No. 83-97
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1984
REBECCA CAMPBELL, FJidow of Raymond
Campbell,
Claimant and Respondent,
-vs-
YOUNG !,IOTOR COMPANY, Employer,
and
FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy
Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Corette, Smith, Pohlman & Allen; Robert Carlson and
Dolphy Pohlman argued, Butte, llontana
For Respondent:
Greg J. Skakles argued, Anaconda, Montana
Submitted: November 30, 1983
Decided: June 28, 1934
"-
Clerk
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Defendants, Young Motor Company, employer, and Federated
Mutual Insurance, the insurer, appeal a judgment of the
Workers' Compensation Court awarding death benefits to
Rebecca Campbell, the widow of Raymond Campbell, who
committed suicide five years a-fter he sustained a compensable
iniury . The trial court found there existed a causal
connection between the injury and the ultimate suicide. We
affirm.
The primary question, one not decided by this Court, is
whether the Workers' Compensation Act permits recovery for a
suicide, if it can be shown that a previous compensable
injury was a substantial contributing cause of the suicide.
Assuming that such recovery is permitted, the second question
is whether substantial credible evidence supports the
findings of the trial court that Raymond Campbell's injury
was a substantial contributing cause of his suicide. The
third issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding
costs and attorney fees to the claimant under section
39-71-611-,MCA, of the Workers' Compensation Act. This issue
is controlled by our answer to the legal question and to the
sufficiency of the evidence question, for, under the statute,
claimant is entitled to costs and attorney fees if the order
is affirmed.
Before setting forth the facts on which the claim was
based, we discuss first the question of whether a claim for
death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act can be
based on a contention that an injury eventually led to the
suicide of the employee. The employer argues that suicide
was of personal origin and was a superced.ing intervening
cause a.s a matter of law.
This state has no statutes dealing with the effect of
suicide on the right to recover death benefits. One statute
in effect at the time of the injury (January 8, 1974), bears
on the question of causation. Section 92-608, R.C.M. 1947,
provides in substance that if an injury is the proximate
cause of death, death benefits are payable even though the
death did not immediately follow the injury. The last part
of this statute simply provides that there is no liability
for compensation after a worker's death if the worker dies
from some "cause other than the in-jury,. . ." This Court, in
Breen v. Industrial Accident Board (1968), 150 Mont. 463, 436
P.2d 701, set forth the requirements of proximate cause under
this statute, and specifically stated that:
". . . this, of course, does not mean that the
injury must be the sole cause of death, but it does
mean that an injury must be a substantial.
contributing cause in the sense that death would
not have occurred but for such injuries. "- 150
Mont. 472-473, 436 P.2d at 706.
The employer argues for an absolute rule that suicide is
per - an intentional act that is an independent, intervening
se
cause, and therefore that as a matter of law, recovery of
death benefits cannot be permitted. Claimant argues, on the
other hand, that recovery of death benefits is permitted if
the required connection between the cornpensable injury and
the suicide is established.
Both the majority and the minority rules of other
jurisdictions permit recovery of death benefits where there
is a suicide. In effect, no jurisdictions recognize suicide
as an intentional act that automatically breaks the chain of
causation to defeat a claim for death benefits. Both the
majority and the minority rules are set forth in Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. IA, § 36.00, at 6-117:
"Suicide under the majority rule is compensab1.e if
the injury produces mental derangement and the
mental derangement produces suicide. The minority
rule is that suicide is not compensable unless
there has followed as the direct result of a
work-connected injury an insanity of such severity
as to cause the victim to take his own life through
an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of
frenzy without conscious volition to produce
death."
In applying the law to the facts here, the trial court
adopted the majority rule, and we approve.
