Andrews v. Com.

Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and
Mims, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.

JOSHUA WAYNE ANDREWS

v. Record Nos. 100374 and 100375 OPINION BY
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
September 16, 2010
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Lon E. Farris, Judge 1

In this appeal, we review the four capital murder

convictions and death sentences imposed upon Joshua Wayne

Andrews for the murders of Romanno Avellino Head and Robert

Irvin Morrison. Although we will affirm Andrews’ convictions,

because of non-harmless errors that occurred during the

penalty-determination phase of the trial, we will vacate the

death sentences and remand the case for a new penalty-

determination proceeding. 2

1
As explained herein, Judge Rossie D. Alston, Jr.
presided at the trial of this case prior to his election as a
Judge of the Court of Appeals of Virginia. Judge Farris
presided over the post-verdict proceedings, including the
review of the jury’s verdict imposing the death sentences and
the entry of the sentencing order confirming that verdict.
2
Record number 100375 is the appeal of Andrews’ 16 felony
convictions for malicious wounding, abduction, and various
firearms charges related to these crimes and to the capital
murders. On February 26, 2010, we entered an order certifying
the appeal of these non-capital offenses from the Court of
Appeals and consolidated that appeal with the mandatory review
of the capital murder convictions and death sentences under
record number 100374. On brief, Andrews does not expressly
 I. BACKGROUND

Under familiar principles of appellate review, we will

state the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth. Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 84, 472

S.E.2d 263, 265 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997).

On the evening of January 2, 2002, Andrews and Jamel Crawford

were at the apartment of Lavada Tucker in Alexandria. Andrews

told Crawford that he wanted to go to Head’s apartment in

Prince William County to buy marijuana. Having no money,

Andrews and Crawford devised a plan to rob Head instead.

Andrews and Crawford asked Tucker to telephone Head at his

apartment in order to determine how many people were present

and whether he had marijuana there.

As Crawford was known to Head, the plan called for

Andrews initially to enter Head’s apartment alone. Once the

occupants were in a secure area, Andrews was to signal

Crawford, who then would join him inside to search for money

seek to have his non-capital convictions overturned, and none
of his assignments of error presents a direct challenge to the
merits of the non-capital convictions. Since the errors that
occurred during the penalty-determination phase of the trial
affected only the sentences for the capital murder
convictions, the remand will likewise be limited to those
convictions. Accordingly, Andrews’ convictions and sentences
for the non-capital offenses will be affirmed. See, e.g.,

2
and drugs. Andrews was armed with a .25 caliber pistol and

asked Crawford for his pistol, which Crawford testified was a

.22 caliber. Andrews cut “X’s on the bullets,” indicating

that this would “break the bullets up” on impact to make them

more lethal. Andrews had both pistols when he and Crawford

left for Head’s apartment.

Morrison, who shared the apartment with Head, and their

mutual friend Rutherford Berry were also at Head’s apartment

that evening. According to Berry, Head received a telephone

call from a woman, presumably Tucker, and told Berry that the

woman was coming to the apartment. Sometime later, Morrison,

who was in the living room at the front of the apartment with

Berry, responded to a knock at the door. He was confronted by

Andrews, who displayed one of the pistols and “slid in” the

apartment through the open door.

Andrews demanded to know whether anyone else was in the

apartment. Morrison and Berry told Andrews that no one else

was present, and Andrews ordered the two men to go down a

hallway toward the back of the apartment. As they did so,

Head came out of one of the bedrooms. Andrews ordered all

Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 353 n.1, 519 S.E.2d
602, 603 n.1 (1999).

3
three men to go into the bathroom. He then demanded money and

drugs.

Andrews ordered the three men to remove their clothes and

to get into the bathtub. He threw the clothing into the

hallway and had a whispered conversation with Crawford, who

had entered the apartment. Andrews then ordered the men to

“get down.” When Berry protested, Andrews shot Berry, who

lost consciousness. Crawford, who had moved toward the back

of the apartment to search for money and drugs, fled the

apartment when he heard multiple gunshots coming from the

bathroom. Andrews followed him, carrying a scale, a bag of

marijuana, jewelry, and some clothing.

When Berry regained consciousness a short time later, he

found that Head and Morrison had been shot multiple times and

had fallen on top of him in the bathtub. After extricating

himself from the bathtub, Berry was able to call 911. During

the 911 call, Berry told the operator that “[a] couple of

black males” had shot him. Police arrived while Berry was

still speaking to the 911 operator. Rescue personnel also

4
arrived on the scene and transported all three victims to area

hospitals. 3

After leaving Head’s apartment, Andrews and Crawford

drove to a motel in Stafford County. On the way, Crawford

asked Andrews why he shot the victims. Andrews told Crawford

that “somebody in the bathroom didn’t [comply] with what he

said.” Andrews later explained to Crawford that Andrews shot

Berry when he refused to lean down in the bathtub beneath the

other two men because “[h]e thought it was kind of homo.”

Andrews also said that he should have brought a sword because

“it would have made less noise.”

At the motel, the two men each rented a room. Although

Andrews paid for his own room, he told the desk clerk to

register both rooms in Crawford’s name. Once in the room,

Andrews burned IDs from Berry’s wallet, which had been among

the items taken from Head’s apartment.

On January 4, 2002, Andrews robbed Gary Kennedy at a

convenience store in Stafford County. Kennedy was shot during

3
At trial, Berry testified that when he regained
consciousness, Morrison was still “breathing and gurgling from
blood,” but Head “just wasn’t there.” However, the medical
examiner’s report indicates that Head was still alive and
receiving CPR upon his arrival at Potomac Hospital where “he
expired in the E[mergency ]R[oom].” Morrison was taken to
Fairfax Hospital where he was pronounced dead.

5
the robbery, but survived. On January 7, 2002, Andrews and

Crawford went to a pawnshop and sold several pieces of

jewelry, including a pendant that was subsequently identified

as belonging to Morrison.

Although the record does not provide details of the

pair’s movement after visiting the pawnshop, sometime later on

January 7, 2002 or early on January 8, 2002, Andrews and

Crawford traveled to New York City. In New York, Andrews and

Crawford were involved in two more shootings. They ultimately

were arrested following a traffic stop when New York police

discovered that they were wanted by the police in Virginia.

Andrews subsequently was convicted in New York of two counts

of attempted second degree murder arising from the shootings

there.

The record does not disclose how police came to focus

their inquiries on Andrews. However, in the early afternoon

of January 8, 2002, Detective Samuel E. Walker of the Prince

William County Police Department swore out warrants of arrest

before a magistrate charging Andrews with the murders of Head

and Morrison and other felonies related to the January 2, 2002

incident. At some point during that day, pursuant to a

warrant, police conducted a search at the home of Andrews’

mother, Imani Taymullah, where Andrews lived. Taymullah and

her husband told police that a .25 caliber Titan automatic

6
pistol was missing or had been stolen from their home. Police

obtained the serial number for the weapon and subsequently had

that information entered into the National Crime Information

Center (NCIC) database. 4 Taymullah also told the police that

Andrews had told her about the murders, describing the crime

in graphic detail, though in doing so Andrews did not

expressly admit to being the shooter.

Upon learning that Andrews had been arrested in New York

City, Walker and another Prince William County police

detective traveled there and interviewed Andrews about the

January 2, 2002 murders as well as the murder of Clayton

Kendall Breeding, who had been shot and killed in Prince

William County on December 13, 2001. Ultimately, statements

made by Andrews during these interrogations were suppressed by

the circuit court.

Walker was subsequently notified that, following an

anonymous tip, New York police had recovered two .25 caliber

weapons, one of which matched the information entered into the

NCIC database. Although Virginia authorities repeatedly

4
The NCIC database is a computerized index of criminal
justice information maintained by the Criminal Justice
Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The NCIC database, among other things,
consists of a file on stolen or missing weapons.

7
advised New York authorities that these weapons were

potentially related to the three Virginia homicides for which

Andrews was the principal suspect and were assured that the

evidence would be preserved, in August 2005 New York

authorities advised Walker that the guns had been destroyed.

The Commonwealth did not seek to indict Andrews until he

had been returned in late March 2006 to Virginia from New

York, following his convictions for the attempted murders

committed there. On April 3, 2006, the Prince William County

grand jury returned indictments against Andrews for three

counts of capital murder and various associated felonies

arising from the January 2, 2002 incident at Head’s apartment.

Two of the capital murder indictments charged Andrews with the

murders of Head and Morrison respectively during the

commission of robbery or attempted robbery, Code § 18.2-31(4),

while the third charged Andrews with the capital murder of

Head as part of the same act or transaction in which he

murdered Morrison. Code § 18.2-31(7).

In addition to the indictments for the crimes committed

on January 2, 2002 at Head’s apartment, Andrews also was

indicted for the capital murder of Breeding and associated

felonies arising from that crime. The principal evidence

linking Andrews to Breeding’s murder was the result of

forensic testing of the bullets recovered during Breeding’s

8
autopsy, which established that they matched bullets recovered

from the victims of the January 2, 2002 crimes. The

Commonwealth’s theory supporting the capital murder indictment

was that Andrews killed Breeding during a robbery or attempted

robbery that possibly was drug-related. Code § 18.2-31(4).

The circuit court ultimately struck the Commonwealth’s

evidence as to the charge of robbery of Breeding, and the

Commonwealth conceded that absent proof of the predicate

gradation offense, Andrews could at most be guilty of the

first degree murder of Breeding. However, the jury

subsequently acquitted Andrews of Breeding’s murder.

Andrews also was indicted for capital murder in violation

of Code § 18.2-31(8). The indictment for this charge stated

that Andrews “did feloniously, willfully, deliberately and

premeditatedly kill and murder more than one person within a

three-year period, to wit: Clayton Breeding, Romann[o] Head,

and Robert I. Morrison.”

A jury trial on all these charges commenced on Friday,

July 13, 2007. As relevant to the issues raised in this

appeal, the incidents of that trial, the circuit court’s

actions on certain preliminary matters that preceded it, and

the post-verdict motions and sentencing will be detailed in

the discussion of those issues below. Thus, at this juncture,

we need recount only a minimal outline of the proceedings in

9
order to place the discussion that follows in the proper

context.

Following selection of the jury, the Commonwealth began

presentation of its guilt-determination phase evidence on July

17, 2007. Evidence in accord with the above-recited facts was

received from several police and crime scene investigation

officers and from Berry and Crawford. The Commonwealth also

called other witnesses, including the owner and an employee of

the pawnshop where Andrews pawned jewelry five days after the

January 2, 2002 murders, and Morrison’s father, who identified

his son’s pendant that had been among the items pawned.

Autopsies performed on Head and Morrison showed that each

had been shot four times. Head had been shot twice in the

head and twice in the back. Both bullets from the gunshots to

the back penetrated the right lung. Morrison was shot three

times in the head and once in the chest. Dr. Francis Patricia

Field, the assistant chief medical examiner for the Northern

Virginia District Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that

both of the head wounds suffered by Head necessarily would

have been fatal, while the wounds to the back “would not have

been . . . immediately fatal,” but would have resulted in

death without medical intervention. Dr. Field further

testified that two of Morrison’s head wounds were necessarily

10
fatal, while the other head wound and the back wound were

potentially fatal.

Gary Arntsen, a ballistic forensic scientist employed by

the Commonwealth, testified concerning ballistic evidence

derived from the bullets recovered during the autopsies of

Head and Morrison and from Berry during surgery. Eight of the

nine bullets recovered were fired from the same weapon, which

Arntsen was able to positively identify as a .25 caliber Titan

automatic pistol. The ninth, one of the bullets recovered

during Head’s autopsy, was fired from a .25 caliber Astra

automatic pistol. Arntsen further testified that he examined

eleven shell casings recovered by police at Head’s apartment.

All were for .25 caliber weapons. Eight of the shell casings

had unique markings that “were consistent with having been

fired from the Titan” though Arntsen conceded that he could

not state with absolute certainty that the casings and the

bullets were from the same weapon.

Police also recovered an unfired .25 caliber cartridge

from Andrews’ mother’s home during the execution of the search

warrant on January 8, 2002. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth

and Andrews’ counsel had stipulated to the admissibility of

certain exhibits including this cartridge. When the

Commonwealth sought to introduce the cartridge at trial,

Andrews’ counsel objected that the stipulation had been only

11
to the chain of custody for the exhibits, not to the

foundation for their admissibility. The Commonwealth

indicated that because of the stipulation, the Commonwealth

had excused the officer who had recovered the cartridge during

the search. The circuit court asked Andrews’ counsel, “Is

that going to be a problem?” Andrews’ counsel responded, “I

guess not, as long as I can check my notes on the

stipulations,” and then stated that the admission of the

cartridge was “[w]ithout objection.” Arntsen subsequently

testified “with a full degree of scientific certainty” that

this cartridge “had been cycled through . . . the same

firearm” as the eight shell casings recovered from Head’s

apartment that were identified as having been fired from a .25

caliber Titan automatic pistol.

On the third day of testimony, the Commonwealth presented

two fact witnesses in an attempt to establish that Andrews

could have robbed and murdered Breeding; however, no direct

evidence of Andrews’ involvement in those crimes was

presented. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence,

Andrews moved to strike the evidence as to all the charges

against him. As indicated above, the circuit court sustained

the motion to strike with respect to the indictment for the

robbery of Breeding, as well as for a use of a firearm charge

associated with the robbery offense. With the Commonwealth’s

12
concurrence, the court reduced the capital murder charge for

the killing of Breeding in the course of a robbery or

attempted robbery to first-degree murder, as the predicate

gradation offense had not been proven.

Andrews elected not to introduce any evidence in the

guilt-determination phase of his trial, except to have the

court receive an exhibit. After Andrews’ renewed motions to

strike were denied, the case was submitted to the jury.

Following two days of deliberations, the jury returned

verdicts convicting Andrews of all the offenses arising from

the events of January 2, 2002 and of capital murder of more

than one person in a three-year period. However, as indicated

above, the jury acquitted Andrews of the murder of Breeding.

Despite that acquittal, Andrews did not expressly object at

this juncture to his conviction for capital murder under Code

§ 18.2-31(8), nor did the Commonwealth seek to amend the

indictment for that crime to delete the reference to Breeding

as one of the persons murdered within the three-year period.

The presentation of evidence in the penalty-determination

phase of the trial commenced on Wednesday, July 25, 2007. The

Commonwealth presented all its witnesses on that day; however,

because Andrews’ witnesses would not be available until the

following Monday, the circuit court recessed the trial until

that day. During the recess, one of the jurors, Karen

13
Gahagen, returned to work where she was questioned about the

ongoing trial by her employer and was asked by a co-worker,

referring to Andrews, “why don’t you just fry him?”

Andrews concluded the presentation of his penalty-

determination phase evidence on August 1, 2007 and the case

was submitted to the jury. On August 3, 2007, the jury

recommended that Andrews receive a sentence of death for each

of the four capital murder convictions, finding in each

instance that Andrews posed a future danger to society and

that the murders had been outrageously or wantonly vile.

Following the return of the jury’s verdicts, the circuit

court entered an order for the preparation of a pre-sentence

report. While Andrews was awaiting sentencing, the defense

became aware of the ex parte communications concerning the

trial between Gahagen and her employer and the co-worker. On

October 29, 2008, Andrews made a motion to set aside the

verdicts and for a new trial on various grounds including a

claim of juror misconduct (hereinafter, the “first new trial

motion”).

Also on October 29, 2008, Andrews filed a motion to set

aside one of his convictions for capital murder and the death

sentence imposed by the jury, contending that because he had

been acquitted of Breeding’s murder, he could not be guilty of

a violation of Code § 18.2-31(8) based solely on the murders

14
of Head and Morrison. This was so, he contended, because

multiple homicides that occur as part of the same act or

transaction are subject to being charged as capital murder

under Code § 18.2-31(7), for which he had also been convicted.

