No. 82-50
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
LARRY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS .
JAMES PASMA,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone
Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Gerald J. Neely argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Herron, Meloy and Llewellyn, Helena, Montana
Peter M. Meloy argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: N'ovember15, 1982
Decided: December 29, 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
Plaintif £/appellant, Larry W i l l i a m s , f i l e d a complaint in the
Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. against
defendant/respondent, James P a s m a , c l a i m i n g l i b e l and a s k i n g f o r
damages. On J a n u a r y 8 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d summary
-judgment t o Pasma. W i l l i a m s appeals.
The alleged libel w a s prompted by an o c c u r r e n c e of events
which began i n O c t o b e r 1979. A t that t i m e there was " t a l k " t h a t
S u p e r i n t e n d a n t of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n , G e o r g i a Ruth R i c e , would be
o p p o s e d by a f o r m e r e m p l o y e e , J u d i F e n t o n . On O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1 9 7 9 ,
K e n n e t h Dunham, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e S t a t e R e p u b l i c a n C o m m i t t e e , made
a c r i t i c a l comment a b o u t b o t h R i c e and F e n t o n which was c a r r i e d
b y t h e Great F a l -l-s- T r -b u- n e .
- - i - I n t h e same e d i t i o n of the Tribune
t h e r e was a n o t h e r s t o r y a n n o u n c i n g t h a t u n s u c c e s s f u l U .S . Senate
candidate Williams and former Governor Tim Babcock had been
s e l e c t e d and a g r e e d t o head a J o h n C o n n a l l y f o r P r e s i d e n t c o m m i t -
tee.
When P a s m a , a member o f t h e S t a t e Democratic C o m m i t t e e , r e a d
the t w o news r e p o r t s , he found it ironic the republicans were
c r i t i c i z i n g t h e two p o t e n t i a l d e m o c r a t i c c a n d i d a t e s w h i l e a t t h e
same time they announced the appointment of two individuals
( W i l l i a m s and B a b c o c k ) who had had " t r o u b l e w i t h t h e law" to r u n
Connallyl s campaign committee. Pasma then composed a press
r e l e a s e w h i c h was p r i n t e d i n t h e - -- - - -- a l.l s - - -i -b u --- on O c t o b e r
Great F - Tr ne
27, 1979. Pasma s t a t e d , "The e n t i r e t h r u s t of my a r t i c l e was f o r
Mr. Dunham t o b u s y h i m s e l f c l e a n i n g up h i s own h o u s e r a t h e r t h a n
attacking unannounced democratic candidates and delving or
m e s s i n g a r o u n d i n a n y way i n t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y . " The p r e s s
release s t a t e d :
"A D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y o f f i c i a l F r i d a y a c c u s e d
s t a t e R e p u b l i c a n spokesman Ken Dunham o f
m a k i n g s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t D e m o c r a t s t h a t were
' s h o r t on c o n t e n t and l o n g on p o o r t a s t e and
bad manners.
" D e m o c r a t i c n a t i o n a l committeeman J i m Pasma,
H a v r e , t o o k i s s u e w i t h comments Dunham made
t h i s week a b o u t P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n S u p t .
G e o r g i a Ruth Rice and h e r p o s s i b l e D e m o c r a t i c
opponent, Judi Fenton. Rice a l s o is a
Democrat.
" Dunham had q u e s t i o n e d R i c e I s c o m p e t e n c y and
s a i d h e was d i s t u r b e d t h a t Democrats would
c o n s i d e r nominating 'another b u r e a u c r a t 1 l i k e
Fenton f o r t h e job.
