In Re Estate of Daughrity

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
AUGUST 5, 2004 Session

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LIZZIE TOMLIN DAUGHRITY, DECEASED

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Marshall County
No. 12506 J. B. Cox, Chancellor

No. M2003-02244-COA-R3-CV - Filed November 16, 2004

This case involves a claim filed by the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare against the estate of an elderly
decedent to recover certain benefits paid to the decedent to cover nursing home expenses during her
lifetime. The executor filed an exception to the claim arguing that it was filed outside the four (4)
month limitations period found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code. The
chancery court issued an order barring the bureau’s claim on the grounds that is was untimely filed.
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and
Remanded

ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. FRANK CRAWFORD , P.J., W.S.,
and HOLLY M. KIRBY , J., joined.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter, Sue A. Sheldon, Senior Counsel, Nashville, TN,
for Appellant, Bureau of TennCare

Cecilia West Spivy, Lewisburg, TN, for Appellee, The Estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity

OPINION

Factual Background and Procedural History

On December 30, 1998, Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity (“Decedent”) enrolled in the Tennessee
TennCare program administered by the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare (“Bureau”). Beginning
January 1, 1999, the Bureau began making payments on behalf of Decedent to NHC Healthcare-
Lewisburg, a nursing home facility. Decedent died on July 30, 2002, at the age of 89 with
accumulated benefits paid on her behalf to the nursing facility up to that point in the amount of
$97,870.91.
 On September 10, 2002, Decedent’s son, Charles Richard Daughrity (“Executor”), filed a
Petition to Probate Will in the Chancery Court of Marshall County, Tennessee. On September 11,
2002, the chancellor entered an order admitting Decedent’s will to probate and appointing Executor
to oversee the administration of the estate. On March 25, 2003, the Bureau filed a claim against
Decedent’s estate, pursuant to section 71-5-116 of the Tennessee Code and applicable federal
Medicaid statutes, seeking reimbursement of the benefits correctly paid to the nursing facility on
Decedent’s behalf. On April 25, 2003, Executor filed an exception to the Bureau’s claim alleging
that the claim was not filed within the four (4) month period allowed for the filing of claims under
section 30-2-306(c) of the Tennessee Code. Executor also asserted that the Bureau received actual
notice to file a claim on September 16, 2002.

The chancellor conducted a hearing on July 2, 2003, to address the Bureau’s claim. On the
day of the hearing, the Executor filed a copy of the Actual Notice to Creditors along with an attached
certificate of service, as well as a copy of the published Notice to Creditors. The Actual Notice to
Creditors indicated that it had been mailed to the Bureau on September 14, 2002, and the certificate
of service showed that it was accepted by an employee of the Bureau on September 16, 2002. The
published Notice to Creditors indicated that it was issued on September 17, 2002. The bookkeeper
for The Lewisburg Tribune Marshall Gazette provided a Publisher’s Affidavit1 which showed that
the Notice to Creditors was published in their newspaper on September 17 and 24, 2002.

The chancellor issued an order on August 13, 2003, which contained the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law:

This matter came to be heard on the 2nd day of July, 2003
before the Honorable J.B. Cox upon the Exception to Claim filed by
the Executor of the Estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity, statements of
counsel and the record as a whole. From which the Court finds that
Actual Notice to the State of Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare was
received by the State of Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare on the 16th
day of September, 2002 and the State of Tennessee, Bureau of
TennCare filed it’s [sic] Claim on March 27th, 2003. The State’s
assertion of sovereignty is limited by its own action. The State’s
action to be bound by the one (1) year barr [sic] to claims should by
the same choice impose the conditions of T.C.A. § 30-2-310 upon the
State. For these reasons the Court finds that the claim of the State of
Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare is barred by T.C.A. § 30-2-310.

1
Section 30-2-306(d) of the Tennessee Code provides:
An affidavit of the publisher of the newspaper, in case of such publication, showing
the dates on which the notice was published, or of the personal representative, in
case of posted notices, showing the date on which the notice was first posted, shall
be prima facie evidence of the publication required by this section. The affidavit
shall be filed with the clerk and be noted by the clerk on the docket of the cause.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-306(d) (2003).

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 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the State of Tennessee, Bureau of TennCare is
enjoined from denying a release as required by law and shall issue a
release to this Estate.

