchandise, and s h e w a s a l s o a r r e s t e d .

I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t was l a t e r t r i e d on a

s h o p l i f t i n g charge a r i s i n g o u t of t h i s i n c i d e n t before t h e

B i l l i n g s p o l i c e c o u r t and found g u i l t y on A p r i l 27, 1976.

She a p p e a l e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and w a s found n o t g u i l t y

by a D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u r y a f t e r a t r i a l d e novo. She l a t e r

sued B u t t r e y Food, Inc., Osco Drug, I n c . , and Bruce McKay

f o r f a l s e a r r e s t and m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n . The D i s t r i c t

C o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c h a r g e and sub-

m i t t e d t h e f a l s e a r r e s t c h a r g e t o t h e j u r y , which found f o r

t h e defendants. Karen Duran b r i n g s t h i s a p p e a l from t h e

judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .

Appellant r a i s e s s i x i s s u e s i n t h i s appeal:

1. Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o e n t e r t h e

d e f a u l t of B u t t r e y Food, I n c . , s i n c e i t was n o t a p r o p e r l y

registered corporation.

2. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t s had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a r r e s t

Karen Duran and whether t h e c o u r t committed e r r o r i n d i r e c t -

i n g a v e r d i c t on t h e malicious prosecution charge.
 3. Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n denying p l a i n t i f f ' s

motion - l i m i n e and a l l o w i n g e v i d e n c e of Yvonne S a u n d e r s '
in

reputation f o r s h o p l i f t i n g , while granting t h e defendants'

motion.

4. Whether t h e merchant d e t e n t i o n s t a t u t e s , s e c t i o n s

46-6-502 and 46-6-503, MCA, are unconstitutional violations

of t h e r i g h t of p r i v a c y .

5. Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on

t h e crime of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r a i d i n g and a b e t t i n g t h e

commission of a n o f f e n s e , where p l a i n t i f f w a s n e v e r c h a r g e d

w i t h t h a t o f f e n s e and where i t was n o t p l e a d e d a s a d e f e n s e .

6. Whether o r n o t t h e c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d p l a i n -

t i f f ' s o f f e r e d proof o f damages.

A p p e l l a n t ' s f i r s t ground f o r r e v e r s a l i s t h a t a d e f a u l t

judgment s h o u l d have been e n t e r e d a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t B u t t r e y

Food, Inc., f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h i s d e f e n d a n t was n o t

properly registered a s a foreign corporation pursuant t o

s e c t i o n s 35-1-1015, 35-1-1016, and 35-1-1101, MCA. On March

28, 1977, a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e month b e f o r e t h i s s u i t w a s f i l e d

on May 2 , 1977, t h e r e c o r d s of t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e showed

B u t t r e y Food, Inc., a s an I l l i n o i s corporation. However,

i n i t s answer and s u b s e q u e n t p l e a d i n g s , t h i s p a r t y d e s i g -

n a t e d i t s e l f as B u t t r e y Food S t o r e s D i v i s i o n , J e w e l Com-

panies, Inc., a N e w York c o r p o r a t i o n . Appellant contends

t h a t B u t t r e y n e g l e c t e d t o n o t i f y t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e of

t h e c o r p o r a t e change by f a i l i n g t o f i l e amended a r t i c l e s of

i n c o r p o r a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 35-1-1015, MCA, by f a i l i n g

t o f i l e a r t i c l e s of merger p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 35-1-1016,

MCA, and by f a i l i n g t o f i l e a p r o p e r a n n u a l r e p o r t p u r s u a n t

t o s e c t i o n 35-1-1101, MCA. A s a consequence of t h e s e f a i l -

u r e s , a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t Buttrey lacked a v a l i d c e r t i -
f i c a t e of a u t h o r i t y t o t r a n s a c t b u s i n e s s i n t h i s s t a t e and

t h a t a d e f a u l t judgment s h o u l d have been e n t e r e d a g a i n s t

t h a t defendant. T h i s argument i s w i t h o u t m e r i t .

Although t h e f i r s t p a r a g r a p h of s e c t i o n 35-1-1004, MCA,

s t a t e s that:

"No f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n t r a n s a c t i n g b u s i n e s s i n
t h i s s t a t e w i t h o u t a c e r t i f i c a t e of a u t h o r i t y
s h a l l be p e r m i t t e d t o m a i n t a i n any a c t i o n , s u i t ,
o r p r o c e e d i n g i n any c o u r t i n t h i s s t a t e u n t i l
s u c h c o r p o r a t i o n s h a l l have o b t a i n e d a c e r t i -
f i c a t e of a u t h o r i t y . . ."
t h e second p a r a g r a p h makes i t c l e a r t h a t :

"The f a i l u r e of a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n t o o b t a i n
a c e r t i f i c a t e of a u t h o r i t y t o t r a n s a c t business
i n t h i s s t a t e s h a l l n o t i m p a i r t h e v a l i d i t y of
any c o n t r a c t o r a c t of such c o r p 3 r a t i o n and
s h a l l n o t p r e v e n t such c o r p o r a t i o n from defend-
i n g any a c t i o n , s u i t , o r p r o c e e d i n g i n any c o u r t
o f t h i s state." (Emphasis added.)