The minority rule, as Larson explains, was once the
majority rule, but it ". . . was gradually displaced as
majority rule by the chain of causation test, which found
compensability if the injury caused the deranged mental
condition which in turn. caused the suicide. " Larson, supra,
5 36.10, at 6-118. In explaining the role of intervening
cause in the analysis, Larson explains that the focus must be
". . . not on the employee's knowledge that he is killing
himself, but rather on the existence of an unbroken chain of
causation from the injury to the suicide . . ." Larson,
supra, 5 36.30, at 6-136. In other words, as Larson
explains:
". . . if the first cause produces the second
cause, that second cause is not an independent
intervening cause. The question whether the actor
appreciated the consequences of his act should not
be d-ecisive on the fundamental question whether
that act was the natural and forseeable result of
the first injury." Larson, supra, § 36.30, at
6-136.
While the employer's position is an easy one to assert
and apply, that is, that suicide is per se intentional and
therefore a sufficient intervening cause to cut off the chain
of cau.sation leading from the initial injury, this position
adopts too hard and fast a rule on the dynamics of cause and
effect. The more reasonable and humane rule is one that was
set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Delaware Tire
Center v. Fox (1979), 401 A.2d 97, where the Court held that
death benefits were available where the worker committed
suicide. The Court stated:
"In applying this [chain of causation] test, death
by suicide would be compensable if it is caused by
severe pain and despair which proximately resul-ts
from a compensable accident, and is of such a
degree as to override normal and ra-tional judgment.
A suicide committed under such circumstances cannot
be said to be 'intentional' even though the act
itself may be volitional. (Citations omitted.)"
This ch.ain of causation rule recognizes that the injury
and the post-injury trauma, mental as well as physical, may
take a path anticipated by no one, but nonetheless be
traceable to the injury itself. We are convinced,
furthermore, that the majority rule we have adopted here more
completely fulfills the statutory duty (section 39-71-104,
MCA) imposed under the Workers' Compensation Act to liberally
construe its provisions in favor of the employee.
On the question of causation, the employer argues that
the suicide note itself set forth the reason Campbell took
his own life, a.nd that it supports only a finding that the
i njury
. was not the precipitating cause his suicide.
Further, the employer argues that the opinion of a
psychologist, who performed a psychological autopsy on
Campbell by using his previous medical records and. history,
was faulty because the psychologist failed to inverview two
fellow employees at Greyrock Trucking who would not have
supported the opinion that Campbell had constant pain and
that he was in a deep depression.
Before his death, Campbell wrote a sui-cide note that
read:
"To Mom [on outside of envelope]
"I'm going home with Grandma and Grandad. [~oth
had predeceased him.]
"Be sure and tell [my son] someday why I went
there.
"I'm very sorry mom but L just couldn't let someone
else take he[r]?
"Love you always."
The employer argues that proper application of the chain
of causation test shows that despite any depression
precipated by Campbell's inability to work and his heavy
drinking, the substantial factor in his suicide was the loss
of his wife and children who moved out one month before the
death because of his heavy drinking and abusive behavior.
The employer also attacks the opinion of a psychologist who
performed a psychological autopsy of Campbell, and who
concluded that the injury was a very significant and very
substantial cause of Campbell's depression and ultimate
suicide. The employer argues that the opinion was faulty
because the psychologist did not interview Campbell before
his death and because he failed to interview two fellow
employees of Ca.mpbe1-1 Greyrock Trucking who would not have
at
supported the psychologist's opinion as to Campbell's
depression or his suffering from pain as the result of his
injury. The evidence, however, fully supports the trial
court's findings and. conclusions.
On January 8, 1974, Raymond Campbell seriously injured
his back while working as a car body repairman for Young
Motor Company in Anaconda. The injury led to two surgeries,
but the surgeon testified that he expected Campbell to have
continuing pain in his lower back and right leg for the rest
of his life.
After the injury, Campbell had medical treatment and
physical therapy, but the pain in his back and right leg
continued. Campbell was referred to Dr. Charles R. Canty in
Butte, who performed a myelogram. The results showed surgery
was necessary, and in September 1-974, Dr. Canty performed a
laminectomy. The pain returned, and approximately six months
later Dr. Canty performed a second operation. He removed
scar tissue from nerve roots, retained fibrous tissue, and
performed a spinal fusion. The doctor told Campbell then
that he should find a new and less strenuous trade.