" Pasma c a l l e d Dunham's comments t y p i c a l o f
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n e g a t i v e c h a t t e r t h a t comes
from t h e Republican s t a t e o f f ice. ' He said
Dunham's p r e s s r e l e a s e s , w h i c h i n c l u d e d a
' v i c i o u s p e r s o n a l a t t a c k 1 o n R i c e and ' a n
e q u a l l y unbecoming m e d i a s a l v o ' a g a i n s t F e n t o n
'may v e r y w e l l s e t t h e t o n e f o r t h e t y p e o f
c a m p a i g n r h e t o r i c w e c a n e x p e c t f r o m t h e GOP
i n 1980. '
"Pasma s a i d it was i r o n i c t h a t on t h e same d a y
t h a t Dunham a t t a c k e d t h e D e m o c r a t s , a s t o r y
r a n i n d i c a t i n g t h a t f o r m e r R e p u b l i c a n Gov. Tim
B a b c o c k and L a r r y W i l l i a m s , u n s u c c e s s f u l 1 9 7 8
GOP S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e , were among t h e l e a d e r s
o f a s t a t e committee p r o m o t i n g t h e p r e s i d e n -
t i a l candidate John Connally.
" 'When w e c o n s i d e r t h a t a l l t h r e e h a v e a t o n e
t i m e o r a n o t h e r been under f e d e r a l i n d i c t m e n t
f o r p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l s h e n a n i g a n s , i t is
s m a l l wonder t o m e a t l e a s t t h a t Ken Dunham
b u s i e s h i m s e l f c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to what he
considers the shortcomings of possible
D e m o c r a t i c o p p o n e n t s , Pasma s a i d . '
" C o n n a l l y , a former Democratic g o v e r n o r of
T e x a s , was a c q u i t t e d o f c h a r g e s t h a t he was
b r i b e d by m i l k p r o d u c e r s when he was s e c r e t a r y
of the treasury. Babcock p l e a d e d g u i l t y and
was f i n e d f o r making a n i l l e g a l c a m p a i g n
contribution to former President Richard
Nixon. W i l l i a m s was s t r i p p e d o f h i s l i c e n s e s
a s a n i n v e s t o r and commodity a d v i s e r , b u t a
c o u r t r u l e d i n h i s f a v o r and h i s l i c e n s e s h a v e
b e e n re t u r n e d .
"Pasma u r g e d Dunham t o s p e n d h i s t i m e making
s u r e t h e R e p u b l i c a n s come up w i t h t h e i r b e s t
qualified c a n d i d a t e f o r s u p e r i n t e n d e n t to
i n s u r e a h e a l t h y d e b a t e of t h e i s s u e s i n t h e
general election ."
Pasma ' s m i s c o n c e p t i o n a b o u t W i l l i a m s e v o l v e d from a n a r t i c l e
which appeared in - --b e -
F o r -s -M-g a z i n e
- a- - -- and was reprinted in the
B i l l i -n g-- G a -z e- t e .
--- .-- .
s - - --t -
.
The a r t i c l e c o n t a i n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t :
" C o u r t r e c o r d s show t h a t W i l l i a m s was t h r e e
times c h a r g e d w i t h v i o l a t i o n s of f e d e r a l r e g u -
l a t i o n s c o v e r i n g c o m m o d i t i e s and security
investment counselors."
Pasma claims he d i d n o t know t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n " c h a r g e d w i t h
a federal offense" and "being under federal indictment."
In a s t o r y which appeared in the Great Falls Tribune on
October 30, 1979, Williams demanded a retraction f r o m Pasma.
Williams stated Pasma's charges that Williams had been under
federal i n d i c t m e n t were f a l s e and constituted "dirty politics"
a n d h e would f i l e a libel suit if a formal r e t r a c t i o n w a s not
made. W i l l i a m s s a i d , "Somebody h a s t o t e a c h p o l i t i c a l p e o p l e i n
Montana t o p l a y t h e game by t h e f a c t s and b y t h e t r u t h , and i f
t h a t h a p p e n s t o be m e , so be i t . "
I n a telephone i n t e r v i e w a f t e r W i l l i a m s demanded a retrac-
tion, Pasma s t a t e d : "If Mr. W i l l i a m s s a y s he w a s n ' t indicted,
t h e n I h a v e no c h o i c e b u t t o b e l i e v e him u n l e s s someone i n f o r m e d
me otherwise." T h i s s t a t e m e n t was p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Great - a --l- s
--- - -- F - l
T r- b - -- .e- on O c t o b e r 3 0 ,
--
i un 1979. Pasma f u r t h e r a d m i t t e d t h a t " h i s
use of the words 'federal indictment' in a press release
' a p p a r e n t l y was a p o o r o n e . "
I In an interview published i n the
Great F a l l s T -- --n-- on December 11, 1 9 7 9 , Pasma s t a t e d , " A t t h e
-- - -- -- -- r i b u e
t i m e I made t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t M r . W i l l i a m s had b e e n f e d e r a l l y
indicted, as had former Governor Babcock and former Governor
Connally, I s i n c e r e l y believed it, . . . talking to M r . W i l l i a m s
b y phone h e a s s u r e d m e t h a t t h i s was i n c o r r e c t and as I s a i d i n a
p r e v i o u s news r e l e a s e , I b e l i e v e him."