B u t t r e y i n t h i s c a s e was n o t s e e k i n g t o m a i n t a i n a s u i t - - i t

was merely d e f e n d i n g t h e a c t i o n , which i t was p e r m i t t e d t o

do under s e c t i o n 35-1-1004 ( 2 ) n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t

i t w a s improperly r e g i s t e r e d .

A p p e l l a n t ' s second argument f o r r e v e r s a l i s t h a t t h e

d e f e n d a n t s l a c k e d p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a r r e s t h e r and t h a t t h e

D i s t r i c t Court therefore e r r e d i n d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t f o r

t h e d e f e n d a n t s on t h e m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c h a r g e . She

b a s e s t h i s argument on t h e f a c t t h a t a f t e r a s e a r c h of h e r

p u r s e , O s c o ' s a s s i s t a n t manager Bruce McKay a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t

t h e r e was no s t o l e n merchandise b e l o n g i n g t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s

i n her possession.

To t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was j u s t i f i e d i n

d i s m i s s i n g t h e m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c l a i m on t h e b a s i s of

t h i s C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n S t e b b i n s v. Wilson ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 122 Mont.

186, 199 P.2d 453. I n t h a t decision, affirming t h e dismis-

s a l of a s u i t f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e Court adopted

t h e following rule:
 "The g e n e r a l r u l e i s a s contended f o r by d e f e n -
dants. I t i s s t a t e d i n t h e R e s t a t e m e n t of t h e
Law on T o r t s , s e c t i o n 667, Page 421, a s f o l l o w s :

" ' T h e c o n v i c t i o n of t h e a c c u s e d by a m a g i s t r a t e
o r t r i a l c o u r t although reversed % an appel-
l a t e tribunal, conclusively e s t a b l i s h e s the
e x i s t e n c e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e , u n l e s s t h e c o n v i c -
t i o n was o b t a i n e d by f r a u d , p e r j u r y , o r o t h e r
c o r r u p t means.'" S t e b b i n s , 199 P.2d a t 454.

Karen Duran h a s n o t a l l e g e d t h a t h e r p o l i c e c o u r t

c o n v i c t i o n w a s o b t a i n e d by f r a u d , p e r j u r y , o r any o t h e r

c o r r u p t means. Thus, h e r c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n i n B i l l i n g s

p o l i c e c o u r t , a l t h o u g h r e v e r s e d by a j u r y v e r d i c t upon t r i a l

d e novo i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t , c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t

d e f e n d a n t s had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o p r o s e c u t e h e r f o r s u s p e c t e d

shoplifting. T h i s i s c r u c i a l because t h e a b s e n c e of prob-

a b l e cause f o r i n s t i t u t i n g t h e proceeding i s an e s s e n t i a l

e l e m e n t of a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n .

O r s e r v. S t a t e (1978), Mont. , 582 P.2d 1227, 35

St.Rep. 1167; Lowe v . Root ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 150, 531 P.2d

674; Wilson v . Gehring ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 221, 448 P.2d 678.

S i n c e p r o b a b l e c a u s e was c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d by a p p e l -

l a n t ' s criminal conviction i n the B i l l i n g s police court, the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n d e t e r m i n i n g a s a m a t t e r of law

t h a t t h e malicious prosecution charge could n o t stand.

Appellant's e n t i r e r e p l y b r i e f i s devoted t o an attempt

t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t S t e b b i n s i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e

p r e s e n t case. The p l a i n t i f f i n t h a t c a s e had been c o n v i c t e d

b e f o r e a j u s t i c e o f t h e peace. Appellant contends t h a t t h e

r u l e i n S t e b b i n s a p p l i e s o n l y t o a c o n v i c t i o n by a "magis-

t r a t e o r t r i a l c o u r t , " and t h a t t h e p o l i c e judge who con-

v i c t e d Duran was n o t a " m a g i s t r a t e " and l a c k e d power t o make

a determination a s t o probable cause. She a r g u e s t h a t o n l y

a j u s t i c e c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make a f i n d i n g of p r o b a b l e
cause. I n s u p p o r t of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n s h e r e f e r s t o t h e f a c t

t h a t under p r e v i o u s law a p p l i c a b l e a t t h e t i m e Duran was

t r i e d and c o n v i c t e d i n p o l i c e c o u r t , p o l i c e c o u r t s l a c k e d

a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e search warrants. S t a t e v . Tropf (1975),