Thus, Andrews maintained that in the absence of proof that he

had committed some other, unrelated murder within three years,

a conviction under Code § 18.2-31(8) would violate the double

jeopardy prohibition of multiple punishments. 5

At a hearing held December 8, 2008, the circuit court

heard argument on both the first new trial motion and the

motion to vacate the Code § 18.2-31(8) conviction. During

this hearing, the court disposed of most of the claims made in

the first new trial motion, but deferred ruling on the juror

misconduct issue. With respect to the double jeopardy claim,

the Commonwealth contended that the court did not need to

vacate the conviction under Code § 18.2-31(8), but could

instead impose a sentence of death “in the disjunctive” for

the convictions under Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and -31(8). Noting

5
Andrews also raised a double jeopardy argument in the
first new trial motion. The thrust of that argument was that
the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that it could
impose four death sentences and sought, in concurrence with
the other issues raised in the motion, to obtain either a new
trial or a new penalty-determination phase as to all his
convictions.

15
that the court had not yet determined whether to impose any

sentence of death, the trial judge stated that “[t]he court

holds that should the court make the determination the death

penalty is appropriate in this case, let the sentencing order

reflect that sanctions imposed under the jury’s verdict

addressing allegations under [Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and -31(8)]

shall be in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive.” 6

However, the court did not subsequently memorialize this

ruling in any order or otherwise take any formal action on the

motion to set aside the Code § 18.2-31(8) conviction.

On January 9, 2009, the circuit court conducted a hearing

to receive testimony from Gahagen concerning the ex parte

communications with her employer and a co-worker during the

recess of the penalty-determination phase of the trial. At

the conclusion of this hearing, the court determined that the

ex parte communications had not influenced Gahagen’s decision

to impose the death sentences on Andrews. On January 20,

6
The colloquy among the parties and the court and the
court’s ruling were limited to what result would obtain if the
court determined to imposed the death sentence for each
offense. The court did not indicate that it would impose a
life sentence “in the disjunctive” for each offense if it
determined that the jury’s sentence should be commuted.

16
2009, the court entered an order denying the first new trial

motion.

On February 11, 2009, the General Assembly elected Judge

Rossie D. Alston, Jr., the circuit court judge who had

presided at Andrews’ trial, to the Court of Appeals of

Virginia for a term beginning March 1, 2009. H. Res. 50, Va.

Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 2009). Judge Lon E. Farris assumed

responsibility for the case following Judge Alston’s

investiture as a Judge of the Court of Appeals. On March 12,

2009 and May 18, 2009, Judge Farris presided at hearings on

procedural matters in the case and subsequently entered orders

memorializing the rulings from those hearings without

objection from Andrews.

On October 19, 2009, the circuit court conducted a

sentencing hearing at which it received the pre-sentence

report and heard testimony from witnesses for the Commonwealth

and Andrews. During this hearing, Andrews raised for the

first time the issue of whether Judge Farris could impose the

death sentences when he had not presided at trial. Citing

Code § 19.2-154, Andrews contended in the alternative that

either Judge Alston’s elevation to the Court of Appeals would

not qualify as a disability barring him from continuing to

preside over the case or that if he was so barred, given the

unique circumstances of a jury trial in a capital murder case

17
in which the court must determine whether to commute the

jury’s death sentence, the successor judge could not

adequately familiarize himself with the record to make such

determination.

At the conclusion of the hearing, after the circuit court

had announced its intention to impose all four death

sentences, the defense raised the issue of Judge Alston’s

prior ruling from the bench that a single death sentence would

be imposed “in the disjunctive” for the convictions under Code

§§ 18.2-31(7) and -31(8). Stating that Andrews’ counsel

should “have raised that at the beginning, not after I imposed

the sentence,” the court denied Andrews’ motion to set aside

one of the death sentences.

On October 26, 2009, the circuit court entered a final

order imposing the four death sentences and terms of

incarceration for the non-capital crimes in accord with the

jury’s verdicts. In that order, the court also overruled

Andrews’ objection to being sentenced by a judge who had not

presided over his trial. Andrews filed written objections to

the order and a second new trial motion on October 28, 2009.

In the second new trial motion, Andrews reasserted that the

court should vacate one of the death sentences, raised various

objections to the conduct of the sentencing hearing, and

sought a new trial based upon the “cumulative prejudicial

18
effect” of various alleged errors previously raised by

Andrews. By an order entered November 2, 2009, the court

denied the second new trial motion.

II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

On March 8, 2010, pursuant to Rule 5:22(b) 7 Andrews filed

a notice of the “assignments of error upon which he intends to

rely for the reversal of the conviction[s] or review of the

sentence[s] of death” in this appeal. In that notice, Andrews

lists 126 assignments of error; however only 45 of these

assignments of error were set out in the opening brief. 8 In

the opening brief, Andrews states twelve questions presented,

indicating that most relate to several different assignments

of error. These questions presented are:

1. Do the capital murder convictions of Andrews for
both “multiple murder” under Va. Code § 18.2-31.7
[sic] and “serial murder” under Va. Code § 18.2-31.8
[sic] for the same underlying offenses violate the
prohibition against double jeopardy?

7
By order dated April 30, 2010, Rule 5:22 was amended
effective July 1, 2010. The subject matter of former Rule
5:22(b) is currently addressed in Rule 5:22(c).
8
The final two assignments of error listed in the opening
brief, numbers 125 and 126, corresponded to the elements of
the mandatory statutory review of Andrews’ death sentences
prescribed by Code § 17.1-313(C). However, Andrews’ counsel
failed to address the mandatory review issues in the opening
brief. By an order dated April 30, 2010, we directed Andrews’
counsel to address those issues in the reply brief.

19
2. Did the trial court err in denying Andrews’
motion for a new trial after a member of his jury
was subjected to prejudicial extraneous influence by
her employer?

3. Did the trial court err in denying Andrews’
request for an instruction informing the jury and
requiring the prosecution to prove that he was a
principal in the first degree for the murders of
Romanno Head and Robert Morrison?

4. Did the introduction of an unadjudicated bad act
committed by Andrews against his codefendant at the
guilt-innocence phase of trial, to demonstrate
consciousness of guilt, render the proceeding
fundamentally unfair?

5. Did the trial court err in allowing the
Commonwealth to introduce untested and unreliable
ballistics evidence regarding guns that the defense
had no opportunity to examine because they were
destroyed?

6. Did the introduction of unsworn hearsay testimony
regarding the destroyed guns violate Andrews’ right
of confrontation?

7. Did the introduction of victim impact testimony
at the guilt-innocence phase and victim impact
testimony regarding extraneous crimes at the
sentencing phase of trial violate due process?

8. Did the court’s exclusion of relevant mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase of trial
violate Andrews’ right to an individualized
sentencing determination?

9. Did the trial court err in allowing the
Commonwealth to violate the discovery order by
providing late notice of unadjudicated criminal
conduct and by denying a continuance?

10. Did the Commonwealth’s references to facts not
in evidence, references to Andrews as a “killing
machine,” and other improper arguments materially
prejudice Andrews and deny him a fair trial?

20
 11. Did the trial court err by removing a life-
scrupled juror for cause on the basis that she would
not impose a death sentence unless she was certain
of the defendant’s guilt?

12. Must a capital defendant be sentenced by the
trial judge who presided over the evidence-taking
proceedings?

Several of the 45 assignments of error actually set out

in the opening brief that are designated as being referenced

in one or more of the questions presented either are not

addressed within the argument or are the subject of inadequate

argument amounting to little more than an assertion that the

circuit court’s action was contrary to the law or the

evidence. Lack of an adequate argument on brief in support of

an assignment of error constitutes a waiver of that issue.

Rule 5:17(c)(4); Rule 5:27; 9 Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va.

307, 318, 541 S.E.2d 872, 880, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043

(2001). Within our discussion of each of the questions

9
Effective July 1, 2010, Rule 5:27 was amended to
provide, without referring to the requirements of Rule 5:17,
that “[t]he opening brief . . . must contain . . . [t]he
standard of review, the argument, and the authorities relating
to each assignment of error,” and that “[w]ith respect to each
assignment of error, the standard of review and the argument –
including principles of law and the authorities – shall be
stated in one place and not scattered through the brief.”
Rule 5:27(d). Subsequent references in this opinion to rules
set out in Part Five of the Rules of Court refer to the
versions of those rules in effect prior to July 1, 2010 during
the proceedings in this case.

21
presented, we will indicate which assignments of error thus

have been waived. Additionally, as indicated below, we need

not address certain issues that have been wholly abandoned or

that are mooted by the necessity to remand the case for a new

penalty-determination proceeding. The remaining relevant

questions presented will be addressed in two groups, first

those pertaining to the guilt-determination phase of the trial

followed by those pertaining to the penalty-determination

phase, the issues within each group being addressed in the

order they arose in that phase of the trial.

III. ABANDONED AND MOOTED ISSUES

A. Abandoned Issues

Because Andrews’ counsel failed to include in his opening

brief 81 of the assignments of error originally designated in

the Rule 5:22(b) notice, we must conclude that counsel made an

affirmative, strategic decision to abandon those issues.

Additionally, Andrews listed in his opening brief the

assignment of error designated as number 122. It does not

appear that the subject of this assignment of error, which

related to a limitation of witnesses Andrews was permitted to

present at the sentencing hearing, is addressed within the

opening brief. Accordingly, we hold that Andrews has waived

the right to assert the issues raised in these 82 assignments

of error as a basis for reversing his convictions and death

22
sentences. 10 Rule 5:27(c)(4); Rule 5:27; Porter v.

Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 225, 661 S.E.2d 415, 424 (2008),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1999 (2009); Teleguz v.

Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 471, 643 S.E.2d 708, 717 (2007),

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1191 (2008); Elliott v. Commonwealth,

267 Va. 396, 422, 593 S.E.2d 270, 286 (2004), cert. denied,

543 U.S. 1081 (2005).

B. Issues Mooted by Remand

As indicated at the outset of this opinion and as will be

discussed below, non-harmless errors arising during the

penalty-determination phase of Andrews’ trial require us to

vacate the sentences of death imposed by the jury and remand

the case to the circuit court for a new penalty-determination

proceeding. As a result, issues raised by several of the

twelve questions presented are moot, as there is no

possibility that the specific errors assigned under those

questions presented will recur on remand. See Powell v.

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 531, 552 S.E.2d 344, 355 (2001).

10
The assignments of error abandoned are numbers 1, 3, 4,
5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 22, 33, 34, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 46, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61,
62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 81, 82, 83,
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99,
100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 114, 120, 122, 123, and 124.

23
Thus, we need not address the issue raised by question

presented number two whether the Commonwealth failed to rebut

the presumption of prejudice arising from juror Gahagan’s

extraneous contacts with her employer and co-worker during the

recess in the penalty-determination phase of the trial; the

issue raised by question presented number nine whether the

circuit court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to present

evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct to be used during

the penalty-determination phase of the trial to establish that

Andrews presented a future danger to society for which notice

had been given after the deadline set in the court’s discovery

order and denying Andrews’ motion for a continuance on that

ground; 11 and the issue raised by question presented number

11
Within the notice of intent to use unadjudicated
criminal conduct that Andrews contends was not timely, the
Commonwealth referenced an incident in which Andrews attacked
Crawford while the two were incarcerated together in the
Prince William County Adult Detention Center. Andrews has
assigned error separately to the introduction of testimony
concerning this incident during the guilt-determination phase
of the trial. Because, in addressing that issue, we conclude
that the evidence was admissible to show Andrews’
consciousness of guilt, and Andrews clearly would have known
of this incident, any error arising from the inclusion of this
incident within the alleged untimely notice of unadjudicated
criminal conduct to be used during the penalty-determination
phase of the trial would be harmless as to its use for a
different, permissible purpose during the guilt-determination
phase.

24
twelve whether Andrews was prejudiced by having a different

judge, who had not presided over the trial, conduct the post-

trial review of the jury’s verdict and determining whether to

impose or commute the jury’s sentences of death.

IV. GUILT-DETERMINATION PHASE ISSUES

A. Striking for Cause of Juror Agnew

As stated in the opening brief, the assignment of error

that Andrews addresses under his eleventh question presented

is:

69. The trial court erred in striking Juror Agnew
for cause.

During voir dire, the circuit court asked the potential jurors,

“If you’re selected to be on the jury and you find Mr. Andrews

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, can you pledge that you can

consider the full range of penalties based upon the evidence

and the law that is presented to you?” (Emphasis added.) One

member of the venire, Pamela Agnew, responded, “I guess not.”

The court called Agnew to the bench and conferred with her

along with counsel for Andrews and the Commonwealth.

Agnew explained she could not impose a sentence of death

unless Andrews’ guilt had been established “beyond the shadow

of a doubt. I would have to be a hundred percent sure. I

would have to be a hundred percent sure in order to [impose]

the death penalty.” The court explained that “the standard of

25
proof in a criminal case is not beyond a shadow of a doubt or

beyond all doubt, it’s beyond a reasonable doubt.” In response

to questions from the court and Andrews’ counsel, Agnew stated

that she could convict Andrews of capital murder if the

evidence proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that

she would be able to “consider” the entire range of sentencing

available for that crime.

In response to questions from the Commonwealth, however,

Agnew again stated that to vote to impose the death penalty “I

would need to be one hundred percent sure. . . . Could I

consider it? Yes. Could I apply it? At the level of one

hundred percent certainty.” She further stated that she felt

there was a difference between being able to consider voting to

impose the death sentence and actually doing so, indicating

that she had “agonized” over the issue since the venire had

been called. While agreeing that the circuit court had

“authority” in such cases, and though she did not believe that

her moral and religious beliefs would impair her ability to

serve on the jury, Agnew also indicated that her conscience

would be guided by a “higher authority.”

Andrews opposed the Commonwealth’s motion to strike Agnew

from the venire for cause, contending that she was qualified to

serve on the jury because she could vote to convict based on

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and could consider imposing

26
the death sentence. This was so, Andrews’ counsel contended,

because “[o]ne who votes for the death penalty can vote for the

death penalty for whatever reason they want, [t]he question is

can they consider it.” The circuit court granted the

Commonwealth’s motion to strike Agnew from the venire.

In asserting that the circuit court erred in striking

Agnew from the venire, Andrews contends that while a juror must

be able to follow the court’s instruction to consider the

question of guilt and innocence under the standard of beyond a

reasonable doubt, and also apply that standard to the

determination of aggravating factors, “Virginia law sets no

[reasonable doubt] standard for the selection of the death

penalty” by a juror. Rather, Andrews contends that the law

requires the juror to consider between a sentence of life or

death, imposing the former if “the death penalty is not

justified.” Andrews contends that Agnew’s voir dire

demonstrates that she would have been able to impose the death

penalty under this standard.

The Commonwealth responds that Andrews fails to consider

Agnew’s responses to the voir dire in their entirety. When

taken in aggregate, the Commonwealth contends that her

responses support the circuit court’s exercise of discretion in

striking Agnew from the venire for cause, as there was a

reasonable probability that she would be unable to follow the

27
court’s directions concerning the appropriate standard of law

to be applied in considering the sentence to impose on Andrews

if he were found guilty of capital murder.

As an appellate court, we give deference to a circuit

court’s ruling on the issue of whether to retain or excuse a

prospective juror for cause and that ruling will not be

disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest error

amounting to an abuse of discretion. Vinson v. Commonwealth,

258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530

U.S. 1218 (2000). As with any matter submitted to the court’s

discretion based on representations made under examination in

open court, it is the trial judge who sees and hears the

prospective juror and, thus, is in the best position to weigh

her “inflections, tone, and tenor of the dialogue, and [her]

general demeanor.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464-65,

248 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979);

accord LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 584, 304 S.E.2d

644, 655 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).