For two and one half years after his injury, Campbell
was unable to work. During this time, he abused alcohol on a
daily basis and was depressed most of the time. He told his
wife that the pain medicine was not relieving the pain and
that he drank alcohol to relieve the pain. He final-1.y
returned to work at Anaconda Ford in the summer of 1976 as a
body repairman. But the pain and the drinking continued.
Campbell was deeply depressed for the entire period
after his injury. He was afraid before both back operations
that he would end up paralyzed, and he continued to fear that
he would someday be paralyzed and unable to support his wife
and children. He became more and more withdrawn and no
longer engaged as frequently in the activities he formerly
enjoyed such as hunting, fishing, and recreational mechanical
work. While working for Greyrock Truckinq, however, Campbell
occasionally went to the woods to cut and haul wood.
The situation for the wife and children became
intolerable and his wife threatened to leave him unless he
stopped drinking. But the drinking continued until November
1976, when Campbell admitted himself to Galen State Hospital
and was diagnosed as suffering from acute alcoholism. He
checked out four days later rather than staying for
treatment. He did, however, manage to stop drinking for
almost a month, but then he started again, on a daily basis,
and usually to the point of intoxication.
Campbell continued working for Anaconda Ford until the
summer of 1977, when he went to work for Greyrock Trucking in
Aria-conda as a truck driver. Medical testimony established
that truck driving would most likely worsen Campbell's lower
back and leg pain.
Campbell's relationship with his wife and children
continued. to deteriorate while he worked for Greyrock
Trucking. Although Greyrock personnel described Ca.mpbel1 as
an "excellent employee," and that they did not observe that
Campbell was ever in pain, other testimony established that
Campbell was in constant pain and was drinking even more.
His wife testified that while at home he was often drunk and
belligerent and physically abusive to her and. to his son.
She testified that although Campbell had been jealous and
over-possessive of his wife since the beginning of their
marriage, his jealousy and abusive behavior intensified after
his back injury. His temper flared often and he wrongly
accused her of being unfaithful. The situation got so bad
that Campbell's wife took the children and moved to Butte to
live with relatives.
Campbell was extremely upset by the prospect of losing
his family, and after his family had moved out, he
d.ra.sticallycurtailed his drinking in an effort to get them
to return. In fact, in the month before his suicide,
Campbell did not drink at all. Although Campbell's wife and
children did drive to Anaconda. to see him several times
during this month, they did not return to the family home.
On or about January 10, 1979, Campbell committed suicide by a
gunshot wound to the heart.
The trial court realized full well the difficulty of
assessing and. analyzing the evidence in determining the issue
of proximate cause based on the chain of causation test. The
court stated:
"Where can this Court find the bright line that
distinguishes the intentional act, the act
premeditated by intellect, from the act that is the
result of the diseased mind? This Court must, and
can only, discover this line by examining the
pre-accident and post-accident conduct of the
decedent, conduct which steps forward and speaks on
his behalf, and the expert testimony of the
psychologist who performed the psychological
autopsy. . ."
The trial court continued:
"The preponderance of the credible evidence in this
case reveals the descent of a proud, active and
accomplished working man into a suicidal
depression; his descent was powered by the constant
pain which resulted from his industrial accident
and was fueled by his alcohol abuse, forced
inactivity and fear of paralysis."
Against the background of Campbell's steady, and
seemingly inexorable decline after his 1974 back injury, the
employer argues that Campbell's intervening volitional act of
suicide was the proximate cause of death rather than the back
injury. The employer argued that despite any depression
precipitated by Campbell's inability to work and heavy
drinking, the substantial factor in his suicide was the loss
of his wife and children who moved out one month before the
death because of his drinking and abusive behavior. The
trial court thought differently.