The Bureau filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to section 30-2-315(b) of the
Tennessee Code,2 presenting the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in imposing the statutory four (4) month limitations period
found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code upon the Bureau’s
claim; and
II. Alternatively, if the four (4) month limitations period does apply to the Bureau’s claim,
whether this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to clarify whether
the Bureau received actual notice according to the governing law given the facial irregularity
of the notices supplied to creditors.

For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Standard of Review

In reviewing the judgment of the chancery court, we are bound by the following standard
of review:

This case was tried in the probate court without a jury. Accordingly,
the standard of review is de novo upon the record with a presumption
of correctness as to the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of
the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Cross v. City of
Memphis, 20 S.W.3d 642, 644–45 (Tenn. 2000). To the extent that
the determination of the issues rests on statutory construction, they
present questions of law. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920,
924 (Tenn.1998). Questions of law are reviewed de novo with no
presumption of correctness. Id.

Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000).

2
Section 30-2-315(b), governing the appeal of a probate court’s ruling on a disputed claim, provides:
(b) A judgment upon the findings of the court shall be entered in the court and from
the same an appeal may be perfected within thirty (30) days from the date of entry
of the judgment, to the court of appeals or the supreme court, as the case may be.
The procedure on appeal shall be governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-315(b) (2003).

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 Bureau’s Ability to File a Claim Against Decedent’s Estate

In order to properly analyze the applicability of the four (4) month limitations period found
in Title 30 of the Tennessee Code, it is necessary to discuss the process by which the Bureau is
seeking recovery of benefits paid to Decedent. The Bureau is required by both state and federal law
to seek recovery of benefits paid to Decedent under the facts presented in this case.

The Medicaid program was created in 1965, when Congress
added Title XIX to the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II), for the purpose of
providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to
reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.
Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely optional,
once a State elects to participate, it must comply with the
requirements of Title XIX.

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). A state wishing to participate in the federal Medicaid
program must establish a state plan for medical assistance which “provide[s] for the establishment
or designation of a single State agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan.”
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (2003).

Tennessee chose to participate in the federal Medicaid program when the legislature
promulgated the Tennessee Medical Assistance Act of 1968. Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-101 (2003).
Accordingly, Tennessee is required to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396a which mandates that
participating states must “comply with the provisions of section 1917 [42 USCS § 1396p] with
respect to liens, adjustments, and recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets,
and treatment of certain trusts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2003). Section 1396p provides, in
relevant part, as follows:

Liens, adjustments and recoveries, and transfer of assets.

....

(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under
a State plan.
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made,
except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State
plan in the case of the following individuals:

....

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 (B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older
when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall
seek adjustment or recovery from the individual’s estate, but only for
medical assistance consisting of —
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and
related hospital and prescription drug services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State
plan.

....

(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made
only after the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and
only at a time —
(A) when he has no surviving child who is under age 21, or (with
respect to States eligible to participate in the State program
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are
not eligible to participate in such program) is blind or disabled as
defined in section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c]; and

....

(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with
standards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall
waive the application of this subsection (other than paragraph (1)(C))
if such application would work an undue hardship as determined on
the basis of criteria established by the Secretary.

42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2003). Congress amended the Medicaid Act in 1993 to require, not just permit,
states to seek recovery of medical costs from the estates of certain deceased beneficiaries to combat
rising costs and perceived abuses. State v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 284
(4th Cir. 2002).

Section 71-5-116 of the Tennessee Medical Assistance Act governs the recovery of
“correctly-paid” TennCare benefits from the estates of deceased TennCare recipients.3 The Bureau
files claims for recovery of these benefits against estates pursuant to section 71-5-116(c), which
provides:

3
Recovery of “incorrectly-paid” benefits is governed by a separate statute which is not at issue in this case.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-117 (2003).