The standard to be applied by the circuit court in

determining whether to retain a member of the venire on the

jury panel is whether her answers during voir dire examination

indicate to the court something that “would prevent or

substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror

in accordance with [the court’s] instructions and [the juror’s]

28
oath.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); accord Turner

v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 549, 364 S.E.2d 483, 486, cert.

denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). When this Court reviews a

circuit court’s ruling on the seating of a juror, we consider

the voir dire of that juror as a whole, and do not consider the

juror’s isolated statements. Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va.

362, 401, 626 S.E.2d 383, 408, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 960

(2006).

Applying these standards, we cannot say that the circuit

court abused its discretion in sustaining the Commonwealth’s

motion to strike Agnew from the venire for cause. Agnew’s voir

dire demonstrates that she would have required proof of

Andrews’ guilt “beyond the shadow of a doubt. . . . [a]t a

level of one hundred percent certainty” before she would be

able to consider imposing a sentence of death. In other words,

although Agnew stated that she would be able to consider the

full range of sentencing available for the crime of capital

murder, she was equally clear that she would not be able to

consider imposing a sentence of death unless convinced the

Commonwealth had already established Andrews’ guilt in the

absence of all doubt. Thus, in order for Agnew to actually

consider whether a sentence of death was “justified,” she would

have required the Commonwealth to first satisfy a burden of

29
proof of guilt beyond what is required by the law and contrary

to how the circuit court would have instructed her.

Moreover, Agnew told the circuit court that she had

“agonized” over this point and conceded that, while recognizing

the authority of the court, she also had to rely upon a “higher

authority” in such matters. Agnew also told the court that she

was “nervous” and had to stop to compose herself when answering

questions. Thus, the court had not only her answers to

consider, but her demeanor as well in judging whether she would

be able to properly follow the court’s instructions. For these

reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion in striking Agnew from the venire for cause.

B. Unadjudicated Bad Act Evidence

As stated in the opening brief, the assignments of error

that Andrews purports to address under his fourth question

presented are:

2. The trial court erred in denying Andrews’ Motion
to Preclude Unadjudicated Criminal Acts.

35. The trial court erred in denying Andrews’ Motion
to Preclude Evidence of Unadjudicated Criminal Acts.

42. The trial court erred in allowing evidence at
the guilt/innocence phase regarding a fight between
Andrews and Jamel Crawford while they were in jail
awaiting trial.

Andrews filed a motion in limine concerning evidence of prior

unadjudicated criminal conduct. The motion, filed June 19,

30
2007, dealt primarily with the issue of whether the

Commonwealth had provided adequate notice of its intent to use

such evidence in the penalty-determination phase of the trial,

but did not specifically address the conduct referred to in

assignment of error number 42. Moreover, within the section

of the opening brief addressing the fourth question presented,

Andrews makes no reference to this motion or any argument

relevant to the issues raised therein. Instead, the argument

of this question presented is confined to the issue raised by

assignment of error number 42. Accordingly, Andrews has

waived any reliance on assignments of error number 2 and

number 35 as a basis for reversing his convictions and death

sentences, and we will limit our discussion of the fourth

question presented to whether the circuit court erred in

permitting Crawford to testify in the guilt-determination

phase of the trial regarding his fight with Andrews while they

were incarcerated together awaiting trial.

When Crawford testified during the guilt-determination

phase of the trial, the Commonwealth asked him whether “there

[had] been any problems . . . in the jail” between him and

Andrews. Andrews’ counsel objected to this line of

questioning, asserting that it was not “relevant to any of the

charges.” The Commonwealth responded that Andrews had

“attacked [Crawford] to try to keep him from testifying.”

31
Andrews’ counsel responded that the notice he had been given

of this testimony was for use in the penalty-determination

phase, with the circuit court agreeing that it had understood

from the notice that evidence of “maladjustment in jail” was

“going to be used as part of [the Commonwealth’s] sentencing

case.”

The Commonwealth maintained that the purpose for

introducing the evidence at this point in the trial was “a

separate issue as to whether or not [Andrews] has taken

actions to try to keep [the] witness from testifying.”

Andrews’ counsel interposed that the evidence was “extremely

prejudicial concerning the charges at this time,” but raised

no further objection at that point. The circuit court

permitted the Commonwealth to proceed.

Crawford then testified that although he and Andrews were

being held on different blocks in the jail, an incident took

place when Andrews pushed past two corrections officers as

Crawford was being taken by Andrews’ block. According to

Crawford, Andrews attacked Crawford, hitting him “many times”

and threatening to kill him. Crawford required medical

attention after the attack. Following this testimony, Andrews

did not renew his motion to exclude the evidence or otherwise

assert that the Commonwealth failed to show what Andrews’

motive had been in attacking Crawford.

32
 During a subsequent redirect examination of Crawford, the

Commonwealth asked him whether Andrews “called him any names”

during the attack, but Crawford responded that Andrews only

“said he was going to kill me.” On further cross-examination,

Crawford denied that he had instigated the confrontation or

been punished by jail authorities as a result.

On brief, Andrews now contends that the circuit court

erred in admitting Crawford’s testimony concerning the fight

because it “was not probative of any element of the charged

offenses, but was introduced merely to prove that Andrews has

a propensity to commit violent acts.” This is so, Andrews

contends, because the Commonwealth “failed to establish that

the testimony was probative of any ‘consciousness of guilt’ ”

in that nothing about the attack was overtly indicative of

Andrews’ supposed motive to keep Crawford from testifying. In

the absence of such evidence, Andrews contends that “it is

equally likely that the fight was motivated by the anger of an

innocent man falsely accused, by resentment over perceived

favorable treatment [of Crawford] in jail, or simply an

impulsive act.”

The Commonwealth responds that Andrews’ objection at

trial prior to Crawford’s testimony about the fight was not

sufficiently specific to preserve for appeal the argument made

on brief that the testimony failed to adequately establish

33
that Andrews’ motive for the attack was to prevent Crawford

from testifying. The Commonwealth also contends that

“evidence of a violent assault on a key witness” by a

defendant is sufficient to raise the inference that the

defendant intended to intimidate the witness or otherwise

prevent him from testifying at trial, even if the defendant

does not use words that expressly state his intent. We will

consider the objection to relevance, and the subsequent

reference to prejudice, asserted by Andrews prior to

Crawford’s testimony concerning the attack in the jail as

sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.

We agree with the Commonwealth that the evidence was

admissible to show consciousness of guilt. “Evidence that a

person charged with a crime procured, or attempted to procure,

the absence of a witness, or to bribe or suppress testimony

against him, is admissible, as it tends to show the

unrighteousness of the defendant’s cause and a consciousness

of guilt.” McMillan v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 429, 432-33, 50

S.E.2d 428, 430 (1948); see also United States v. Young, 248

F.3d 260, 272 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[E]vidence of witness

intimidation is admissible to prove consciousness of guilt if

it is both related to the offense charged and reliable.”).

Although the admission of such evidence is a “close call” in

many instances, the decision whether the defendant’s actions

34
are sufficiently probative of his consciousness of guilt to

overcome the prejudice inherent in admitting evidence of

subsequent bad acts is committed to the sound discretion of

the trial court, and the decision to allow evidence of this

nature is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

United States v. Smith, 352 Fed. Appx. 387, 389-90 (11th Cir.

2009); see also United States v. Mendoza, 236 Fed. Appx. 371,

389 (10th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, the issue before us is whether the circuit

court abused its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to

elicit testimony from Crawford that Andrews assaulted and

threatened to kill Crawford based on the inference that

Andrews’ motive was to silence or intimidate Crawford into

altering his anticipated incriminating testimony. In this

regard, we will address Andrews’ contention that the

Commonwealth was required to prove that this was his motive

for attacking and threatening Crawford by direct, overt

evidence. This is an issue of first impression in this

Commonwealth.

When it is established that the defendant has procured a

third-party to act on his behalf, the court will be able to

judge by the nature of the communication between the defendant

and the proxy whether the intention was to silence or

intimidate the witness. See McMillan, 188 Va. at 433, 50

35
S.E.2d at 430. However, when, as here, it is the defendant

who commits the act of aggression against the witness, rather

than a third-party allegedly acting on the defendant’s behalf,

in the absence of direct evidence establishing an intent to

intimidate the witness, the accepted rule is that the primary

focus of the inquiry as to the defendant’s intent is on the

likely effect of the defendant’s actions. This is to be

determined by the trier of fact.

In Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 592 N.E.2d 1279 (Mass. 1992),

for example, the defendant contended that evidence that he had

deliberately driven his vehicle toward a group of pedestrians

including the complaining witness and another witness expected

to testify against him, only swerving away at the last moment,

was inadmissible to show consciousness of guilt because there

was no direct evidence that he had intended for this act to

intimidate the witnesses. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court rejected this contention, stating that there was “no

such rule” requiring direct evidence of the intent underlying

a threat or act of violence directed at a witness by a

defendant. Id. at 1286-87. Rather, the Court held that the

evidence was admissible to show consciousness of guilt and

“[i]f conflicting inferences are to be drawn from a

defendant’s conduct, the determination of where the truth lies

is the province of the jury.” Id. at 1287.

36
 Similarly, in State v. McGhee, 788 P.2d 603 (Wash. Ct.

App. 1990), the Court of Appeals of Washington considered the

question whether the defendant’s threat against a witness

“could have been [the action] of a wrongfully accused person,”

as he maintained, or “[m]ore plausibly [that] it was the

conduct of one with guilty knowledge attempting to intimidate

a witness.” Id. at 605. The Court held that the evidence was

admissible and that “the inference [to be drawn therefrom] was

for the trier of fact.” Id.

We are persuaded by the rationale of Scanlon and McGhee

that when, as in this case, the threat or act of violence

against a key witness is done by the defendant himself, the

trier of fact may draw a reasonable inference that the

defendant intends to silence or intimidate the witness.

Therefore, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in

permitting the Commonwealth to elicit such testimony. If, as

Andrews maintains, there were alternative explanations for

what may have motivated him to attack and threaten Crawford,

it was for the jury to determine whether the Commonwealth’s

contention regarding Andrews’ motive for the attack was the

more plausible. Accordingly, we hold that circuit court did

not abuse its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to

elicit testimony from Crawford during the guilt-determination

37
phase of the trial concerning the attack on him and the threat

to kill him made by Andrews.

C. Hearsay Evidence Concerning the “Missing” Titan Pistol

As stated in the opening brief, the assignments of error

that Andrews addresses under his sixth question presented are:

45. The trial court erred in admitting hearsay
statements regarding an allegedly stolen gun.

77. The trial court erred in allowing testimony
regarding an alleged report of a stolen gun, and an
NCIC report concerning that gun.

During Detective Walker’s testimony, the Commonwealth

asked him about the standard procedure for dealing with a

report of a stolen weapon. Walker indicated that the normal

procedure would be to enter information concerning the weapon

into the NCIC database. The Commonwealth then began to ask

Walker about “the report that the police department received

from [Andrews’] mother,” but Andrews’ counsel interposed an

objection before the question could be completed.

In a bench conference, Andrews’ counsel asserted that

“the statements are not in evidence at all about what the

mother said . . . it’s hearsay.” The Commonwealth asserted

that the evidence of the report of the missing or stolen

pistol was not hearsay because it was being offered not for

its truth, but rather to explain why the police acted to enter

the information into the NCIC database. In response, Andrews’

38
counsel contended that the evidence was “offered for the truth

of what she[] sa[id]. . . . Secondly, he enters a weapon into

NCIC. What’s the relevance of that?”

The circuit court permitted the Commonwealth to continue

its examination of Walker over Andrews’ objection. Walker

confirmed that a report of a stolen or missing .25 caliber

Titan automatic pistol had been entered into the NCIC database

on January 9, 2002 as a result of the report received from

Andrews’ mother. On cross-examination, Walker conceded that

he personally had not received this report of the stolen

weapon, but had “talked to the detective that spoke with the

mother.” Andrews then renewed his motion to exclude the

testimony as hearsay. The circuit court again overruled the

motion.

Andrews contends that the circuit court erred in

permitting Walker to testify concerning the stolen or missing

.25 caliber Titan automatic pistol. He maintains that Walker

had no direct knowledge concerning the weapon, but only based

his testimony on the information entered into the NCIC

database by an unidentified person following a report of

another police officer who had received the information from

Andrews’ mother. Thus, he contends that Walker’s testimony

was based upon a “chain of hearsay.”

39
 The Commonwealth responds that the circuit court did not

err in permitting this testimony because it was not “offered

for the truth of the matter asserted therein, i.e., that the

information given actually was the serial number of the stolen

gun.” Rather, the Commonwealth contends that the purpose of

the evidence was merely to explain the process of Walker’s

investigation of the crime.

We do not agree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that

the evidence produced by Walker’s testimony concerning the

information he obtained through the NCIC database was not

being offered for its truth. Unlike Frye v. Commonwealth, 231

Va. 370, 387, 345 S.E.2d 267, 279-80 (1986), where we approved

the admission of an NCIC report under the “business records

exception” to the hearsay rule, the evidence here was not

offered merely to show how the content of the NCIC database

furthered the investigation of the crime. Rather, it is clear

that this evidence was being offered, at least in part, to

establish that Andrews had access to a .25 caliber Titan

automatic pistol, the same make and caliber as the principal

pistol used in the January 2, 2002 shootings. As such, we

agree with Andrews that the circuit court erred in permitting

the Commonwealth, under the guise of presenting the evidence

to explain “police procedure,” to introduce hearsay evidence

from Walker’s testimony concerning the report received by

40
another police officer from Andrews’ mother and its subsequent

use in creating the NCIC information by someone other than

Walker.

Andrews asserts that the admission of this hearsay

evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation

because the information Andrews’ mother provided to police was

“testimonial” in nature. Although Andrews offers no authority

to support this assertion, we will assume without deciding

that a report to police of a missing or stolen pistol received

during the course of a criminal investigation is testimonial

hearsay for Confrontation Clause purposes and that its

admission at Andrews’ trial was constitutional error. See,

e.g., United States v. Henry, 226 Fed. Appx. 963, 965 (11th

Cir. 2007).

When a federal constitutional error is involved a

reversal is required unless we determine that the error is

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Zektaw v. Commonwealth,

278 Va. 127, 139, 677 S.E.2d 49, 56 (2009). Accordingly, we

must determine “ ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility

that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the

conviction.’ ” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)

(quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). In

making that determination, we consider, among other factors,

“the importance of the tainted evidence in the prosecution’s

41
case, whether that evidence was cumulative, the presence or

absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the tainted

evidence on material points, and the overall strength of the

prosecution’s case.” Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551,

523 S.E.2d 208, 209 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).

Here, the evidence that Andrews had prior access to a

pistol of the same make and caliber as one of the pistols used

in the January 2, 2002 shootings in Head’s apartment was not

essential to proving Andrews’ involvement in those crimes. By

direct evidence from Berry, the Commonwealth had already

established that Andrews had displayed a pistol in Head’s

apartment and that he used that pistol to shoot Berry.

Forensic evidence further established that the pistol used to

shoot Berry was also used to fire seven of the eight bullets

that struck Head and Morrison, and further that, individually,

the wounds caused by the pistol would have been fatal to both

victims.

Given this evidence, the jury would not have had to

determine whether the pistol Andrews used was the .25 caliber

Titan automatic pistol reported stolen or missing or some

other weapon of the same make and caliber, since that issue

was not essential to the jury’s determination of Andrews’

culpability for the crimes committed on January 2, 2002.