166 Mont. 79, 530 P.2d 1158, 1161. T h a t c a s e was o v e r r u l e d

by C h a p t e r 165, S e c t i o n 2 , Laws of 1975, which amended what

i s now s e c t i o n 3-11-102(2), MCA, t o a l l o w p o l i c e c o u r t s (now

c i t y c o u r t s ) t o i s s u e s e a r c h w a r r a n t s and h o l d p r e l i m i n a r y

h e a r i n g s on f e l o n i e s ; however, t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h a t

amendment i s a f t e r D u r a n ' s c o n v i c t i o n i n t h e B i l l i n g s p o l i c e

c o u r t and hence d o e s n o t a p p l y t o t h i s c a s e .

T h i s argument m i s s e s t h e p o i n t . The r a t i o n a l e behind

s e c t i o n 667 of t h e R e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e Law of T o r t s , a s

a d o p t e d by t h e Montana C o u r t i n S t e b b i n s , i s n o t t h e con-

v i c t i n g c o u r t ' s a u t h o r i t y t o make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of prob-

a b l e cause. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e r e a s o n i n g i s a s s t a t e d i n

Comment ( b ) t o s e c t i o n 667:

". . . u n l e s s t h e c o n v i c t i o n was o b t a i n e d by
f r a u d , p e r j u r y , o r o t h e r c o r r u p t means, t h e
o p i n i o n - -e trier of -c t e x p r e s s e d & -
of t h - fa its
v e r d i c t under t h e r u l e t h a t t h e g u i l t of t h e
a c c u s e d must be e s t a b l i s h e d beyond a r e a s o n -
a b l e d o u b t , i s r e g a r d e d as c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e
that the -
-- p e r s o n who i n i t i a t e d - p r o c e e d i n g s
the
had r e a s o n a b l e grounds -r- d o i n g . "
fo so (Empha-
s i s added.)
A p p e l l a n t ' s t h i r d ground f o r r e v e r s a l i s t h a t t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d have g r a n t e d a p p e l l a n t ' s motion -
in

l i m i n e t o p r e v e n t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e of Yvonne

S a u n d e r s ' r e p u t a t i o n and p a s t c r i m i n a l r e c o r d f o r s h o p l i f t i n g .

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d a p p e l l a n t ' s motion and a l l o w e d t h e

t e s t i m o n y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of showing t h a t d e f e n d a n t s a c t e d

r e a s o n a b l y and had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o d e t a i n a p p e l l a n t and t o

c a u s e h e r a r r e s t , s i n c e d e f e n d a n t s ' employee Diane E l d r i d g e