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 (c) There shall be no adjustment or recovery of any payment for
medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of any individual under
this part, except in the case of an individual who was fifty-five (55)
years of age or older when such individual received such medical
assistance or services, from such individual’s estate, and then only
after the death of such individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only
at a time when such individual has no surviving child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age or who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled.
(1) To facilitate and enhance compliance with this subsection (c), the
department of health shall promptly notify the bureau of TennCare,
in a format to be specified by the bureau, of the death of any
individual fifty-five (55) years of age or older. Such notification shall
include the decedent’s name, date of birth, and social security
number. It is the legislative intent of this subsection (c) that the
bureau of TennCare strive vigorously to recoup any TennCare funds
expended for a decedent after the date of death.
(2) Before any probate estate may be closed pursuant to title 30, with
respect to a decedent who, at the time of death, was enrolled in the
TennCare program, the personal representative of the estate shall file
with the clerk of the court exercising probate jurisdiction a release
from the bureau of TennCare evidencing payment of all medical
assistance benefits, premiums, or other such costs due from the estate
under law, unless waived by the bureau.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116 (2003).

Statute of Limitations Applicable to Bureau’s Claim

The Bureau correctly points out that there are two limitations periods which apply to
creditor’s claims under Tennessee’s probate law. See In re Estate of Jenkins v. Guyton, 912 S.W.2d
134, 135 (Tenn. 1995). First, section 30-2-210(b) provides as follows:

Limitations on time of filing claims.

....

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), all claims and
demands not filed by the State of Tennessee with the probate court
clerk, as required by the provisions of §§ 30-2-306 – 30-2-309, or, if
later, in which suit shall not have been brought or revived before the
end of twelve (12) months from the date of death of the decedent,
shall be forever barred. This statute of limitations shall not apply to

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 claims for state taxes. Such claims shall continue to be governed by
Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 67-1-1501.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-310(b) (2003) (emphasis added). Decedent died on July 30, 2002, and the
Bureau filed its claim with the probate court on March 27, 2003. The Bureau’s claim, therefore, was
filed well within the twelve (12) month limitations period.

Second, sections 30-2-306 and 30-2-307, which are at issue in this case, combine to establish
a four (4) month limitations period applicable to creditor’s claims. See In re Estate of Jenkins, 912
S.W.2d at 135–36. Section 30-2-306 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Notice to creditors of qualification of personal representative.

....

(c) The notice shall be substantially in the following form:
NOTICE TO CREDITORS
Estate of ____________________________(name of deceased)
Notice is hereby given that on the _____ day of
____________, 20____ letters testamentary (or of administration as
the case may be) in respect of the estate of
________________________ (name of deceased) were issued to the
undersigned by the _________________ Court of ______________
County, Tennessee. All persons, resident and nonresident, having
claims, matured and unmatured, against the estate are required to
file the same with the clerk of the above named court within four (4)
months from the date of the first publication (or of the posting, as the
case may be) of this notice, otherwise their claims will be forever
barred.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-306 (2003) (emphasis added). Section 30-2-307 provides, in relevant
part, as follows:

Claims against estate — filing.

(a)(1) All claims against the estate arising from a debt of the decedent
shall be barred unless filed within the period prescribed in the notice
published or posted in accordance with § 30-2-306(c).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307(a)(1) (2003). The Bureau concedes that it did not file its claim within
four months of September 17, 2002, the date of the first publication of the Notice to Creditors in the
local newspaper.

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 The Bureau argues, however, that the statutes establishing a four (4) month limitations period
for filing claims against the estate do not apply to a state agency acting in a sovereign governmental
capacity. The Bureau asserts that recovery of TennCare benefits in this instance is a governmental
function, and when the state is acting in such a capacity it is not barred by any statutes of limitations
unless the legislature expressly provides that a particular limitations period applies to actions brought
by the state. We agree.

The courts of this state have consistently held that, when the State of Tennessee, acting
through its various departments, files a claim in a governmental capacity, statutes of limitations do
not bar the state’s claim absent an express legislative directive to the contrary.

The common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurit regi,
which is literally translated as “time does not run against the king,”
prevents an action brought by the State from being dismissed due to
the expiration of the statutory period of limitations normally
applicable to the specific type of action. This doctrine has been
justified on the ground “that the public should not suffer because of
the negligence of its officers and agents . . .” State ex rel. Board of
University & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 274 (8th Cir.
1982). . . . This doctrine is not to be lightly regarded, as we have
repeatedly stated that statutes of limitations are looked upon with
disfavor in actions brought by the State, and will not be enforced in
the absence of clear and explicit statutory authority to do so. Dunn
v. W.F. Jameson & Sons, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tenn. 1978);
Anderson v. Security Mills, 175 Tenn. 197, 133 S.W.2d 478 (1939).