42
Thus, the evidence that Andrews had access to a pistol of the

same make and caliber as the pistol that the Commonwealth had

already established by direct evidence Andrews possessed and

used was merely cumulative. The jury would not have had to

rely on that evidence in order to convict Andrews of the

crimes committed on January 2, 2002. 12 Accordingly, we hold

that the error in the admission of hearsay evidence concerning

the .25 caliber Titan automatic pistol that Andrews’ mother

reported to the police as missing or stolen was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.

D. Ballistic Evidence Issues

As stated in the opening brief, the assignments of error

that Andrews purports to address under his fifth question

presented are:

7. The trial court erred in denying Mr. Andrews’
Motion to Dismiss for Spoliation of Evidence.

54. The trial court erred in excluding Mr. Andrews’
evidence that the alleged murder weapons had been
destroyed.

12
Arguably, the Commonwealth’s purpose in presenting this
evidence was to show that Andrews had access to the pistol
before the January 2, 2002 crimes in order to establish that
he could have used the weapon in the murder of Breeding.
However, as Andrews was acquitted of that crime, any prejudice
resulting from the error in the admission of the hearsay
evidence with regard to that offense is moot.

43
 78. The trial court erred in failing to provide the
defense with a ballistics expert who could
independently review the ballistics [evidence] in
this case.

79. The trial court erred in giving the following
instruction to the jury: “Due to no fault of the
Commonwealth of Virginia or the Defendant or his
counsel, the firearms were not available for
inspection and analysis by the Defendant or the
Commonwealth nor [were] the Defendant’s experts able
to conduct independent ballistics tests.”

80. The trial court erred in permitting the
prosecution to introduce unreliable and invalidated
ballistics evidence.

Andrews presents no express argument of the issues asserted in

assignments of error 54 and 78. Accordingly, with respect to

the issue of whether Andrews was erroneously prohibited from

presenting evidence of the destruction of the alleged murder

weapons and whether the circuit court erred in failing to

appoint a ballistics expert to assist Andrews in his defense,

we hold that these issues have been waived. 13 Rule 5:17(c)(4);

Rule 5:27.

13
On December 5, 2006, the circuit court granted Andrews’
request for appointment of a ballistics expert to aid in his
defense. The court limited the expert’s function to
“reviewing and analyzing the reports prepared by the
Commonwealth’s witnesses,” but included the provision that
“the scope of the ballistic[s] expert’s appointment may be
expanded with an additional showing of a more particularized
need.” This order was endorsed by Andrews’ counsel as “asked
for” and without objection or reservation. There is no
indication in the record that Andrews ever sought to have the

44
 With regard to assignment of error 7, although Andrews

makes reference within the opening brief to his motion to

dismiss for the alleged spoliation of evidence as a result of

the destruction of the weapons by New York authorities, he

makes no substantive argument that the circuit court erred in

denying that motion. The Commonwealth contends that Andrews

has waived his argument that the court erred in determining

that the destruction of the weapons was not chargeable to the

Commonwealth and, thus, not susceptible to a claim of

spoliation requiring dismissal of the indictments against him.

Teleguz, 273 Va. at 472, 643 S.E.2d at 718; Wolfe v.

Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 206-07, 576 S.E.2d 471, 479, cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 1019 (2003). We agree with the Commonwealth.

Accordingly, we will limit our consideration to Andrews’

arguments concerning Arntsen’s testimony and the instruction

given by the circuit court to the jury during that testimony.

In a motion filed February 23, 2007, Andrews sought to

have the indictments against him dismissed, or in the

alternative to “suppress[] all testimony regarding the spoiled

evidence” because the destruction of the weapons recovered by

scope of the ballistics expert’s appointment enlarged to
include an independent review of the ballistic evidence.

45
New York authorities prevented Andrews from conducting tests

on those weapons. In the absence of forensic testing of the

weapons, Andrews contended that his Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation would be impaired because he could not

meaningfully cross-examine the Commonwealth’s ballistics

expert. On May 30, 2007, Andrews filed a written “summation”

of his argument on this motion, in which he asserted that his

inability to have access to the weapons recovered in New York

also interfered with his ability to “cross-examine [the

Commonwealth’s expert concerning] any evidence recovered in

Virginia.”

In an opinion letter dated June 5, 2007, subsequently

incorporated by reference in an order dated June 18, 2007, the

circuit court overruled Andrews’ motion, finding that the

destruction of the weapons by New York authorities was not

chargeable to the Commonwealth. Moreover, even if the actions

of the New York authorities were attributable to the

Commonwealth, the Court nonetheless found that Andrews had not

satisfied the two part test of California v. Trombetta, 467

U.S. 479, 489 (1984), to show both that the potential

exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent to the

government at the time the evidence was destroyed and that the

defense had no other means of obtaining the exculpatory

evidence. The court noted that Andrews’ principal assertion

46
of the exculpatory nature of the evidence which could have

been obtained from the destroyed weapons was that neither

weapon matched the serial number or description of the .25

caliber Titan automatic pistol which Andrews’ mother told

police was missing from her home and that the police entered

into the NCIC database. The court concluded that there was

ample evidence to support this assertion even without the

ability to examine the weapons.

Despite having found that the destruction of the weapons

was not chargeable to the Commonwealth and that in any case

their destruction did not result in any prejudice to Andrews,

the court opined that

some corrective measure must be articulated to
explain the unavailability of the firearms to the
fact-finder. As such, the destruction shall be
dealt with by the [c]ourt in a forthright manner in
the presence of the jury. The jury shall be
instructed that despite repeated protective measures
implemented by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the New
York authorities destroyed the alleged murder
weapons in August of 2005. The jury will also be
informed that because of these actions of the New
York authorities, the Defendant’s experts were not
able to conduct independent ballistics tests, but
were given the ability to analyze the New York
tests.

As indicated above, during direct examination, Arntsen

conceded that he could not state positively that eight of the

nine .25 caliber bullets recovered from Berry, Head, and

Morrison, the eight .25 caliber shell casings recovered at

47
Head’s apartment, and the unfired .25 caliber cartridge found

at Andrews’ mother’s home were all connected to the same

weapon. At best, Arntsen was able to state that the eight

bullets had all been fired from a .25 caliber Titan automatic

pistol, and that the casings and cartridge had been chambered

and cycled through a .25 caliber Titan automatic pistol, “but

I can’t say conclusively that the two were one.” Asked by the

Commonwealth what would be required in order to make that

determination, Arntsen replied, “The firearm.”

The Commonwealth then asked for a bench conference,

requesting that the circuit court “provide the instruction to

the jury . . . that there is not a firearm to compare due to

no fault of either the Commonwealth or the defense.” After

some discussion of the wording of the instruction, Andrews’

counsel agreed to the language, but asked that the court not

give the instruction until after Arntsen had been cross-

examined. When the Court indicated that it would read the

instruction immediately, counsel replied, “Your Honor, just

note our exception.” The court then instructed the jury that

[d]ue to no fault of the Commonwealth of Virginia or
the Defendant or his counsel, the firearms were not
available for inspection and analysis by the
Defendant or the Commonwealth nor was the
Defendant’s expert[]able to conduct independent
ballistics tests.

48
 In cross-examining Arntsen, Andrews’ counsel asked

numerous questions about the methodology Arntsen used to

compare the bullets to one another and in comparing the

casings and cartridge. However, at no point was an objection

raised by the defense to the reliability of Arntsen’s

testimony on these matters.

In briefing this appeal with respect to assignment of

error 80, Andrews contends that the circuit court erred in

permitting Arntsen to testify concerning his analysis of the

bullets, casings and cartridge “[i]n the absence of the actual

weapon that allegedly created the tool marks on these items.”

He asserts that, in the absence of the ability to test the

specific pistol from which the bullets and casings were

allegedly fired, such evidence is “dubious” and

“questionable.” In support of this argument, Andrews makes

general assertions about the reliability of toolmark evidence

to make comparisons between items of ballistic evidence in the

absence of an exemplar fired from that pistol. Thus, he

contends that the evidence should have been excluded because

it was scientifically unreliable.

In his pre-trial motion, Andrews did not expressly

challenge the scientific reliability of ballistic comparison

evidence as a general proposition. Rather, his objection was

limited to his ability to adequately cross-examine the

49
Commonwealth’s expert without the ability to conduct

independent ballistic tests on the destroyed weapons.

Accordingly, the argument Andrews has advanced on brief

regarding the admission of Arntsen’s testimony does not

correspond to the arguments he advanced in his motion in

limine to exclude evidence because of alleged spoliation, nor

does it reflect any objection actually raised at the time of

Arntsen’s testimony. We will not consider this argument for

the first time on appeal. Rule 5:25.

Accordingly, the only remaining issue to be addressed

under Andrews’ fifth question presented is whether the circuit

court erred in giving the cautionary instruction concerning

the inability of either party to inspect or conduct tests on

“the firearms.” 14 “The decision whether to give a cautionary

instruction is a matter lying within the trial court’s

14
At trial, Andrews’ objection was limited to the timing
of when the instruction was given, and there is no express
objection to the intent to give such an instruction as stated
in the June 5, 2007 opinion letter. Nonetheless, we conclude
that the issue was adequately preserved by Andrews’ argument
advanced in the motion in limine, that he was impaired in his
ability to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s expert about the
forensic testing of ballistics evidence recovered in Virginia
by his inability to test the weapons destroyed in New York and
implicit in his argument that the ballistics evidence should
thus be excluded entirely was the assertion that a cautionary
instruction would not be sufficient.

50
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the

record shows an abuse of discretion.” Goins v. Commonwealth,

251 Va. 442, 465, 470 S.E.2d 114, 129, cert. denied, 519 U.S.

887 (1996).

It should be noted that, although there had been other

testimony concerning the .25 caliber Titan automatic pistol

missing or stolen from Andrews’ mother’s home, Arntsen’s

testimony was limited to his analysis of the bullets, casings

and cartridge. Arntsen never referred directly to the missing

weapon or the weapons seized and destroyed by New York

authorities. Likewise Detective Walker, who testified

immediately before Arntsen, did not refer directly to the

existence of the destroyed weapons. Thus, while the circuit

court’s initial determination to give the instruction

concerned the destruction of the weapons by New York

authorities, this context would not have been present in the

minds of the jurors when the instruction was read to them.

Rather, the context of the instruction was framed by the

fact that it came immediately after Arntsen had testified that

he was unable to positively connect the bullets recovered from

the victims with the casings and cartridge because he did not

have “the firearm” with which to make such a comparison. When

viewed in this respect, the circuit court’s instruction did no

more than advise the jury that there were no firearms which

51
either the Commonwealth or the defense had been given the

opportunity to test and compare with the other ballistics

evidence, and that neither party was at fault for this

circumstance. As such, the court was properly instructing the

jury that it was to consider only the evidence before it,

giving to that evidence such weight as it might, and that it

should not speculate about the absence of other evidence. The

instruction was neutral and appropriate to the circumstances.

Accordingly, we hold that the court did not abuse its

discretion in giving this instruction to the jury.

E. “Triggerman” Instruction 15

As stated in the opening brief, the assignments of error

that Andrews purports to address under his third question

presented are:

44. The trial court erred in limiting Andrews’
cross-examination of Jamel Crawford.

49. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice
and instructing the jury during Jamel Crawford’s

15
As we have noted before, “[t]he euphemism,
‘triggerman,’ is inadequate to describe the breadth of
criminal responsibility subject to the death penalty in
Virginia. Immediately and obviously, capital murder cases are
not confined to murders completed by the instrumentality of a
firearm. Recognizing this inadequacy, our capital murder
cases routinely use the term ‘immediate perpetrator’ as the
appropriate descriptive term.” Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269
Va. 451, 483, 619 S.E.2d 16, 34 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1136 (2006).

52
 testimony that “only the person who pulls the
trigger during a first degree murder is eligible for
the death penalty,” which is an inaccurate statement
of Virginia law.

50. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct
the jury at the guilt/innocence phase that under
section 18.2-18 of the Virginia Code, Andrews could
not be convicted of capital murder if he was not a
principal in the first degree.

51. The trial court erred in denying Andrews’
request that the jury be instructed that it must
find him to have been a principal in the first
degree to convict him of capital murder under
section 18.2-18.

60. The trial court erred in limiting Andrews’
proposed evidence regarding the victims’ drug
dealing.

97. The court erred in finding that there was not a
“modicum” of evidence to suggest that Jamel Crawford
was the triggerman in this case, when Prince William
County had indicted Crawford as the shooter.

Andrews presents no express argument of the issues asserted in

assignments of error 44 and 60. Accordingly, we hold that

Andrews has waived his arguments with respect to whether the

circuit court erred in limiting Andrews’ cross-examination of

Crawford and in not permitting him to present evidence of the

victims’ alleged drug dealing. Rule 5:17(c)(4); Rule 5:27.

During opening statements, Andrews’ counsel told the jury

that Crawford had “cooperated with the Commonwealth and

expects consideration for his testimony. At the very least,

he’s not going to face the death penalty.” In cross-examining

Crawford during the guilt-determination phase of the trial,

53
Andrews’ counsel had Crawford confirm that his counsel had

“worked out a deal with the prosecution that they won’t seek

the death penalty.”

On redirect examination, the Commonwealth asked Crawford

if he had “told anyone at any time anywhere that you intended

for Joshua Andrews to shoot anyone on January 2nd of 2002?”

After Crawford responded that he had not, in a bench

conference the Commonwealth asked the circuit court “to take

judicial notice that only the person who pulls the trigger

during a first degree murder is eligible for the death

penalty.” Andrews’ counsel objected to the relevance of this

request. The Commonwealth asserted that it “removes the bias

if he can’t get death,” and the court ruled “it’s an attempt

at rehabilitation which is appropriate under the law.”

Andrews’ counsel asked the court to “note my exception” and

thereafter the Commonwealth in open court reiterated that

“only the person who pulls the trigger during a first degree

murder is eligible for the death penalty,” with the court

stating that it would “take judicial notice of that.”

Following the conclusion of the evidence in the guilt-

determination phase, when the circuit court and counsel were

discussing jury instructions, Andrews proffered his

Instruction EE which sought to distinguish between the

culpability for capital murder as a principal in the first

54
degree and as a principal in the second degree. Specifically,

the instruction stated that to convict Andrews of capital

murder the jury must find that he was a principal in the first

degree and that to do so, “the Commonwealth has [to] prove[]

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Andrews] was an active and

immediate participant in” the murders of Head and Morrison.

The instruction further stated that “[a] principal in the

second degree is an individual who did not with his own hand

commit the act that constituted the crime” and that “a

principal in the second degree cannot be convicted of capital

murder.”

The Commonwealth objected, asserting that “[t]here isn’t

any issue before this [c]ourt regarding principals in the

first degree or principals in the second degree. All the

evidence is that Mr. Andrews [was] the shooter. . . . There is

no indication that he was ever a principal in the second

degree.” Andrews’ counsel responded that Berry’s testimony

established that both Andrews and Crawford were in the

apartment. Moreover, counsel noted that Berry “heard somebody

right outside, right before the first shot went off, after

which he blacked out. He’s got no idea what happened

afterward.” Noting that Crawford did not deny being in the

apartment, Andrews’ counsel contended that “no one knows

specifically or can testify specifically as to what happened

55
after [Berry was shot], then there is evidence supporting [the

contention that Andrews could have been a] principal in the

second degree” in the murders of Head and Morrison.