After Pasma r e f u s e d t o make a formal retraction, Williams
filed a complaint i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County a g a i n s t Pasma a l l e g i n g
t h a t he had b e e n l i b e l e d and s u f f e r e d damages by v i r t u e of the
article published i n t h e Great -F a l l- s - r i b-- n -- .
-- -- -- --- T - u -e Pasma moved to
d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n c l a i m i n g W i l l i a m s was a " p u b l i c f i g u r e " and
therefore i n o r d e r f o r W i l l i a m s to r e c o v e r h e m u s t a l l e g e and
prove a c t u a l malice. Before the District Court acted on the
m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , W i l l i a m s amended h i s c o m p l a i n t c h a r g i n g Pasma
with a c t u a l malice. On J a n u a r y 8 , 1 9 8 2 , f o l l o w i n g c r o s s - m o t i o n s
f o r summary judgment , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d Pasma ' s mot i o n
and ordered judgment be entered in favor of Pasma. Williams
appeals.
The s u b s t a n c e o f t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d o n a p p e a l is as f o l l o w s :
1. Whether the District Court erred by granting summary
j u d g m e n t w h i c h h e l d W i l l i a m s is a p u b l i c f i g u r e a s a m a t t e r of
law.
2. Whether there is a n y g e n u i n e i s s u e as to a n y m a t e r i a l
fact affecting Williams' allegations that Pasma acted with
malice, and i f n o t , is t h e r e a n y f a c t u a l b a s i s upon which a j u r y
could conclude that the statements were made with malice.
3. W h e t h e r t h e s t a t e and f e d e r a l r u l e s p r o t e c t i n g f r e e d o m o f
s p e e c h and p r e s s i n l i b e l a c t i o n s a p p l y to a nonmedia d e f e n d a n t .
4. W h e t h e r t h e d e f e n s e s of "belief i n t h e t r u t h " and " f a i r
comment" w e r e p r o p e r l y p l e a d e d and i f so, w h e t h e r t h e s e d e f e n s e s
and t h e p r i v i l e g e s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, apply i n
t h i s action.
W i l l i a m s c o n t e n d s summary j u d g m e n t w a s i n a p p r o p r i a t e c l a i m i n g
the i s s u e o f w h e t h e r o r n o t h e was a p u b l i c f i g u r e is f o r t h e
jury to d e t e r m i n e . W i l l i a m s c i t e s A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7 , 1972
Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n :
" I n a l l s u i t s and p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r l i b e l or
s l a n d e r t h e t r u t h t h e r e o f may be g i v e n i n
e v i d e n c e , and t h e j u r y , u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n of
t h e court, s h a l l determine the l a w and t h e
facts ."
In support of his position, Williams relies upon the
f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e f r o m M a d i s o n v. Yunker ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 5 4 ,
" L i k e w i s e i t may be c o n t e n d e d i n t h e r e t r i a l
t h a t Madison i s a ' p u b l i c f i g u r e . ' Whatever
h i s s t a t u s , it is a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e j u r y to
d e t e r m i n e , b e c a u s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l pro-
v i s i o n t h a t t h e j u r y u n d e r t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of
t h e c o u r t i s t h e j u d g e o f b o t h l a w and f a c t .
Article 11, Section 7, 1972 Montana
Constitution. With a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
t h e j u r y c a n d e t e r m i n e t h e s e matters and t h e i r
status in any trial, unless otherwise
stipulated." 589 P.2d a t 1 3 3 .