had r e c o g n i z e d a p p e l l a n t ' s companion Yvonne Saunders a s a

-8-
shoplifter. Appellant contends that this evidence was
inadmissible under Rules 404, 405, 608 and 609, M.R.Evid.
In arguing the motion - limine, defense counsel
in
stated:
"Its not put in for the purpose of showing the
guilt of Karen Duran but for the purpose of
showing the reasonableness and probable cause
on the part of the defendants because they knew
Yvonne Saunders and knew her to be a shoplifter."
The district judge believed the testimony to be relevant to
respondents' defense of the false arrest claim and stated to
counsel that it would be admissible for the limited purpose
of showing that defendants operated under probable cause and
acted reasonably under the circumstances, and that the
testimony was not being admitted for the purpose of incriminating
plaintiff. The district judge stated that plaintiff was
entitled to a cautionary instruction to this effect, but
none was ever offered by plaintiff's counsel nor given to
the jury.
It should be clear that the reputation of Yvonne
Saunders as a shoplifter has no bearing in giving a right to
the Buttrey employees to retain and arrest Karen C. Duran.
That Yvonne Saunders was a shoplifter, and that the Buttrey
employees knew of it, might of course be a ground for the
surveillance of Saunders and her companion by the Buttrey
employees when they discovered that Saunders and Duran had
come into the store. However the right to detain or arrest
either Saunders or Duran must derive from the statute on
which Buttrey relies. Under section 46-6-502, MCA, a private
person may arrest another when he is a merchant, and "has
probable cause to believe the other is shoplifting in the
merchant's store." It is obvious that the reputation of
being a shoplifter alone would not be a sufficient reason
-9-
for Buttrey employees to detain and arrest either Saunders
or Duran at the time in question. What would give rise to
the right to detain the couple could only be a reasonable
cause to believe that they were in fact shoplifting. If the
rule were otherwise, Buttrey could detain and hold for
arrest Saunders and any of Saunders' companions merely on
the ground that Saunders was a shoplifter. Buttrey's right
to detain and arrest Karen Duran must rise or fall on whether
Buttrey had reasonable cause to believe that Duran was
shoplifting, and not on the reputation of Saunders as a
shoplifter. Admission of the evidence of Saunders' record as
a shoplifter therefore, was error and it prejudiced Duran's
case.
The District Court appreciated that there was a danger
of prejudice in that the jury might think the evidence
established guilt by association. In denying Duran's
motion - limine, the District Court stated that appellant
in
was entitled to a cautionary instruction limiting the purposes
for which the evidence could be considered by the jury. The
appellant did not offer a cautionary instruction, but in our
view a cautionary instruction would not have reached the
heart of the problem which is that the right to detain and
arrest by merchants depends on reasonable cause for belief
that shoplifting has occurred, and not merely on the ground
that one of the persons has a reputation for shoplifting.
Appellant's fourth ground asserted for reversal is that
Montana's merchant detention statute, which allows a mer-
chant to make a private arrest on probable cause to believe
that a person is shoplifting in the merchant's store, and
which allows a merchant to stop and temporarily detain a
suspected shoplifter for up to thirty minutes, unconstitu-
tionally violates the right of privacy guaranteed by 1972 Mont.
Const. Art. 11, 810. Therefore, appellant contends, the
District Court erred in giving an instruction in the words
of that statute, which reads:
"46-6-502. When arrest % private person autho-
rized. A private person may arrest another when:

"(3) - -is a merchant, as defined in 30-11-301,
he -
and - probable cause to believe the other is
- has
shoplifting - - merchant's store." ( ~ m p h z i s
in the
added. )
"46-6-503. Restrictions on arrest & merchant--
liability. (1) A merchant acting under 46-6-502
may -- temporarily detain the suspected
stop and
shoplifter. The merchant - -
in such event:

" (a) shall promptly inform the person that the
stop is for investigation of shoplifting and
that upon completion of the investigation the
person will be released or turned over to the
custody of a peace officer;

"(b) may demand of the person his name and his
present or last address and may question the
person in a reasonable manner for the purpose
of ascertaining whether or not such person is
guilty of shoplifting;
"(c) may take into possession any merchandise
for which the purchase price has not been paid
and which is in the possession of the person or
has been concealed from full view; and

"(dl may place - person under arrest or request
the
the person to remain on - premises until -
- the a
peace officer arrives.
" (2) A x stop, detention, questioning, or
recovery of merchandise under 4 - - 0 ( ) n
66523ad
- - in a
this section shall be done - - reasonable-
manner and time. Unless evidence of concealment
is obvious and apparent to the merchant, 46-6-502
and this section shall not authorize a search
of his coat or other outer garments and any package,
briefcase, or other container, unless the search is
done by a peace officer under proper legal authority.
After the purpose of a - - has been accomplished
- - - stop
or - minutes have elapsed, whichever occurs first,
- 30
the merchant shall allow the person - - unless
to go
- ---
the person is arrested and turned over to the
custody_ - -:oie
of plc officer.
" ( 3 ) --- --
Such stop and temporary detention, with or
without questioning or removal of merchandise, when
done Q - merchant - c o m p l i a n ---
a i~ c ~ i t h law,
the
 shall not constitute - unlawful arrest or search.
an
A merchant stopping, detaining, or arresting a
person on the belief that such person is shoplifting
is not liable for damages to such person unless the
merchant acts with malice, either actual or implied,
or contrary to the provisions of this law." (Emphasis
added.
Appellant's primary objection to section 46-6-503, MCA,
is that it allows private individuals--merchants--to detain,
search and arrest other private individuals in violation of
their right to privacy under the Montana Constitution.
Appellant urges that this statute violates 1972 Mont. Const.
Art. 11, §lo:
"The right of individual privacy is essential
to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest."
In particular, appellant objects to that part of section 46-
6-503, MCA, which provides:
"After the purpose of a stop has been accomplished
or 30 minutes have elapsed, whichever occurs first,
the merchant shall allow the person to go unless
the person is arrested and turned over to the custody
of a police officer."
Appellant argues that this statute also violates 1972
Mont. Const. Art. 11, 811:
"The people shall be secure in their persons,
papers, homes and effects from unreasonable
searches and seizures ..
."
Under Montana law, the right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures applies against infringements by
private individuals as well as by law enforcement officers.
State v. Brecht (1971), 157 Mont. 264, 270, 485 P.2d 47,