The trial court, as the finder of fact, met this
argument by stating:
". . . Looked at narrowl-y, the last causal event in
the chain of events that culminated in the
decedent's suicide was his wife's departure, but
this artifically narrow view ignores the chain of
events starting with the cla.imantrs industrial
accident, and continuing unbroken until he
committed suicide. That chain, as demonstrated by
Dr. Walters' [the psychologist] testimony, may be
summarized simply as follows:
" (1) The decedent ' s industrial accident severely
injured him, prevented him from working for two and
a half years, caused him to suffer almost constant
physical pain, fear of future paralysis, and a
consequent inability to work, and depression; (2)
He drank alcoholic beverages to lessen the pain and
this intensified his depression and consequent
distorted view of reality; ( 3 ) His increased and
continuing pain, depression and distorted view of
reality caused him to become more abusive of his
wife and children and to continue to drink
excessively; (4) His wife left him because of his
excessive drinking and abusive behavior."
The trial court eloquently and poignantly placed the
cause and effect of this chain of events in a perspective
that is almost invariably better appreciated by the trier of
fact:
"This sequence of events is roughly analogous to
the events that can occur when a gust of wind
strikes a tree branch heavily laden with moist snow
causing the snow to fall to the snow-covered slope
and move forward downhill with increasing speed and
size until it becomes an avalanche that lays waste
to all that comes within its path. While the cause
in retrospect may appear remote and slight, the
chain of events it engendered were, on close
examination, unbroken and ultimately overpowering.
The decedent's industrial accident set in motion
events that coursed through his life with
increasing destructive force and that, in
retrospect, proximately caused him to take his own
life. I
'
The employer challenges the trial court's findings, and
argues that even under the chain of causation test applied by
the trial court, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. The employer argues that the opinion
of the psychologist is legally deficient because he did not
personally interview Campbell before his suicide, and because
he failed to interview two fellow Greyrock Trucking
employees, who, in observing Campbell at work, had a
different perception of him than that provided by Campbell's
wife, mother and friends.
Undoubtedly, it would have been helpful for Dr. VJalters
to have interviewed Campbell before his death, but no one
anticipated the precise direction that Campbell's life was
taking so that he could be rushed to a psychologist. Rut the
fact that Campbell was not interviewed before his death does
not render inadmissible a psychologist's opinion based on the
available data concerning Campbell's pre-injury and
post-injury condition, physical and mental.
It is true that Willard Larsen and John Hall, as
coemployees of Campbell, presented a different picture of him
just before his death. Both Larsen and Hall testified that
Campbell was an excellent employee, never missed shifts, was
competent, and seemed to enjoy his work. They also did not
observe that he was in pa.in or that he was depressed. This
portrayal is markedly different from that provided by
Campbell's wife, mother, and old friends. If, however, the
employer believed this evidence to be so important, the
employer could have submitted the information to the
psychologist before he examined the available data and before
he formed his opinion as to the reason Campbell committed
suicide. Furthermore, the employer had ample opportunity to
cross-examine the psychologist to test whether his opinion
would have been changed by the testimony given by Larsen and
Hall. Finally, the trial court had the opportunity of
weighing this testimony, and the testimony was not considered
that important to the trial court's conclusion that the 1974
injury was a. substantial contributing cause to Campbell's
suicide in 1979.
Our holding on the first two issues disposes of the
third issue because, under section 39-71-611, MCA, if an
employer denied liability for a claim that is later adjudged
compensable in trial court or on appeal, the employer
(insurer) "shall pay reasonable costs and attorney fees as
established by the workers' compensation judge." Here both
the trial court and this Court have determined the claim to
be compensable and therefore costs and attorney fees must be
awarded under the statute.
The order of the Workers' Compensation Court awarding
death benefits to claimant is affirmed.
We Concur:
? h d t D , W M d
Chief Justice
Justices