However, this language is not controlling and must be
qualified. In Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Co. (1943), 114
Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580, this Court correctly stated:
" W h i l e o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n l i k e t h a t of M i s s o u r i ,
C o l o r a d o , S o u t h D a k o t a and Wyoming p r o v i d e s
t h a t i n l i b e l s u i t s ' t h e j u r y , under t h e
d i r e c t i o n of t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r m i n e t h e
l a w and t h e f a c t s , ' y e t t h e d e c i s i o n s c l e a r l y
show t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e c o u r t and j u r y
i s n o t g r e a t l y d i f f e r e n t i n t h e t r i a l of l i b e l
f r o m w h a t it is i n o t h e r cases.
" I n o t h e r w o r d s , it i s f o r t h e c o u r t and n o t
the jury t o p a s s upon d e m u r r e r s t o t h e
complaint; upon t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the
evidence; upon m o t i o n s for nonsuit; upon
m o t i o n s f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t ; upon m o t i o n s
f o r a new t r i a l and upon m o t i o n s t o s e t a s i d e
v e r d i c t s or v a c a t e j u d g m e n t s . " 1 1 4 Mont. a t
512.
Thus, t h e r e is no a b s o l u t e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t g r a n t i n g sum-
m a r y j u d g m e n t i n l i b e l cases. A s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t
commented i n R o s e b l a t t v . B a e r ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 3 8 3 U.S. 75, 88, 86 S.Ct.
669, 1 5 L.Ed.2d 597: "we r e m a r k o n l y t h a t , as i n t h e case w i t h
q u e s t i o n s of privilege generally, it is f o r t h e trial judge in
the f i r s t instance t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e p r o o f s show r e s p o n -
d e n t t o be a ' p u b l i c o f f i c i a l . ' "
Next, w e m u s t d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w a s correct
i n f i n d i n g W i l l i a m s w a s a p u b l i c f i g u r e as a matter of law. If
W i l l i a m s w a s a p u b l i c f i g u r e a t t h e t i m e of the alleged l i b e l ,
t h e n h e c a n n o t r e c o v e r damages u n l e s s he c a n show t h e s t a t e m e n t
w a s made w i t h a c t u a l malice. his r u l e w a s s t a t e d b y t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n N e w York Times v . Sullivan ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 376
U.S. 2 5 4 , 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 7 1 0 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686:
"The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s r e q u i r e , w e
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
o f f i c i a l f r o m r e c o v e r i n g damages f o r a defama-
t o r y f a l s e h o o d r e l a t i n g t o h i s o f f i c i a l con-
d u c t u n l e s s he p r o v e s t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t w a s
made w i t h ' a c t u a l m a l i c e t - t h a t i s , w i t h
k n o w l e d g e t h a t it w a s f a l s e or w i t h r e c k l e s s
d i s r e g a r d o f w h e t h e r it was f a l s e or n o t ."
For a period of time t h e United States Supreme C o u r t d i f -
ferentiated between public officials and public figures. See
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct.
1 9 7 5 , 1 8 L.Ed.2d 1094. Finally, i n G e r t z v. Robert Welch, Inc.
( 1 9 7 4 ) r 418 U.S. 323, 351, 94 S . C t . 2997, 4 1 L.Ed.2d 789, the
United States Supreme Court removed the d i s t i n c tion and
classified public figures as falling into one of t w o groups:
" I n some i n s t a n c e s a n i n d i v i d u a l may a c h i e v e
s u c h p e r v a s i v e fame or n o t o r i e t y t h a t he be-
comes a p u b l i c f i g u r e f o r a l l p u r p o s e s and i n
a l l contexts. More commonly, a n i n d i v i d u a l
v o l u n t a r i l y i n j e c t s h i m s e l f or is drawn i n t o a
p a r t i c u l a r public controversy and thereby
becomes a p u b l i c f i g u r e f o r a l i m i t e d r a n g e of
issues. I n e i t h e r c a s e s u c h p e r s o n s assume
s p e c i a l p r o m i n e n c e i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of p u b l i c
questions. "
I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , i f W i l l i a m s f a l l s i n t o e i t h e r of t h e above-
m e n t i o n e d g r o u p s , it would m o s t l i k e l y be t h e f o r m e r . Obviously,
there is a l i m i t e d number who c a n be included i n t h e g r o u p of
public figures for all purposes. I n - ertz the United
G - States
Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d :
" A b s e n t c l e a r e v i d e n c e of g e n e r a l fame o r
n o t o r i e t y i n t h e community, and p e r v a s i v e
involvement i n t h e a f f a i r s of s o c i e t y , an
i n d i v i d u a l s h o u l d n o t be deemed a p u b l i c p e r -
s o n a l i t y f o r a l l a s p e c t s of h i s l i f e . " 418
U.S. a t 352.