Andrews’ counsel also contended that the evidence showed

that Andrews was armed with only one gun when he entered the

apartment, while the ballistics evidence established that two

guns had been used in the shootings. Since one of the bullets

from the second gun was “a potential death shot,” he contended

that “[t]here’s no definitive evidence that establishe[d who

was the] principal in the first degree with regard to that

shot.” The Commonwealth responded that, despite the evidence

of a second gun being used, the evidence showed that the “gun

that shot Mr. Berry is the same gun that shot Mr. Morrison and

shot Mr. Head. In order for this theory to be viable for the

jury, there would have to be some evidence that somehow

[Andrews] gave the gun to somebody else.” The circuit court

refused the instruction, indicating that to be entitled to the

instruction, the defense’s theory that Crawford could have

been the sole principal actor in the murder of Head and/or

Morrison “must be supported by some modicum of evidence and in

this case the [c]ourt doesn’t see it.”

Later in the discussion of the proposed instructions,

Andrews’ counsel returned to the issue of whether the jury

should be instructed on the distinction between first and

56
second degree principals. Referring to the redirect

examination of Crawford, counsel noted that the court had

“upon request by the Commonwealth [given] an instruction to

the jury about when and whom could be responsible – face[] the

death penalty in a capital charge.” Contending that this

“instruction” raised the issue of whether Crawford might have

been a principal in the first degree, counsel asked the court

to reconsider its ruling refusing Instruction EE. The court,

noting that it had not instructed the jury on this point and

only had taken judicial notice of the rule, indicated that it

had not done so “in the context of culpability of Mr. Andrews,

but rather . . . to corroborate Mr. Crawford’s testimony that

he knew he wasn’t facing the death penalty.” Andrews’ counsel

responded, “It may have . . . been intended . . . that way,

but it could be interpreted another way and I think it

highlights the importance of having . . . [I]nstruction [EE].”

The court again refused to give the instruction, reiterating

that it found “no factual basis for providing that instruction

to the jury.”

Returning to the issue a final time on the next day of

trial shortly before the jury was instructed, Andrews’ counsel

contended that the “judicial notice” that the Commonwealth had

requested during the trial was in conflict with Code

§ 18.2-18, which requires that a principal in the second

57
degree to a capital murder is to be “indicted, tried,

convicted and punished as though the offense were murder in

the first degree.” Counsel contended that during the trial

the Commonwealth had misrepresented the law because “[i]t’s

not just that [a principal in the second degree] can’t face

the death penalty; it’s that they can’t be convicted of

capital murder.” Thus, counsel contended that Instruction EE

should be given so that “the state of the law should be

accurately reflected.” The circuit court, which again had

noted that the judicial notice was taken in reference to the

issue of Crawford’s potential bias, not Andrews’ culpability

for the murders, ruled that “the motion for reconsideration of

the prior ruling of the [c]ourt is denied.”

During closing arguments in the guilt-determination

phase, when addressing the contention that Crawford had

received consideration for his testimony, the Commonwealth

asserted that “we got the Judge to instruct you that only the

triggerman in Virginia in a case such as this is eligible for

the death penalty. [Crawford] was not the triggerman. He

can’t get the death penalty. That was not given to him by us

in consideration; that was bestowed upon him by the law of

this Commonwealth.”

Andrews contends in assignment of error 49 that the

circuit court erred “in taking judicial notice and instructing

58
the jury during Jamel Crawford’s testimony that ‘only the

person who pulls the trigger during a first degree murder is

eligible for the death penalty,’ ” asserting that this was “an

inaccurate statement of Virginia law.” 16 However, at the point

during the trial where the Commonwealth asked the court to

take judicial notice that Crawford would not be subject to the

death penalty as a principal in the second degree, Andrews’

counsel’s sole objection was to the “relevance” of the

Commonwealth’s request, stating that the fact Crawford was not

subject to the death penalty “doesn’t remove the bias.”

Although Andrews’ counsel subsequently raised the issue

of whether the Commonwealth’s recitation of the law was

accurate during the court’s review of proposed Instruction EE,

the court correctly indicated at that time that the judicial

notice was taken in reference to whether Crawford would have a

motive to fabricate his testimony in order to avoid the

possibility of receiving the death penalty. At no point did

16
Within the argument of this assignment of error, as
well as at several points during the trial, both parties have
conflated the concept of “taking judicial notice” with
“instructing the jury.” Because the distinction is not
germane to our resolution of this issue, we will not express
any view as to whether the circuit court’s “taking judicial
notice” of the law as stated by the Commonwealth, without
more, was the functional equivalent of instructing the jury on
that point of law.

59
Andrews’ counsel request that the court withdraw the judicial

notice it had taken or give a clarifying instruction to the

jury with regard to the effect of the judicial notice of the

law on Crawford’s testimony. Rather, counsel asked the court

to give Instruction EE, which specifically defined the law

with regard to Andrews’ culpability for the murders, not

Crawford’s. Accordingly, we hold that Andrews’ assignment of

error 49 is barred because he is raising a different argument

on appeal than was asserted in the circuit court at the time

of the ruling being challenged. Rule 5:25.

In three other assignments of error, Andrews further

contends that the circuit court erred in failing to give

Instruction EE, thus depriving the jury of the option to

acquit Andrews of capital murder if it found from the evidence

that he was not the immediate perpetrator responsible for the

murder of Head or Morrison. Though Andrews raises this issue

in assignments of error 50, 51, and 97, his argument on brief

is essentially that he was entitled to have Instruction EE

given to the jury because there was more than a scintilla of

evidence to support his theory that Crawford or some other

person could have shot Head and/or Morrison after Andrews shot

Berry and Berry lost consciousness. He contends that the

following evidence would support giving Instruction EE:

60
 1. The forensic ballistics evidence that showed
the victims had been shot by two different
guns, while “both Crawford and Berry testified
that Andrews had only one gun.”

2. Crawford had a motive to kill Head, because
Head and Crawford were rival drug dealers and
had other interpersonal conflicts.

3. Based on much the same evidence as was
presented in Andrews’ trial, Crawford had been
indicted for capital murder for the deaths of
Head and Morrison, thus the grand jury must
have found there was probable cause to believe
that Crawford could have been the immediate
perpetrator of those crimes, and the quantum of
evidence required to establish probable cause
before a grand jury far exceeds the “more than
a scintilla” needed to obtain a jury
instruction.

The Commonwealth contends that Andrews did not

specifically advance these facts in support of Instruction EE

in the circuit court and, thus, we should not consider them

now. Rule 5:25. The Commonwealth’s position is not well

taken with regard to the ballistics evidence, which Andrews’

counsel clearly relied upon when Instruction EE was first

considered. However, we agree that Andrews’ counsel did not

expressly advance the evidence of Crawford’s alleged motive

for killing Head or his indictment for the capital murders of

Head and Morrison in support of Instruction EE in the circuit

court. Accordingly, we will limit our analysis of this issue

to the facts and argument in support of Instruction EE

actually presented at trial.

61
 Andrews’ contention that “both Crawford and Berry

testified that Andrews had only one gun” is not supported by

the record. At best, the evidence showed that Andrews

displayed only one pistol to Berry and Morrison when he first

entered the apartment and that Berry did not see a second

pistol before he was shot and lost consciousness. Berry did

not testify that Andrews had only one pistol and would have

had no basis for doing so.

Likewise, Crawford was adamant in his testimony that

Andrews had at least two pistols – the .25 caliber pistol that

Andrews had displayed to Crawford in Tucker’s apartment and

the .22 caliber pistol that Crawford had given him there.

Although during cross-examination Andrews’ counsel attempted

to elicit from Crawford an admission that he had retrieved the

.22 caliber pistol from Andrews and carried it into Head’s

apartment, Crawford consistently denied that he had done so

and affirmatively testified that Andrews had both weapons at

all times after they left Tucker’s apartment.

While it is true that the ballistics evidence showed that

two different .25 caliber pistols were used in the shootings,

at best Crawford’s testimony can be interpreted as

establishing that Andrews was armed with at least two pistols.

It certainly cannot support the contention that Andrews had

only one pistol and does not preclude the possibility that,

62
unknown to Crawford, Andrews was already in possession of a

second .25 caliber pistol when they left Tucker’s apartment,

or that Andrews came into possession of another .25 caliber

pistol after entering Head’s apartment.

Likewise, the evidence that a second .25 caliber weapon,

identified by Arntsen as an “Astra,” was used during the

shootings does not support Andrews’ contention that someone

other than Andrews was the sole immediate perpetrator of the

murder of Head, the only victim who was shot by a bullet from

the Astra. The medical examiner’s evidence showed that Head’s

death would have resulted independently from wounds inflicted

by both the Astra and the Titan, the weapon that Andrews used

to shoot Berry. Accordingly, Andrews’ contention that he was

entitled to have the court give Instruction EE to the jury is

premised solely on his contention that because Berry lost

consciousness before Head and Morrison were shot, it was

theoretically possible that Crawford, or some other unknown

perpetrator, could have taken the Titan from Andrews and fired

all the shots that killed Head and/or Morrison, including the

shot from the Astra.

In considering questions concerning jury instructions, we

have observed that:

It has been repeatedly held that an instruction
should not be given when there is no evidence
tending to prove the facts upon which the

63
 instruction is based, for the reason that the
tendency of such instruction is to mislead the jury
by withdrawing their attention from the legitimate
points involved in the issue. Juries are
sufficiently prone to indulge in conjectures,
without having possible facts not in evidence
suggested for their consideration. And before
either party is entitled to an instruction there
must be more than a scintilla of evidence
introduced.

Wagner v. Fiery, 206 Va. 370, 373-74, 143 S.E.2d 876, 879

(1965) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 202, 688 S.E.2d 244,

259 (2010); Porter, 276 Va. at 241, 661 S.E.2d at 434.

The case of Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 397

S.E.2d 385 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991), is

instructive on the question of when a defendant on trial for

capital murder will be entitled to a principal in the second

degree instruction based upon the theory that the evidence

does not exclude the possibility that someone other than the

defendant was the immediate perpetrator of the crime. In

Eaton, the defendant contended that there was sufficient

evidence in the record to support his theory that he was only

culpable as a principal in the second degree for the capital

murder with which he had been charged. Specifically, he

maintained that the jury could surmise that rather than

committing the murder, he only acted in a manner to distract

the victim, thereby giving his accomplice the opportunity to

64
shoot the victim. Id. at 255-56, 397 S.E.2d at 397. We held

that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the

jury on the definition of a principal in the second degree and

on the jury’s duty to convict the defendant of a lesser

offense if it had a reasonable doubt as to his immediate

culpability on the capital murder charge, because there was no

evidence to support the instruction. Id. at 256, 397 S.E.2d

at 397. We reached this conclusion even though the record

established that the accomplice had actually handled the

murder weapon at some point and there was no direct evidence

that Eaton fired the fatal shot killing the victim, but only

that he had used the same weapon to shoot others both before

and afterwards. Id. at 241-42, 397 S.E.2d at 388-89.

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Andrews, as we must when the issue is whether the circuit

court erred in refusing an instruction proffered by the

defendant, Porter, 276 Va. at 241, 661 S.E.2d at 434, as in

Eaton, we can find no evidence in the record which would take

Andrews’ theory that some other person might have been the

sole immediate perpetrator of either or both murders out of

the realm of pure conjecture. Andrews cannot, for example,

rely on Berry’s subsequent statement to the 911 operator that

he and the others had been shot by “[a] couple of black males”

to support the contention that a second perpetrator was

65
involved in the shootings, because as Andrews’ own theory

makes plain, Berry lost consciousness after the first shot was

fired. Thus, Berry’s statement, like Andrews’ theory, is one

of conjecture, not fact.

Similarly, the evidence that a second weapon was used to

shoot Head does not provide the necessary evidence to show

that his death was solely the result of actions taken by

someone other than Andrews. Even accepting that the evidence

that two weapons were used in the crime is a strong indication

that there were at least two perpetrators, the evidence also

establishes that Head’s death would have resulted individually

from wounds inflicted by either weapon.

“That there may be more than one principal in the first

degree for a particular offense is beyond dispute.” Muhammad

v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 482, 619 S.E.2d 16, 33 (2005),

cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136 (2006); see also Coppola v.

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257, 257 S.E.2d 797, 806-07 (1979),

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980). Thus, evidence that a

second weapon was used in the shooting of Head is not

sufficient, in light of all the evidence, to establish that

someone other than Andrews was the sole immediate perpetrator

in the murder of Head.

As in Eaton, the absence of direct evidence that Andrews

fired the shots that killed Head and Morrison is not evidence

66
that Crawford or some other person did so; it is merely a

circumstance that permits the mere conjecture that this might

have been the case. Moreover, unlike in Eaton, where the

evidence established that the accomplice had actually handled

the murder weapon at some point, there is no evidence that

Crawford ever had a .25 caliber Titan automatic pistol in his

possession, let alone that he took possession of the gun used

to shoot Berry from Andrews in the brief space of time between

the shooting of Berry and the murders of Head and Morrison.

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in

refusing to give Instruction EE.

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that

Andrews has not demonstrated that there was any reversible

error in the conduct of the guilt-determination phase of his

trial. Accordingly, we will affirm his convictions for

capital murder.

V. PENALTY-DETERMINATION PHASE ISSUES

A. Convictions Under Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and 18.2-31(8)

As stated in the opening brief, the sole assignment of

error that Andrews addresses under his first question

presented is:

17. The trial court erred in overruling Andrews’
objection to the imposition of four death sentences.

67
As indicated in the question presented, “Andrews’ objection to

the imposition of four death sentences” was that two of the

death sentences were being imposed for identical conduct

charged under separate subsections of Code § 18.2-31 in

violation of the double jeopardy prohibition of multiple

punishments. Specifically, Andrews contends that he cannot be

convicted and punished under both Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and -

31(8) because both offenses were proven based upon the

concurrent murders of Head and Morrison.

The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy,

enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment, consists of three separate constitutional

protections. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717

(1969). “It protects against a second prosecution for the

same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second

prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it

protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”

Id. (footnotes omitted). The present case involves the third

protection because Andrews’ convictions, and the death

sentences that resulted, occurred in a single trial. Blythe

v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 796, 797-98

(1981). “In the single-trial setting, ‘the role of the

constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court

does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing

68
multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” Id. at 725, 284

S.E.2d at 798 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165

(1977)).

“ ‘[T]he question whether punishments imposed by a court

after a defendant’s conviction upon criminal charges are

unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without

determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has

authorized.’ ” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344

(1981) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688

(1980)). The issue is whether “[t]he General Assembly has

clearly indicated its intent to impose multiple punishments”

for the defendant’s conduct. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va.

513, 530, 273 S.E.2d 36, 47 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.

1011 (1981).

In some cases, the legislative intent to impose multiple

punishments is unambiguous because the statute in question

makes that intent clear. Thus, in Turner we distinguished

Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), and concluded

that the General Assembly intended to punish both capital

murder during the commission of robbery while armed with a

deadly weapon under Code § 18.2-31(4) and the use of a firearm

in the commission of a felony under Code § 18.2-53.1, because

the latter statute expressly provided that the offense it

defined “shall constitute a separate and distinct felony” from

69
the predicate offense. Turner, 221 Va. at 530, 273 S.E.2d at

47.

Even where the Code does not expressly provide for

separately defined crimes to be subject to individual

punishments, we may nonetheless conclude that crimes with

common elements are subject to multiple punishments if the

overall context in which those statutes were enacted clearly

shows such legislative intent. Thus, in Fitzgerald v.

Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 292 S.E.2d 798 (1982), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 1228 (1983), we concluded that the forms of

capital murder which required proof of another felony as a

predicate gradation offense did not bar the Commonwealth from

seeking to punish both the murder and the predicate offense.

We reviewed the capital murder statutory scheme and its

legislative history and concluded that the “overriding

purpose” of the various homicide statutes is gradation. We

explained that “[t]he General Assembly grades murder in order

to assign punishment consistent with prevailing societal and

legal views of what is appropriate and procedurally fair.”

