No. 8 6 - 2 4 9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
MAYBELLE H. WATSON,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
JOHN W. WATSON,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable Thomas McKittrick, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Bottomly & Gabriel; Robert W. Gabriel, Great Falls,
Montana
Strause & Anderson; Lawrence A. Anderson, Great Falls,
Montana
For Respondent:
Regnier, Lewis & Boland; Thomas Boland, Great Falls,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 30, 1 9 8 7
Decided: July 131 1987
Filed: JuL 13 1987
Clerk
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
The husband, John Watson, appeals the marital property
distribution as ordered by the Cascade County District Court.
The issues on appeal are:
1) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in
dividing the marital property?
2) Whether the District Court erred in offsetting the
$28,000 maintenance award from the property awarded to the
husband?
We affirm.
The wife, Maybelle Watson, married her first husband,
Walter Evers, in 1930 and had two children by him, Judy Evers
Kurth and Jon Evers. The Evers lived on a ranch in Chouteau
County, Montana. Mr. Evers died in 1948 and left his entire
estate to his wife. After Mr. Evers' death, the wife ran the
ranch with the help of two hired men. In 1948,
representatives from the Hutterite colony offered the wife,
according to her son and son-in-law, approximately $500,000
for the ranch. The wife declined the offer, explaining that
she ran a family ranch which was not for sale to outsiders.
At present, the family ranch is now in its fifth generation.
In 1950, the wife married the husband in this action,
John "Jock" Watson, a bartender at the Vet's Club in Fort
Benton, Montana. The husband had some ranching experience,
helping his mother raise dairy cows. In 1949, one year
before the marriage, the husband declared a net farm loss of
$11.50 on his tax return. He brought approximately five head
of cattle to the ranch at the time of the marriage. When the
parties were married, the ranch debt totalled $65,000. That
debt was assumed in 1959 by the wife's daughter and
son-in-law, Judy and Dick Kurth, when the couple was deeded
2,925 acres of the ranch. From 1959 forward, the ranch has
been operated debt-free.
In the first few years of the marriage, the husband,
among other things, assisted in the building of a tin roof on
a shed and performed occasional concrete work. The ranch was
largely fenced by contract labor and the ground which was
broken into farmland was similarly accomplished through the
efforts of hired laborers and the wife's son-in-law. The
wife claims that she was expanding ranch operations before
she married the appellant. With the exception of a strip of
abandoned railroad right-of-way, no additional real property
was purchased for ranching purposes. However, the parties
did purchase real property in Idaho, Arizona, Chouteau
County, Montana, and Glacier County, Montana. Beginning in
1967, the parties spent the winters in Arizona. From 1968 to
1972, the wife's son-in-law, Dick Kurth, and other full-time
hired men managed the affairs of the ranch. Kurth operates a
ranch of his own in Chouteau County. Kurth testified that
the husband repeatedly requested help, so much so that Kurth
oftentimes could not get his own work done. From 1972 to
1977, the wife's son, Jon Evers, and his wife managed the
ranch while the parties wintered in Arizona. Over this
period of time, Evers significantly increased his management
role at the ranch. From 1977 to the present, Evers and his
wife have operated the ranch pursuant to three separately
written contracts - a contract for the sale of livestock,
equipment, and machinery, a farm rental agreement, and a
contract for deed to a portion of the ranch property. The
son and his wife made several equipment purchases and
undertook many improvements which have contributed to the
value of the ranch.
In valuing the ranch property which is at the heart of
the dispute, the District Court considered the opinions of
both parties' appraisers, and those of Evers and Kurth. The
court noted that Kurth has been in the cattle business for 35
years and has been commended and recognized by several
livestock groups as well as the governor of Montana for his
experience and background in ranching. The court accepted
the opinion of the wife's appraiser as to the per acre value
of the cropland, grazing land, and the value of building
improvements. The court made its own determination as to the
per acre value of the mountain place grazing land located on
the ranch after considering the opinions of the husband's
appraiser, Kurth, and Evers, and further noted that neither
party's appraiser considered the detrimental effect of alkali
on the value of the ranch. The judge concluded that the
ranch's value at the time of marriage was $500,000 and
$767,400 at the time of hearing.
In the property division, the husband was awarded
property worth $520,000. The wife received the balance of
the marital estate, or property worth approximately $952,000.
We set out the pertinent part of the award:
112. After full consideration of each of
the above findings including the value of
Maybelle Watson's ranch prior to her
marriage, the appreciated value of that
ranch during the marriage and the
contributions made by Jock Watson
individually to the appreciated value of
the ranch, the Court finds that Jock
Watson is entitled to the following:
a. The parties' property in the state of
Idaho.
b. The parties' property in the state of
Arizona.
c. The parties' property in Fort Benton,
Montana.
d. The parties' 1 9 7 9 Dodge pickup truck.
e. The parties ' 1984 Chevrolet
automobile.
f. The following life insurance policies
which have an accumulated face value of
$40,000:
1. New York Life policy No. 21866466
with a face amount of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 .
2. Prudential policy No. 3 3 0 0 8 3 2 5 with a
face amount of $20,000.
3. Both National Service Life policies
with a combined face value of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 .
g. Cash in the amount of $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
h. The Donald Scott receivable in the
principal amount of $ 1 2 , 0 0 0 .
i. One-half of the barley check
currently in the possession of Maybelle
Watson which said barley check is in the
amount of $3,796, half of which is
$1,898.
j. One-half of the parties' 1 9 8 4 net
winter wheat crop proceeds after the
parties' spraying and fertilizer expenses
have been deducted pursuant to the lease
agreement with Jon and Teri Evers.
113. The Court finds that the
approximate present value of its award to
Jock Watson is $ 5 2 0 , 0 0 0 .