Hamilton County Bd. of Educ. v. Asbestospray Corp., 909 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tenn. 1995); see also
In re Estate of Darwin, 503 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1973); Jennings v. Davidson County, 344
S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tenn. 1961); Dossett v. Obion County, 221 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tenn. 1949);
Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, 156 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tenn. 1940); Nelson v. Loudon County,
144 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tenn. 1940); In re Estate of Lacey, No. W2002-01230-COA-R3-CV, 2003
Tenn. App. LEXIS 505, at *17–19 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2003); Milhous v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville, No. M1997-00226-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589, at *6 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 31, 2000); Knox County v. Perceptics Corp., No. 03A01-9803-CH-00089, 1998 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 656, at *9–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1998); Wood v. Cannon County, 166 S.W.2d 399,
401 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942).

Executor asserts that, in seeking a recovery of benefits from Decedent’s estate, the Bureau
is acting in a proprietary, not a governmental, function. Accordingly, Executor argues that the
Bureau is required to file a claim for correctly paid benefits within the four (4) month period set forth
in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a).

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 The statute of limitations does not run against the sovereign
or the state, or against a county, when seeking to enforce a demand
arising out of, or dependent upon, the exercise of its governmental
functions as an arm of the state. But the statute does run against a
county or municipality in respect of its claims or rights which are of
a private or corporate nature and in which only its local citizens are
interested, as distinguished from a public or governmental matter in
which all the people of the state are interested.

Wood, 166 S.W.2d at 401 (citations omitted). Executor contends that the Bureau is operating the
TennCare program as a state run insurance company accepting premiums and providing coverage
to not only those in financial need, but also to those who cannot obtain private insurance coverage
for whatever reasons.

The legislature set forth the purpose behind the Tennessee Medical Assistance Act, in
relevant part, as follows:

(a) The purpose of this part is to make possible medical assistance to
those recipients determined to be eligible under this chapter to receive
medical assistance that conforms to requirements of Title XIX of the
Social Security Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant to Title
XIX.
(b) (1) Except as may be required by federal law or regulation, it is
hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Tennessee that
participation in the TennCare program, or its successor programs, is
not an entitlement and is conditional upon, among other things,
specific appropriations for the program.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-102 (2003). As an extension of the Medicaid program, TennCare is
designed to meet the policy goal of Medicaid; providing medical treatment to those in need. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). “The authorities over the country generally, however,
are practically unanimous in holding that in providing for the poor the state is exercising a
governmental function. . . .” Jennings v. Davidson County, 344 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn. 1961).
Therefore, we find that the Bureau was carrying out a governmental function when it filed a claim
against Decedent’s estate seeking to recover benefits paid on Decedent’s behalf.

Having determined that the filing of a claim for the recovery of benefits pursuant to section
71-5-116(c) of the Tennessee Code constitutes a governmental function, we now examine whether
the four (4) month limitation period set forth in sections 30-2-306(c) and 32-3-307(a) of the
Tennessee Code applies to that claim. Upon carefully reading these statutes, it is clear that the
legislature did not expressly mention their applicability to claims filed by the State of Tennessee.

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 The supreme court addressed a similar issue as the one before this Court in State Department
of Public Welfare v. O’Brien, 292 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1956). In O’Brien, the department filed a
claim against the estate of a deceased elderly female seeking to recover benefits paid under the Old
Age Assistance Law, the precursor to the Medical Assistance Act. Id. at 733. The department filed
its claim more than nine months after the notice to creditor’s was given, well beyond the limitation
period in the statute existing at the time. Id. at 733–34. Finding that the statute of limitations for
filing claims did not apply to the state in that instance, the court stated:

Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, supra, held that the claim
of the sovereign state for taxes and assessments was exempt from that
provision of the statute barring claims against the estate of decedent
which are not filed within the time limited by that statute, (nine
months now) Section 30-513, T.C.A. One of the reasons given by the
Court was that this exemption of the sovereign existed because of
“the general rule that the sovereign is not within the limitation [of a
statute of limitation], unless expressly so provided.” This is the
common law rule.
State v. Smith, 194 Tenn. 582, 585–587, 253 S.W. 2d 758,
760, held that the claim of the State for moneys paid under the Old
Age Assistance Law, as it then existed, was a claim owed to the State
in its sovereign capacity, and that there was nothing in the Old Age
Assistance Law “which evinces any intention of the Legislature to
divest the State of any of its prerogatives, rights or remedies.”
One of such rights is to have its claims exempt from statutes
of limitations, except when it is expressly embraced within the
limitations provided by the statute. Hence, under the aforestated
ruling in State v. Smith, the claim of the sovereign against the
decedent’s estate for moneys furnished such decedent under the Old
Age Assistance Law is not barred by that provision of the
administration of estates statute barring claims which were not filed
within the time therein specified. Section 30-513, T.C.A.
Further, this Court is unable to find any distinction in quality
between the claim owed the State for payments in its sovereign
capacity from its taxes to aid indigent persons, and the claim of the
State for taxes and assessments owed it. If, therefore, the provision
in the administration of estate statute barring claims which have not
been filed within the time provided by the statute does not apply to
the claim of the sovereign for taxes owed it because of the rule stated
in Commerce Union Bank v. Gillespie, surpa, then for the same
reason, that statute does not bar the claim of the sovereign against the
estate of the decedent for payments made such decedent under and by
virtue of the Old Age Assistance Law.

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Id. at 734; see also In re Estate of Darwin, 503 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1973).

Executor directs our attention to the language in section 71-5-117 of the Tennessee Code,
governing recovery of incorrectly paid benefits, which provides that “[a]ny benefits incorrectly paid
shall be recoverable from the recipient, while living, as a debt due to the state and, upon the
recipient’s death, as a claim classified with taxes having preference under the laws of this state.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-117(a) (2003). Executor notes that section 71-5-116 of the Tennessee
Code, governing recovery of correctly paid benefits, does not classify these benefits in the same
manner. Executor, however, has overlooked the fact that section 71-5-116, the statute both parties
agree is at issue in this case, provides as follows:

Before any probate estate may be closed pursuant to title 30, with
respect to a decedent who, at the time of death, was enrolled in the
TennCare program, the personal representative of the estate shall file
with the clerk of the court exercising probate jurisdiction a release
from the bureau of TennCare evidencing payment of all medical
assistance benefits, premiums, or other such costs due from the estate
under law, unless waived by the bureau.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116(c)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). In addition, the legislative amendment
to section 30-2-310 expressly provides that “[t]his statute of limitations shall not apply to claims for
state taxes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-310(b) (2003). Similar language is conspicuously absent
from sections 30-2-306 and 30-2-307 of the Tennessee Code. Therefore, we find Executor’s
argument in this regard to be without merit.

After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find that the four (4) month limitations
period found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code is inapplicable to the
claim filed by the Bureau against Decedent’s estate. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s
ruling4 in this regard and remand with the instruction that the chancellor accept the Bureau’s claim

4
The chancellor’s order relied on section 30-2-310 to find that the Bureau’s claim was time barred. The
chancellor was apparently relying on the language in subsection (b), where the legislature expressly made the twelve (12)
month limitations period applicable to the state, to justify finding that the four month limitations period found in sections
30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) applied to the state as well. See 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 970, §1. W e find the chancellor’s
reasoning in this regard to be misguided. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the legislative
intent, with all the rules of construction being aides to that end.” Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W .2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998)
(citing Locust v. State, 912 S.W .2d 716, 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). W hen examining a statute to glean legislative
intent, we “are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the legislature in the statute.” Id.
(citing Austin v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 655 S.W .2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983)). W e also presume that the Tennessee General
Assembly was aware of the existing state of the law when it promulgated the 2000 Amendment. See Winter v. Smith,
914 S.W.2d 527, 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Wilson v. Johnson County, 879 S.W .2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1994)).
Our reading of Tennessee Code section 30-2-310, in conjunction with sections 30-2-306 and 30-2-307, reveals that the
legislature chose to make only the twelve (12) month limitations period applicable to claims filed by the state while
withholding application of the four (4) month limitations period to such claims.

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as timely filed. Since we have determined that the Bureau’s claim is not subject to the four month
limitations period, it is unnecessary for us to address the Bureau’s alternative issue.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the chancery court’s ruling and remand this case to the
chancery court with the instruction to admit the Appellant’s claim as timely filed. Costs of this
appeal are taxed against the Appellee, the estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity, for which execution
may issue if necessary.

___________________________________
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

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