Id. at 636, 292 S.E.2d at 810. Because of this overriding

purpose, we concluded that there was “no legislative intent to

eliminate punishment for other offenses included in the

[capital] murder statute[] solely for the purpose of

categorizing the murder” as one subject to the possible

70
imposition of the death penalty. Id. Accordingly, we held

that in enacting the separate subsections of Code § 18.2-31

that included predicate felonies such as rape, abduction, or

robbery, the General Assembly did not intend “any elimination

of underlying sentencing authority” to punish those predicate

gradation offenses along with the offense of capital murder.

Id. at 636-37, 292 S.E.2d at 810.

In Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 509 S.E.2d 293

(1999), we concluded that a defendant could be subject to more

than one death sentence for the killing of one person if he

was charged under separate subsections of Code § 18.2-31 and

the evidence established that in committing the murder he had

committed the separate predicate gradation offenses of those

subsections. Id. at 227-28, 509 S.E.2d at 300-01 (holding

that double jeopardy did not bar imposition of two death

sentences for the capital murder of the victim during the

commission of robbery, Code § 18.2-31(4), and the commission

of rape, Code § 18.2-31(5)). We further concluded in Payne

that the General Assembly also intended to authorize multiple

punishments for the same murder charged under two counts of

the same subsection of Code § 18.2-31 if the evidence

established that in the commission of the offense the accused

committed two separate and distinct gradation offenses defined

in the subsection. Id. at 228, 509 S.E.2d at 301 (holding

71
that commission of attempted rape and object sexual

penetration of the victim, both gradation offenses of Code

§ 18.2-31(5), permitted the imposition of a death sentence for

each offense).

In Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 509-10, 544

S.E.2d 360, 364-65 (2001), we further explained that in

defining the nature of an offense that would elevate first

degree murder to capital murder, the General Assembly has

focused on several different types of gradation criteria. In

Fitzgerald and Payne, the gradation criterion was the

concurrent commission of another felony. In Burlile, we noted

that other capital murder offenses were defined by gradation

criteria involving “the status of the defendant” or the

“status of the victim.” Id. at 509, 544 S.E.2d at 364. see

also Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290, 309, 645 S.E.2d 448,

460 (2007). The foregoing cases demonstrate that there is

nothing inherently offensive to principles of double jeopardy

when a defendant is charged with multiple counts of capital

murder, as well as other felonies, arising out of one set of

operative facts.

The gradation criterion of Code § 18.2-31(7) is proof of

a predicate felony, the commission of a murder in the same act

or transaction in which another, or several other, murders

occur. The gradation criterion of Code § 18.2-31(8) likewise

72
requires proof of the commission of at least two murders

within a three-year period, each of which would constitute a

predicate felony. It is obvious, however, that in many

instances the same operative facts would be sufficient to

prove either offense. In this sense, both offenses can be

viewed as having gradation criteria defining the status of the

defendant as having committed multiple homicides.

Although we have previously considered at least four

prior appeals in which a defendant was convicted under

indictments charging him with violations of Code §§ 18.2-31(7)

and –31(8), we have not had occasion to address whether

convictions under both subsections based on the same operative

facts would violate the double jeopardy prohibition against

multiple punishments. In Burlile, for example, although the

defendant had been convicted of violations of Code §§ 18.2-

31(7) and –31(8), he limited his appeal to whether proof of

his guilt under Code § 18.2-31(8) required proof that he was

the immediate perpetrator of every murder included in the

indictment for that offense. 17 Burlile, 261 Va. at 506, 544

17
In addition to Burlile, Gray and Zirkle v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 631, 553 S.E.2d 520 (2001), also
involved circumstances in which the constituent crimes
supporting the indictments for each offense were the same and
occurred as part of the same act or transaction. As in

73
S.E.2d at 362. Thus, this case presents an issue of first

impression as to whether the General Assembly intended through

its enactment of Code § 18.2-31(8) to permit the punishment of

the commission of two or more murders that occur within a

three-year period as a separate offense when all of the

constituent crimes for that offense also occur as part of the

same act or transaction and the defendant is also convicted

and punished for capital murder under Code § 18.2-31(7) in the

same trial.

Andrews concedes that at the time of his indictment for

these offenses, there was no potential double jeopardy issue

because the indictment charging him with violation of Code

§ 18.2-31(8) included the murder of Breeding as one of the

constituent murders occurring within a three-year period, and

that offense was not a constituent murder under the indictment

charging Andrews with violation of Code § 18.2-31(7).

Burlile, in neither case did the defense choose to assert a
claim based on multiple punishment double jeopardy in
challenging the death sentences and, thus, the issue was not
before us. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 263 Va. 13, 557 S.E.2d
223 (2002), one of the constituent crimes upon which the Code
§ 18.2-31(8) conviction was founded was separate from and
unrelated to the two murders that supported the conviction
under Code § 18.2-31(7). Multiple punishment double jeopardy
was thus not an issue in Smith, as it would not have been in
this case had Andrews been convicted of Breeding’s murder.

74
However, once he had been acquitted of Breeding’s murder,

Andrews contends that the jury’s decision to convict under the

indictment for violation of Code § 18.2-31(8) necessarily must

have been premised only on the murders of Head and Morrison

and, thus, was based upon the same evidence used to sustain

his conviction under Code § 18.2-31(7). In this context, he

contends that he has been subjected to impermissible multiple

punishments for two offenses based upon the same operative

facts.

Asserting that claims of double jeopardy are resolved

based on an abstract analysis of the applicable statutes,

rather than the specific facts of the individual case, Coleman

v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 196, 200, 539 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2001),

the Commonwealth responds that multiple death sentences for

convictions under Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and –31(8) do not offend

the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments.

This is so, the Commonwealth asserts, because each offense

requires proof of a fact that the other does not under the

test prescribed for analyzing such cases by Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also Payne, 257

Va. at 228, 509 S.E.2d at 300. Specifically, the Commonwealth

notes that under Code § 18.2-31(7) it was required to prove

that Andrews committed multiple murders as part of the same

act or transaction, while under Code § 18.2-31(8) it was

75
required to prove only that he committed two or more murders

within a three-year period.

Andrews contends, however, that even when viewed in the

abstract, a conviction under Code § 18.2-31(8) does not

require proof of any fact that is not also required to prove a

violation of Code § 18.2-31(7) when the predicate murders for

that offense occur, as in this case, as part of a continuous

act in immediate succession. This is so, he contends, because

it is “impossible for two killings to be so closely related in

time as to satisfy the ‘same act or transaction’ requirement

without occurring within three years of one another.”

In all our prior cases interpreting the capital murder

statute in which we have been required to consider whether the

General Assembly intended for a defendant to be subject to

multiple punishments in the same trial for conduct that met

the criteria for more than one offense, we have either been

confronted with circumstances, such as in Turner, where the

legislature gave clear and unambiguous guidance on the issue

through the language of one of the statutes at issue, or

instances where the proscribed conduct as defined clearly

required proof of different elements as in Fitzgerald, holding

that rape and robbery and a murder committed in the commission

of those crimes could all be punished separately, and Payne,

holding that murder of one person that occurred in the

76
commission of multiple distinct and separate predicate

gradation felonies could result in multiple punishments. But

we have not heretofore addressed a circumstance, as in this

case, where the General Assembly has defined two gradation

criteria for elevating first degree murder to capital murder

which can each be satisfied by proof that also would be

sufficient to sustain the other. To resolve this question, we

look to the current capital murder statutory scheme and its

legislative history to determine whether the General Assembly

intended for multiple punishments to be available in this

circumstance. Fitzgerald, 223 Va. at 635-37, 292 S.E.2d at

810; see also Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 96-97, 372

S.E.2d 377, 381-82 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009 (1989).

While the Commonwealth is correct that under Blockburger

the analysis of whether multiple punishments are authorized by

legislative act is to be conducted in the abstract, rather

than by reference to the specific facts of the case under

review, that analysis does not take place in a vacuum, and it

does not follow that our analysis begins with the test set out

in that case. Rather, before applying the Blockburger test,

we first consider whether “the legislative intent is clear

from the face of the statute or the legislative history,” and

if so, then “the Blockburger rule is not controlling.”

Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985); see also

77
Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310, 313, 337 S.E.2d 711, 713

(1985) (holding that “the Blockburger test . . . need not be

applied when the intent of the legislature can be gleaned from

a reading of the relevant statutes”). Thus, while Blockburger

can provide an efficient mechanism to parse statutory language

in order to determine the legislature’s intent with regard to

whether multiple punishments are permitted for conduct

chargeable under more than one code section, it is not the

sole, or in many cases, the primary tool of statutory

construction used to determine that intent. As the United

States Supreme Court has observed, “it would be difficult to

contend otherwise without converting what is essentially a

factual inquiry as to legislative intent into a conclusive

presumption of law” that any differentiation in the language

defining the elements of an offense would authorize multiple

punishments for otherwise undifferentiated conduct. Garrett,

471 U.S. at 779 In short, “[w]here the same conduct violates

two statutory provisions, the first step in the double

jeopardy analysis is to determine whether the legislature

. . . intended that each violation be a separate offense.”

Id.; accord Brown, 230 Va. at 313, 337 S.E.2d at 713.

78
 Code § 18.2-31(7) was first enacted as Code § 18.2-31(g)

in 1981. 18 1981 Acts ch. 607. Code § 18.2-31(8) was added to

the capital murder statute in 1996. 1996 Acts ch. 959. In

the interim, we had determined that the offense defined by

Code § 18.2-31(7) required the Commonwealth to “allege more

than one killing in a single-count indictment” in order “to

supply the numerical ingredient necessary to charge capital

murder.” Morris v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 206, 210, 321 S.E.2d

633, 635 (1984). However, we also held in Morris that “[i]t

d[id] not follow . . . that such an indictment will support

multiple convictions or sentences.” Id.

In Woodfin, we also parsed the language of Code § 18.2-

31(7), holding that “the phrase ‘same act or transaction’

. . . is synonymous with ‘same criminal episode.’ In other

words, two offenses arise out of the ‘same act or transaction’

if they are connected so closely ‘in time, place and

circumstance that a complete account of one charge cannot be

related without relating details of the other charge.’ ”

Woodfin, 236 Va. at 92, 372 S.E.2d at 379 (quoting State v.

Boyd, 533 P.2d 795, 799 (Ore. 1975) and State v. Fitzgerald,

18
To avoid confusion, we will hereinafter refer to Code
§ 18.2-31(7) by its current designation.

79
516 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Ore. 1973)) (internal citation omitted).

We concluded that where the “two murders were committed at the

same location, about the same time, and under the same

circumstances” the statute was not unconstitutionally vague

because the “defendant reasonably should have been on notice

that the statute applied to his actions.” Id. at 92-93, 327

S.E.2d at 379.

In Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d 757

(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990), we further

examined the scope of Code § 18.2-31(7). Our discussion of

the statute’s application with regard to the distinction

between what the Commonwealth may charge by way of multiple

indictments for capital murder, and whether it also may obtain

multiple punishments in the trial on those indictments, is

particularly instructive:

[Code § 18.2-31(7)] describe[s] capital murder
as the “willful, deliberate, premeditated killing of
more than one person as a part of the same act or
transaction.” This means that it took the killing
of at least two people as part of the same act or
transaction to constitute one capital murder under
[Code § 18.2-31(7)]. Here, four people were killed;
thus, there was the theoretical possibility that
Buchanan could be convicted of two capital murders.
The critical issue is how many acts or transactions
were involved. If all four individuals were killed
in one act or transaction, Buchanan could only be
convicted of one capital murder. If two individuals
were killed as part of one act or transaction and
the two others were killed as part of a second,
different act or transaction, then Buchanan could be
convicted of two capital murders.

80
 But the theoretical limitation on the number of
possible capital murder convictions that can be
supported by four murders does not control the way
in which the Commonwealth can frame indictments.
The Commonwealth is free to indict an individual for
as many separate crimes as the Commonwealth, in good
faith, thinks it can prove. Further, the
Commonwealth is free to charge the commission of a
single offense in several different ways in order to
meet the contingencies of proof. See Bryant v.
Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 315, 53 S.E.2d 54, 56
(1949); R. Bacigal, Virginia Criminal Procedure
§ 13-6 (1983). The indictments of which Buchanan
complains were proper. The Commonwealth was not
required to make an election.

Id. at 397, 384 S.E.2d at 762.

We went on to conclude that while Buchanan would have

been subject to at most two death sentences for capital murder

in violation of Code 18.2-31(7), “if he had been so convicted,

there could not have been any overlap in the two pairs of

murder victims on which the convictions were based” in order

for the Commonwealth to have sought and obtained separate

punishments for the two convictions. Id. at 398, 384 S.E.2d

at 763. We also concluded that Buchanan’s conviction and

death sentence for the capital murder of the predicate victim

in the same act or transaction as the other three murders

barred a separate conviction and sentence for the first degree

murder of that victim as an impermissible multiple punishment

in violation of double jeopardy. Accordingly, we vacated the

81
life sentence imposed for the latter offense. Id. at 415, 384

S.E.2d at 772-73.

“In ascertaining legislative intent, we presume that the

General Assembly, when enacting new laws, is fully aware of

the state of existing law relating to the same general subject

matter.” Gillespie v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 753, 758, 636

S.E.2d 430, 432 (2006) (citations omitted). In Gillespie, we

further indicated that when amending the existing capital

murder statutes “[t]he General Assembly is not only presumed

to have been aware of the capital murder statutes . . . but is

also presumed to have been aware of our decisions construing

them.” Id. at 759, 636 S.E.2d at 432.

Thus, in 1996 when the General Assembly enacted Code

§ 18.2-31(8), it was aware from Woodfin that we had

interpreted Code § 18.2-31(7) as permitting the Commonwealth

to punish as capital murder the killing of two or more persons

where the murders “are connected so closely ‘in time, place

and circumstance that a complete account of one charge cannot

be related without relating details of the other charge.’ ”

236 Va. at 92, 372 S.E.2d at 379. Likewise, it was aware from

Morris that the indictment for that offense required the

inclusion of two or more murders “to supply the numerical

ingredient necessary to charge capital murder.” 228 Va. at

210, 321 S.E.2d at 635. Finally, and most significantly,

82
Buchanan would have informed the General Assembly that, while

the Commonwealth was free to put forth in separate indictments

as many different theories of the crime that “in good faith,

[it] thinks it can prove” and “to charge the commission of a

single offense in several different ways in order to meet the

contingencies of proof,” 238 Va. at 397, 384 S.E.2d at 762,

once the evidence had established the particulars of the

crime, the Commonwealth could seek to obtain only one

punishment under Code § 18.2-31(7) for all of the deaths that

were part of “the same act or transaction.”

Given this state of the law at the time Code § 18.2-31(8)

was enacted, we hold that the General Assembly could not have

intended to create a separate offense of capital murder under

which a defendant could be punished for the same conduct for

which he also could be punished under Code § 18.2-31(7). To

accept the Commonwealth’s position that an abstract

application of the Blockburger test requires us to find that

the legislature intended to allow for two punishments for the

same conduct, we would in effect be required to read Code

§ 18.2-31(8) as defining as capital murder the killing of more

than one person within a three-year period without regard to

whether such killings occur as part of the same act or

transaction. We do not believe that such a reading of the

statute would be consistent with our application of Code

83
§ 18.2-31(7) permitting only one punishment thereunder for all

murders that are part of one act or transaction, nor are we

permitted to imply a meaning not found on the face of the

statute by adding words not used by the General Assembly to

obtain that result. See Burlile, 261 Va. at 511, 544 S.E.2d

at 365.

