Smith Mountain Supply v. Windstar Prop.

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and
Millette, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J.

SMITH MOUNTAIN BUILDING SUPPLY, LLC
                                         OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE
v.   Record Nos. 080651 and 080652        ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
                                            February 27, 2009
WINDSTAR PROPERTIES, LLC

             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
                    William N. Alexander, Judge

      In these appeals, we determine whether the trial court

erred in declaring invalid and unenforceable two mechanic's

liens without allowing the lien claimant to present evidence

that its inclusion in the memoranda of charges outside the 150-

day limitation period in Code § 43-4 was an "inaccuracy" within

the meaning of Code § 43-15.

                                  I

      The relevant facts are not in dispute.   Smith Mountain

Building Supply, LLC (Smith Mountain), supplied materials to a

general contractor for the construction of a home on each of two

properties owned by Windstar Properties, LLC (Windstar).    Smith

Mountain furnished materials to the jobs from June 24, 2005, to

March 9, 2006.   March 9, 2006 is the last day Smith Mountain

supplied materials to the jobs.   The 150-day limitation period

prescribed by Code § 43-4, therefore, is October 10, 2005,

through March 9, 2006.

      Smith Mountain filed its memoranda of mechanic's lien on

June 9, 2006.    The amount claimed on one of the memoranda is
$15,253.44.   The amount claimed on the other of the memoranda is

$51,835.34.   The charges for materials properly recoverable

during the 150-day limitation period are $1,422.80 and

$13,593.65, respectively.

                                II

     Smith Mountain filed two actions against Windstar to

enforce its mechanic's liens.   Windstar filed motions for

summary judgment, asserting that the mechanic's liens sought to

be enforced by Smith Mountain were invalid under Code § 43-4

because they included sums due for materials furnished more than

150 days prior to the last day on which materials were supplied

to the jobs preceding the filing of the memoranda.   Windstar

relied upon Carolina Builders Corp. v. Cenit Equity Co., 257 Va.

405, 512 S.E.2d 550 (1999).

     Smith Mountain opposed the motions for summary judgment,

asserting that its inclusion of sums due for materials furnished

outside the limitation period is an inaccuracy that does not

invalidate the liens under Code § 43-15 and that it was entitled

to present evidence that its inclusion of such sums was an

inaccuracy, rather than a mistake.   Smith Mountain relied upon

Reliable Constructors, Inc. v. CFJ Properties, 263 Va. 279, 559

S.E.2d 681 (2002).

     The trial court heard the two actions together and, upon

the pleadings, memoranda of the parties, and argument of


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counsel, granted Windstar's motions for summary judgment and

dismissed Smith Mountain's actions to enforce the mechanic's

liens.   The trial court determined that the inclusion of sums

for materials supplied outside the 150-day limitation period

rendered the mechanic's liens invalid and unenforceable.    The

trial court also determined that Reliable Constructors did not

apply.   We awarded Smith Mountain this appeal.

                                III

     Code § 43-4 provides, in pertinent part, that "no

memorandum filed . . . shall include sums due for labor or

materials furnished more than 150 days prior to the last day on

which labor was performed or material furnished to the job

preceding the filing of such memorandum."   Code § 43-15 provides

as follows:

     No inaccuracy in the memorandum filed, or in the
     description of the property to be covered by the lien,
     shall invalidate the lien, if the property can be
     reasonably identified by the description given and the
     memorandum conforms substantially to the requirements
     of §§ 43-5, 43-8 and 43-10, respectively, and is not
     wilfully false.

     On appeal, Smith Mountain contends that it should have been

permitted to present evidence to show that its inclusion of

charges outside the 150-day limitation period was an

"inaccuracy" within the meaning of Code § 43-15.   Smith Mountain

also contends that the two cases relied upon by the parties,

Carolina Builders and Reliable Constructors, "reflect two


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divergent rationals [sic] which cannot be reconciled."   Smith

Mountain asserts that substantial compliance is the appropriate

standard to apply in the present case.