The crucial question is whether there has been a
showing of a compelling state interest which would justify
the infringement of appellant's right to privacy. State v.
Sawyer (1977), 174 Mont. 512, 517, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133-34.
The mere fact that defendant's conduct comported with the
merchant's detention statute does not establish a compelling
state interest. See, State v. Brackman, (1978) - Mont. I

582 P.2d, 1216, 1222, 35 St.Rep. 1103, 1112. To accept that
rationale would be to surrender this Court's power to determine
the constitutionality of enactments of the legislature.
We fail to discern a compelling state interest which
would justify the very serious invasion of a person's privacy
which occurs when she is publicly stopped and detained for
up to thirty minutes by private individuals who search her
purse and cause her great indignity and embarrassment, all
under the immunity ostensibly granted by section 46-6-503,
MCA. While it is true that merchants and their employees as
private individuals have a right to defend their property,
that right does not amount to a compelling state interest
which would justify allowing the merchant or his employee to
invade the privacy of another individual to the extent
t-
permitted under section 46-&-503, MCA. Therefore, insofar
as it permits a merchant with immunity to stop and temporarily
detain an individual suspected of shoplifting for up to
thirty minutes without making an arrest, we hold section 46-
6-503, MCA, unconstitutional as an invasion of the right to
privacy guaranteed by 1972 Mont. Const. Art. 11, 510, as it
applies in this case.
Weemphasize that our holding here has no effect on
section 46-6-502(3), MCA, which provides that a merchant who
has probable cause to believe that the other is shoplifting
in a merchant's store may arrest such a person. While the
drafters of section 46-6-503, MCA, probably did not intend
so, the language of the statute gives the impression to the
casual reader that a merchant may - - -
in any event hold a person
-

for up to thirty minutes on the belief the person is shoplifting.
This goes beyond the power of detention or arrest given to
any other private person under section 46-6-502, MCA, and
equates the merchant or his representatives with the same
degree of power as a peace officer under the stop-and-frisk
statute. Section 46-5-402, MCA.
The merchant's arrest statute, sections 46-6-502(3) and
503, MCA, were adopted originally as a part of Chapter 274,
Montana Session Laws of 1974. That act contained a sever-
ability clause declaring that if a part of the act were found
invalid, all severable valid parts remained in effect. By
holding the application of the thirty-minute provision in
the merchant's statute unconstitutional, especially as
applied in this case, we leave remaining in force and effect
the provision of section 46-6-503(2) that any stop, detention,
questioning or recovery of merchandise under the statute
shall be done in a reasonable manner and time.
We have limited our holding here on the unconstitution-
ality of section 46-6-503(2) to the point raised by the
appellant, that the thirty-minute clause is an invasion of
the right of privacy guaranteed by Montana's constitution,
and its further guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 1972 Mont. Const. Art. IS, S810 and 11. Not
raised in this case is the question whether section 46-6-
503, MCA, is in essence a detention statute as distinguished
from an arrest statute. See Cervantez v. J. C. Penney
Company, Inc. (1979), 24 Cal.3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 981-2.
Appellant's fifth ground for reversal is that the dis-
trict judge erred by instructing the jury on the subject of
accountability for aiding and abetting the commission of an
offense, where appellant was never charged with accountability
and where it was not pleaded as a defense.
The jury was instructed substantially in the words of
section 45-2-302(3), MCA:
 "You are instructed that a person is legally
accountable for a criminal offense when either
before or during the commission of an offense by
another, and with the purpose to promote or facili-
tate such commission, such persons solicits, aids,
abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other
person in the planning or commission of the
offense. "
The instruction as given disregards the gravamen of plain-
tiff's false arrest claim that she was arrested, charged
and tried for the offense of shoplifting. She was not
charged or tried as an accomplice.
Although in criminal cases this Court has held that an
indictment charging the defendant with an offense but not
specifically charging him with accountability has been
sustained by proof that he was guilty of aiding or abetting
in the commission of the offense, State v. Murphy (1977),
174 Mont. 307, 310, 570 P.2d 1103, 1105, these cases do not
meet the situation that is presented in the case at bar.
The appellant charges that she was falsely arrested for the
offense of shoplifting. It is not germane to the issue that
she might also have been charged as an accomplice, because
that did not occur.
Appellant's sixth and final argument for reversal is
that the District Court improperly refused to allow her
offered proof as to damages occurring after formal charges
had been filed. She argues that the District Court also
erred in excluding proof of damages on the malicious prosecu-
tion charge. The short answer to these contentions is that
the second question was settled by the District Court's
dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim based on
Stebbins, and the District Court upon a new trial can allow
appellant to offer proof of all damages arising out of the
false arrest, which she claims occurred.
 The judgment of the District Court Is reversed and the
case is remanded for a new trial.