In summary, we conclude that the Commonwealth is free to

indict the defendant under Code § 18.2-31(8) for the murder of

more than one person within a three-year period when each of

the constituent murders occurred as part of the same act or

transaction, and also indict the defendant for capital murder

under Code § 18.2-31(7) for the same murders. However, if the

Commonwealth obtains convictions on both indictments it may

not seek to have separate punishments imposed for each

offense. Rather it must elect which indictment it will

proceed upon in the penalty-determination phase of the trial. 19

For these reasons, we hold that the imposition of two death

19
Nothing in this opinion should be construed as barring
the Commonwealth from seeking to convict and punish a
defendant for capital murder under both Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and
–31(8) where, as in Smith, the evidence proves that one or
more of the constituent killings that form the basis of the
latter offense occurred as part of a separate act or
transaction from the constituent killings that support the
indictment under the former.

84
sentences upon Andrews for the convictions under Code §§ 18.2-

31(7) and -31(8) violated the double jeopardy prohibition

against multiple punishments for the same offense.

Andrews asserts that “[u]nder these conditions, the

remedy is to set aside one of the capital murder convictions.”

In a typical case where a defendant has been subject to

impermissible multiple punishments, “the only remedy

consistent with [the legislature’s] intent is for the [trial

court], where the sentencing responsibility resides, to

exercise its discretion to vacate one of the underlying

convictions.” Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864

(1985). In the present case, however, because of other errors

in the penalty-determination phase of Andrews’ trial that

require that all four death sentences be vacated, the

appropriate remedy is to direct that upon remand the circuit

court shall require the Commonwealth to elect between the

convictions under Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and –31(8), proceeding on

only one in the new penalty determination proceeding. The

circuit court thereafter shall vacate the other conviction.

B. Victim Impact Evidence

As stated in the opening brief, the assignments of error

that Andrews purports to address under his seventh question

presented are:

85
 18. The trial court erred in denying Andrews’ Motion
for New Trial.

23. The trial court erred in allowing victim impact
testimony at the guilt/innocence phase regarding an
extraneous and unrelated shooting.

24. The trial court erred in allowing victim impact
testimony at the penalty stage of trial regarding an
extraneous and unrelated shooting.

25. The trial court erred in allowing Sheila Kennedy
to testify.

31. The court erred in denying Andrews’ Second
Motion for New Trial.

32. The trial court erred in not ordering a new
trial based upon the cumulative prejudice that was
created by the legal errors in this case.

75. The trial court erred in allowing Rutherford
Berry to testify that after the shootings he left
the Washington area for safety reasons.

76. The trial court erred in permitting testimony at
the guilt/innocence phase regarding the impact of
the alleged offenses upon the victim(s).

Andrews contends that the circuit court erred in

permitting the victim impact testimony of four witnesses —

Rutherford Berry, Miram Benson, Dinesh Jasani, and Sheila

Kennedy. Because Andrews raised no objection to the alleged

victim impact testimony of Berry or any other witness during

the guilt-determination phase, assignments of error 23, 75,

and 76 were not preserved for appeal. Rule 5:25. Andrews

also presented no argument during the penalty-determination

phase regarding the alleged victim impact testimony of Benson

86
and Jasani. Accordingly, we will not address Andrews’

arguments as to these two witnesses. Id. Furthermore,

Andrews presents no express argument on brief of the issues

asserted in assignments of error 31 and 32. Thus, these

assignments of error have been abandoned. Rule 5:17(c)(4);

Rule 5:27. Finally, because Andrews did not argue at trial

that Sheila Kennedy’s testimony violated his constitutional

rights, we will limit our analysis of assignments of error 18,

24, and 25 to whether Sheila Kennedy’s victim impact testimony

violated Virginia law.

Two days after the murders of Head and Morrison, Andrews

allegedly committed a robbery and shooting at a Stafford

County convenience store. The particulars of those events

were subsequently recounted at Andrews’ trial. Jasani, the

owner of the store, testified that he and Gary Kennedy were

working behind the counter when Andrews entered the store,

announced his intent to commit robbery, and shot Kennedy in

the head. Tiffany Lashea Hawthorn-Dorsey, a patron of the

store during the robbery, also testified that Andrews shot

Kennedy. Kennedy, who survived the shooting, did not testify.

According to Stafford County Circuit Court records, the

charges against Andrews arising from the robbery and attempted

capital murder of Kennedy were dismissed on the Commonwealth’s

motion for nolle prosequi on February 28, 2006.

87
 Before Sheila Kennedy, Gary Kennedy’s daughter,

testified, Andrews’ counsel asked for a proffer of her

testimony. The Commonwealth responded, “Victim’s impact, the

effect the shooting has had on Mr. Kennedy, the effect it’s

had on her family.” Andrews’ counsel then objected to

Kennedy’s testimony on the basis that she was not a statutory

victim of the offense for which Andrews was on trial. The

circuit court overruled the objection.

When asked about the impact of the shooting on her

father, Kennedy testified:

He’s got a permanent speech problem. His
equilibrium is off. . . . He’s lost a lot of
weight. He’s on Cumadin for the rest of his life
because he has a blood clot in his left leg, and he
has a filter. He’ll never, ever be able to work
with heating and air conditioning ever again. It’s
been a big impact on him.

She later added, “he doesn’t have feeling in his right arm or

his hand, so he can’t hold my children unless he’s sitting

down” and “he can’t walk a long distance without getting out

of breath. He can’t walk up hills and stuff. He just usually

stays at home, and I don’t think he has the motivation [to

work] anymore.” Kennedy also testified about the effect the

shooting had on her:

Every time I look at him it hurts me . . . because
he doesn’t smile like he used to smile. He could
tell you a joke and smile . . . and now he just – he
tries. . . . My dad was my everything.

88
 Following Kennedy’s testimony, Andrews’ counsel argued

that Gary Kennedy was not a victim of the charged crimes and

that there was no statutory provision to allow victim impact

testimony related to an unadjudicated criminal act. The

circuit court responded, “I’ve already ruled on that. Let’s

move on.” Prior to closing arguments, Andrews’ counsel

renewed the objection, asking the court to preclude the

Commonwealth from referring to Kennedy’s testimony on the

basis that “she was not a statutory victim with regard to

these charges.” The court again overruled the objection.

On appeal, Andrews contends that by testifying to the

impact of crimes other than the capital crimes for which

Andrews was being sentenced, Kennedy’s testimony went beyond

the scope of victim impact testimony allowed by Code § 19.2-

264.4. According to Andrews, the plain language of Code

§ 19.2-264.4 limits victim impact testimony to “the impact of

the offense upon the victim,” meaning the capital murder

offense for which the defendant is on trial. (Emphasis

added.)

The Commonwealth does not expressly respond to these

assertions. Instead, the Commonwealth asserts that Andrews

waived the victim impact issue because he did not object at

trial that Kennedy’s testimony was improper victim impact

testimony. The Commonwealth maintains that even if Andrews

89
had objected he cannot show prejudice from Kennedy’s testimony

which in lieu of live testimony from Gary Kennedy was

sanitized to avoid provoking an unduly emotional response from

the jury.

As an initial matter, we find that Andrews properly

preserved the issue of whether Sheila Kennedy’s testimony

would be proper victim impact evidence in a capital murder

trial with the objections Andrews’ counsel made before and

after she testified. Furthermore, our analysis of this issue

would be the same whether Sheila or Gary Kennedy testified.

Accordingly, the relevant issue is whether the circuit court

erred in admitting victim impact evidence arising from an

unrelated crime over Andrews’ objection. If the evidence was

improperly admitted, the burden would not be upon Andrews to

show that its admission was prejudicial, but upon the

Commonwealth to show that the court’s error in admitting the

evidence was harmless because no prejudice could have

resulted.

In Virginia, “the death penalty may not be imposed unless

the trier of fact finds one or both of the two aggravating

factors that we have referred to as ‘vileness’ and ‘future

dangerousness.’ ” Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 149,

547 S.E.2d 186, 201 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094

(2002). We have held that evidence of unadjudicated criminal

90
conduct is admissible to determine a defendant’s future

dangerousness because it has a tendency to show that the

accused would commit criminal acts of violence in the future.

See Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 64-65, 515 S.E.2d 565,

571 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000); Stockton v.

Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 209-10, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206 (1991),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991). We have also held that

victim impact testimony regarding a capital offense is

admissible because it is probative of the depravity of mind

component of the vileness predicate. See Weeks v.

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90 (1994),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829 (1995). Victim impact testimony

regarding unadjudicated criminal conduct, however, is not

relevant to the vileness predicate because the testimony

concerns an offense unrelated to the capital offense upon

which the defendant is being sentenced.

Code § 19.2-264.4, in pertinent part, provides that:

A. Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of an
offense which may be punishable by death, a
proceeding shall be held which shall be limited to a
determination as to whether the defendant shall be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . .

A1. In any proceeding conducted pursuant to this
section, the court shall permit the victim, as
defined in § 19.2-11.01, upon the motion of the
attorney for the Commonwealth, and with the consent
of the victim, to testify in the presence of the
accused regarding the impact of the offense upon the
victim.

91
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of this statute limits

victim impact testimony to “the impact of the offense,”

referring to an “offense which may be punishable by death.”

Accordingly, as a matter of law, victim impact testimony at a

proceeding held in a capital murder trial to determine whether

the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment

is limited to the testimony of the victims, as defined in Code

§ 19.2-11.01(B), of the capital offense for which the

defendant has been found guilty. 20

In this case, neither Kennedy nor her father was a victim

of the capital murders for which Andrews had been found

guilty. Kennedy’s testimony, by the Commonwealth’s own

admission at trial, was solely presented as victim impact

testimony of unrelated and unadjudicated criminal conduct. We

therefore hold that the circuit court erred in admitting

Kennedy’s testimony. Moreover, because it is self-evident

that the jury could have based its penalty-determination

verdict imposing the death sentences on Andrews based in part

20
Generally, the victim is defined in Code § 19.2-
11.01(B) as a person “who has suffered physical, psychological
or economic harm” as the result of the commission of a
criminal act and includes, among others, the child of that
person.

92
on consideration of this improperly admitted evidence, we

cannot say that this error was harmless. Accordingly, we must

vacate the death sentences and remand the case for a new

penalty-determination proceeding.

Because we have determined that there was reversible

error in the penalty-determination phase of Andrews’ trial

which will necessitate a remand for a new penalty-

determination proceeding, we need not conduct the inquiry

prescribed by Code § 17.1-313(C) “[w]hether the sentence of

death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or

any other arbitrary factor” and “[w]hether the sentence of

death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed

in similar cases, considering both the crime and the

defendant.” Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 179-80, 510

S.E.2d 445, 457 (1999). Nonetheless, we will briefly address

additional issues concerning the conduct of the penalty-

determination phase of the trial that are likely to have

relevance on remand. Id. at 180, 510 S.E.2d at 457; see also

Powell, 261 Va. at 535, 552 S.E.2d at 357.

C. Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence

As stated in the opening brief, the assignments of error

that Andrews addresses under his eighth question presented

are:

93
 29. The trial court erred in preventing Andrews from
introducing relevant and material testimony from
Gary Bass of the Virginia Department of Corrections.

30. The trial court erred by excluding relevant
mitigating evidence.

113. The trial court erred in excluding the relevant
mitigating testimony of Caroline Long Burry at the
penalty phase.

115. The trial court erred in excluding mitigating
evidence of a poem that Andrews wrote.

116. The trial court erred in preventing Andrews
from admitting and publishing to the jury the box
containing his father’s remains as mitigation
evidence.

117. The trial court erred in preventing Andrews from
presenting relevant testimony to rebut the prosecution’s
allegation that Mr. Andrews would constitute a
“continuing serious threat to society.”

i. Admission of Cremains 21

Taymullah, Andrews’ mother, testified that when Andrews

was 14 years old, his father was murdered while on death row

in a penitentiary in Texas. After the father was cremated,

Taymullah suggested to her sons that they scatter their

father’s cremains at a local reservoir, but Andrews resisted

the idea. Instead, Andrews kept the box of cremains in his

21
Cremains, commonly referred to as ashes, are the human
remains collected following cremation of the body. See, e.g.,
Code § 54.1-2808.1; Shilling v. Baker, 279 Va. 720, 727-28,
691 S.E.2d 806, 810-11 (2010).

94
room and eventually carried them around in a backpack

“[e]verywhere he went.”

When Andrews’ counsel attempted to show the box of

cremains to the jury, the circuit court inquired about the

relevance of doing so. Andrews’ counsel acknowledged, “I’m

not trying to prove anything,” but maintained that the

cremains had a “dramatic effect” on Andrews’ life and that his

mother should be allowed to take the box of cremains from the

backpack and show it to the jury. The Commonwealth questioned

the probative value of showing the jury the cremains and

argued that it was “calculated purely to appeal to the emotion

of the jurors.” The court agreed that showing the jury the

box of cremains was “not probative of anything,” but ruled

that it would allow Taymullah to look inside the backpack and

identify the box of cremains as those that Andrews carried

around with him.

In accord with the circuit court’s ruling, Taymullah

looked inside Andrews’ backpack and testified that the black

box inside contained Andrews’ father’s cremains. Photographs

of the backpack and the black box then were introduced into

evidence without objection.

Andrews contends that the box of his father’s cremains is

“powerful mitigating evidence.” Apart from “squeamishness,”

Andrews maintains there was no reason for the circuit court to

95
prevent the jury from seeing this significant item of his life

history. Andrews asserts that if a defendant has “no right to

sanitize” the evidence against him, then the Commonwealth has

no right to sanitize a defendant’s mitigation evidence.

Andrews recognizes the unsettling and disturbing nature of

presenting physical evidence of human remains, but asserts

that the box of cremains is a critical part of his background

and character which the jury was entitled to see.

The Commonwealth responds that the effort to show the box

of cremains to the jury was probative of no particular fact

and was attempted only to provoke an emotional reaction from

the jury. The Commonwealth alleges that Andrews’ counsel

conceded this at trial with the statement, “I’m not trying to

prove anything.” In any event, the Commonwealth contends that

Andrews can show no prejudice from the circuit court’s ruling

in light of the testimony of his mother that he carried the

box of cremains around in his backpack.

After Taymullah testified, a photograph of the box was

entered into evidence. Thus, the jury was only denied the

opportunity to see the actual box of cremains. We cannot see,

nor has Andrews established, how showing the jury the actual

box of cremains would have any probative value. Accordingly,

we hold that the circuit court did not err in preventing the

jury from seeing the box of cremains.

96
 ii. Admission of Andrews’ Poem

Taymullah also testified that Andrews loved to write

poetry. Andrews’ counsel attempted to introduce into evidence

a poem that Andrews purportedly had written before the crimes:

I’ve been struggling in this smokeless fire for 19
years
over my lifetime I shed my pain through unwanted
tears
been through hell back burning since adalescence
[(sic)]
will I enter heaven or return for final destination
born into a world filled with complete darkness
didn’t understand love so my heart hardened
forereal forreal [(sic)]

The Commonwealth objected to the poem as hearsay. Andrews’

counsel argued that it was not hearsay because it was “not

offered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Rather, it was

“offered to show that he writes poems and things of that

nature.” The circuit court ruled that the poem was

inadmissible.

Andrews contends that the poem was not hearsay because it

was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted because

he was obviously not seeking to prove that he had been in “a

smokeless fire for 19 years” or that the world is “filled with

complete darkness.” Rather, Andrews maintains that the poem

was offered to reveal his character and to give the jurors a

glimpse of his personality. Moreover, Andrews asserts that

97
the poem was highly relevant to the jurors’ sentencing

decision and that “virtually no limits are placed on the

relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce

concerning his own circumstances.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542

U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (internal quotation mark omitted);

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). Andrews stresses

that since the Commonwealth repeatedly portrayed him as a

“killing machine,” it was error to exclude this evidence of

his “humanity, insight, thoughtfulness, and feelings.”

The Commonwealth responds that the poem was nothing more

than self-serving hearsay, not subject to cross-examination.