W e must determine h e r e w h e t h e r t h e r e is c l e a r e v i d e n c e t h a t
Williams had "general fame or n o t o r i e t y i n t h e community" and
exhibited "pervasive involvement in the af f a i r s of society. "
Prior to the time of the alleged libel Williams had:
p u b l i s h e d a n i n v e s t m e n t a d v i s o r y s e r v i c e and t r a d e d i n s t o c k s and
c o m m o d i t i e s ; a u t h o r e d t h r e e b o o k s on s t o c k s and c o m m o d i t i e s ; b e e n
the subject of an article i n ----- Magazine i n 1 9 7 5 and
Forbes -- --
- - an
a r t i c l e i n t h e -- a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l i n 1 9 7 6 , and g a v e a s p e e c h to
W -
a n economic c o n f e r e n c e i n L o s Angeles; u n s u c c e s s f u l l y r a n f o r t h e
position of United S t a t e s Senator f o r the S t a t e of Montana i n
1 9 7 8 ; a t t e n d e d a r e p u b l i c a n p a r t y c o n v e n t i o n i n 1 9 7 9 and g a v e a
s p e e c h ; s e r v e d a s c h a i r m a n f o r t h e Montana r e p u b l i c a n p a r t y ; and
b e e n a n a c t i v e member of the National T a x p a y e r ' s Union. Some
c o u r t s h a v e h i n t e d t h a t n a t i o n a l n o t o r i e t y is n e c e s s a r y t o a t t a i n
general public figure status. S e e , S w a t s l e r , -- -- v o l u t i o n . -.f -
The E -- o .
t h e P-u-b l i c ---g--r- -r i n e
- - - Fi u e Doct
- in
--- D e f a m a-- n A --i--n s ,
.- - tio - c t o -- 4 1 Ohio S t .
L.J. 1 0 0 9 , 1030 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . However, we c a n n o t f i n d a n y a u t h o r i t y
from the United States Supreme C o u r t nor S t a t e Supreme C o u r t
cases that expressly sets such a requirement. In fact, the
language "in the community" appears to require only local
notoriety. We find t h e above-mentioned a c t i v i t i e s do e s t a b l i s h
c l e a r e v i d e n c e t h a t W i l l i a m s had g e n e r a l fame o r n o t o r i e t y i n t h e
community ( M o n t a n a ) and e x h i b i t e d p e r v a s i v e involvement in the
a f f a i r s of s o c i e t y and t h u s was a p u b l i c f i g u r e a s a m a t t e r of
law.
I n v i e w o f o u r f i n d i n g t h a t W i l l i a m s was a p u b l i c f i g u r e a s a
m a t t e r of l a w , w e m u s t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d
i n holding there i s no f a c t u a l b a s i s upon which a jury could
conclude Pasma's s t a t e m e n t s were made w i t h m a l i c e . As stated
above, the rule t h a t a public o f f i c i a l cannot r e c o v e r damages
upon a c l a i m f o r d e f a m a t i o n w i t h o u t a showing of actual malice
was stated i n N e w York Times v. Sullivan, supra. There, the
United States Supreme Court held malice must be proved by a
s h o w i n g t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was p u b l i s h e d " w i t h knowledge t h a t it
was f a l s e o r w i t h r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d of w h e t h e r it was f a l s e o r
not."