     Windstar contends that Code § 43-4 must be strictly

construed and that Smith Mountain's inclusion of charges outside

the limitation period renders its mechanic's liens

unenforceable.   Windstar also contends that Code § 43-15 is not

applicable in, and that Reliable Constructors is distinguishable

from, the present case.

                                IV

     We do not agree with Smith Mountain that Carolina Builders

and Reliable Constructors cannot be reconciled, and we agree

with Windstar and with the trial court that, pursuant to

Carolina Builders, the mechanic's liens sought to be enforced by

Smith Mountain are invalid and unenforceable.   Therefore, we

will affirm the trial court's judgments invalidating the

mechanic's liens.

     In Carolina Builders, the builder filed a memorandum of

mechanic's lien for sums owed to it for materials it had

supplied for the construction of a residence.   257 Va. at 407,

512 S.E.2d at 550-51.   The memorandum included sums due for

materials furnished prior to the 150-day limitation period, and

one of the defendants in the builder's enforcement action filed

a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the lien was


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invalid under Code § 43-4.    Id. at 408, 512 S.E.2d at 551.     The

trial court agreed.    Id. at 409, 512 S.E.2d at 551.     In

affirming the judgment of the trial court, we concluded that the

150-day limitation period "is one of the prerequisites required

by Code § 43-4 in order to perfect a mechanic's lien," and we

cited the longstanding rule that "statutes dealing with the

existence and perfection of a mechanic's lien must . . . be

strictly construed."    Id. at 410-11, 512 S.E.2d at 552-53.     We

also noted that Code § 43-15 was not applicable.       Id. at 411

n.2, 512 S.E.2d at 553 n.2.

       In Reliable Constructors, a subcontractor that had supplied

labor and materials for plumbing and mechanical work to a travel

plaza construction project filed a memorandum of mechanic's

lien, which it sought to enforce.     263 Va. at 280, 559 S.E.2d at

682.   The memorandum included a claim for reimbursement of a

$250 fine that had been levied against the subcontractor by the

Commonwealth for failure to provide on-site hand-washing

facilities for the subcontractor's employees.       Id.   The

defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lien

was invalid under Code § 43-4 because the fine had been levied

prior to the 150-day limitation period.       Id. at 281, 559 S.E.2d

at 682.   The trial court agreed and dismissed the

subcontractor's enforcement action.     Id.   In reversing the

judgment of the trial court, we held that the subcontractor


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should have been permitted to present evidence that the

inclusion of the fine in the memorandum constituted an

inaccuracy within the meaning of Code § 43-15 and that the

inaccuracy was not willfully false.    Id. at 282, 559 S.E.2d at

682-83.

     In reaching our holding in Reliable Constructors, we noted

that "[t]he word 'inaccurate' is defined as:   'not accurate:    as

. . . containing a mistake or error.' "    Id. at 282-83, 559

S.E.2d at 682 (quoting Webster's Third New International

Dictionary 1139 (1986)).   Thus, we focused on the nature of the

sum erroneously included in the memorandum, and we distinguish

Reliable Constructors on this basis.   A fine is clearly not a

sum due for labor performed or materials furnished and is,

therefore, not recoverable by a mechanic's lien.   The inclusion

of a fine in a memorandum is akin to claming a larger sum than

the lien claimant's proof would support rather than a violation

of a statutory prerequisite to perfect a mechanic's lien.

     In the present case, Smith Mountain violated one of the

prerequisites required by Code § 43-4 in order to perfect its

mechanic's liens.   Code § 43-15 has no application.

                                 V

      We hold, therefore, that the inclusion in the memoranda of

charges for materials supplied outside the 150-day limitation

period in Code § 43-4 rendered Smith Mountain's mechanic's liens


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invalid and unenforceable and that the trial court did not err

in so ruling.   Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments of the

trial court.

                                                         Affirmed.




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