PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and
Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, 1 S.J.
HENRY MAGRUDER WILLIAMS
v. Record No. 021591 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
February 28, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that Code § 18.2-270 permits enhanced
punishment for driving under the influence (DUI), third offense,
when a defendant was not convicted of his second DUI offense at
the time he committed the third offense.
Henry M. Williams was indicted for the felony of operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, "after
having been convicted of two like offenses within ten years," in
violation of Code §§ 18.2-266 and –270. 2 He was convicted of the
offense following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City
of Richmond.
Williams appealed from his conviction to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Williams v.
Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 414, 415, 421, 565 S.E.2d 328, 329,
1
Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in the
hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of
his retirement on January 31, 2003.
2
Although Code § 18.2-270 has been amended since the date
of Williams' May 19, 2000 offense, the present version of the
331 (2002). The Court of Appeals concluded, among other things,
that Code § 18.2-270 does not require that a conviction for a
second DUI offense precede the commission of the third DUI
offense. Id. at 419, 565 S.E.2d at 330. The Court stated that
any "third or subsequent" conviction within the prescribed
statutory period "triggers the enhanced punishment" provision of
Code § 18.2-270. Id. Williams appeals.
The evidence before the trial court showed that in October
1994, Williams was convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond for driving while intoxicated, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-266. In March 2000, Williams was charged with driving
while intoxicated, second offense, and a trial was scheduled for
May 31, 2000. However, on May 19, 2000, the date of the present
offense, while awaiting trial for the March 2000 offense,
Williams was arrested and again charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol, second offense.
When Williams was convicted of the March 2000 offense, the
Commonwealth obtained a nolle prosequi of the charge arising
from the May 19, 2000 offense. Williams later was indicted in
the present case for the offense occurring on May 19, 2000.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, Williams
made a motion to strike on various grounds, including the
statute does not contain substantive changes affecting the issue
presented in this appeal.
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argument that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had been
convicted of two prior DUI offenses at the time he committed the
May 19, 2000 offense. The circuit court denied the motion and
convicted Williams of the offense charged in the amended
indictment.
On appeal to this Court, Williams again asserts that the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he
only had one prior DUI conviction when the May 19, 2000 offense
occurred. He argues that under the language of Code § 18.2-270,
elevation of an offense to a felony and the resulting
enhancement of punishment can occur only if a defendant has been
convicted of two previous offenses under Code § 18.2-266 at the
time the third offense is committed.
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the language of
former Code § 18.2-270 does not require that a person be
convicted of two prior DUI offenses before being charged with a
"third or subsequent offense." The Commonwealth contends that
the plain language of the statute demonstrates the General
Assembly's intent to authorize enhancement of punishment even
when a prior DUI offense has not resulted in a conviction before
the date of a new offense.
In determining the issue before us, we observe that
Williams does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to
support the trial court's determination that he violated Code
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§ 18.2-266. He only challenges the trial court's application of
the enhanced punishment provisions of Code § 18.2-270, which
resulted in the elevation of the charged DUI offense from a
misdemeanor to a Class 6 felony.
At the time of the present offense, Code § 18.2-270
provided certain enhanced penalties, including the following
relevant language:
Any person convicted of a third or subsequent offense
committed within ten years of an offense under § 18.2-
266 shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Under basic rules of statutory construction, we determine
the General Assembly's intent from the words contained in the
statute. Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677, 554 S.E.2d 88,
90 (2001); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 38, 41, 501 S.E.2d
391, 393 (1998). When the language of a statute is unambiguous,
courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may
not assign a construction that amounts to holding that the
General Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated.
Mozley v. Prestwould Bd. of Dirs., 264 Va. 549, 554, 570 S.E.2d
817, 820 (2002); Caprio v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 507, 511-12,
493 S.E.2d 371, 374 (1997).
The statutory language before us is unambiguous and
demonstrates the General Assembly's intent to authorize
punishment for a Class 6 felony when a defendant has committed
three or more DUI offenses under Code § 18.2-266 within a ten-
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year period. This punishment is activated, in the language of
the statute, by a defendant's conviction of a third or
subsequent "offense committed within ten years." The General
Assembly's use of the words "offense" and "committed" signals
its clear intent to authorize enhanced punishment for a third
DUI offense occurring within the prescribed time period even
though the second DUI offense has not resulted in a conviction
before the third offense is committed.
The contrary interpretation advanced by Williams would
permit an offender to violate the statute repeatedly without
being subjected to a felony charge simply because he could not
be tried and convicted in the brief time periods separating the
several offenses. Such an interpretation would violate the
plain purpose of the statute, which is to deter this type of
criminal conduct by increasing punishment for those who
repeatedly drive under the influence of alcohol.
Our conclusion also is supported by our holding in Thomas
v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 38, 501 S.E.2d 391, in which we
examined a similar enhanced punishment provision. We were asked
to construe Code § 46.2-357(B)(3), which provides enhanced
punishment for the offense of driving after being declared an
habitual offender when the crime is "a second or subsequent such
offense." We held that the General Assembly's choice of the
word "offense" demonstrated its intent to authorize enhanced
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punishment for a second offense even though it had occurred
before the defendant had been convicted of the first offense.
256 Va. at 41-42, 501 S.E.2d at 393. Thus, in accordance with
this reasoning and with the plain meaning of Code § 18.2-270, we
hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that
Code § 18.2-270 permitted enhanced punishment for a third DUI
offense based on Williams' conduct of May 19, 2000.
For these reasons, we will affirm the Court of Appeals'
judgment.
Affirmed.
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