I n -- w --
N e - York -...---- - t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l stemmed from a f u l l p a g e
Times
advertisement published in t h e New York Times which
- s p o k e of
alleged human rights infractions by the police department in
Montgomery, Alabama. About w h e t h e r t h e r e was a showing t h a t t h e
p u b l i c a t i o n was made w i t h m a l i c e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t
stated:
"The s t a t e m e n t d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e malice a t t h e
t i m e of t h e p u b l i c a t i o n ; even i f t h e adver-
tisement w a s not ' s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o r r e c t ' -
a l t h o u g h r e s p o n d e n t ' s own p r o o f s t e n d t o show
t h a t i t was - t h a t o p i n i o n was a t l e a s t a
r e a s o n a b l e o n e , and t h e r e w a s no e v i d e n c e to
impeach t h e w i t n e s s ' good f a i t h i n h o l d i n g
it." 3 7 6 U.S. a t 2 8 6 .
W find here,
e a s i n -N e w -- - m- ,
York T i-e s t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was
made i n good f a i t h and a l t h o u g h it was n o t a correct s t a t e m e n t ,
there is s i m p l y no e v i d e n c e t h e s t a t e m e n t was made w i t h a c t u a l
malice. The d i f f e r e n c e between the l e g a l words "indicted" or
" c h a r g e d " is r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r i n t h e m i n d s of t h e a v e r a g e Montana
c i t i z e n and Pasma s t a t e d he d i d n o t know t h e r e was a d i f f e r e n c e .
Pasma's s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e p r e s s which were p u b l i s h e d a f t e r the
alleged libel s u r e l y a b d i c a t e a n y a l l e g a t i o n t h e s t a t e m e n t was
made w i t h a c t u a l m a l i c e : " A t t h e t i m e I made t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t
Mr. Williams had been federally indicted . . . I sincerely
believed it, . . . talking to M r . W i l l i a m s by phone he a s s u r e d m e
t h a t t h i s w a s i n c o r r e c t and as I s a i d i n a p r e v i o u s news r e l e a s e ,
I b e l i e v e him."
Williams next argues the First Amendment privilege
e s t a b l i s h e d by N e w - Times d o e s n o t a p p l y b e c a u s e Pasma is a
York .
nonmedia d e f e n d a n t . The -- York Times p r i v i l e g e e v o l v e d from
New
t h e United States Supreme C o u r t ' s recognition of the need for
far-reaching F i r s t Amendment p r o t e c t i o n i n c e r t a i n cases. The
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d :
"Such a p r i v i l e g e f o r c r i t i c i s m o f o f f i c i a l
c o n d u c t is a p p r o p r i a t e l y a n a l o g o u s to t h e p r o -
t e c t i o n a c c o r d e d a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l when h e i s
s u e d f o r l i b e l by a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n ... The
r e a s o n f o r t h e o f f i c i a l p r i v i l e g e is s a i d to
b e t h e t h r e a t o f damage s u i t s would o t h e r w i s e
' i n h i b i t t h e f e a r l e s s , v i g o r o u s , and e f f e c t i v e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t ' a n d 'dampen t h e
a r d o r o f a l l b u t t h e most r e s o l u t e , or t h e
most irresponsible , in the unflinching
d i s c h a r g e of t h e i r d u t i e s . ' [ c i t a t i o n omitted ]
Analogous c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t t h e p r i v i l e g e
f o r t h e c i t i z e n - c r i t i c of government. I t is
a s much h i s d u t y t o c r i t i c i z e as it is t h e
o f f i c i a l ' s duty t o administer." 376 U.S. a t
282.
T h i s p r i v i l e g e was e x p a n d e d to i n c l u d e matters i n v o l v i n g a l l
public figures. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d i d n o t l i m i t
its e x t e n s i o n to o n l y media d e f e n d a n t s i n G e r t z , s u p r a . We agree
w i t h t h e h o l d i n g o f t h e O r e g o n Supreme C o u r t i n W h e e l e r v . G r e e n
( 1979 -- ---- Ore. . , 593 P.2d 777:
"There i s , however, n o t h i n g i n G e r t z which
s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e cases a p p l y i n g t h e ~ k w - York
-
Times rule to non-media d e f e n d a n t s - were
i n c o r r e c t or would n o t be f o l l o w e d i n f u t u r e
a c t i o n s b r o u g h t by p u b l i c o f f i c i a l o r p u b l i c
figures. The C o u r t ' s c o n c e r n i n t h o s e cases
t o p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e p r o t e c t i o n f o r f r e e d o m of
p u b l i c d e b a t e on i s s u e s o f p u b l i c i m p o r t a n c e
h a s n o t been r e p u d i a t e d . W e conclude t h a t a l l
defendants, not only those associated with the
m e d i a , c o n t i n u e t o be p r o t e c t e d b y t h e N e w
York -
-
- Times r u l e i n cases i n v o l v i n g comment
-
upon p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s and p u b l i c f i g u r e s . "
5 9 3 P.2d a t 784.