114. The Court finds that the balance of
the marital estate not described in
finding of fact No. 1 1 2 hereinabove
should be awarded to Maybelle Watson.
In July 1 9 8 6 , the husband filed a motion for temporary living
expenses. He requested an award of $28,000, not to be offset
against his marital property award. In his motion, the
husband acknowledged a present balance of $27,597.16 in his
two bank accounts. The court granted the motion but offset
the $28,000 award against the marital property award to the
husband.
The first issue is whether the District Court abused its
discretion in dividing the marital property. The standard of
review is found at § 40-4-202, MCA. That statute gives the
court the authority to equitably apportion marital property
in a dissolution proceeding. A district court has
far-reaching discretion in resolving property divisions and
its judgment will not be altered unless a clear abuse of
discretion is shown. Buxbaum v. Buxbaum (Mont. 1984) , 6 9 2
P.2d 411, 414, 41 St.Rep. 2243, 2246. Findings of fact will
not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. First
Nat. Mont. Bank of Missoula v. McGuiness (Mont. 1985), 705
P.2d 579, 42 St.Rep. 1288.
The husband first argues that the lower court abused its
discretion by adopting verbatim the wife's proposed findings
of fact without sufficient evidentiary grounds to do so. We
cite two cases as authority on this point.
[tlhe danger in verbatim adoption of
proposed findings from one party is that
the court does not show itself to be
exercising independent judgment...
Nonetheless we have said that our
ultimate test for the adequacy of
findings of fact is whether they are
sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent
to the issues to provide a basis for
decision and whether they are supported
by the evidence presented.
First Nat. Mont. Bank of Missoula v. McGuiness (Mont. 1985),
705 P.2d 579, 584, 4 2 St.Rep. 1288, 1294. The record should
reflect conscientious concern and participation by the
district court. Goodmundson v. Goodmundson (1982), 201 Mont.
535, 538, 655 P.2d 509, 511. We note that the lower court
went to impressive lengths in detailing the long factual
background of this case. While we continue to believe that a
trial court must file its own findings and conclusions, the
court should have guidance from the parties' attorneys. See
Tomaskie v. Tomaskie (Mont. 1981), 625 P.2d 536, 38 St.Rep.
416. We of course realize that attorneys will attempt to
portray the interests of their clients in a most favorable
light. It is therefore incumbent upon the judge in a bench
trial to gather the facts as seen from each side and discern
the most accurate or probable set of circumstances. We note
that the court made significant changes to the wife's
proposed findings, including an increase in the cash award to
the husband from $150,000 to $200,000. We conclude that the
findings and conclusions are sufficiently comprehensive,
pertinent to the issues, and supported by the evidence
presented.
The husband next argues that the lower court failed to
correctly value his interest in the ranch. We note that
neither party personally testified at trial as to the ranch's
value and therefore the court was forced to rely on the
opinions of experts and laymen. The trier of fact has the
discretion to give whatever weight he sees fit to the
testimony of an expert. In re Marriage of McCormack (Mont.
1986), 726 P.2d 319, 43 St.Rep. 1833. However, that same
trier of fact is free in its discretion to adopt the
recommendation of a party or a layman over that of an expert.
Goodmundson, 655 P.2d at 511. In valuing the ranch, the
court relied on the expert appraisers and the opinions of Mr.
Kurth and Mr. Evers, both longtime ranchers of this property.
The court made its own determination as to the per acre value
of the mountain place grazing land and the effect of alkali
on the ranch's property value. In addition, there are
several instances where the court settled on a property value
figure somewhere between the parties' proposals. We find
substantial evidence to support the valuation findings of the
trial court.
We believe it necessary to mention the fact that the
source of marital property is a major factor to be considered
by the District Court under 5 40-4-202, MCA. See In re
Marriage of Summerfelt (Mont. 1984), 688 P.2d 8, 41 St.Rep.
1775. In Summerfelt, we reversed the property distribution
because the wife brought substantially more net worth into
the marriage than did the husband. ($425,000 from the wife,
$12,000 from the husband). Here, as in Summerfelt, the wife
brought substantially more net worth into the marriage than
the husband. When the parties married, the wife was in
charge of an expanding ranching operation, while the husband
was bartending in Fort Benton, and the owner of five head of
cattle. In light of these facts a property distribution of
$520,000 for the husband and $952,000 for the wife cannot be
considered inequitable. We therefore defer to the decision
of the trial court.
The second issue is whether the District Court erred in
offsetting the $28,000 post-trial award from the husband's
property settlement. Maintenance is allowed when two
conditions exist: (1) the party seeking maintenance lacks
sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) the party is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment. In re Marriage of Korpela (Mont.
1985), 710 P.2d 1359, 42 St.Rep. 1912.
Here the District Court awarded the husband $28,000 in a
post-trial motion, despite the fact that the husband had over
$27,000 in his bank accounts. We quote the language in the
order:
2. The money so transferred by Maybelle
Watson Evers to Jock Watson pursuant to
the Order of this Court herein shall be
construed as being transferred in
accordance with this Court's findings,
conclusions and decree dated February 11,
1986, so that it is understood between
the parties and their counsel that the
money transferred by Maybelle to Jock
pursuant to the Order of this Court
herein is inclusive in and not in
addition to those monies awarded to Jock
Watson by this Court in its Decree of
Dissolution dated February 11, 1986.
We agree that an offset was in order. The parties had been
ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs and the
post-trial motion by the husband was primarily based upon the
need to pay attorney fees and transcript costs. The
maintenance award was not to alter or contradict the previous
marital property award, and the court was correct in so
stating.
Affirmed.
Justice'
We concur: