IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
April 22, 2008 Session
BOBBY C. (CLARK) KING v. SEVIER COUNTY ELECTION
COMMISSION, ET AL.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sevier County
No. 07-5-181 Telford E. Forgety, Jr., Chancellor
No. E2007-02355-COA-R3-CV - FILED JULY 31, 2008
This case arises from an election for Gatlinburg City Commission in May 2007. Six candidates were
on the ballot; the top three finishers were elected. Bobby C. (Clark) King received 210 votes and
finished fifth, 304 votes behind the third-place finisher. Mr. King now seeks to have the election
declared void, and a new election ordered, on the basis of several alleged procedural errors that he
says render the election results invalid. After a bench trial, the court rejected Mr. King’s arguments,
declaring some of his accusations factually lacking and holding that others, even if true, were not
sufficiently serious to justify voiding the election. Mr. King appeals. We affirm.
Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
Affirmed; Case Remanded
CHARLES D. SUSANO , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, P.J.,
and SHARON G. LEE, J., joined.
David A. Stuart, Clinton, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bobby C. (Clark) King.
Robert H. Watson, Jr., and Nathan D. Rowell, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Jerry Hays,
Mike Helton and Mike Werner.
Dennis B. Francis, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Sevier County Election Commission,
Paul Bollinger, J.B. Matthews, Ava Hornung, Joe Newman and Elizabeth Pierce.
OPINION
I.
Mr. King was one of six candidates in the nonpartisan, vote-for-three election for Gatlinburg
City Commission on May 15, 2007. The three winning candidates received 639 votes, 577 votes and
514 votes, respectively. The fourth-place candidate received 257 votes. Mr. King, the fifth-place
candidate, received 210 votes. The sixth-place candidate received 183 votes. Mr. King filed suit
to contest the election. The defendants include the winning candidates, the Sevier County Election
Commission, and the commission’s members. For simplicity and ease of understanding, we will
refer to the defendants simply as “the county.”
Mr. King alleges that the election is invalid because, according to him, the pre-election
procedures violated several statutory requirements. Specifically, he claims: that Sevier County’s
non-standard voting machines were not properly approved by state elections officials; that county
officials failed to mail required notices to the political parties regarding when and where the voting
machines would be examined; that the two voting machine technicians conducting the examination,
one a Republican and one a Democrat, failed to do so “jointly,” as the Republican technician was
frequently absent due to illness; that certificates indicating the machines had been properly prepared
for the election were inadequate under the statute; and that a requirement regarding the storage of
“keys for each machine” was not followed (because the machines in question do not have
individualized keys).
As stated by the Supreme Court in 1983,
Tennessee law empowers a court to void an election on two
alternative, but closely related bases. First, “upon a sufficient
quantum of proof that fraud or illegality so permeated the conduct of
the election as to render it incurably uncertain, even though it cannot
be shown to a mathematical certainty that the result might have been
different.” Emery v. Robertson County Election Com’n, 586 S.W.2d
103, 109 (Tenn. 1979) . . . Secondly, where some ballots are found to
be illegal, the number of illegal votes cast is equal to, or exceeds, the
margin by which the certified candidate won.
Millar v. Thomas, 657 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tenn. 1983). Mr. King attempts to cast his challenge as
falling within the second category rather than the first category, apparently because he believes he
can more easily prove that the “number of illegal votes cast is equal to, or exceeds, the margin by
which the certified candidate won” than that “illegality so permeated the conduct of the election as
to render it incurably uncertain.” Mr. King argues that “every [alleged] statutory violation . . . goes
to the integrity of the entire ballot and [therefore] the votes are all illegal or invalid, thereby
exceeding all the margins.” (Emphasis added.) “With every ballot on every machine being an
illegal ballot,” he writes, “every vote is an illegal vote[.]” For reasons that we will discuss in more
detail later in this opinion, we think this argument misapprehends the distinction between the two
bases for voiding an election. In our view, Mr. King’s allegations are properly viewed as a claim
that “illegality so permeated the conduct of the election as to render it incurably uncertain.”
Pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), “review of findings of fact by the trial court in civil
actions shall be de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the
correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” As for the trial
court’s conclusions of law, the review remains de novo, but with no presumption of correctness.
Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).
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We will begin by addressing Mr. King’s allegation that the county did not receive the
required state approval for the voting machines in question. We will then proceed to consider his
other allegations.
II.
On the issue of voting machine approval, Mr. King points to the statute governing the “[u]se
of non-standard machines” and argues that county officials violated it.1 The statute reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
The county election commission, with the approval of the coordinator
of elections and the state election commission, may provide for the
use of voting machines which do not meet the requirements of this
title except under this section.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-9-110(a) (2003). As can be seen, the statute does not outline any specific
requirements for what form the requisite state “approval” must take. Accordingly, the question
before the court is simply whether the county’s use of the subject “non-standard,” electronic voting
machines was, in fact, “approv[ed]” by the state.2 The trial court held that the machines were so
approved.
At trial, Mr. King called former Sevier County election administrator Pamela Flynn to the
stand and asked her, “Do you have records showing that the [state] coordinator of elections and the
State Election Commission approved these particular machines?” Ms. Flynn replied, “Yes,” and
then presented a faxed letter from the state elections coordinator as “the original documentation that
we got.” The three-page document, printed on state Division of Elections letterhead, indicates that
it was faxed from the “ELECTIONS DIVISION” and sent to various county elections officials. The
document is unsigned. Ms. Flynn testified that she was “not sure” if the state elections coordinator
“signed the cover page,” which is not in the record. In any event, after eliciting this testimony from
Ms. Flynn and being handed the document by the commission’s attorney, Mr. King asked the trial
court to move the document into evidence as Exhibit 2.
On appeal, Mr. King argues that the document “is not certified or authenticated in any way,
and is not a self-proving or self-authenticating document that could come into evidence on its own.”
In response, the county points out that the document was offered into evidence by Mr. King, and he
raised no qualms about its admissibility; thus, he cannot now object to the document’s admissibility.
The county is correct on this point. “It has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the
trial court will not be entertained on appeal.” Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn.
1
It is undisputed that “non-standard” voting machines were used in the election, and therefore approval was
required, lest the county be in violation of of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-9-101 (2003), which lists the “specifications” for
standard voting machines.
2
This court has upheld the constitutionality of using electronic voting machines. See Mills v. Shelby County
Election Com’n, 218 S.W.3d 33, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
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1983). See also Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief
be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably
available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error”).
Mr. King responds by asserting in his reply brief that his “argument is not as to the
admissibility of Exhibit 2.” This is a strange statement, given that Mr. King’s initial brief clearly
frames the issue in terms of admissibility, including an extensive, almost three-page-long excerpt
from the Tennessee Rules of Evidence concerning “authentication as a condition precedent to
admissibility[.]” Tenn. R. Evid. 901, 902. Moreover, Mr. King’s discussion of whether the
document is “certified or authenticated in any way” can only be understood as an evidentiary
argument, since the statute providing the pertinent substantive law – the previously cited Tenn. Code
Ann. § 2-9-110(a) – requires only “the approval of the coordinator of elections and the state election
commission,” and does not indicate that this “approval” must be “certified or authenticated.” In any
event, since there is no substantive statutory requirement regarding the document’s form, and since
any evidentiary objection was waived below, Mr. King’s argument regarding “certification” and
“authentication” must fail.
Perhaps anticipating this result, Mr. King shifts his argument in his reply brief to focus more
clearly on the document’s sufficiency, as opposed to its admissibility. He asks the court to conclude
that “Exhibit 2 does not constitute sufficient evidence of approval of these non-standard machines.”
Yet Mr. King has the burden of proof backwards: as the plaintiff, he must present sufficient evidence
that the county did not get the requisite approval. This he has not done. Moreover, his argument
that the sufficiency of the evidence “can be determined as a matter of law from the face of the
exhibit” is incorrect. The exhibit is not the only relevant evidence on this point. The oral testimony
of Ms. Flynn, who produced the document in question and discussed its contents, is also relevant and
undoubtedly affected whether the trial court believed that the county received the requisite state
approval. We defer to the trial court on such matters, as it “is uniquely positioned to observe the
manner and demeanor of witnesses.” Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
For all of these reasons, it is clear that the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s
conclusion that Mr. King failed to prove any violation by Sevier County of the § 2-9-110(a)
“approval” requirement. This issue is without merit.3
3
Mr. King’s argument that we should declare the use of these machines illegal because they “do not provide
as much protection for the purity of the ballot and against election fraud” is likewise without merit. Mr. King has not
proven this allegation.
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III.
Mr. King’s four other issues all relate to highly technical procedural requirements governing
the preparation of voting machines prior to the election. Two of these issues are factually
unsupported on this record, as we will explain momentarily. As for the other two issues, we agree
with the trial court that, even if accurate, the alleged violations do not justify voiding the election.4
One of Mr. King’s allegations is that the county violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-9-105(d)
(2003), which states that “[t]he keys for each machine shall be sealed in an envelope showing the
location where the machine is to be used, the number of the machine, the number on the protective
counter, and the seal number.” No such action was taken with the electronic machines, because, by
design, they do not have keys.5 It seems to us that the sealed-keys requirement is necessarily waived
by the state’s approval of these “non-standard” machines. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-9-110(c) states that
approved non-standard voting machines “shall be as valid for all purposes in an election as if the
machines had otherwise met the requirements of this title for voting machines.” § 2-9-105(d),
requiring sealed keys, is part of “this title.” Thus, while the use of keyless machines cannot
“otherwise me[e]t the requirements” of the statute’s key-related provisions, those provisions are
waived by state approval of such non-standard machines under § 2-9-110, and the machines are
consequently “as valid” as if the waived requirements had been met. Accordingly, no statutory
violation has been proven.
Another claim by Mr. King asserts that the county violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-9-105(c),
which requires that each machine be certified after inspection, and that the certification must state
“the number of machines, whether all of the machines are set at zero (000), the number registered
on each protective counter and the number on each metal seal with which the machines are sealed.”
The “Technician’s Certification,” in the record as Exhibit 1, is self-evidently in compliance with
every aspect of this rule except for the requirement that it state “whether all of the machines are set
at zero (000).”6 The only disputed question is whether that one particular requirement was violated.
We find that it was not. The certification document states that each machine has “been properly
prepared, Cleared and Tested, Sealed, and [is] ready for [the] City of Gatlinburg Municipal
Election.” (Emphasis added.) It is evident to us that setting a machine to “zero (000)” could
sensibly be referred to as “clearing” the machine. Mr. King is quibbling over semantics. The statute
does not mandate a particular wording, but rather the certification of an action, and the wording
herein is more than adequate to certify that action. The certification document is in full compliance
with the statute.
4
This same analysis would apply to the first two issues as well, if violations had been proven.
5
There are “keys” that lock the machines into their stands, but those keys are not unique to the machine and
have nothing to do w ith whether the machine functions; i.e., they do not “lock” the machines. Thus, they have no
applicability on this point, as they are manifestly not the type of “keys” that the statute refers to.
6
Mr. King claims that the “m etal seal” provision was also violated because these machines are sealed with
plastic, not m etal. However, this argument fails for the same reason just stated with regard to the lack of keys on
approved, non-standard machines.
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That leaves two remaining alleged violations: of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-9-105(b), which
mandates that the county election commission “mail notices to the chairs of the county executive
committees of the political parties and to independent candidates stating where and when the
[voting] machines will be examined”; and of § 2-9-103(e), which states that the technicians
performing the above-described examination, who are appointed by each political party on the
commission, must perform their duties “jointly.” The latter provision was allegedly violated because
the Republican-appointed technician, who was undergoing chemotherapy, was absent approximately
75 percent of the time, while the Democrat-appointed technician was present at all times. The
former provision was allegedly violated because the county – apparently acting with the approval
of state officials – published notice in local newspapers, at its office and by phone, but not via mail
to the party chairs.
It seems clear that, on the facts in this record, a technical violation of § 2-9-105(b) occurred,
whether or not it was authorized by state officials (who, of course, do not have the authority to
override statutory requirements, unless the statute specifically grants them that authority). We are
less sure that § 2-9-103(e) was violated, since it seems at least plausible that the technicians’
mutually agreed-upon arrangement – with the ill technician stopping by “on occasion” to “check on
[the other technician] to make sure that everything was going fine” – might constitute “joint”
performance of their statutory duties. However, we will assume arguendo that this requirement, too,
was violated. The fact remains that neither of these alleged violations are nearly serious enough to
warrant voiding the election.
“Courts should be . . . reluctant to take the step of declaring an election invalid.” Forbes v.
Bell, 816 S.W.2d 716, 724 (Tenn. 1991). “The Courts appreciate the fact that honest mistakes will
be made in the conduct of elections.” Ingram v. Burnette, 316 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tenn. 1958). “The
whole object of our election laws passed by the Legislature over the years has been with the idea of
maintaining fair and honest elections.” Id. Where, as here, the alleged violations are highly
technical in nature, and there is no allegation whatsoever of deliberate or purposeful misconduct, nor
even any particularized claim of harm, we are especially loathe to disturb the expressed will of the
voters. “[N]ot every irregularity, or even a combination of irregularities, will necessitate the
invalidation of an election.” Forbes, 816 S.W.2d at 724.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not condone violations of election statutes, even “highly
technical” ones. Elections officials have a duty to follow the law, and to the extent that present
practices do not comport with statutory requirements, those practices should be changed to bring
them into compliance with the law. However, voiding an election is an extreme remedy. As the
Supreme Court stated in Forbes, courts will only void an election on the basis that it was “so
permeated with fraud [or]7 illegality that it cannot be said to fairly reflect the will of the voters” when
the alleged wrong is
7
The quoted text uses the word “and,” not “or.” However, the test upon which the Court in Forbes relied, first
announced in Emery, 586 S.W.2d at 109, uses the disjunctive form: “fraud or illegality.” Forbes initially quotes this
language correctly, but then later in the opinion, uses “and” and “or” interchangeably. For ease of understanding, we
have changed “fraud and illegality” in this quote to “fraud or illegality,” since this is the correctly stated test.
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so gross and palpable a failure of the opportunity for a free and equal
expression of the popular will, that the courts cannot permit the
election to stand. Honest mistakes or mere omissions, or irregularity
in directory matters – even though gross – if not fraudulent, will not
void an election unless they affect the result or at least render it
uncertain.
* * *
In reviewing a complaint that does no more than allege statutory
violations . . . the focus of the court’s inquiry must be kept in mind –
that is, whether the violations are so serious as to thwart the will of
the community upon a particular question.
* * *
[T]echnical non-conformity with election statutes will not necessarily
void an election, as “such strictness would lead to defeat rather than
uphold, popular election, and can not be maintained.” Invalidating an
election solely on the basis of technical omissions, much like failing
“to cross a ‘t’ or dot an ‘i’,” would effectively disenfranchise voters.
Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted; emphasis added) (quoting McCraw v. Harralson, 44 Tenn. 34
(1867)). Thus, although the plaintiff in Forbes alleged some fairly serious violations relating to the
improper use of paper ballots,8 the Supreme Court held that the “permeated with fraud or illegality”
standard was not met. In the instant case, wherein the alleged violations are more technical and less
serious, we certainly cannot conclude, in accordance with Forbes, that this election was “so
permeated with . . . illegality” as to justify voiding the election.
Mr. King, presumably recognizing that he cannot win under the law announced by Forbes,
tries to extricate himself from the reach of that precedent through a clever logical device. He
contends that he is not claiming the election was “permeated with fraud or illegality,” but rather, that
the “number of illegal votes cast is equal to, or exceeds, the margin by which the certified candidate
won.” 816 S.W.2d at 720. He argues that “the votes are all illegal or invalid, thereby exceeding all
the margins.” (Emphasis added.) Because of the alleged statutory violations, he claims that “every
8
Specifically, as later summarized in Stuart v. Anderson County Election Comm’n, 237 S.W.3d 297, 305
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), the allegations in Forbes included: “(1) the improper utilization of paper ballots in conjunction
with voting machines when the voting machines were not out of order; (2) paper ballots at one precinct being cast in
violation of the statute rendering all 153 ballots ‘illegal’; (3) allowing ballot boxes to be unlocked in violation of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 2-7-109; (4) voters using paper ballots not being provided private voting compartments as required by
relevant statutes; (5) voters using paper ballots turning in the ballots to election officials, as opposed to depositing them
into a locked box; and (6) lines of voters were allowed to accumulate at one precinct because the election officials did
not strictly enforce the ‘time limits for voters to use the voting machines thereby causing registered voters to leave the
voting place without voting after a wait of at least one and a half to two hours.’ ”
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ballot on every machine [was] an illegal ballot,” and therefore “every vote is an illegal vote[.]” Thus,
it is argued, the occurrence of statutory violations is enough, without more, to render the whole
election null and void. Although he does not say so explicitly, Mr. King’s argument necessarily
implies that the election must be voided regardless of whether “the violations are so serious as to
thwart the will of the community upon a particular question.” Id.
In support of this novel theory, Mr. King points to Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-133 (Supp. 2007),
the statute governing “Uncounted ballots,” part of the chapter dealing with “Procedure at the Polling
Place.” The statute states: “Only ballots provided in accordance with this title may be counted. The
judges shall write ‘Void’ on others and sign them.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-7-133(a). Because “this
title” refers to the entire Election Code, the alleged technical violations of § 2-9-105(b) and § 2-9-
103(e) in preparing the voting machines mean, according to Mr. King, that all ballots cast on those
machines are not “in accordance with this title” and therefore “may [not] be counted.” Mr. King also
points to language in Emery stating that
[t]he integrity of the ballot is jeopardized upon violation of any of the
procedural safeguards that the Legislature has included in the election
laws, which are obviously designed to (1) prevent undue influence or
intimidation of the free and fair expression of the will of the electors
or (2) insure that only those who meet the statutory requirements for
eligibility to vote, cast ballots. A ballot cast in violation of statutory
safeguards falling within those categories affects the freedom and
purity of the ballot to exactly the same extent as a ballot tainted with
actual fraud[.]
586 S.W.2d at 109. Since the votes herein were, according to Mr. King, “ballot[s] cast in violation
of statutory safeguards,” he argues that they should all be thrown out.
If we were to accept Mr. King’s logic, we would completely eviscerate the “permeated with
fraud or illegality” category of election contests, and render Forbes a dead letter. No candidate
would challenge a result under the exacting “permeated with . . . illegality” standard, which requires
a showing that the “violations are so serious as to thwart the will of the community,” if it were
possible to win one’s case simply by demonstrating any violation of the Election Code – and not
necessarily a “serious” one – that makes each ballot, and therefore each vote, “illegal” in a highly
technical sense. Such an outcome would be clearly averse to the reasoning of Forbes, which, as
noted earlier, holds that “[t]echnical non-conformity with election statutes will not necessarily void
an election, as ‘such strictness would lead to defeat rather than uphold, popular election.’ ” 816
S.W.2d at 721. It would also run afoul of Emery, which states that “whether there is proof of actual
fraud only, or violations of statutory safeguards only, or a combination of the two, the issue is
whether or not those acts, viewed cumulatively, compel the conclusion that the election did not
express the free and fair will of the qualified voters.” 586 S.W.2d at 109 (emphasis added).
Mr. King makes no particularized claims of wrongdoing that relate to specific ballots, as
contemplated by the “number of illegal votes cast” theory of recovery. Like the plaintiff in Forbes,
he “does not charge fraud or tampering . . . nor claim that as a result of this irregularity any voter was
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deprived of voting,” 816 S.W.2d at 723, nor that any votes were changed. Instead, he charges simply
that the whole election was flawed due to the procedural errors – precisely the sort of claim that the
“permeated with fraud or illegality” theory is designed to encompass. This is the archetypal example
of a “complaint that does no more than allege statutory violations.” Id. at 720. It is for this reason
that we treat Mr. King’s claim as an allegation that the election was “permeated with . . . illegality,”
and follow the Forbes Court’s directive to remember “the focus of the court’s inquiry[:] . . . whether
the violations are so serious as to thwart the will of the community.”9 Id. Having so focused our
inquiry, we find nothing whatsoever to indicate that these violations are serious enough to pass that
test.
