I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
NO. 84-502
I N THE M T E OF:
ATR
T.L.G. and M.E.H., Youths.
ORDER D E N Y I N G WRIT
AND O P I N I O N
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OF @UPREME COURT
GE X
L ~ ~ ~ ABilhsnTANA
The S t a t e o f Montana, a c t i n g t h r o u g h t h e County A t t o r -
n e y ' s o f f i c e of B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow, Montana, h a s made a p p l i c a -
t i o n t o t h i s Court seeking a w r i t of supervisory control, a
w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n , o r other appropriate w r i t , against the
Youth C o u r t o f t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i . c t o f t h e S t a t e o f
Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f S i l v e r Bow.
The writ sought would in effect overrule the Youth
Court's order of November 13, 1984, denying the State's
motion to arrest proceedings in t w o c a s e s pending i n t h e
Youth Court involving T.L.G. and M.E.H. The youths are
f a c i n g c h a r g e s i n t h e Youth C o u r t t h a t e a c h i s a d e l i n q u e n t
y o u t h i n t h a t e a c h had committed t h r e e c o u n t s o f d e l i b e r a t e
homicide, t h a t T.L.G. had committed r o b b e r y by a c c o u n t a b i l i -
ty, and that M.E.H. had committed robbery, all felonies.
T.L.G. i s f o u r t e e n y e a r s o f a g e , h a v i n g been b o r n on J a n u a r y
16, 1970. M.E.H. i s f i f t e e n y e a r s o f a g e , h a v i n g been b o r n
on March 1, 1969.
The p u r p o s e o f t h e S t a t e i n moving t o a r r e s t p r o c e e d -
i n g s i n t h e Youth C o u r t was t o f u r t h e r move t h a t t h e y o u t h s
b e t r a n s f e r r e d t o c r i m i n a l c o u r t u n d e r 5 41-5-206, MCA. That
statute, however, requires t h a t b e f o r e s u c h c h a r g e s may b e
transferred to the criminal court, the youth charged must
have been sixteen years of age or more at the time of the
conduct alleged to be unlawful.
In making the application, the State contends in effect
that the sixteen-year-old requirement for transfer has the
effect of placing in the Youth Court total iurisdiction over
all criminal cases amounting to a fel.ony if the youth charged
is less than sixteen years old and that such statutory provi-
sion is in con£l i c with Art. VII, Sec. 4 ( 1 )
..t , Montana Consti-
tution 1972.
We set out in full the constitutional provision in
question:
"Section 4. District court jurisdiction.
(1) The district court has original
iurisdiction in all criminal cases
amounting to felony and all civil matters
and cases at law and in equity. ...
" (3) Other courts ma.y have jurisdiction
of criminal cases not amounting to felony
and such jurisdiction concurrent with
that of the district court as may be
provided. by law. "
The State contends that the provisions of the 1972
Montana Constitution gives t.he District Court original juris-
diction in all criminal cases amounting to a felony, and that
und-er the decision of this Court in State ex r ] . Ell-iot v.
e.
District Court (Mont. 1984), 684 P.2d 481, 41 St.Rep. 1184,
an individual under the age of sixteen is legally caps-ble of
committing a felony.
We have concluded that the State is not entitled to
relief by supervisory control, writ of prohibition, or other
writ for two principal reasons: ( 1 ) the term "original iuris-
diction" as used in Art. VII, Sec. 4, of the 1372 Montana
Consti.tution should not be interpreted to mean exclusive
-jurisdiction; and (2) in any event, wher; the Youth Court
acts, it is the District Court acting in that capacity.
If the term "original jurisdiction," as used in the
Constitution, meant "exclusive original jurisdiction," as the
State here assumes, it would mean, of course, that the ].egis-
lature would have no power to provide for the prosecution of
a crime amounting to a felony in any other forum but a Dis-
trict Court. Courts have not given the term "original juris-
diction" such a narrow construction. The question has a-risen
in several cases interpreting the term "original jurisdic-
tion" found in the Civil Rights Act in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For
example, in Brown v. Pitchess (Cal. 1975), 119 Cal..Rptr. 204,
"Unless Congress confers exclusive juris-
diction on federal courts, state courts
competent to exercise it have concurrent
jurisdiction to enforce federal law in
civil actions. [Citing authority.]
"Section 1983 does not itself address the
question of jurisdiction. The jurisdic-
tional provision governing section
1983--28 United States Code section
1343(3)--confers 'original jurisdiction'
on the federal district courts. The
phrase 'original jurisdiction' means the
power to entertain cases in the first
instance, as distinguished from appellate
jurisdiction; it does not mean exclusive
iurisdiction. [Citing authority.] When
intending to confer exclusive, as well as
original, jurisdiction on the federal
district courts, Congress is quite capa-
ble of making itself understood. For
example, section 1338(a) of title 28 of
-
the United States Code provides: ' The
district courts sha.11 have original
iurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to
-
patents, plant variety protection, copy-
rights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the
sta-tes n patent, plant variety protec-
i
tion and copyright cases.'"
In accord see, Sanchez v. Attorney General (N.M. 1979), 598
P.2d 1170; Will-iams v. Greene (N.C. 19781, 243 S.E.2d 156.
We determine that nothing in the language of the Con-
stitution using the term "original jurisdiction," without
additional language showing that such jurisdiction is to be
exclusive, prevents the prosecution of youths as delinquents
under the Youth Court Act in cases amounting to felony.
Nothing that this Court said in State ex rel. Elliot v.
District Court, supra, conflicts with that determination.
The second reason that. we determine that the state
constitution is not offended by the prosecution of felonies
in the Youth Court is that it appears obvious that the Youth
Court, when it acts in jurisdiction, is acting as a District
Court.
Section 41-5-201, MCA, provides that each judicial
district of the state shall have at least one judge of the
Youth Court. It further provides that in multi-judge judi-
cial districts the judges shall by court rule designate one
of their number to act as a Youth Court judge in each county
of the c?istrict. The legislature encourages continuity of
service as to the appointed Youth Court judge. Id. In Youth
Court cases, however, the legislature has provided for "ex-
clusive original jurisdiction," saying:
"41-5-203. Juridiction - - court.
of the
Except as provided in subsection (2) the
court has exclusive original jurisdiction
of all proceedings under the Montana
Youth Court Act in which a youth is
alleged to be a delinquent youth . . ."
The exception noted in 5 41-5-203, MCA, relates to concurrent
jurisdiction in justice, municipal and city courts with
respect to alcoholic beverage violations and traffic or fish
and game law viol.ations, and has no application here.
The constitutional framers recognized. that the Legisla-
ture might enact laws which enhance the protection of persons
not adults. In Art. 11, Sec. 15, 1972 Mont. Const., it
provided that the rights of persons under eighteen years of
age include all the fundamental rights granted by the Consti-
tution unless specifically precluded by laws "which enhance
the protection of such persons."
In accordance with these view, IT IS HEREBY ORDEFED
that the application of the State in this cause for 2 writ of
supervisory control, writ of prohibition or other appropriate
writ be DENIED and the application is dismissed.
The Clerk of this Court shall serve copies of this
order and opinion upon counsel of record for the parties, and
upon the Youth Court of the Second Judicial District.
%i
DATED this - day of December, 19f!4.
*
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k ,,
, Justice B
he concur:
7
-
Chief Justice
Justice Frank R . Morrison, Jr., has authorized a statement
that he concurs with the foregoing result but would deny the
application for reason that a fifteen-year-old youth cannot
be charged with a felony during the time he or she is a
youth. Since a felony charge cannot be filed, the constitu-
tional provision given the District Court jurisdiction of
felonies has no application.