Justice 1

We Concur:

..................................
Chief Justice

Justices
M r , C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and
dissenting i n part.

I c o n c u r w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y i n g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l on t h e

g r o u n d t h a t t h e a d m i s s i o n i n e v i d e n c e o f Yvonne Saunders' reputa-

t i o n f o r s h o p l i f t i n g denied defendant a f a i r t r i a l .

M quarrel
y i s w i t h the majority holding t h a t the 30-minute

detention provision i n the Merchant's Detention Statute (section

46-6-503, MCA) i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o n i t s f a c e .

The m a j o r i t y have s e e m i n g l y c o n s t r u e d t h e M e r c h a n t ' s

D e t e n t i o n S t a t u t e t o a u t h o r i z e a merchant t o h o l d a suspected

s h o p l i f t e r f o r up t o 3 0 m i n u t e s i n a n y e v e n t . I n m view t h i s i s
y

a t o r t u r e d c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e a t odds w i t h t h e p l a i n

meaning o f t h e language enacted by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e .

Montana law a u t h o r i z e s a merchant t o a r r e s t a suspected

s h o p l i f t e r i n cases where t h e merchant "has p r o b a b l e cause t o

believe the other i s s h o p l i f t i n g i n the merchant's store."

S e c t i o n 46-6-502(3), MCA. The M e r c h a n t ' s D e t e n t i o n S t a t u t e p r o -

v i d e s t h a t w h e r e t h e m e r c h a n t i s a c t i n g u n d e r s u c h a u t h o r i t y he

"may s t o p a n d t e m p o r a r i l y d e t a i n t h e s u s p e c t e d s h o p 1 i f t e r . "

S e c t i o n 46-6-503(1), MCA. I n such e v e n t , t h e merchant shal 1

promptly i n f o r m the person t h a t the stop i s f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f

s h o p l i f t i n g and t h a t upon c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h e

p e r s o n w i l l be r e l e a s e d o r t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e c u s t o d y o f a p e a c e

officer; t h e m e r c h a n t may demand t h e p e r s o n ' s name and a d d r e s s

a n d may q u e s t i o n t h e p e r s o n i n a r e a s o n a b l e m a n n e r t o a s c e r t a i n

w h e t h e r he i s g u i l t y o f s h o p l i f t i n g ; t h e m e r c h a n t may t a k e i n t o

p o s s e s s i o n any m e r c h a n d i s e f o r w h i c h t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e h a s n o t

been paid; a n d he may p l a c e t h e s u s p e c t e d s h o p l i f t e r u n d e r a r r e s t

o r r e q u e s t h i m t o r e m a i n on t h e p r e m i s e s u n t i l a peace o f f i c e r

arrives. Section 46-6-503(1) (a through d), MCA. The s t a t u t e

f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t any s t o p , detention, questioning o r reco-

v e r y o f m e r c h a n d i s e m u s t be d o n e i n a r e a s o n a b l e m a n n e r and

- 17 -
time; t h a t unless concealment i s obvious, t h e merchant i s not

a u t h o r i z e d t o search t h e suspected s h o p l i f t e r ' s c l o t h i n g o r per-

sonal effects; and t h a t a f t e r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s t o p has b e e n

a c c o m p l i s h e d o r 30 m i n u t e s h a v e e l a p s e d , whichever occurs f i r s t ,

t h e m e r c h a n t s h a l l a l l o w t h e p e r s o n t o go u n l e s s he i s a r r e s t e d

and t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e c u s t o d y o f a p o l i c e o f f i c e r . Section

46-6-503(2), MCA. The s t a t u t e f i n a l l y p r o v i d e s t h a t s u c h s t o p

a n d t e m p o r a r y d e t e n t i o n i s n o t an u n l a w f u l a r r e s t o r s e a r c h i f

the m e r c h a n t c o m p l i e s w i t h t h e l a w and t h a t t h e m e r c h a n t i s n o t

l i a b l e i n damages u n l e s s he a c t e d w i t h m a l i c e o r i n v i o l a t i o n o f

t h e law. Section 46-6-503(3), MCA.

The m e r c h a n t i n t h i s case c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e s t a t u t e . No

c o n t e n t i o n h a s b e e n r a i s e d t h a t he d i d n o t .

