took no further action to pursue the matter, but appellant, through her
own counsel, filed a motion to compel arbitration in the district court. The
district court denied the motion on the grounds that the collective
bargaining agreement was between the City and the Association, and
therefore appellant, as an individual employee, did not have standing to
compel arbitration. This appeal followed.
Whether standing exists is a question of law subject to de novo
review. Ruiz v. City of N. Las Vegas, 127 Nev. „ 255 P.3d 216, 219
(2011). Additionally, a determination as to whether a dispute is arbitrable
involves questions of contractual construction, which this court also
reviews de novo. Clark Cnty. Public Emps. Ass'n v. Pearson, 106 Nev. 587,
590, 798 P.2d 136, 137 (1990).
On appeal, this court is asked to determine whether appellant,
as an individual employee member of the Association, has standing to
move to compel her employer to arbitrate under the collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and the Association. We agree with the
district court's determination that she does not. The collective bargaining
agreement provides that if, after the Association submits the grievance on
behalf of the employee, the city manager and the Association cannot reach
a "mutually satisfactory settlement," then "the Association shall have the
right to submit the matter to arbitration." This language indicates that
only the Association, and not its individual members, has the right to
pursue arbitration. Cf. Ruiz, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 220-21
(concluding that an individual employee member of the Association is not
a "party" to the arbitration based on the language of the collective
bargaining agreement).
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Moreover, the Association cannot assign its right to pursue
arbitration to the individual employee because doing so would materially
increase the City's obligations under the collective bargaining agreement
in situations where the Association has decided, at any point during the
grievance process, not to pursue arbitration. See id. at , 255 P.3d at
221-22 (explaining that under the traditional principles of contract law,
the union could not assign its right to challenge an arbitration decision
because doing so would increase the city's obligations or risks and the
collective bargaining agreement did not expressly provide for assignment).
To the extent that appellant attempts to distinguish Ruiz as involving
different factual circumstances and a different point in the arbitration
process, we note that other jurisdictions have rejected the proposition that
an employee may compel arbitration under circumstances similar to the
ones presented here. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co., Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1962) (concluding
that when the terms in the collective bargaining agreement do not give an
individual employee the right to compel the employer to arbitrate, that
employee has no standing to do so); Thomas v. Thompson Sch. Dist. R2-J,
749 P.2d 966, 967-68 (Colo. App. 1987) (concluding that only the union,
and not an individual teacher, has standing pursuant to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement to compel the school district to arbitrate
the grievance, even if the union initially requested arbitration); see also
Wilcoxson v. Tackett, 41 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)
(recognizing that language in a collective bargaining agreement that
limits the right to compel arbitration to the parties is not unusual). And
in responding to the City of North Las Vegas's arguments in this regard,
appellant fails to cite to any contrary authority allowing an employee to
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compel arbitration under circumstances similar to those presented here.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.'
citkA j.
Hardesty
Parraguirre C-
cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
Craig A. Hoppe, Settlement Judge
Law Office of Daniel Marks
North Las Vegas City Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
'To the extent that appellant's arguments have not been addressed,
we conclude that they lack merit. Further, to the extent that appellant
has inquired as to what alternative remedies are available to the
individual employee if the court denies standing to individual employees
to compel arbitration, this court does not issue advisory opinions. See
Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. „ 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010)
(explaining that "[t]his court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but,
rather, to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment").
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