This holding is consistent with this Court's ruling in
G a l l a g h e r v. Johnson (1980 ) , - - - Mont .- -
-. - .- , 6 1 1 P.2d 6 1 3 , 37
St.Rep. 940. In Gallagher we held the New York --- r u l e
Times
a p p l i e d t o a nonmedia d e f e n d a n t who p u r c h a s e d a d v e r t i s i n g s p a c e
i n a l o c a l n e w s p a p e r t o v e n t h i s c r i t i c i s m s o f , and f r u s t r a t i o n s
with, the government for the city of Anaconda, Montana.
Williams' l a s t a s s e r t i o n is t h a t t h e d e f e n s e s of "belief in
t h e t r u t h " and " f a i r comment" were n o t p r o p e r l y p l e a d e d and t h a t
t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, are
not available in t h i s action. The d e f e n s e s of "belief in the
t r u t h " and " f a i r comment" were common law p r i v i l e g e s which l e d t o
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n N e w York T i m e s , v .
Sullivan, supra. A c l o s e r e a d i n g o f - - Times r e v e a l s t h a t
N e w York
t h e common l a w p r i v i l e g e of f a i r comment w a s t h e p r i v i l e g e which
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t was a d d r e s s i n g when it s t a t e d :
" T h u s w e m u s t c o n s i d e r t h i s c a s e a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a p r o -
f o u n d n a t i o n a l commitment t o t h e p r i n c i p a l t h a t d e b a t e on p u b l i c
i s s u e s s h o u l d be u n i n h i b i t e d , r o b u s t , and wide o p e n , . . ." 376
U.S. a t 270. The common l a w p r i v i l e g e of b e l i e f i n t h e t r u t h was
s i m i l a r l y incorporated i n t o t h e - --- --
N e w York Times r u l e a s g o i n g to
t h e proof of actual malice. As these privileges were incor-
porated i n t o t h e r u l e s e t f o r t h i n - York -. i m e s ,
New T - t h e r e i s no
longer a requirement t h a t t h e y be p l e d a s s p e c i f i c d e f e n s e s or
lost. Throughout t h e c o u r s e of this action, Pasma m a i n t a i n e d
W i l l i a m s was a p u b l i c f i g u r e and t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e
s t a t e m e n t was made w i t h a c t u a l m a l i c e . T h i s is a l l t h e d e f e n s e
Pasma was r e q u i r e d t o p l e a d .
W e f i n d no need t o comment upon W i l l i a m s ' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e
p r i v i l e g e s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, a r e not applicable
here. W e h a v e a l r e a d y a p p l i e d t h e - - -York -T i-- e s r u l e and
N e w -- - m -- its
extensions to the f a c t s of this case. In so d o i n g , w e find
W i l l i a m s was a p u b l i c f i g u r e a t t h e t i m e of P a s m a ' s s t a t e m e n t and
there is no e v i d e n c e that the s t a t e m e n t was made with actual
malice. Judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is a f f i r m e d .
T.7
ire concur:
Chigf J u s t i c e
Mr. C h i e i J u s t l c e P r a n k I. H a s w e l l , d i s s e n t i n g :
I would v a c a t e t h e summary j u d g m e n t a n d remand t o t h e
D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings.
The l y n c h p i n o f t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i s t h a t p l a i n t i f f
Larry Williams is a public figure for a l l purposes as a
matter of law. I disagree. I n my v i e w , t h i s is a j u r y
q u e s t i o n p r e c l u d i n g summary j u d g m e n t .
In a l i b e l action the jury, under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
c o u r t , d e t e r m i n e s the law and t h e f a c t s . Art. 11, S e c . 7,
I 9 7 2 Mont. Const. W have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t a p e r s o n ' s
e
status as a public figure is a question for the jury to
determine. Madison v. Yunker ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 5 4 , 6 6 , 589
P.2d 126, 133. The m a j o r i t y now l i m i t Madison t o cases
where t h e r e i s a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t f o r t h e j u r y
t o determine. I agree.
M q u a r r e l is w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e
y
is no j u r y q u e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . I n my v i e w , t h e r e is a
g e n u l n e l s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t as t o whether p l a i n t i f f L a r r y
Williams is a p u b l i c f i g u r e f o r a l l p u r p o s e s which fore-
c l o s e s summary j u d g m e n t .
The s u b s t a n c e o f t h e u n c o n t e s t e d e v i d e n c e o f r e c o r d i n
thls case discloses the following facts relating to
Williams' status as a public figure at the time of the
a l l e g e d l i b e l ( O c t o b e r 27, 1 9 7 9 ) :
(1) N i l l i a m s was a n u n s u c c e s s f u l c a n d i d a t e f o r U n i t e d
States Senator in 1978 and in connection therewith made
numerous s p e e c h e s , issued press releases, a p p e a r e d o n TV,
a n d made numerous p u b l i c a p p e a r a n c e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s
campaign ;
(2) Williams authored three books on stocks and
commodities prior to 1978;
(3) Williams published an investment advisory service
and traded in stock and commodities;
(4) Williams and others were selected to be members of
the State Committee for Republican presidential candidate
John Connally;
(5) Williams was the subject of an article in Forbes
magazine in 1975 and the Wall Street Journal in 1976;
(6) Williams gave a speech to an Economic Conference
in Los Angeles;
(7) Williams attended a Republican convention and gave
a speech for a candidate for State Republican Chairman;
(8) Williams was a member of the National Taxpayers
Union and gave testimony to a legislative committee and
worked at the legislative level, made a public statement
promoting balanced budgets, and issued three press releases
during the legislative session.
Do these uncontested facts make Williams an all-
purpose public figure as a matter of law? Not at all. To
establish such there must be "clear evidence of general fame
or notoriety in the community, and persuasive involvement in
the affairs of society." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
(1974), 418 U.S. 323, 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d
789, 812. It has been held by a federal appeals court that
"a person can be a general public figure only if he is a
'celebrity1--his name is a 'household word1--whose ideas and
actions the public in fact follows with great interest."
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1980),
627 F.2d 1287, 1292, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898, 101 S.Ct.
266, 62 L.Ed.2d 128. Examples of persons the courts have
held to be all-purpose public figures are Johnny Carson
[Carson v. Allied News Co. (7th Cir. 1976), 529 F.2d 2061
and William F. Buckley, Jr. [Suckley v. Littell (2nd Cir.
1976), 539 F.2d 882, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct.
786, 50 L.Ed.2d 7771. Measured by these standards, isn't
there at least a jury question as to whether Larry Williams
qualifies as an all-purpose public figure? Is Williams a
celebrity whose name is a household word and whose ideas and
actions the public follows with great interest? There is no
evidence that the general public is even aware of his many
publications and activities. Nor is there evidence of the
impact of his activities on the public.
It is equally important to note other facts disclosed
by the record:
(1) Williams was not a public official;
(2) Williams did not inject himself into the Pasma-
Dunham controversy that gave rise to the alleged libel;
(3) Prior to the alleged libel, Williams had not
served as a n officer of the Republican Party, was not
involved in promoting placement of Initiative 86 on the
ballot, and was not involved in any activity in connection
with the John Connally campaign.
A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the
benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from
the offered proof. Mally v. Asanovich (1967), 145 Mont. 99,
105, 423 P.2d 294, 297. A case should never be withdrawn
from the jury unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a
recovery cannot be had upon any view of the facts which the
evidence reasonably tends to establish. Miller Insurance
Agency v. Home Fire Etc. Ins. Co. (1935), 100 Mont. 551,
561, 5 1 P.2d 628, 630. Such i s n o t the c a s e here. The
summary judgment should be vacated and the case should
proceed t o j u r y t r i a l .