The Commonwealth also contends the poem was cumulative

evidence because it was not probative of any fact not

established by his mother’s testimony that Andrews wrote

poetry. The Commonwealth finally contends that Rule 5:25 bars

Andrews’ assertion that the content of the poem would

influence the jurors in their decision about whether his life

was worth preserving.

We have repeatedly held that “[a]n out-of-court statement

not admitted for ‘the truth of the matter asserted’ is not

hearsay, and therefore is not barred by the general rule

against the admissibility of hearsay.” Hodges v.

Commonwealth, 272 Va. 418, 432, 634 S.E.2d 680, 687 (2006).

In this case, the poem was offered as evidence of Andrews’

98
character; it therefore was not barred by the hearsay rule.

Moreover, Andrews should have been able to present the poem as

mitigating evidence against the Commonwealth’s remarks that

Andrews was a “killing machine.” Finally, the poem itself was

not cumulative of the fact that Andrews wrote poetry because

the jury was not given the opportunity to hear or read the

type of poetry Andrews wrote and give weight, if any, to its

mitigating effect. For these reasons, we hold that the

circuit court erred in excluding the poem from evidence, and

its admission will not be barred in the new penalty-

determination proceeding.

iii. Testimony of Gary Bass

The Commonwealth objected to the anticipated testimony of

Gary Bass, Chief of Operations for the Virginia Department of

Corrections. The Commonwealth argued that Bass’ anticipated

testimony about general prison conditions was prohibited under

our decision in Walker, 258 Va. at 70, 515 S.E.2d at 574-75,

excluding so-called “prison life” evidence. See also, e.g.,

Burns, 261 Va. at 338-40, 541 S.E.2d at 893; Cherrix v.

Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653, cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999). Andrews’ counsel responded that

Bass would testify to how co-defendants such as Andrews and

Crawford will not have contact with each other in prison.

Andrews’ counsel then made a specific proffer of Bass’

99
testimony concerning the various levels of prison security

that Andrews would be designated to if sentenced to life

without parole. The Commonwealth again objected to Bass’

proposed testimony, arguing that it was about general prison

conditions, which are not relevant to the future dangerousness

inquiry.

The circuit court limited Bass’ testimony to two

questions: (1) whether Bass was aware of policies and

procedures of management of inmates within the Department of

Corrections, and (2) whether steps will be taken to segregate

Andrews from an individual with whom he had a negative contact

in the past. During Bass’ testimony, the court allowed an

addition question: whether these policies of the Department

of Corrections have been successful in the past. The court

disallowed any additional questions regarding prison life

testimony.

During its closing argument, the Commonwealth made the

following statements:

If [Andrews] is given life in prison, one day
there’s going to be an error. Guards are going to
get too close, an inmate is going to get too close,
the door is going to be accidently left open and the
Defendant is going to act again.

. . . .

Now, if the Defendant is given life in prison, he’s
going to be in a prison. He’s going to have a day-

100
 to-day life. And who knows whether that’s good or
bad; I suspect it’s not (unintelligible).

But there’s always that possibility that during
the period in time that he’s imprisoned that he’ll
have a good day. Food[’s] better than it used to
be, a visitor came, guards didn’t hassle me today,
got to watch T.V., something. There’s a possibility
if the Defendant is given life in prison that he’s
going to have a good day.

He doesn’t deserve a good day. The victims
don’t get that. He took everything these victims
had and everything they ever will have. You see the
prison can’t treat him inhumanly. They’ve got to
treat him – they’ve got to feed him, they’ve got to
give him some recreation. They’ve got to take care
of him. There’s a possibility he’s going to have a
good day.

Andrews’ counsel moved the circuit court to reopen the

case and allow Bass to testify, arguing that the Commonwealth

“open[ed] the door” when it talked about “what [a] day in the

life of prison would be and how there could be a good day in

prison and discussed prison life testimony” that Andrews was

not allowed to provide. The court agreed to instruct the jury

to disregard the statements made by the Commonwealth

concerning prison life evidence and to consider only the

evidence “from Mr. Bass and the Department of Corrections.”

The circuit court then asked the Commonwealth’s Attorney

if he was going to make any references to prison life in his

rebuttal. The Commonwealth’s Attorney replied, “I am indeed.”

The court stated it would therefore give the instruction after

the closing arguments had concluded. Andrews’ counsel asked

101
that the Commonwealth not be allowed to make any further

argument regarding prison life during rebuttal. The court

responded, “We’ll see what he says. If he . . . says

something inappropriate, we’ll deal with it.”

During the Commonwealth’s rebuttal, the circuit court

overruled Andrews’ further objection to the interjection of

commentary on prison life after the Commonwealth asserted to

the jury that “[t]here is no safe haven for [Andrews.] There

is no locking him up and throwing away the key and forgetting

about it.” Before submitting the case to the jury, the court

instructed the jurors to “disregard any of [the

Commonwealth’s] arguments or statements regarding prison

life.”

We have consistently held that evidence of general prison

conditions is not relevant to the future dangerousness

inquiry. See Morva, 278 Va. at 350, 683 S.E.2d at 565;

Porter, 276 Va. at 247-52, 661 S.E.2d at 437-40; Juniper, 271

Va. at 427, 626 S.E.2d at 424. Accordingly, we reject

Andrews’ bare assertion that our prior cases were wrongly

decided and find that the circuit court properly excluded Bass

from testifying regarding general prison conditions such as

the various security measures utilized in maximum security

facilities. However, when the Commonwealth acknowledged that

it would reference general prison conditions during its

102
closing, the court should have been proactive and prohibited

the Commonwealth from doing so, instead of taking a “wait-and-

see” approach. Moreover, having already decided to give a

curative instruction after the first instance of improper

argument, the court clearly should have prevented the

Commonwealth from making any additional improper arguments of

the same type. 22

Having persuaded the circuit court to prevent Andrews

from presenting general prison life evidence, the Commonwealth

gained an unfair advantage in referring to prison conditions

in its closing. Even after the court had ruled that such

argument was improper, the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s emphatic

assertion that he would return to the topic in his rebuttal

demonstrates the importance the Commonwealth placed on this

aspect of its argument in impressing upon the minds of the

jurors the possibility that sentencing Andrews to life in

22
It is not necessary today to address whether the
Commonwealth “opened the door” to prison life evidence by
referring to general prison conditions in its closing
argument. Nevertheless, we observe that the doctrine of
“curative admissibility” allows a party to introduce otherwise
inadmissible evidence, such as prison life evidence, when
necessary to counter the effect of improper evidence or
argument previously presented by the other party. See
Elliott, 267 Va. at 417, 593 S.E.2d at 284.

103
prison would be inadequate to protect society or sufficiently

punish him for his crimes.

Because the necessity for remand on other grounds

effectively moots the question of whether the circuit court

properly exercised its discretion by only giving a curative

instruction to the jury rather than permitting Andrews to

reopen the case to allow Bass to testify on “prison life”

topics, we express no opinion thereon. However, we reiterate

that in this case it was plain error to delay giving the

instruction and to permit the Commonwealth to compound the

error that necessitated that instruction during its rebuttal

argument.

iv. Testimony of Dr. Caroline Long Burry

Andrews contends that the circuit court erred in

excluding relevant mitigating evidence from Dr. Caroline Long

Burry, associate professor at the University of Maryland’s

School of Social Work. Dr. Burry was prepared to testify

regarding the risk factors and protective factors that have

been identified by the Department of Justice as predictive of

future violent conduct in youth. Andrews’ counsel proffered

that once Dr. Burry identified those factors and established

the empirical framework, then it would be left to the jury to

determine which factors applied to Andrews and to determine

the mitigating value of those factors. Andrews’ counsel later

104
explained that Dr. Burry’s testimony was not offered to

predict future dangerousness, rather it was offered as

mitigation evidence to show Andrews’ “background and

circumstances as a child” and the likely violence in his

future based on the risk factors.

The circuit court excluded Dr. Burry’s testimony,

reasoning that her testimony, based solely on empirical data,

was not admissible because it is not particularized to

Andrews. The court, however, allowed Andrews to proffer a

record of Dr. Burry’s testimony.

Outside the presence of the jury, Dr. Burry testified to

the risk factors that the Department of Justice has identified

in youth that are predictive of future violent conduct.

Before doing so, Dr. Burry stressed that the risk factors are

cumulative, meaning an individual with more risk factors is

more prone to later violence. Dr. Burry identified individual

risk factors such as hyperactivity, lack of concentration,

restlessness, risk-taking, aggressiveness, early initiation of

violent behavior, nonviolent antisocial behavior, and

favorable attitudes toward antisocial or deviant behavior.

Dr. Burry next identified family risk factors such as parent

criminality, child neglect and abuse, parental substance

abuse, parent/child separation, and instability. Dr. Burry

further identified risk factors related to education, peer

105
groups, and community. Finally, Dr. Burry identified

counterbalancing protective factors such as intelligence,

positive social orientation, resilient temperament, and

attachment to pro-social family members that make future

violent conduct less likely even when risk factors are

present.

Andrews contends that given the mitigation evidence they

heard regarding his background, the jurors could have put

Andrews into a framework of risk factors versus protective

factors. Andrews maintains that Dr. Burry’s testimony would

have enabled the jury to understand that, through no fault of

his own, Andrews was subject to many of these risk factors.

For example, Dr. Burry testified that “none of these [risk

factors] are a youngster’s choice. You know, your family is

your family. You don’t choose to be maltreated. You don’t

choose to have a parent be a criminal or a parent abusing

substances.” Andrews asserts that Dr. Burry’s testimony would

have helped the jury to understand why his horrific and

traumatic background diminishes his moral culpability.

According to Andrews, this is the essence of mitigating

evidence and should not have been denied. See Penry v.

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“[E]vidence about the

defendant’s background and character is relevant because of

the belief, long held by . . . society, that defendants who

106
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged

background . . . may be less culpable than defendants who have

no such excuse.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Commonwealth responds that the circuit court properly

excluded Dr. Burry’s testimony. The Commonwealth contends her

evidence was not admissible to rebut the claim of Andrews’

future dangerousness because it was evidence about the

dangerousness of other offenders. Moreover, the Commonwealth

asserts that her testimony was not relevant because it related

to factors in juveniles that predict violent conduct, but it

was never proffered that her evidence would have any

scientific validity to predict that the then 27-year-old

Andrews would not be violent. Finally, the Commonwealth

maintains that the jurors needed no expert assistance in order

to determine whether the disturbing facts of Andrews’ life

provided a reason to sentence him to life instead of death.

We disagree.

A defendant in a capital case has the constitutional

right to present virtually unlimited relevant evidence in

mitigation. See Tennard and Lockett, supra. The Commonwealth

misconstrues the point of Dr. Burry’s mitigating evidence

testimony. As Andrews’ counsel made clear at trial, Dr.

Burry’s testimony was not offered as rebuttal to the future

dangerousness inquiry. Instead, Dr. Burry’s testimony was

107
offered to explain Andrews’ background and to show that the

person he is today was the product of forces beyond his

control. We are of opinion that this mitigating evidence

presents an issue regarding the weight of the evidence, a

question for the jury, rather than the admissibility or

relevance of the evidence. We hold that the circuit court

erred in excluding the testimony of Dr. Burry in its entirety.

Accordingly, upon remand, Andrews will be permitted to

introduce evidence such as that proffered generally by Dr.

Burry for the purpose of mitigation.

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

As stated in the opening brief, the assignments of error

that Andrews purports to address under his tenth question

presented are:

26. Andrews’ rights were violated when the
prosecutor made improper arguments that were based
upon facts not in evidence.

27. The trial court erred in refusing to
prevent the prosecutor from making improper
references to prison conditions during closing
arguments.

28. The prosecuting attorneys violated Andrews’
rights by making improper remarks that were
calculated to arouse prejudice and biases against
Andrews.

118. The prosecuting attorneys violated
Andrews’ rights by improperly purporting to speak
for the victims and their families in asking the
jury to return a sentence of death.

108
 119. The prosecuting attorneys violated
Andrews’ rights by referring to facts not in
evidence and using rhetoric intended to inflame the
passions and biases of the jury at the penalty
phase.

Because at the time of the errors alleged in assignments of

error 26, 28, and 119 Andrews failed to timely object, timely

ask for a cautionary instruction, or timely move for a

mistrial, we will not consider his arguments with regard to

these issues. Rule 5:25; Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va.

127, 148, 547 S.E.2d 186, 200-01 (2001), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 1094 (2002) (“Unless a defendant has made a timely motion

for a cautionary instruction or for a mistrial, we will not

consider his assignments of error alleging that improper

remarks were made by the prosecutor.”). Similarly, on brief

Andrews does not make a particularized argument concerning the

alleged error by the court “in refusing to prevent the

prosecutor from making improper references to prison

conditions during closing arguments” as a basis for finding

prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, despite having

concluded in the prior section of this opinion that the court

erred in permitting the Commonwealth to address prison life

conditions in its closing argument, we hold that Andrews has

waived his right to rely upon this issue, as stated in

assignment of error 27, to support his claim of prosecutorial

109
misconduct. Rule 5:17(c)(4); Rule 5:27. Thus, we will

address only assignment of error 118.

“ ‘The making of improper statements in argument is

reversible error, where such statements are so impressive as

to remain in the minds of the jurors and influence their

verdict.’ ” Kitze v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 283, 288, 435

S.E.2d 583, 585 (1993) (quoting McLane v. Commonwealth, 202

Va. 197, 205, 116 S.E.2d 274, 281 (1960)). In his opening

brief, Andrews provided a citation to the joint appendix

indicating the point in the closing argument he contends the

Commonwealth purported to speak on behalf of the victims and

their families. The citation provided, however, is to a

portion of Andrews’ counsel’s closing argument. We have

reviewed the Commonwealth’s entire closing argument and we

have concluded that Andrews’ argument is most likely directed

toward the following statement made by the Commonwealth toward

the end of its closing argument following the assertion that

Andrews would have “good days” in prison:

The victims don’t even get the prospect, the
possibility, they don’t get the prospect of a good
day, the possibility of that. They don’t get a
fraction of the life that this Defendant gets. They
get nothing. They don’t get the opportunity to cope
with their surroundings. He does. The victims[’]
lot in these cases are not even []comparable to the
Defendant. He gets life; they get death. It’s
really what we’re talking about here, folks. No one
can call that justice.

110
 It would mean that the value of the victims or
the dignity of the victims as compared to this
Defendant’s was exceedingly small. Exceedingly
small. There are victims and there’s families of
victims and those grief stricken survivors
confronted with butcher[y] of the Defendant – the
butchery of someone who’s near and dear.

What capital punishment says to those folks is
we take your loss seriously. We value these
victims. We know that these victims are filled with
rage and pain.

Contrary to Andrews’ assertion that the Commonwealth

purported to speak for the victims and their families, the

context of the prosecutor’s statements was a proper comment on

victim impact as it relates to the sentencing decision to be

made by the jury. Cf. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460,

476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 390 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829

(1995). Thus, based upon our review of the record, we cannot

say that Andrews was “substantially prejudiced” by the

prosecutor’s statement during closing argument. See Avent,

279 Va. at 204-05, 688 S.E.2d at 260-61.

VI. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we will affirm Andrews’ convictions

for capital murder and the other felony convictions and terms

of imprisonment imposed thereon. We will vacate the four

death sentences, and remand the case for a new penalty-

determination proceeding to be conducted consistent with the

views expressed in this opinion on the two convictions under

111
Code § 18.2-31(4) and, at the Commonwealth’s election, the

conviction under either Code § 18.2-31(7) or Code § 18.2-

31(8).

Record No. 100374 – Affirmed in part,
vacated in part,
and remanded.

Record No. 100375 – Affirmed.

112