Although a failure to notify party chairs of machine examination plans, and a failure by the
party-appointed machine technicians to perform their jobs “jointly,” could theoretically erode the
safeguards that are designed to protect an election’s integrity from the fraudulent influence of one
party or another, there is absolutely nothing in this record to suggest that such was either the intent
or the result in the instant case. This is particularly so given that this was a nonpartisan election,
though that fact is not dispositive. The key point is that there is simply nothing in the record to
suggest any actual harm to the integrity of the election, nor do we believe that these particular
statutory violations, on these facts, are so intrinsically harmful to the integrity of the election as to
require that it be voided.
These facts stand in stark contrast to the facts of several cases in which elections have been
voided, such as Shoaf v. Bringle, 241 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1951) (alleging, among other things,
“intimidation and dures[s]” at the polls, and a conspiracy between officials and candidate to provide
insufficient ballots in opponent’s stronger precincts); State ex rel. Davis v. Kivett, 177 S.W.2d 551
(Tenn. 1944) (alleging a conspiracy to “steal the election” through intimidation and the use of
fraudulent votes); and Hollis v. State ex rel. Vaughan, 237 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1951) (alleging,
again, a conspiracy to “steal the election,” including by the procurement of “fictitious absentee
ballots” and the printing of fraudulent ballots that omitted some candidates’ names). Such are the
sort of widespread irregularities that would justify a finding that an election was “permeated with
fraud or irregularity.” The allegations herein, even moreso that the allegations in Forbes, “pale by
comparison with the egregiousness of the conduct reflected in the cases summarized above.”
Forbes, 816 S.W.2d at 722.
One excerpt from Forbes, discussing the specific allegations in that case, is particularly
helpful in putting Mr. King’s allegations into the proper context:
The use of an unlocked ballot box, for example, would clearly
contravene provisions in T.C.A. § 2-7-109. But Forbes does not
charge fraud or tampering in this regard, nor claim that as a result of
9
Alternatively, if we were to treat M r. King’s claim as falling under the “number of illegal votes cast” theory,
as he desires, we would nevertheless hold that Forbes applies to cases under that theory with facts such as these. In
either case, the result is the same: we must adhere to the Supreme Court’s directive that, in cases that allege only
statutory violations, the election w ill not be voided unless “the violations are so serious as to thwart the will of the
community.”
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this irregularity any voter was deprived of voting. Similarly, the
complaint alleges that voters using paper ballots were not provided
with privacy, in violation of T.C.A. § 2-3-108(b)(1). That statute
does set certain standards for the casting of a paper ballot, but again,
there is no claim that as a result of the lack of “a private voting
compartment,” anyone casting a paper ballot was harassed,
intimidated, or prevented from voting. Other alleged statutory
violations appear even less weighty in terms of their effect on the
integrity of the election. These include the appearance of blank
signature lines on the poll sheets, which may have occurred because
of a voter’s inadvertence in skipping a line; the fact that voters may
have been permitted to stay in the voting machines longer than the
two minutes provided in T.C.A. § 2-7-118(a); and the failure to sign
each tally sheet, in violation of T.C.A. § 2-7-132(b)[.]
Id. at 723-24. If the “use of an unlocked ballot box” and the failure to provide voters with privacy
do not mandate the “conclusion that the election did not express the free and fair will of the qualified
voters,” Emery, 586 S.W.2d at 109, then certainly, the allegations in the instant case – which relate
only to pre-election, machine-preparation procedures, several steps removed from the casting of
actual votes – cannot be seen as doing so. The connection between these alleged procedural
violations and any hypothetically possible disruption of the popular will is extremely tenuous at best.
IV.
For the above-stated reasons, we reject all of Mr. King’s claims. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Bobby C. (Clark) King. This case is
remanded to the trial court for collection of costs assessed below, pursuant to applicable law.
_______________________________
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
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