T h e m a j o r i t y s e e m i n g l y c o n s t r u e t h i s s t a t u t e as p e r m i t t i n g

a m e r c h a n t t o d e t a i n a s u s p e c t e d s h o p l i f t e r f o r up t o 3 0 m i n u t e s

- any
i n event. I n my v i e w t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e

be1 i e s t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n .

The M e r c h a n t ' s D e t e n t i o n S t a t u t e p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t

part:

" ( 2 ) Any s t o p , d e t e n t i o n , q u e s t i o n i n g , o r r e c o -
v e r y o f m e r c h a n d i s e u n d e r 4 6 - 6 - 5 0 2 ( 3 ) and t h i s
s e c t i o n s h a l l be d o n e i n a r e a s o n a b l e m a n n e r and
time. ... A f t e r t h e p u r p o s e - -e s t o p -
of th
been a c c o m p l i s h e d - - m i n u t e s have e l a p s e d ,
has
o r 30
whichever o c c u r s f i r s t . t h e merchant shal 1
a l l o w t h e p e r s o n t o go u n l e s s t h e p e r s o n i s
a r r e s t e d and t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e c u s t o d y o f a
police officer." S e c t i o n 4 6 - 6 - 5 0 3 ( 2 ) , MCA.
( E m p h a s i s added.)
I n my v i e w , t h i s l a n g u a g e p l a i n l y s a y s t h a t a n y s t o p ,

detention, q u e s t i o n i n g o r r e c o v e r y o f m e r c h a n d i s e s h a l 1 be d o n e i n

a r e a s o n a b l e manner and w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e u n t i l i t s pur-

p o s e s h a l l have been a c c o m p l i s h e d s u b j e c t t o an a b s o l u t e t i m e

l i m i t o f 30 m i n u t e s i n any e v e n t . Where t h e l a n g u a g e o f a s t a -

t u t e i s plain, unambiguous, d i r e c t and c e r t a i n t h e s t a t u t e s p e a k s

f o r i t s e l f and t h e r e i s n o t h i n g l e f t f o r t h e c o u r t t o c o n s t r u e .

D u n p h y v. A n a c o n d a Company ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 151 Mont. 7 6 , 4 3 8 P.2d 6 6 0 and

cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . The f u n c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t i s s i m p l y t o

a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e what i n t e r m s o r i n s u b s t a n c e i s c o n t a i n e d

i n the statute. S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA. Such i s t h e c a s e h e r e .

- 18 -
 The 3 0 - m i n u t e provision i n the Merchant's Detention

S t a t u t e so d e t e r m i n e d d o e s n o t v i o l a t e e i t h e r t h e r i g h t o f p r i -

v a c y p r o v i s i o n i n t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n n o r t h e p r o h i b i t i o n

a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s t h e r e i n .

The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of privacy i s contained i n t h i s

1anguage:

"The r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y i s e s s e n t i a l t o
t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f a f r e e s o c i e t y and s h a l l n o t
be i n f r i n g e d w i t h o u t a showing o f a c o m p e l l i n g
state interest." A r t . 1 1 , Sec. 1 0 , 1 9 7 2 M o n t a n a
Constitution.

E q u a l l y important i s t h e i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t o f a l l persons

t o acquire, p o s s e s s and p r o t e c t t h e i r p r o p e r t y . Art. 11, Sec. 3 ,

1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . S h o p l i f t i n g poses a s u b s t a n t i a l

t h r e a t t o these rights. I n 1 9 7 5 t h e r e w e r e an e s t i m a t e d 1 4 0

m i l l i o n s h o p l i f t i n g i n c i d e n t s n a t i o n w i d e r e s u l t i n g i n 1.9 billion

i n business losses t o r e t a i l e r s . U. S. Department o f J u s t i c e ,

S e c u r i t y -- Small Busines R e t a i l e r ,
and t h e p. 11. These l o s s e s a r e

p a s s e d on t o t h e p u r c h a s i n g p u b l i c i n t h e f o r m o f h i g h e r p r i c e s .

P u b l i c law enforcement o f f i c e r s are not generally, i f ever,

engaged i n w a l k i n g t h e f l o o r s o f r e t a i l s t o r e s where s h o p l i f t e r s

operate. I n an e f f o r t t o s e c u r e t h e r i g h t o f a m e r c h a n t t o p r o -

t e c t h i s p r o p e r t y , m e r c h a n t ' s d e t e n t i o n s t a t u t e s had b e e n e n a c t e d

i n 44 s t a t e s by 1977. Citizen's Arrest, Mr. Cherif Bassiouni,

1 s t Ed., p. 81.

As n o t e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n , the crucial question i s

whether t h e r e i s a compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t which would j u s t i f y

t h e infringement o f the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y p r o v i s i o n i n Montana's

Constitution. T h e p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h p r o v i d e s t h a t c o m p e l li ng

state interest. Montana case l a w f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t p r o t e c -

t i o n of a person's property furnishes a compelling state i n t e r e s t

t o which t h e r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y must y i e l d . S t a t e ex

rel. Z a n d e r v. D i s t r i c t Court (1979), Mont. , 5 9 1 P.2d

656. We h a v e p r e v i o u s l y e x p r e s s e d t h e c o n t r o l li n g p r i n c i p l e s i n

t h i s fashion:
 "The r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y i s a fundamen-
t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t e x p r e s s l y r e c o g n i z e d as
essential t o the well-being o f our society. The
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee of individual privacy
i s not absolute. I t m u s t be i n t e r p r e t e d ,
c o n s t r u e d and a p p l i e d i n t h e l i g h t o f o t h e r
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s and n o t i n i s o l a t i o n .
The r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l p r i v a c y m u s t y i e l d t o a
compel 1i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t . Such compel l i n g
s t a t e i n t e r e s t e x i s t s where t h e s t a t e e n f o r c e s
i t s c r i m i n a l l a w s f o r t h e b e n e f i t and p r o t e c t i o n
o f o t h e r fundamental r i g h t s o f i t s c i t i z e n s . "
Z a n d e r , 5 9 1 P.2d 6 5 6 .

Montana's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n against unreasonable

s e a r c h e s a n d s e i z u r e s r e a d s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t as f o l l o w s :

" T h e p e o p l e s h a l l be s e c u r e i n t h e i r p e r s o n s ,
p a p e r s , homes, and e f f e c t s f r o m u n r e a s o n a b l e
s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s . . ."
T h e M e r c h a n t ' s D e t e n t i o n S t a t u t e e x p r e s s l y and s p e c i f i -

c a l l y p r o v i d e s t h a t any s t o p , detention, questioning o r recovery

o f m e r c h a n d i s e m u s t be d o n e " i n a r e a s o n a b l e m a n n e r a n d t i m e " a n d

t h a t " a f t e r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s t o p has been a c c o m p l i s h e d o r 3 0

m i n u t e s have elapsed, whichever occurs f i r s t " t h e suspected

s h o p l i f t e r m u s t be r e l e a s e d o r a r r e s t e d and t u r n e d o v e r t o a

police officer. Section 46-6-503(2), MCA. B e f o r e any a r r e s t

i s made b y t h e m e r c h a n t , he m u s t h a v e " p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e

t h e other i s s h o p l i f t i n g i n h i s store." S e c t i o n 46-6-502(3),

MCA.

W i t h t h e s e s a f e g u a r d s and l i m i t a t i o n s , I f i n d nothing

u n r e a s o n a b l e i n t h e maximum 3 0 - m i n u t e d e t e n t i o n p r o v i s i o n i n t h e

Merchant's Detention Statute or i n the limited protection i t

a f f o r d s a m e r c h a n t i n p r o t e c t i n g h i s own p r o p e r t y . The c o n s t i t u -

tional p r o h i b i t i o n a p p l i e s o n l y t o u n r e a s o n a b l e searches and

seizures. T h e a b s o l u t e 3 0 - m i n u t e l i m i t on d e t e n t i o n - any e v e n t
i n

p r e v e n t s d e t e n t i o n f o r an u n r e a s o n a b l e l e n g t h o f t i m e . The

f u r t h e r p r o v i s i o n t h a t t h e d e t e n t i o n m u s t be r e a s o n a b l e as t o

t i m e a n d m a n n e r and t h e p e r s o n m u s t be r e l e a s e d o r a r r e s t e d when

t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s t o p has been a c c o m p l i s h e d w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e

t o t h e 30-minute maximum p r e v e n t s a n y o v e r r e a c h i n g o r u n j u s t i -

f i a b l e i n t r u s i o n by a merchant. Only by c o n s t r u i n g t h e s t a t u t e

- 20 -
t o a u t h o r i z e a merchant t o d e t a i n a s u s p e c t e d s h o p l i f t e r f o r up

t o 30 m i n u t e s i n a l l c a s e s as t h e m a j o r i t y h a v e a p p a r e n t l y d o n e ,

i s t h e r e any v i o l a t i o n o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n

a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e s .

I would h o l d t h e Merchant's D e t e n t i o n S t a t u t e c o n s t i t u -

tional i n i t s entirety.

Chief Justice

Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n :

I concur w i t h Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell.